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*Paramésvara-jnyána-góshthi.*

---

# A DIALOGUE

OF THE

KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUPREME LORD,

IN WHICH ARE COMPARED THE CLAIMS OF

# CHRISTIANITY AND HINDUISM,

AND VARIOUS QUESTIONS OF

INDIAN RELIGION AND LITERATURE

FAIRLY DISCUSSED.

---

Il se-viant in vos, qui nesciant, quanto labore Veritas acquiritur.—*St Augustine.*  
Cum homines DEUM querunt . . . . facillime debent ignoscere errantibus in tanti investigatione  
Secreti.—*Id.*

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1856.

*141. h. 24.*



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TO  
JOHN MUIR, ESQUIRE,

LATE OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE,

THIS BOOK, PROMPTED BY HIS MUNIFICENCE,

AND AIDED BY HIS SUGGESTIONS,

IS INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR,

IN TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD AND ESTEEM.

AND IN HUMBLE HOPE OF ITS PROMOTING

FAITH IN GOD, AND GOODWILL AMONGST MEN.

CAMBRIDGE, A.D. 1847.

LAMPETER, A.D. 1856.

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# PARAMÉSWARA-JNYÁNA-GOSHTI,

&c. &c.

---

*What the Saugata Múni thinks.*

“Cependant, toute cette antique sagesse des Indiens est comme ensevelie dans une idolatrie.”—A. REMUSAT.

---

## CHAPTER I.

YOU have often asked me to give you a fuller account of the conversation which I once heard at Conjeveram between two Englishmen and some learned Hindús, who disputed about the true knowledge of the Supreme Being. I am better prepared to do so now, from having written down, as far as my memory enabled me, the longer among the speeches, with the names of the speakers opposite them; some parts, however, I have only filled up roughly; nor can I tell you precisely how the dialogue arose, since it appeared to have gone some way when I first ventured to become a silent listener. Some extraordinary circumstance must have brought together so many men remarkable, each in his particular kind. There were two natives of Great Britain, both of whom I imagine must have been priests; but one was much the more venerable of the two, and when he spoke, his language had a tone of calm authority. His name was said to be Mountain. His companion, who was called Blanche, treated him with great deference, and seemed glad to learn from him; but he himself, the younger I mean, was more skilful in arguing, and undertook the greater part of the dialogue. He seemed to agree, as far as possible, with his opponents, as if he were in search of some common ground upon which they

might meet. It happened luckily, or as I now think, by some divine ordinance, that among those who took part in the discussion were two of the wisest men who could easily be found in India. One was a *Dandi* of the Brahmanical caste, and of the greatest reputation for sanctity and learning, called Vidyáchárya. He had never in all his life done injury to anything that breathed, though some Englishman once tried to persuade him that in the water which he drank were swarms of animate beings; this however Vidyáchárya denied to be true, and said the appearance was an illusion. He had been married, and had educated his children at Benares, but was then a *Vairági*, or rather, as I think, a *Sanyási*, having entered upon that advanced stage when he practised little besides religious contemplation. In other respects he embodied more diligently in his life the observances of the religious books, with which he was well acquainted, than is now usual even among the Brahmans; and no one could either better explain the nature of his religion, or shew a brighter example of its practice. What circumstance had now brought him so far south as Conjeveram, I do not know; but possibly it may have been some mission, either of friendship or controversy, regarding the second Hindú present on this occasion. This other was a *Guru*, or teacher of great dignity, who presided over a *Matha*, or a kind of College, somewhere in the neighbourhood, containing a vast number of disciples. His name was Sadánanda, and he also enjoyed a high reputation, though rather for learning than for the devotion which was ascribed to Vidyáchárya. But you will be able to judge him by his speeches. Together with these, although I somewhat wondered to find him in their company, was a conductor of the worship of Buddha, who had come all the way from Nepaul, partly, as he said, to confer with his brethren in Ceylon about the differences in their sacred books; but partly, as I suspect, to mediate, or re-arrange, matters in some religious uneasiness of a half political kind, with a dispute about the genuineness of certain relics, which had sprung up in the island.



At any rate he had now returned to the continent, having transacted whatever may have been his business, and he was the speaker who happened first to attract my attention. He seemed to be called, if I understood aright, *Saugata Múni*. But I have forgotten to mention one other person, who occasionally took part in the dialogue. This was an European, named Wolff, but not an Englishman, though he had been employed by your Government to make some inquiry into the causes of the cholera. He was therefore, I suppose, a physician, and was certainly a very ingenious and observant person; but withal somewhat conceited, as I fancied, and with traces of an irritable restlessness in his manner.

But the speaker, as I said, upon my first listening, was *Saugata Múni*. It would seem that some one had charged him and other Bauddhas with being *Sarva-vainásicas*, or holding the doctrine of "total perishableness;" as if he thought that all bodies perished as soon as they were decomposed, and all life or soul, being merely a product of their organisation, flitted away. But such a doctrine he utterly disclaimed; saying, "We do indeed believe that all bodies which are objects of sensuous perception are themselves merely aggregates of atoms; and the atoms of which they are formed are constantly changing their places, some falling away and others being joined on; the bodies therefore consisting of such changeable materials, are themselves changed; and whatever is changed, we can never know to exist, except so long as it falls under our perception; so that the existence of all material objects is not unreasonably said by one of our sects (the *Vaibhásicas*) to depend only on perception." "Is that then your own opinion?" asked Blancombe. "Not exactly," replied the *Saugata*; "for I myself, being a *Sautrántica*, should rather say that objects themselves are not so much seen as their existence is inferred from the outward manifestations which strike our senses. As from seeing a tree grow we may infer a root, so from seeing a certain outside show I infer a particular arrangement of atoms to be for the time lying underneath; but when the show vanishes, I have no longer reason to believe in anything under-

lying: existence therefore changes, and objects no longer perceived ought not to be said to exist." "It is evident, then," here said Vidyáchárya, interposing, "that the result of the doctrine which has been explained is total perishableness, and Sancara had reason on his side, when, on this as on other points, he refuted the whole system of the Baudddhas. 'For that which is apprehended,' he said, 'such as a wall, a jar, or a cloth, cannot be nonexistent; nor does the existence of objects cease when the apprehension does so. Nor is it like a dream, for the condition of dreaming and waking is quite different.' According to what the Saugata has told us, an object, such as a table, would exist while a person was in the room observing it; but on his going out it would cease to exist, and again on his return recover existence. Moreover, since the Saugata believes not only all perceptible objects but our own organs of perception to consist entirely of these fluctuating atoms, it is evident that his doctrine would never allow us to be certain whether anything existed or did not exist. The whole doctrine, when tried and sifted, crumbles like a well sunk in loose sand."

"You think, then, my venerable friend," said Blancombe, "that objects around us have a real existence, independently of their being perceived?"

"We are taught," replied Vidyáchárya, "in our sacred books, as interpreted by Sancara, that at least the existence of objects is not uncertain, or brought to an entire end, because they are composed of atoms. Sancara also remarks, that the doctrine of atoms is to be utterly rejected, never having been received by any venerable person, as the Sanchya doctrine of a plastic matter has been in part by Menu and other sages."

"I should be glad," returned Blancombe, "to learn from you hereafter the mode in which Sancara refuted other Baudddha doctrines; but at present I agree with you, that we need not doubt of the external world having some kind of existence. Only it is not clear to me whether the Saugata will assent to all that you have said."

“Certainly,” said the Saugata, “I should feel a difficulty in doing so. But indeed I fear that I may not have explained what I wished to say properly; otherwise I do not understand how the Áchárya could assert that no venerable person had ever received the doctrine of atoms: for our opinion on this head does not differ very essentially from that which Canáda has rendered famous throughout India; while again his school, the Vaiséshica, is confirmed in many points by the Nyáya of Gótama. Nor indeed do I see how any one who follows perception, which is one of the two great sources of all knowledge, can deny the sensible world to be in a state of flux, with life and death constantly succeeding each other, as the composition of various bodies is altered or modified; so that growth and decay in the world are like the flow and ebb of a tide in the ocean of life. Some indeed may dispute how far these things proceed in their own natural order, or require an external guidance (though the signs of a guide are at least nowhere apparent); and Canáda, either from want of subtilty or from deference to others, conceded that some forms and arrangements of atoms were eternal; we, however, find no existing body which is not capable of being decomposed, as its parts are capable of being moulded again into a fresh form of life; neither can we trace any discernible limit to this process. Nothing therefore prevents us from saying that existence changes, and bodies come to an end. But this saying does not mean either that the minute particles, or atoms, out of which bodies are composed, themselves perish, or again that the vast whole in which these things revolve, like bubbles in an ocean, is in any danger of being dried up, and becoming dead.”

BLAN. “We all, I may probably venture to say, feel much obliged to you for thus explaining your doctrine; but permit me to ask, if it does not imply nothing but material nature to be eternal. Existence, you appear to say, depends only on an aggregation of particles, and each of its forms, when decomposed, loses its identity, or ceases to be; though the atoms themselves

may be cast into another shape. The followers then of your religion would seem to be, as our venerable Hindú friend evidently thinks, *Násticas*, or disowners of any spiritual existence beyond the present."

SAUG. "You must pardon me if I disclaim entirely the account you would give of us. Such a description would belong more properly to the *Chárvácas*. They are materialists, and some of them believe that the *púrusha* or person of a man is merely his body; others say that the soul is only the animal life; or perhaps, with rather more subtlety, that it is the result of the bodily organs of sensation; or again, that it should be called the faculty of thought, but considered to have been engendered by the blending of different physical substances, just as spirit is produced by the fermenting of simpler liquors. But all such statements are merely different expressions of materialism: whereas the *Upásacas*, or worshippers of Buddha, diverge so entirely from such a doctrine, that one considerable division of us, the *Yógácháras*, look upon all appearances of material things as utterly untrustworthy, and maintain that our internal sensation, or intelligence, is the only real being the eternity of which may be affirmed. Instead therefore of being materialists, they might rather be called spiritualists, or at least, believers in intelligence alone, and not in matter." "But pray," asked Blancombe, "how do they arrive at such a belief?" "Partly," answered the Saugata, "by following out the train of thought already explained, about the fluctuation of external life somewhat farther than is necessary. They remark that all the signs which we observe of external things are not the things themselves, but either the composite result of simpler parts, or coverings which like garments conceal the real body from us, or else inherent characteristics, and as it were belongings, just as it belongs to sunshine to be bright, or to water to be cool and soft. But now the bark of a tree, or the skin of a man, give but an imperfect notion of what the body is beneath; and when you have penetrated to the body, you find it in one case consist of sap and fibre and

such things, and in the other of bone and flesh ; but all of these parts are again made up of simpler elements, and those of simpler still ; and when you have divided down to the smallest divisible atoms, you have entirely got rid of the body of the man or the tree which you were inquiring about ; for only the minutest chemical particles remain ; but of these particles again you feel only that they are hard, or sharp, or round, or whatever they may be in character ; but what they are in essential being, or whether they have any being in themselves, is as much a secret to you as in the case of the original body, the being of which escaped from your feeling for it while it was in your hands." "All that," said Blancombe, "cannot be denied ; but although it turns out that we see things in their properties or their inherent characteristics, rather than in themselves, does it not still follow that there remains something behind, too subtle, perhaps, for us to apprehend, but still which we must infer to exist, and therefore know to be real. You remember what you said of the root of the tree." "Yes," answered the Saugata, "that is the belief as to the reality of matter which I rather prefer ; but then the Yógácháras go on to observe, that this reality, so far as it is real, being known only by mental inference, is only a matter of belief, and therefore a creation of the mind. It therefore, after all, depends upon intelligence, which is the only thing of the being of which we are well assured. Moreover, in another sense, the same persons assert (and here, strange as it may sound, I should not wonder if the wise Sadánanda were partly to agree with them,) the cause of the external world may be said to be ignorance. So long as we could trace the composition of various bodies, either of trees or men, we were in no danger of supposing them to have any real existence apart from the elements of which they consisted, which were very different from the appearance ; but when we had penetrated to the least traceable particles, our ignorance of what might or might not lie underneath or behind, started up in the form of knowledge, and said, Here you have the original forms of matter.



Ignorance therefore creates matter, at the moment when we seemed to have discovered its non-existence."

"I was not sorry," remarked Blancombe, "to hear you say that our knowledge of the material world rests after all upon mental belief, or at least you said what amounted to something of the kind; only it is not clear to me how this doctrine of the Yógácháras, which you have been now expounding, differs from that of the total perishableness, which you did not like to be charged with." "Rather," said Vidyáchárya, "it is clear that there is no great difference; but the doctrines of Buddha make everything uncertain. Moreover, although the *Múni* here is too intelligent to maintain what had been so well refuted by Sancara, yet the doctrine of the external world having no reality, or rather even of an universal void, so that no reality can be held certain, is the original tenet of the Sútras of Buddha." "I am sorry," replied the Saugata, "that you approve as little of the doctrines of Buddha as he did of books which are by some considered venerable; but perhaps the Yógácháras would not admit that the existence of things is rendered any the less certain by being made to depend upon intelligence. Perhaps they might argue that as any man observes or infers external objects, using however mental intelligence, so when he is withdrawn, if the things continue to exist, they do so in virtue of being observed by some higher intelligence; and so, upon the man's return, he may find them as it were in the same place, so far at least as the absence of change in material forms is possible. Again, some of them might say that the ultimate reality or latent substance of matter, which we trace only by inference, does not consist in the mere parts, nor even in their arrangement, but rather in the rule which binds them, or in the thought according to which they cohere, so as to be one thing rather than another; and thus their substance will be that principle which gives form to them, and, in fact, a sort of intelligence. Some such answer as this therefore might satisfy what you objected a little time back about the table's existing after a man left the room. Although,

indeed, if it were the true doctrine of our perfect teacher Sákya, that no certain stability can be traced by reason in the fluctuating forms of life and matter, I am not able to see that it is our duty to falsify the facts of the case, in order to make perishable forms appear more certain than they really are." "Certainly not," here assented Mountain; "and indeed what you say reminds me of a Christian doctor, St Augustine, who teaches that God does not behold things because they are, but by beholding causes them to be; only I am not sure if I yet understand how far this doctrine, for which you now suggest an apology, resembles or differs from the perishableness of which we before spoke." "Only so far," replied the Saugata, "that the total perishableness then spoken of resulted from the decomposition of material forms, which we fully maintain, without on that account acknowledging that the intelligence of which we partake perishes. Now at least the doctrine which we are at present discussing is the very opposite of the materialism of the Chárvácas; nor does it at all imply that the holders of it disown a future life, or what you call another world. But again, you are perhaps aware that the Sútras of Buddha, upon which my own belief is fashioned, do not maintain either an universal void, or the unreality of the external world, quite so clearly as the venerable Áchárya supposes." "Upon that point," remarked Blancombe, "neither my friend here nor myself can presume to judge confidently, and we shall be glad to learn from you. I had, however, a notion that the terms used in the Sútras were such as seemed to point in the direction in which you are unwilling to follow them. Do they not, for example, call matter *ignorance*? and body (or substance) *appearance*? and our senses the *five roots*? while again I have some impression of having heard that they call spirit *the void*. So that, if they take away matter and body by calling them *ignorance* or *appearance*, and spirit by calling it *void*, and at the same time make the senses as it were the roots of our apprehensions, I scarcely know how they can be said not to have taken away the two things most commonly believed to

exist, namely, body and spirit, and with these, all other certainties." Here the Saugata fully acknowledged that such terms as those mentioned occur in the earliest Sūtras, and that those who follow them most literally were considered by some the earliest Bauddha sect; "But I am not sure," he continued with a gentle smile, "that the natives of Europe in general, with the exception of a few, such as those happily present, are the fittest interpreters of the wise language of our sacred books. We do indeed call body *appearance*, for which name I have already given some reasons, and we call matter *ignorance*, which is not an inappropriate name for that which is unintelligent, and even comparatively passive, as opposed to mind, which is intelligently active; and again, we call spirit *void*, because the very idea of spirit is to be unlike, and negative of, all colours and shapes such as we see or handle: by what better name therefore could it be designated than simply *void*? Whatever other name we selected would only lead the simple to confound it with outward and visible forms, whereas we judge it to be something far more mysterious, ineffable, and sacred." "You would not then, it appears, concede," asked Blancombe, "that your system is one of absolute negation, or of mystical *nihilism*, as if you loosened in turns the several foundations on which the belief of everything depends." "Certainly not," answered the Saugata, "though such a description of it, as I have heard, has been given. Whereas the Bauddha faith, so far as I am capable of judging, reposes, as all true knowledge amongst mankind must ultimately repose, upon the two foundations of perception and intelligence, external things being perceived by the senses, and internal or spiritual things inferred by reasoning. Hence I both believe in the revolution of life and external forms, on some such evidence as to yourself appeared probable, and I also seek the sanctification of my intelligence by purity and knowledge, as well as by religious worship." "May I then ask farther," continued Blancombe, "with respect to Him whom we consider both the Creator of the external world and the Giver of intelligence, do you both acknowledge and

honour him? in which case I suppose the Bauddha designation of Him must be explained on the same principle as those other terms already mentioned: or is it true, as some have said, that your religion is only a deification of the human reason, and thereby a putting of man in the place of God?" "You have asked indeed a hard question," answered the Saugata; "but assuredly we do not deify each man his own reason. On the contrary, we subject it to the necessity of practising virtue, of reverencing all life, of worshipping with pure oblations of honey or flowers, restraining the passions, forgiving injuries, doing good to all men, and especially promoting their eternal welfare, holding fast the faith, obeying the true priests, and honouring the relics of holy men. By persevering in such practices we trust finally to attain *Nirvana*, or the blessedness of a perfect calm, and freedom from the passions which attend a personality involved in the errors and obstructions of this life: but we are well aware, that by passion the intelligence may become darkened, and so entangled in the necessity of suffering, that it must undergo many transmigrations before it arrive at the blessedness of repose. Seeing then that we acknowledge the allegiance of piety and duty, and do not pretend that these are established by ourselves, it cannot fairly be said that we deify our own reason: least of all should such an account of us be given by any Christian: for many of our doctrines correspond so nearly, that whoever ridicules the one may be said to injure the other. You have sacred books or treatises upon retributive justice; so have we; you also recommend 'universal repentance,' and so do we; and if you boast of expecting 'everlasting life,' we also entertain the same expectation." "These remarks of yours," said Blancombe, "interest me highly; and I should be desirous of learning hereafter on what grounds the great expectation which you have just mentioned is entertained among yourselves; but first it occurs to me to ask, since you have spoken of worship, to what Being in particular is your worship addressed?" "Evidently," answered the Saugata, "to the supreme Buddha." "And Buddha, if

I understand aright," interposed Blancombe, "means intelligent."

SAUG. "Precisely so."

BLAN. "Well, since the Deity must be conceived to have created and disposed all things by wisdom, and since the commands which he utters to his creatures must be the expression of intelligence, I do not know that any better name need be given to Him who is properly ineffable, than the one you appear to have chosen."

SAUG. "But here, if you please, we must go gently; for although some of my friends would willingly acquiesce in even the appearance of agreement with one so much honoured as yourself, you must not suppose me to believe that the Highest of all intelligences is degraded by contact with such grovelling things as are employed in the fashioning of the world, or that his blessed calm is disturbed by anxiety about things constantly changing, and being destroyed. For, unless you think otherwise, that would appear to me an impious lowering of the Most Blessed to our imperfect conceptions; and again, there are many things daily happening, so full of passion, and darkness, and suffering, that we cannot piously make the Deity accountable for them, instead of rather laying the blame, as we ought, upon our own folly, negligence, and ignorance. As to creation, you may, if you think proper, suppose certain inferior intelligences, or *Bodhisatwas*, either stooping from the higher blessedness of the supreme Buddha, or, as I should rather say, not having yet attained to that highest tranquillity, though far above our troubled state, to have fashioned the existing form of the world, and arranged its contents in some such self-regulating order as might work like a vast machine; so at least many Bauddha philosophers have taught, and I find no fault with their mode of conceiving the theory. If, however, you ask me what is necessary, I do not see in what respect an utter blank would be better than the world as it exists, or therefore why we should suppose a blank ever to have been; nor again,

is it easy to explain, how out of nothing a complex fabric of things could ever have begun to be ; and once more, if this world had been contrived by a pure intelligence, the contrivance would probably have been more perfect, or at least not so liable to disorder from darkness and passion. So that, just as the life of each individual now begins, and, when it comes to an end, gives place by its very death to some new life in succession, in the same manner I suppose forms to have succeeded forms of life indefinitely ; but I dare not say the whole aggregate had ever a time when it was not in some phase, for fear such an assertion should be, as it appears to me, both irrational and impious." "Well," answered Blancombe, "you do right to avoid the assertion, if such is its nature ; but pray explain to us why it would be irrational ; or rather, if you please, how the opposite, which seems your own belief, escapes being irrational. For to many persons, a long string of beings in succession without beginning or end is the most inconceivable picture possible ; especially if those beings are like blind men, with little control over their own motions, and yet with no wiser hand to guide them."

SAUG. "Perhaps it is to you inconceivable, because you take your notion as it were from a river which has its source in a mountain and its outlet in the sea, or because you conceive of time as moving straightforward in a line, to which your imagination, influenced by daily experience of little things, requires that there should be ends ; yet probably you have seen a circle, which has neither beginning nor end. Now since Time is, like space, a certain medium for mentally classifying objects, there is no difficulty in classifying the forms of life which succeed each other, as arising in a circle, rather than in a line. Nay, that this is the true conception, may seem suggested to us by the shape of the world, which wise men say is round. Just, then, as all the nations of the earth might follow each other round, some sinking in each country, and others rising in their place, supposing that a perpetual peregrination of men were

necessary, so in the vast round of time, life may follow life, and at each date, as if on each spot of space, some overwearied may sink down, and others rejoicing in fresh birth rise into their place in the ranks; so that neither beginning need have been imagined, nor termination be apprehended. Nor here should that image of the river, which seemed in your favour, be left without a closer examination; for it appears, no doubt, as if the river had a beginning and an ending; but to those who investigate such things more closely, it becomes manifest that the moisture from the sea is drawn up by the power of the heavenly heat into the clouds, and from thence dispersed upon the mountains, which in turn pour it down in the form of a river along the thirsty plains. So that here too there is neither beginning nor end, although possibly if the drops were as easily deluded as mankind, they might dispute, as they rolled along, which was the more dignified of the number, or which should live the longest, fancying that they had begun to exist when they entered on the river's channel; or again, not knowing that the individuality of each may be decomposed, and the parts severed as they are re-cast into new combinations of particles. Or again, with equal wisdom they might dispute what was life and what death, or which ought to be called the cause, whether the river of the ocean, or the ocean of the dew, and so on."

BLAN. "Your answer shews so much as this, that there are circles now existing, which no one denies; but that these circles can have been from eternity is quite a different supposition; and perhaps indeed both those larger cycles of life and decay, and these smaller revolutions of water by which you illustrate the others, both bear in themselves unmistakeable traces of being in their whole circumference effects, and of its being impossible for them to contain in themselves alike cause and effect. For example, I should myself say that the revolutions of dew and river and tide were so framed as to testify both the wisdom and beneficence of some higher being by whom they have been arranged; or again, I might remark that explorers of



the earth have discovered clear proofs of life, in its most extended career, having proceeded from a beginning in a line, rather than of its revolving in an infinite circle. Since however these things constitute in themselves an abstruse study, and I am at present rather learning from you your opinions, we will dismiss that particular point, only remarking that, if we find hereafter, or if any other persons should find clear signs of a beginning of life, that discovery will alone sweep away a considerable portion of your theory. But at present please rather to explain by what sort of operation, if not agency, you suppose this wonderful ocean, as you call it, of life to ebb and flow, or the myriad forms of existence to succeed each other. For I suppose you do not deny that a certain order may be observed, so that all things take place, in fact, as if some mind were governing them."

SAUG. "I neither deny on the one hand, that there is a certain appearance of order, nor, on the other hand, have I discovered it to be so perfect that I should say it was constantly watched, or even that it had been originally arranged, by any very perfect intelligence. At least it appears to be more pious to conceive of the highest and most adorable Buddha as neither vexed by the anxiety which must pain one deeply interested in what goes on in this fluctuating scene of change, nor yet responsible for the misery, such as the mutual destruction and cannibalism which exist among living creatures, and which, according to some venerable persons, from whose doctrine, however, I shrink, must be ascribed to the Creator. But how it arises, that things in the mass and in the rough proceed in something like order, just as stones roll down a hill, rather than upwards, I consider myself happily excused from explaining; since we have among us the justly celebrated Sadánanda, who as a master of the Sankhya philosophy will explain everything, on nearly the same principles as myself, but with far greater sagacity; while, as a professor of the Hindú religion he may perhaps be listened to with greater acquiescence by the venerable *Āchārya*."



Here then we all turned to Sadánanda ; but he began gravely to decline the compliments offered him, as well as the task of explaining. “ Rather,” he said, “ it belongs to the *Múni* to complete the exposition of his own system ; especially since he has admitted his own habit of relying only on two sources of knowledge, namely, perception and reflexion ; whereas we include also a third, namely, the tradition of revelation, or holy writ ; so that confusion might arise if we attempted to blend together systems of discordant principles. Let the *Múni* therefore proceed with the same clearness which he has displayed hitherto.” Upon this, Blancombe, turning to the *Saugata*, asked, “ How is it that you now appeal to Sadánanda here for confirmation, whereas some time ago I understood you to fraternise rather with Canáda, the master of the atomic school, and Gótama, the Hindú logician ?” “ Why,” replied the *Saugata*, “ it is not wonderful that our system, being the truth, should have affinities upon different sides. For example, as regards the aggregation of atoms, we do, as already explained, approach to an agreement with Canáda. So again in our methods of discriminating truth from falsehood, we do not shrink from the distinctions of Gótama. We have no objection to say, there are six *padárthas*, that is, categories, or descriptive heads, under which all things may be reduced ; for all things may be described as coming either under substance, or quality, or action, or participation, or individuality, or association. But moreover all substances have some kind of inherent qualities, as things are either heavy or light, sweet or bitter. What we especially agree in, then, with the Sankhya philosophers, is this belief, that all substances act according to their qualities, and not against them ; and this quality, being also a tendency, is the reason of their so acting ; so that really the effect of every action or result is already contained in its cause ; for otherwise it could not be superadded by any external maker. You would not yourself say, that a spinster makes woollen yarn out of sand, but out of a fleece ; nor could a sculptor carve his statue except out of a block, which

already contained its capability. So the wise Sadánanda here could tell us out of the treatises of his school, that oil is in the seed of sesamum before it is extracted; and milk, not water, must be taken to make curds. Just as any one seeing an earthen jar, would infer that a lump of clay had previously existed, or from a golden coronet would infer the virgin gold, or even on seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, imagine his parents or teachers to be of a sacerdotal tribe; so, in all cases, if we look forward, we find materials must be selected which have in them a quality or aptitude for the purpose, and if we look backward, we must infer the cause to have contained already the effect; for *the nature of cause and effect is the same*.

“ You now therefore probably begin to understand, how certain aggregations of atoms, being once constituted, have a quality or a tendency in themselves, the heavy ones to fall lower, and the lighter ones to mount upward; and seeds, being once developed from earth, and moistened by water, and animated by air, and warmed by fire, tend to germinate, and the germs to branch out, and the branches to bear flowers, and the flowers to become fruit. Yet, in all such processes, no intelligent man will say that the germ and flower are conscious in themselves of their own destination, if even of their being; nor, again, do we perceive any interference from any external hand with their going on. Whether, indeed, you look at the immediate cause, which is the seed, or at the concurrent occasions which are the earth and so on, you in neither case detect a plan of forethought, such as you wish me to ascribe to your Creator. Again, if, upon the the same principle, you examined the human frame, you would find the same elements of earth, water, fire, and air, contributing each something to its parts, and each in turn acting upon their aggregate, so that sensation (*védaná*), and longing (*trishná*), produce effort (*upádána*), and effort produces merit or demerit, (*dharma* and *adharma*), and either of these has a consequence of reward or punishment; while along with them all runs intelligence, through which we observe what exists, and are alone

assured of its existence. While men follow true intelligence of things, as they really are or rather are changed, they tend upward like air and light; but if they follow passion, which comes of ignorance, they both bring misery through sin upon themselves, and beget in turn a race of children destined to go through the same cycle of delusion. You see then, how no external interference with the course of the world is necessary in order to give things what you observed was a certain appearance of order. For all things act according to their qualities, while they possess them; but the substance being changed, the quality changes, and life changes into death, or death into life, or either of them leads on to *Nirvana*, or else to renewed transmigration."

BLAN. "Perhaps I hardly understand the nature of your argument; though many difficulties occur to me; partly, for instance, in the shape of a doubt about what you call *causes*, whether they are not more properly *sources*, and whether our tracing of a particular source gives us any real clue to a general or original cause; and partly also about those qualities which you speak of, whether they are not merely attributed by your imagination, and so are figures of speech; or, again, if those qualities are real existences, how they became inherent, or who fixed the law of succession, whether progress or revolution, by which they guide, or, at least, the things to which you attribute them are guided; while concurrently with this last doubt, or as a part of it, comes in my old difficulty about a beginning; and that I can scarcely ask you to explain, because to you it appears a difficulty which need not even be raised."

SAUG. "Certainly I must abide by what has been said about not ascribing to the whole ocean of existence a beginning; for, if there ever had been a time when the entire whole was a blank, neither then (as Sadánanda will demonstrate to you) could anything but a blank have begun to be. Moreover, such a supposition would make even the Supreme Intelligence, *Adi Buddha*, himself unnecessary. For, if there was no world, why

should we any longer suppose any Deity to be? So that, although I have heard some Europeans call us Bauddhas atheists, which it seems is an ugly appellation with you, in my judgment, the true atheists are those who say the vast order of things and events ever began to be, or had a time when it was not, instead of rather, as is the reality, always being, and always becoming."

BLAN. "Pray pardon me, if I have seemed for a moment, by mistake, to imitate those unwise persons who put all their arguments in the shape of reproaches. Such was not even for an instant my intention; yet let me acknowledge that I don't quite understand how the benefit of this last argument belongs to you; for you imply that the existence of the world is the reason from which we infer a Deity, which is a just inference with us who make the Deity the Creator; but since you deny Him apparently any share, or at least any active and operative share, in creation or control, I feel a difficulty in seeing the sort of connexion which you imply between the eternity of the world and of the Supreme Intelligence."

SAUG. "Well, we have never denied that the whole subject is, from its vastness, one of difficulty; but you allow, I suppose, that man in general has intelligence."

BLAN. "Certainly."

SAUG. "And you infer the real existence of what you call a mind from seeing a human body in full life."

BLAN. "Exactly so."

SAUG. "But yet you allow that some of the operations of the body, dependent on health or disease, go on pretty much mechanically, or with little aid from the mere volition of the mind."

BLAN. "Partly I allow that."

SAUG. "Well, then, partly you will comprehend how, in allowing the world to exist, I also admit the existence of the Highest Intelligence; but to say, that this Supreme Being is cumbered about the ordinary processes of the world, would be like saying that the wisest or holiest of men has no better

employment than making his hair or his nails grow, all which sort of things proceed naturally, neither needing his aid, nor perhaps being much benefited by it. Our full conviction therefore that this universal frame has what, if you please, you may call a soul, or a Deity, or any other name, but which we have learnt to call the Supreme Intelligence ; and, again, our belief in numerous other beings, some nearer and some farther from the highest and most serenely blessed, are neither absurd, nor yet imply any necessity of troubling what is highest with the care of what is lowest."

BLAN. " Perhaps I might remark, in passing, that the case of this universal frame and its Highest Intelligence, as you put it, differs from that of our body and our soul, inasmuch as whatever care our body may need, independent of our exertions, may, it is conceivable, be supplied by the forethought of a higher or external Being ; whereas the world must be either cared for by its Highest Ruler, or not at all ; or again I might argue, that because some of the lesser processes of our animal constitution go on without much aid from our mind, it does not at all follow, and it is an illegitimate extension of the facts of the case to suppose, that the mind has no share in guiding, controlling, and even preserving the body ; for surely we might find, even in this instance, the lower does not exist without the supervision of the higher ; but it is more interesting for me at present to ask, if the supreme Buddha be so tranquil as you conceive, not to call it what my countrymen in general would, so inert, why do you offer worship ? wherefore all your temples, and priests, and prayers, as well as your own anxiety, which I have observed is very great, not to act in any way against what you conceive to be piety, either in injuring animal life or otherwise ? For piety, I suppose, means conformity with the will of Buddha, does it not ? or, at least, your prayers seem to imply a belief in some Being capable of answering them, and of whom you imagine that he may grant your petitions."

SAUG. " Evidently it is not to be supposed that the

Supreme Intelligence can will what is wrong, for then He would not be intelligent; though neither do I see why we should encumber Him with much volition, supposing, as we believe, that to see clearly all things, as it were with a mental eye, is in itself the highest happiness; but although the Deity neither wants anything, nor therefore should be said to wish anything, it is clear that mankind become happier in proportion as they draw nearer to what is most perfect. Now I suppose you will not deny that prayer is an instrument by which man is exalted and improved, his intelligence raised, and his passions calmed; so that by devotion we may draw ourselves nearer to that which is in itself immovable."

BLAN. "Certainly; we may walk, for example, towards a city, yet no man in doing so utters exclamations to the city to come nearer him, for he conceives of the motion as a thing depending upon himself; whereas in prayer we ask for something which depends upon another; and, except for this mode of thinking, I imagine men in general would scarcely pray at all."

SAUG. "Have I not, then, heard that your own great Teacher told you that your Heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of, as if it did not much concern the Supreme to hear from us a list of our desires, and yet he commanded you, I believe, to pray?"

BLAN. "That means, that we are not to use pompous declamations, as if a true prayer to God was to be cast in the same mould as an harangue to men; but it still leaves asking as a condition of our receiving, though not as a means of our Heavenly Father's learning."

SAUG. "If you please, I am willing to allow that the distinction which you draw is correct, or, at least, intelligible; but still it is our belief that prayer is a part of virtue; and, although we attach little value to devotional ceremonies, when put in the balance against doing good actions, we should still think it an unpropitious beginning for a teacher of religion to use arguments against prayer."

BLAN. "Such, pray believe me, was far from my intention; only it occurred to me that devotions, if they are undertaken rather as the means of self-improvement than in the hope of obtaining any petition from a higher power, might, in our language, be called not so much prayers as aspirations."

SAUG. "What is the difference?"

BLAN. "Something of this kind. Prayers are, as it were, from a child to his father, asking for something. Aspirations are rather a lifting of the affections, as of a man gazing on some beautiful object, or rising in conception to some sublime idea, either of which he endeavours, as it were, to draw himself nearer to."

SAUG. "Perhaps I understand."

BLAN. "But it is also part of my distinction, that prayer to the highest of all Beings would most naturally be addressed by those who fancy they have some positive reason for knowing it will be favourably received, and be of some service to them in bringing down an assistance from above, as the light and rain come upon flowers; whereas aspiration will be rather the mental posture of those who by reasoning or inference have conjectured some higher intelligence to exist, but are either not persuaded of his hearing prayer, or deny his active government of the world. This, then, I would gladly ask further of you."

SAUG. "What do you mean?"

BLAN. "What is your ground of belief that one kind of religious worship is better than another, or upon what is that expectation built, which you profess to entertain, of arriving by a certain course of conduct at *Nirvana*?"

SAUG. "Our expectation is part of the faith taught us by the last Buddha, and our worship is also shaped according to his directions, or those of the saints who have followed in his footsteps."

BLAN. "In saying the last Buddha, you denote that others had preceded him?"

SAUG. "Certainly."

BLAN. "Then, I suppose, they are not all supreme?"

SAUG. "They all enjoy the title of supreme, in token of their having attained the supreme perfection of intelligence."

BLAN. "Am I to understand, by their having attained, that there was a period when they were in some lower state, and, perhaps, one of humanity like our own?"

SAUG. "Exactly so. The twenty-four Buddhas had all lived as men, and, in turns, acting either singly or with each other, they regenerated the world from the effects of ignorance and irreligion."

BLAN. "Then is it to any of these twenty-four Buddhas that you apply the title *Adi Buddha*, or is it these persons, who formerly were mere men, that you worship?"

SAUG. "You ask rather a difficult question to answer; for it may happen that all of us may not quite agree what is the fittest answer to give. For my own part, I humbly conceive of the single Supreme, *Adi Buddha*, as above all the others, and in a manner distinct from them. Perhaps, indeed, by *Adi Buddha*, I mean most nearly what in your language you term God the Father, since of him alone I do not presume to conceive as ever having been any other than he now remains, the highest and most perfect Intelligence, and I am afraid of irreverently ascribing to him any unworthy office; whereas, both the twenty-four Buddhas already mentioned, and also Gótama, the last, as well as the numbers numberless whom I need not mention, have lived in the form of men not only once, but for numerous lives, until by vanquishing sin they escaped the necessity of being born again. With this highest Being, or Father of all intelligences, I ever associate *Dharma*, the law which comes forth from him, and *Sanga*, the Union, or Bond of Fellowship, in which all the saints are bound to Buddha and to each other. These, then, make up the three blessed ones. Nor do I myself see any use in a distinction, which is often practically drawn in Nepaul, between the more glorious deliverers, who are considered emanations of the highest Deity, and other saints who



have acquired blessedness by striving and aspiring. For since *Adi Buddha* is highest, and best, and alone originative of good, he is the fittest object of prayer; but since he is the source of all intelligence, so in worshipping it anywhere I really worship him; and those who rise to partake of this perfection can only do so by being essentially akin to it. There are, however, among the professors of our religion, persons, with some of whom I have recently been conferring, who think somewhat differently as to the Deity."

BLAN. "That is just what I supposed; and you would confer on me one of the greatest possible favours, if you would convey to me even a faint notion of the difference between you."

SAUG. "Perhaps it is something of this kind. They believe, as I do, in the eternity of matter, or of something out of which the world goes on renewing and fashioning itself, and they also believe in intelligence, which, as long as we admit the eternity of the world, we may also conceive to be eternal. So that there is, you see, as it were, a soul and a body; only that by soul, perhaps, we mean something different from what you would. Now the persons, about whose opinions you inquire, entertain the same fear as I do, of ascribing to that Highest Intelligence any of the accidents which encumber the minds of ordinary men. They go, however, somewhat farther; and not only separate it from passion, or terror, or anxiety, but even from volition; (lest, I suppose, wishing should seem to imply wanting, or to disturb seeing;) and therewith, in a way, disengage it from all which you, perhaps, would call personality. It remains mere and pure intelligence, just as matter is mere ignorance. Now that which is thus pure, abstract, and spiritual, cannot be conceived by the impure and selfish, or even by those who are blinded in the conception of their having life in themselves, endeavouring to hold fast a perishing individuality, instead of knowing themselves parts in the great whole which has one life throughout; but, on the other hand, the perfectly sanctified, who have vanquished sins, and obtained power by prayer, may become par-

takers at length even of that most spiritual intelligence. They, then, as we say, obtain Buddhahood, or become themselves Buddhas; and, since nothing can be more perfect than the intelligence and the tranquillity of which they are alike partakers, there seems to many of us no necessity, even if it be possible, to suppose anything higher."

BLAN. "Your friends, then, appear to have no difficulty in conceiving of many persons as united, in a way, in one Supreme Intelligence?"

SAUG. "Neither should I, so far, provided that our idea of this Supreme is not encumbered by any attributes of passion and volition, taken from what we observe in mankind."

BLAN. "Then, I suppose, it is either to some of these Buddhas, or to the Intelligence of which they all partake, that the friends of whom you have been speaking direct either their prayers or their aspirations?"

SAUG. "Exactly so; but chiefly to the last of all, the Saviour, Sákya, who, by the establishment of our faith, as we now hold it, regenerated the world, and delivered mankind from the miseries of sin."

BLAN. "Then, again, they see nothing wrong in praying to one who was formerly a man?"

SAUG. "Certainly not, any more than would the most venerable teachers among the Hindus; for they many of them believe that their deities have been incarnate, though not with such good reason as we believe Sákya to have become divine and omniscient."

BLAN. "But did I not understand that you prayed yourself to the supreme Buddha, which seemed to me at the time to mean *Adi Buddha*?"

SAUG. "Neither do I say that you understood wrongly; though, indeed, it appears of little importance; for though the highest Being, who never was subject to the necessity of birth, may seem the fittest hearer of prayer, yet Sákya, as the venerable Tathágata, who has entirely gone beyond any such necessity,

and who partakes now a certain divine omniscience, is no less worthy of honour; and as it would be impious in me to disparage either his faith or his holy relics, so neither do I refuse to invoke him with prayer. In fact, he may stand to me as the representative of pure Intelligence, which in itself, however, may be the thing properly worshipped; but the Saviour having escaped from the accidents of human personality may be identified with that truest Being."

BLAN. "Here then is another question which I much wish to ask. Is this religion of yours to be considered on the whole as a revelation, or as a discovery?"

SAUG. "Perhaps you will explain to me the nature of the distinction."

BLAN. "By a revelation we mean generally a self-uncovering, as it were, on the part of the Deity, as if by drawing aside a veil of mystery He disclosed to us things which otherwise we should not have known. Whereas a discovery in religion would be rather an advance of the human mind, either by the discipline of its own faculties or by a larger survey of regions hitherto unexplored, to some higher truth. Now I rather suppose that the first of these processes can only be expected by those who ascribe to the Deity, whether rightly or wrongly, agencies of a more personal and more active kind than you are inclined to place among the divine attributes; so that the distinction, again, in this instance, will come to nearly the same as in the case of aspiration and of prayer. It is only, indeed, with some belief in a revelation that we in Europe generally associate the term *religion*; though we do not deny that much natural piety may exist without such a belief; but then we should call any opinion respecting the Deity in this case a philosophy rather than a religion. What I wish to inquire of you then is, whether Sákya professed to have a revelation, or whether he discovered by his own sagacity or merit the doctrines which he taught."

SAUG. "Why it follows, as you have correctly inferred, from our conception of the Supreme Intelligence, that we do not

assert a revelation in the sense you have defined ; but it must not therefore be fancied that the religion of Sákya is either less true, or comes to us with less authority."

BLAN. " Perhaps not, if he had attained, as you appear to say, a sort of divine omniscience. Only we should require some extraordinary guarantee to assure us of such an attainment."

SAUG. " We wish no stronger guarantee than the pure life of Sákya in all its circumstances. First we have his self-denial, though he was a king's son, in leaving wife and palace and pomp, in order to become a teacher of mankind. Then come his tremendous austerities and his patient prayers, by which he both obtained power over nature, and forced even the Brahmans, whose scholar he had been, though he was only a Cshatriya, to do him reverence. Then again we read of the many wonderful miracles which he wrought, and of the thousands to whom he gave sanctification by teaching them the true faith. Such a personal career is alone sufficient guarantee of a teacher's sacred character. If we turn to the doctrine which Sákya taught, we find it eminently pure, and conducive to the happiness of mankind. He protested against the insolence of allowing men no escape from their hereditary castes, and declared the way of salvation open to the Mlechcha and the Chándála, no less than to the Brahman. The virtues, which he declared to be the six highest perfections, were bountifulness, righteousness, knowledge, activity, patience, and mercy ; virtues, which, if you consider them severally, you will find to contain every essential of human excellence. Nor ought the wonderful success of Sákya's preaching and the extension of his doctrine to be overlooked. Even in his lifetime he converted vast multitudes of disciples ; and now the most populous nations, comprehending, as I have heard, a larger portion of the human race than follow any other religion, are believers in his name. Not that such a success would be an argument, if it had been attained by mere violence of conquest, as when Sultan Mahmud, or other Mahometans, spread their faith with the sword ; but it is well known, both how Sákya

used no other weapons than simple preaching and miracles, and how the kings who first embraced his religion, such as the famous Asoca, practised the mildest maxims of toleration. No other reasons, then, can be given for the rapid progress of Buddhism, than the force of sacred truth, the divine character of Sákya himself, and the tendency of his religion to promote the happiness of mankind."

BLAN. "Those, then, it appears, are the sort of things which you consider just evidences of the truth of a religion."

SAUG. "Decidedly; and we happily have abundance of them."

BLAN. "Many of them, I own, are clear indications of goodness; but it would be a considerable step farther to say that whatever proves a man good, proves him also to be a trustworthy teacher of all that falls within the compass of religion. For, whether the opinions which you have been explaining, about the being of the world, and the probability or certainty of a Deity, and the expectation of endless bliss, are held most correctly by you or by others, you at least observe that they relate to matters far removed from our daily experience; and therefore doubts of this kind may arise: if there be a state of happiness in another world, can any one either describe it to us or shew us the way there, who has not himself come from thence; or whether the deepest guesses of the wisest men may not be as far from the reality as the dreams of an infant: and again, taking only the possibility of there being a Supreme Being somewhat more energetic than you conceive, whether any but Himself can teach us His will so distinctly as to save us from all danger of being like servants who run on their master's errand without having heard his orders; so that, on the whole, we rather require in a teacher of religion some credentials different from those which might justify us in trusting ourselves to the hands of a physician or a lawyer."

SAUG. "But do not you, then, allow miracles to be credentials sufficient even for a teacher of a new religion?"

BLAN. "You mean by miracles works greater than any human being ordinarily can perform, and somewhat out of the common processes of nature, so as to raise a probability of some higher power being concerned in them than either Nature or Man?"

SAUG. "That description will suit my meaning tolerably well."

BLAN. "But then of course it occurs to you that such things are rare, and must continue to be rare, or else they would no longer deserve the description which we have given of them."

SAUG. "Perhaps so."

BLAN. "But have you quite determined in your own mind that for miracles to be rare, unusual, and not of every-day occurrence, is quite essential to their definition?"

SAUG. "If you please, I have no objection; though it would appear to me difficult to prove that divine teaching ought to be rare, rather than frequent."

BLAN. "Then I am afraid this point about miracles being rare is one to which we ought to return hereafter. But it surprises me the more that you should not think so, because your conception of the Deity represents Him as less concerned in the affairs of this lower world than other wise men have believed. Upon your system, then, I should have imagined miracles ought to be rarer than they need be upon ours, since we believe that the Almighty cares for mankind."

SAUG. "But then are you not forgetting that I have all along admitted the existence of intelligence, as a thing superior to brute matter; and it is clear that both Sákya and all others among the supreme Buddhas, as also the Bodisatwas, or whatever other beings of kindred perfection may exist, undoubtedly partake of high degrees of intelligence; it is, therefore, nothing incredible, if, in their indefatigable struggles upward, they have severally mastered the lower power of existing things, just as you would admit that thought controls matter—least of all

should this be doubted, when the most perfect teachers have by their tremendous austerities given abundant proof of their triumph over whatever meaner things obstruct the fulness of our intelligence."

BLAN. "What you now say enables me to understand rather better both what you mean by miracles, and in what sense your religion generally ought to be considered either a revelation or a philosophy. It does not seem to be a self-uncovering of a power above, and distinct from nature; so that it is not a revelation in our sense; nor, again, is it a mere discovery by one supposed not to partake at least a sort of kindred to the Highest Intelligence; but it is a sort of up-growth or development of that intelligent principle which you conceive to reside in the world of nature, until, purifying itself as it rises, and approaching nearer to that perfection to which it is essentially akin, it both acquires freedom for itself, and also power, either over the lower world, or to instruct mankind. Some such development of intelligence you appear to conceive was embodied in Sákya. But now, I suppose, you believe that in proportion to the great excellence of Sákya as a teacher, his works also were wonderful?"

SAUG. "Certainly, I do."

BLAN. "Well then, in exact proportion as anything is wonderful, it may also be considered less likely to happen, or at least to require more distinct and ample testimony. No one, for instance, wonders either at the daily recurrence of sunrise, or of the ocean tides, or of any other of the great and normal revolutions of nature; and therefore no one requires proof of any one of them having occurred. Whereas an eclipse, or an earthquake, which are somewhat rarer, though still in the natural order of things, we require to be informed of by some one well conversant with such matters, before we expect either of them to happen; and as for the monsoons, which blow here, having their course altogether inverted, or as to men moving through the air upon burning carpets, it would require many testimonies from persons

not easily mistaken, in order to convince us of such things having happened. You observe, I am not in the least arguing that any such things are impossible; but all that argument of your own, about things acting according to their properties, comes in here sufficiently for me to remind you of it; for if you saw a person making yarn without wool, or oil without sesamum seed for him to extract it from, you would consider it so rare as almost to distrust your own senses; much more then, if other persons reported it, you would suspect some mistake to exist somewhere; and so generally we shall find, in proportion as any thing is marvellous and out of the way, the more intelligent part of mankind would require clearer and more ample evidence of it. Pray, should not you think so?" continued Blancombe, here turning to Sadánanda. "For my part, I certainly should," he replied. "Then we see," resumed Blancombe, "that not only as regards the miracles of Sákya, but all miracles asserted everywhere, there is need to cross-examine our witnesses sharply, and inquire not only into their sincerity, but into their opportunities of observation, and their clearness of judgment. Perhaps, indeed, if we were discussing miracles which appealed to the whole world, we should desire them to have happened among a people of no credulous turn, but inquisitive and apt to test occurrences by the strictest methods. There is scarcely an art in the schools of Hindú dialecticians, Gótama and the rest, which in such a case must not admit of being resorted to. Hence not only the country, but the genius of the people, and the period of its history, and the predisposition of mind on part of the witnesses, should all be taken into account; and if the tradition of the miracles has been handed down for many generations, one would ask many questions as to the books in which it is preserved, and the persons in whose custody the books have been, and the authors to whom they are ascribed, and not least, as to the witnesses by whom that authorship is asserted, and the number of years which may have elapsed between that assertion and the lifetime of the supposed authors, or the probability of their



overhearing it. I do not here enlarge upon considerations of moral fitness, though it is obvious to persons of any gravity that amongst things wonderful those are most worthy of being received as credentials of a religious teacher, which are least capable of being called by any one either childish, or useless, or maleficent; only, as you have mentioned the miracles of Sákya, I was willing to learn from you incidentally, how far your system takes into account the necessity of greater evidence for a thing in exact proportion as it is extraordinary."

SAUG. "What you say has a very reasonable sound, but it does not apply in such a way as to throw the slightest discredit upon the miracles of Sákya, which are handed down in our Holy Scriptures."

BLAN. "But when were those Scriptures written?"

SAUG. "Perhaps the different books at different times; the earliest Sútras for instance by the immediate followers of Sákya, such as Anánda; and the *Abhidharma* containing our philosophy, having been arranged at the first great council in the year when the luminary of the world was extinguished. But since the three *Pitakas* consist of different books, to which may be added the *Atthakatha* or commentaries on them, it is not unnaturally a matter of discussion among ourselves as to what date, or by whom, particular portions were written."

BLAN. "Of what age may we venture to say the *Mahá-wansa* should be considered?"

SAUG. "You mean the genealogies and histories of Ceylon?"

BLAN. "Exactly."

SAUG. "According to the Cingalese, with whom I have recently been conversing, they were written about four hundred years after the death of the comforter of the world."

BLAN. "It is in those books, I think, written about four hundred years after the death of Sákya, that we read of his flying through the air, of his astonishing the Yakkas with storms, and of various miracles being performed by his relics; we also, I think, read of a princess being married to a lion, and of

various beings, half serpents, and half something higher, all of which Sadánanda here would say partook somewhat of the marvellous. Supposing then it should turn out that these sort of stories abound more in writings farther removed from the time of Sákya, while in the Sútras which can with more confidence be traced to his immediate successors, such as *Ánanda*, these stories appear less, but we find in their stead traces of your great teacher's wisdom and virtue, would that circumstance make such stories appear to you rather less certain, or less necessarily credible?"

SAUG. "I do not see that it would; for all our Scriptures were written before the age of *inspiration* had ceased. So long as inspiration lasted, it was less necessary that accounts should be written minutely; but when it was about to cease, though its influence was still felt, our Scriptures were written for the affliction of righteous men, if they compared the degeneracy of their own times, and their delight, if they looked back on what had preceded."

BLAN. "Then I see, the whole question of inspiration ought to be considered by us. But pray how is it that you talk of Holy Scripture and inspiration, when it is generally imagined that Sákya was rather what we should call a sceptic, or a devout rationalist, throwing doubt upon the sacred books of his race, and professing to have secured the highest knowledge by the light of his own intelligence?"

"That is a question," here Vidyáchárya mildly interposed, "which it rather pleases me to hear asked; for indeed the inconsistency both of Sákya and of his followers has always appeared to me wonderful. He made light of our sacred books, rejected sacrifices, and calumniated the Brahmans, teaching men to overthrow all venerable distinctions, and permitting the Sudra, or even the Chándála, to boast himself against the wise and the honourable, so that both the natural and consecrated order of society was overthrown by him; and not only this, but the justice of the Divinity was blasphemed, since those distinctions in life,

which are in fact the due requital of whatever we have done in some former existence, were suffered to be lightly evaded, as indeed you have heard the Saugata here boasting; yet after all, this man, whom the Vishnu Purana justly calls the great Illusion, pretended to have been elevated to such a pitch, that his smile gave divine grace, and the effluence of his breath brought knowledge from heaven. Then we have heard even the reports of his discourses by his disciples spoken of as inspired, and considered as sufficient authority for any marvel. Thus, by overthrowing a rightful and sacred authority, he was only paving the way for a greater despotism. Yet I do not deny Sákya to have been very eminent in knowledge and sanctity, but it surprises me he should have taught such doctrines, that, according to Sancara, he may well be thought to have been an intentional deluder of mankind in the spirit of some *Racshasa*, rather than merely to have fallen into any human error."

SAUG. "Well, how much may be said in favour of our Vanquisher of sins, has been already in part explained; and also the sense in which his inspiration should be understood will be clear to any one who remembers how I shewed that men may become possessed of the highest and most perfect intelligence. But as for the accusation that he opposed the Brahmans, something more may be said. We read that before the conversion of King Asoca, he gave alms daily to sixty thousand Brahmans, and it cannot be doubted that in the earlier time, when the Comforter first taught the world his doctrine, the preponderance and the number of the Brahmans were equally great. Not only was it believed that men are born in particular castes on account of their merit or demerit in a former life, (which the Saviour never denied,) but they were excluded from the hope of rising to freedom through the highest knowledge. Sacrifices of blood were ordered in the books held sacred, and practised by the priests, though when the compassionate One beheld them, he 'blamed on that account the whole of the Vedas.' In the mean time men cared only for themselves or for their caste, and not

for mankind. While religious ceremonies had a great stress laid on them, good actions were little practised. Men had fallen through false conceptions into all manner of superstition, selfishness, ignorance, and sin, with all that misery which such things must entail. Sákya therefore, the indefatigable struggler, had prayed to each of the supreme Buddhas, that he too might become a Buddha, for the sake of delivering mankind from misery, and they all had foretold that he should succeed. In order to fit himself for his sacred work he studied first under the Brahmans, nor did he at any time refuse them personal respect, though he extended to every man the free option of that sanctification by the highest knowledge, which it was previously thought must belong to the upper castes only. But by extending such benefits to others, he did no injury to the Brahmans. On the contrary, many of them became his disciples, and, assuming the yellow garb of mendicants, they not only forsook the world, but went about preaching the true faith, and inviting all men to be saved by the six highest excellencies. Then came those remarkable missions which spread our faith from Magadha over a large part of India, to Ceylon in the South, to Nepal in the North, and even to Thibet and China, and a large part of the world. The virtues of King Asoca, whose inscriptions remain to this day as an evidence of the truth of our faith, are well known, and not least was his anxiety for the souls of men. In all this, however, the Brahmans were not injured; though it is true their bloody sacrifices were forbidden, and the books which enjoin them were considered on that account defiled."

BLAN. "You appear to think, then, that a certain humanity of sentiment should be expected in all books which claim to be sacred."

SAUG. "Certainly; such for instance as we have in the inspired Sûtras of Buddha. If, however, to resume my argument, Sákya from his victory over sin was called the Vanquisher, and from his benefits to mankind the Saviour, and from his complete liberation the *Tathágata*, or if again the nations in their gratitude

honour his relics with worship in which they offer incense and flowers, or even if we address prayers to one who shares the perfection of the divine intelligence, such things offer no just subject for reproach, either against his sacred memory, or against our religion in general. Whereas on the other hand, the cruelties which our saints suffered at the instigation of the fierce Cumánila, when, after conquering India by persuasion, they were driven out of it by extreme violence, were such as I even shudder to remember."

"But whatever may be said of Cumánila," here resumed Vidyáchárya, "you do not deny that Sákyá suffered himself to be considered as above our holy triad of deities, and to me I confess such presumption appears impious."

SAUG. "Well, how far it was presumptuous, must depend upon how far those whom you term deities are true or eternal; and perhaps on that point we are not agreed. Supposing then, as we hold, your deities are either creatures of the imagination, or so far as they exist, are only products of nature, and therefore destined to pass away like all other forms of the natural world, it is clear that the enlightened one, having overcome sin, and attained participation in the supreme intelligence, would have attained a superior rank. But this same rank he holds out as possible to be attained in turn by others who aspire to it through the same piety, knowledge, and excellence. It was not therefore arrogance, as you suppose, but the perfection of his knowledge which rendered the claim you allude to, on part of the Saviour, perfectly legitimate."

Here Vidyáchárya said nothing, but Blancombe resumed, "You conduct your argument in this part with as much spirit as you did with clearness in the former part; and if our venerable friend here does not reply to you, neither shall I attempt it. Only, from what you relate of Sákyá, I should augur, there must have been a great difference between his view of the sacerdotal caste, and the practice now current among you. At least I have heard, that in Ceylon the institution of caste is

now pretty rigidly observed by the professors of your faith ; and it is certain that in Thibet, and elsewhere, you have a more thoroughly organized hierarchy than now exists among the Brahmanical Hindús. Your many monasteries, your temples, your chanting, and in short your abundant ritualism, all savour of something different from the humane yet fervently devout and somewhat mystical rationalism which it seems was the character of your founder."

SAUG. "Well, it is not surprising that a religion thoroughly established should need somewhat different provisions from those which suited its commencement. Something even of human error may creep in. All those things however, to which you allude, have not come about among us at random, but were established by the wisdom of the saintly followers of the Saviour, when they assembled in various councils. There are three such councils which we especially venerate. The first already spoken of, at which the Holy Scriptures were arranged, took place in the year of the Saviour's death ; the second, in order to extinguish schisms, a hundred years later ; and the third, in which it was determined to propagate the faith by missions throughout the world, after another interval of about one hundred and eighteen years, or not much more. In such councils then our wise men made various useful regulations ; and we are far from thinking as the Áchárya here supposed, that all authority ought to be despised ; for in fact it does not follow, because the older Brahmans were blameable for using authority in order to exclude men from the truth, that therefore authority should not be obeyed, when it is used to establish and spread abroad the truth by holy men."

BLAN. "I understand. But now I begin to fear you will think me very wearisome, if not almost as great a persecutor as Cumáрила. Yet there is one, and I believe scarcely more than one question yet, with which I would venture to trespass upon your patience. You have spoken of the purity of Sákyá's doctrines, and also of missions for the sake of propagating the faith.

Pray then, how has it arisen, that you have never yet converted some of those in Ceylon, and in the parts of India nearest to it, who might appear most favourably situated for the influence of your missions to operate upon them; and again, among those who profess your faith in both those countries, how is it that practices prevail, such as probably Sákyā, as much as any man, would have condemned? Not that I here speak of personal vices, such as in the case of reckless men elude or defy the controul of even the purest faith; but I allude to forms of belief and modes of worship, which stand in the strongest contrast to the purity which you have ascribed to Sákyā. Need I tell you of the crowds who worship idols? or of the homage paid in such absorbing excess to what you consider sacred relics, as to draw away the worshipper's mind from any thought of the high and holy one, by whatever name we style him, who, as we both agree, ought to be worshipped? Or what shall I say of the devil-worshippers of Tinnevely, who (if I understand their doctrine aright) endeavour to propitiate the spirit of evil; and certainly their vicious lives, in many cases, prove they have fallen sufficiently below humanity for such a horrid kind of creed to correspond well enough with their practice? Then again, rites are spoken of in India, though, I believe, in parts which no longer fall within the range of your religious influence, in which unclean passions and the sensual vices, such as even bad men generally are ashamed of, are both practised and considered a kind of piety. But what a piety can that be, which thus arrays itself against the modesty of every pure conscience, and enters into alliance as it were with whatever is evil in man, against whatever aspiration he might raise towards the holy and the eternal? Such a kind of religion in fact is on the side of passion and of darkness against intelligence. Yet of those three things you fully admit the first and second to be evil, and the third to be good."

SAUG. "Undoubtedly we do; but of the persons you allude to, some are descendants of the old Yakkas\*, or the demon race,

\* The speaker uses here a Pali form, as quoting the *Mahāvamsa*.

who never fully received the Saviour, and we have not been able to make an impression upon their obdurate minds ; again, as to the others, the ignorance of mankind is always apt to degenerate from a pure religion, and I do not see that such degeneracy is the fault of the luminary of the world."

BLAN. "Certainly not of Him whom we should call the true luminary ; nor again is it a fault in the personal character of Sákya, whom you probably mean ; but it remains to be inquired, whether the circumstances I have alluded to may not indicate some inherent weakness in his religion. But now I am so anxious to see men happier and better, by whatever name they call themselves, that I would earnestly entreat you in the name of Sákya, if you please, to consider with me how we can enlighten the intelligence, or purify the imaginations of those miserable persons we have spoken of ; and this I promise, if your way appears the more likely, I will so far join it as to consent at least to your giving these benighted people the purest form of your faith ; whereas, if any other way should appear better, you perhaps will not refuse to follow whatever method the most perfect intelligence may point out as the best?"

SAUG. "Perhaps we will so consider it. At least I quite agree that the practice of virtue is the principal thing."

BLAN. "It appears to my own mind there are several points we so far agree in, that it is worth while attempting to come nearer each other ; especially I think we agree that whatever course the most perfect intelligence would approve, that ought to be followed. We are also agreed that bountifulness or beneficence is a virtue to be practised, and that of all gifts we could confer upon men, the gift of salvation, or the knowledge of the true faith, would be the greatest ; for certainly we should be most anxious about their souls. You have spoken also of knowledge, and I suppose knowledge implies possession of the highest truth of all ; if this then is so valuable, we should not close our eyes against any beam of it, from whatever quarter it may fall."



SAUG. "To all that I see no objection."

BLAN. "Shall we however try to sum up briefly what has been said, lest any one should have dropt as it were the thread from his hand?"

SAUG. "If you please."

BLAN. "It appears then that you distinguish the Bauddha doctrine from that of various Chárvácas or materialists; that you consider intelligence and matter as two things eternally co-existent, of which the one, being visible in its properties, leads us to infer the other, though it is not clear how far either acts upon the other. Nor again, do you object to the opinion of your friends who deny the existence of anything except internal perception or intelligence. In the same manner again, you think that a highest form of intelligence exists, answering more nearly to what we conceive of the Deity, but you do not censure those who think such a supposition unnecessary. Your own reason indeed for making it, seems to be chiefly an application of the analogy of body and soul, to the world and God; or else a perception of the fitness of giving symmetry to the various gradations of intelligence by admitting one form higher and more perfect than the rest; and not in the least any need of attributing the world to a creator; for life and death, decay and quickening, succeed each other, you imagine, in a cyclical series, which may be compared to bubbles and waves rising and falling in alternation around a ball. You are all agreed in resting your essential belief upon the last supreme Buddha, or Sákya; and he, having been once a man, became so enlightened as to share the highest intelligence, and to have authority in matters of belief, though his divinity seems a kind of growth or development rather than an original inheritance; and his doctrine, though superhuman, may more nearly be described as an aspiration than as a revelation; but on this point I found some difficulty in reconciling all that dropt from you. You conceive however of the standard both of your belief and practice as being something external to yourselves, and will not have it described as

a mere deification of any individual man's reason; and lastly, while you appeal to the authority of Sákya, you admit your religious practices in the present day to vary considerably from his doctrine. For while his life might almost seem a solemn mission against caste and sacerdotalism, its result seems to have been the establishment of a system more elaborately sacerdotal than the one against which he protested; and among many of those who are called Buddhists, as well as the neighbours who should be converted by them, the grossest idolatry and superstition prevail. But such things you would probably say were no strong argument against the original truth of your religion, supposing its evidences, and especially its miracles, to be satisfactory, and its sacred books to be written, as you believe, both in an humane spirit, and also by divine inspiration. In other respects you appear to agree with Hindús in general in the belief of the transmigration of souls, and in the endeavour to attain a certain tranquillity in a future life, as the reward of certain conduct here; and this tranquillity appears from what you said of Sákya to consist in freedom from the necessity of being born again, so that some would consider it but a negative kind of enjoyment."

SAUG. "As far as I observe, your summary is, for a brief one, tolerably correct; though as we have seen that some of our terms are misapprehended by Europeans, so perhaps I should make allowance for the inadequacy of your language to express the fulness of our sacred truth."

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#### NOTES ON CHAPTER I.

THE Bauddhas have many sects, of which the Saugatas are one. Those who wish to test the assertions of the speaker in this dialogue, may compare them with the numerous citations in Colebrooke's *Collected Works*; with Eugène Burnouf's splendid and critical *Analysis*;

with Mr Hodgson's Account of the Nepaulese Buddhists, Trans. R.A.S., Vol. II. ; with various notices in the Writings of Professor H. H. Wilson, especially in his edition of the Vishnu Purána ; with Mr Turnour's Introduction to the Cingalese Maháwansa ; with A. Rémusat's Mélanges Asiatiques, Vols. I. and V. ; and with Lassen's Indische Alterthumskunde. Some of the above books may be considered as standing references for subsequent chapters in this volume.

M. V. Cousin has somewhere described Buddhism as *un nihilisme absolu* ; and Mr Hodgson as a deification of human reason ; while Mr Turnour argues that it should be rather considered as a revelation ; and again, Lassen finds no clear intimation of a Deity, he says, in the primitive Sutras. On the whole, however, the citations in Burnouf and Turnour, with the statements of Colebrooke, and the ingenious criticism of A. Rémusat, point to some such doctrine as that of the Saugata Muni in the text. For Baudha history, Colonel (now Lieut.-General) Sykes's paper in the Royal Asiatic Society's Journal has also a real, though a controversial sort of interest. His results cannot be considered probable, but his reasons are worth reading.

## CHAPTER II.

*What the Vaishnava Sankhyast thinks.*

“The historian ... will be painfully struck by the inferiority of the ethical development to the physical and merely speculative. The [German] mind appears overpowered by the contemplation of God as Nature and as Thought. His manifestation as conscious Spirit and Will is neglected : abstract reasoning absorbs the mystery of conscience, and the feeling of reality.”—BUNSEN, *On German Thought*.

“The distinction which the Sankhya draws between the *sensuous consciousness* and the *self-consciousness*, is a proof of the very strong disposition to refer the inner development of our sensuous conception to a higher and more general force, and thereby to separate it from man’s true personality.”—RITTER, *Hist. Philosophy*.

“It appears then,” said Blancombe, now turning to Sadánanda, “that much of the doctrine which the *Múni* has been explaining finds its justification in the treatises of the Sankhya philosophy.” “With respect to some portion of it,” answered the other, “the case is so.” “Well then,” continued Blancombe, “if your treatises are older than the time of Sákya, such a circumstance may be thought somewhat to detract from his originality as a teacher ; for there will be some things which he will appear not so much to have revealed or to have discovered, as to have borrowed from others.” “Just so,” assented Sadánanda. “Well now,” resumed Blancombe, “I am curious to know whether in virtue of this speculative affinity between your philosophers on the one hand, and the followers of Sákya on the other, you consider yourselves as on the whole his allies and votaries, or whether you are still to be classed as professors of what is more properly the Hindú religion.” “Evidently,” answered Sadánanda, “the fact of Sákya’s having learnt from our treatises—which is the case, for Capila our teacher is at least of far earlier date—no more renders us Buddhists than the Brahmans themselves in general are so. For Sákya had Brahmanical teachers, some of whom he may have subsequently seduced, as the Saugata has asserted ; yet the great body retained their faith ; and in the same way our agreement or our priority

as regards Sákya in some subjects of speculation has never led us to imitate him in rejecting the authority of the Hindú Sástras, and especially of the Vedas. You have heard that the Buddhists admit only two sources of knowledge, whereas we, not thinking that the knowledge enjoyed by mankind is too great as it stands, consider it prudent to retain the third source, namely revelation, or its tradition, as embodied in the sacred books of our race."

BLAN. "In fact then you practise the rites of the Hindú religion, and worship its deities."

SAD. "Certainly, I practise the rites so far as my own weakness and the deplorable degeneracy of this Cali age will permit, and I do not intentionally omit due honour to any of the deities, but especially to Vishnu, the great preserver of all things."

BLAN. "Vishnu then, it seems, is your name for the Supreme; and pray do you associate with him also his wife either as Srí, or as Saraswatí?"

SAD. "Certainly, as the goddess of plenty, Srí, and of prosperity, Lakshmí, but hardly as the Queen of eloquence, or speech, Saraswatí; for most think that this last name belongs properly to the wife of Brahmá, nor do I quarrel with their mode of considering it."

BLAN. "But I had imagined you, perhaps erroneously, to be in some things a disciple of Rámánuja's, and he I conceive worshipped Rama."

SAD. "You say correctly, in some things, for we are not bound by his metaphysical opinions; he however considered Rama as an incarnation of Vishnu, which is also our belief."

BLAN. "You extend then the same incarnation theory to Crishna?"

SAD. "Yes, I am inclined to consider the deity Crishna as a form of Vishnu, becoming incarnate in Rama."

BLAN. "Then what am I to suppose is your belief respecting Siva and Durga, Indra and Sachí, Agni, Kartikeya,

Varuna, Yama, and all the other names which I sometimes hear spoken of with veneration?"

SAD. "You may, if you please, suppose me to conceive of them according to the pious traditions usually current among my countrymen, of the general bearing of which I imagine you are scarcely ignorant. Vishnu, for example, as the preserver of all things, may well be considered the highest, and with him Sri, or Lakshmi, as his bountiful associate in giving prosperity."

"Again Siva, as the destroyer and rebuilders of various forms of life, has his place of worship, though I am not agreed with those who rank him above the preserver. With him, however, Durgá, or Párvatì the mountain-born goddess of terror, may be mentioned, though she has also a milder aspect, as Bhaváni. Then Indra, the god of the sky, may well deserve grateful oblations, and worship, as well as his consort Sachí; for without the bounty of the sky, this Earth of ours would be barren and wretched. He may fairly also be called *Maghavân*, the possessor of bliss. Nor again, do I suppose any one so blind or ungrateful, as to deny the benefits which men receive from fire, and air, and water. All these then have their deities, Agni, and Pavan, and Varuna, whom we honour as the lords of their several gifts or regions. So with Indra the god of heaven, I might have classed Surya the deity of the Sun, and the father of the twelve Adityas, who give us light in their turns; or I might have spoken of Ganésa, who had once exclusive votaries, and whom now men chiefly invoke, when they commence any undertaking; or of Manasá, the healer of mankind from the wounds of serpents. But I do not wish to perplex you with the various names and attributes of the deities, respecting some of which and their respective ranks all our teachers are not quite agreed. Suffice it generally, that from whatever quarter mankind derive any especial benefit, we think it reasonable to ascribe the good to some benignant giver, and to honour the giver therefore with grateful offerings,

as well as with the prescribed prayers. But besides those gracious and more bountiful beings, whom we honour as our preservers or benefactors, it is evident that there also exist in nature many terrible agencies, the influence of which we may well tremble at. Kartikeya, for instance, is the god of war, and Kali the goddess of bloodshed, whose terrors we think it not unnatural to avert, without inquiring nicely, whether she is distinct from Durgá, or only the same described as the dark goddess; but in either case, I do not see why it should be a mark of wisdom to ridicule us for deprecating the displeasure of a being powerful to injure. Then even beyond this life there is Yama the god of death, who as regards our certain removal may be termed inexorable, though either in postponing it, or in judging us mercifully when we stand before his tribunal, we hope he may be rendered propitious to us by prayer. Nor indeed can I blame those who think no other deity so fit an object of their exclusive devotion as this gloomy king. With him may be classed his messenger Chitrakupta, who conveys us to Yam-álaya, the abode of death, and all the array of witnesses, who give account in that dread presence of all our words and actions; such as Swarga, Chandra, Pavan, and many others, there being no place either in heaven or earth, which does not send forth his embodied witness to give unerring testimony of what has been good or evil in each action of our lives."

BLAN. "Any such tribunal as you describe must certainly be a tremendous one to stand before. But how do you know so much of its nature?"

SAD. "Perhaps something may be known respecting it in many ways; but amongst others it is said that some one having been carried off once by Chitrakupta in error, before his time was fully come, he returned to life, and described all the punishments which he had seen."

BLAN. "Upon my word, if we had happened to fall in with that person, I think we should have agreed to ask him a great many questions. For the subject is one so momentous, that I

cannot conceive any rational man's not feeling an interest in it. But your notion generally of the punishments is, I imagine, the same as that of other Hindús. You made them consist in the necessity of undergoing some new form of existence, in which a man starts with advantages or disadvantages, corresponding in a way to his conduct in any previous life."

SAD. "Very much that."

BLAN. "Then the highest reward will be freedom from any such necessity?"

SAD. "Just so."

BLAN. "Then for the fortunate person who has obtained such liberation there will remain only the tranquillity which our friend the Múni has already described, as consisting in entire exemption from the anxieties of an isolated personality, and perhaps a communion in some way with the tranquil volition or the serene contemplation of the Supreme Spirit."

SAD. "I will not object captiously to his way of describing it, or to your own; only it is evident that the highest enjoyment must be in thorough knowledge, and the way to it is also through growth in knowing."

BLAN. "Does not this high estimation which you form of knowledge clearly imply that there is something to be known?"

SAD. "Certainly."

BLAN. "And therefore that there is such a thing as positive truth, or that external things are in a certain way so far as they exist, or that they have been acted in a certain way so far as they are facts, and a conception of these, according to the manner in which they really are or have been, must be knowledge; so that truth in any man's thought or affirmation will require as its correspondent a certain external reality?"

SAD. "I do not see how what you say can be denied."

BLAN. "Then if any one assured us that the internal conceptions of the mind bear no clear relation, or need not correspond to external things as they either exist or have been enacted, or that there are no such spiritual realities as



true ideas, or mental views of external things, to which we ought, as far as possible, to make our own notions approximate, such a person would take away the very ideas of truth and knowledge, and consequently destroy the possibility of that highest liberation to which you think the human soul should aspire?"

SAD. "Quite so."

BLAN. "Then it seems clear that we should not suffer ourselves lightly to be embarrassed by any difficulties which a man arguing for so despondent an opinion might possibly start; but rather we should spare no effort to arrive at the truth, and keep alive in ourselves by all holy or wise methods a courageous hope of attaining it."

SAD. "I certainly admit that by right methods the soul may learn to know, and it is the great triumph of the Sankhya philosophy to have devised such methods."

BLAN. "Very well. But you profess in part to accept the doctrines of Rámánuja; and again you profess a certain allegiance to the religious books of the Brahmanical religion. Will then the venerable Áchárya here approve of your selecting Vishnu as the main object of your worship, or will he admit that the Supreme Being is most properly considered as the preserver?"

SAD. "Probably not, nor perhaps in some other things far more important, will he approve of the conclusions to which our philosophy leads us. He at least is, I believe, a worshipper by preference of Siva, and probably will not admit that human souls are each one essentially distinct from the other."

BLAN. "These differences, however, do not seem to make your religion in its general idea a different one?"

SAD. "Certainly they do not; for we agree in appealing to the same sacred books, as the traditionary depository of a revelation."

BLAN. "Does it not then appear to you that the doctrine held is of more consequence than the book in which it is recorded?"

SAD. "Why, without affirming or denying anything upon

that point, it must at least be considered of great importance to hold fast the written depository of divine truth ; for so long as we both appeal to the same books, our difference will be only one of interpretation, and there may be a chance of our some day arriving at an agreement ; whereas, if we, like the Buddha, Sákyá Muni, threw off all allegiance to the tradition or history of a prior revelation, we should have lost one of the great sources of knowledge, and be more hopelessly divided." Thus far Sadánanda ; and Vidyáchárya then assented to what had been said of the importance of appealing to the same religious books, at the same time that the difference of interpretation as between himself and Sadánanda was exceedingly great.

"May I then ask," resumed Blancombe, "why you have selected Vishnu in particular as the most worthy of all the Hindú deities to be ranged as it were at the head of things divine?" "Partly," replied Sadánanda, "because the earliest of our Scriptures speak of him either in that character, or at least as not apparently inferior to Indra<sup>1</sup>. Although it may be true that the Vedic songs speak chiefly of the divine agencies of Nature, and of Heaven, or Indra, who encompasses all the rest, this may arise from that temporal or economic character which, I contend, should be ascribed to Holy Writ. But still more," he continued, "we think Vishnu worthy of the highest honour, because nothing appears to us more wonderful than that in the constant flux of things and succession of forms, such as the Saugata has described, any power should seem to preserve the world from ruin, and enable us to enjoy long periods of happiness and opportunities of seeing nature as it were exhibit herself to our gaze. For this so great an instance of benignant wisdom we thank Vishnu, and honour him as Náráyana, the great pervader of all life, and preserver of things that are."

BLAN. "You do not appear to agree with the Baudddhas, then, in considering the world as self-preserved?"

\* In what sense Vishnu is a Vedic Deity, will be discussed lower down.

SAD. "Not in such a sense as to exclude the deities from any care of it."

BLAN. "But yet you seemed to adopt, or even to be quoted as authority for, that doctrine of all things moving in a certain order in virtue of their inherent qualities, or because they are such as to do so and so."

SAD. "Why, undoubtedly facts, when examined, lead us to that conclusion. You gather of every tree in nature the fruit which belongs to its particular kind, and you see born of every animal young ones corresponding to the sire; so in the arts, the painting or the statue implies first the colours or the stone; and for any man to go about an action with means utterly disproportioned to it because they did not contain in themselves some capacity for achieving it, would be reckoned justly a kind of insanity. This principle holds good alike, whether the soldier should attempt to have a sword forged without iron, or a village maiden to draw water without going to the well. You see therefore that in everything like begets like, or that the effect is already contained virtually in the cause, like the oil in the berry. All things thus act according to nature, or, if you please, according to their qualities."

BLAN. "You speak of effects produced before our eyes; and since we are not the earliest men, every one knows that whatever now is, has had some antecedent. We all acknowledge that the stream flows from a fountain; but what are we to say of the visible source itself; or of that which you call the cause, and which you say involves the effect? Is it also an effect of some prior cause, or do your observations at all help us towards discovering that more primary and general cause, to which these things of to-day, whether effects, or causes, or sources, or only links, must ultimately be traced? I should be glad to hear from you a little more as to the farther bearings of your philosophy."

SAD. "Since you wish it, I will proceed farther. But our teachers generally begin their explanation at the part farthest

from us, because it resembles most as it were a beginning of the things spoken of; whereas perhaps you will understand me better if I begin at the part nearest to us. You see then the outside of things. The colour of any fruit or flower is perhaps painted on it by the heat of the sun, yet it only becomes of such a tinge in virtue of the skin or the sap being already of a particular kind. Then as to the substance of the fruit itself, it evidently is composed of juices according to the nature of the plant. Break up, if you will, the fibres, and divide again and again the parts with all their smaller parts, whether moist or dry, then you will find all the atoms themselves ultimately resolvable into one element. Not that perhaps every one will be able to reach this; for within the gross body which is perceptible by our senses, and which suffers from rough collision, there is a more subtle modification of matter, in which all the parts are more refined and, as it were, transparent, like gold beaten out into a delicate leaf. This may be termed the inner body, and should be considered either as the fugitive essence of life, or as the vehicle wherein personal life resides; but rather, I should say, the latter. Within this more subtle body, then, which is so far more refined than our gross body, that it extends, as we see by the presentiment of touch, to a little distance from our grosser organs, like the flame of a candle leaping beyond the wick with which it is connected—within, I say, this subtle body dwells the personality of man; and that personality we admit to be more durable than the gross body, just as air and water are not so easily injured by blows as earthenware; but for this personality or life to conceive of itself as a distinct being is as absurd as for music to think itself distinct from the instrument by the combination of whose parts it is produced; for in reality this “subtle person” or personal life can only act by material organs, whether of the more refined order among which it dwells, or the grosser kind which it throws around itself as an outer sheath; and it is even itself the mere product of consciousness; and consciousness of intellect; for it is evident that no

one is conscious either rightly of existence, or wrongly of an imaginary personality, unless he has, first, intellect. Therefore intellect is the truly great one, and the first production of nature. It manifests itself even in darkness, and then changing, it becomes sensitive or passionate, and again changing, it shews itself as goodness. So that in three divine manifestations it remains one essential form; from which fact also we worship Brahmá, Vishnu, and Mahéswara, or Siva, the great ruler. But farther, even intellect (*Buddhí*), though it be the great prolific principle from which consciousness proceeds, and, through consciousness, life, could itself have neither action nor being, unless there lay behind it a potentiality of organisation out of which it might be evolved, or an eternal bubbling, out of which the many-coloured waters of darkness, sensibility, goodness, life, organisms either more subtle and with only sentiment, or more material and therefore with sensuous feeling, and in short, all opposites co-operating, may flow forth, swelling and subsiding, according as various qualities are blended in mysterious combinations. So that behind or beyond all the other things spoken of, there is in fact *Pracriti*, or what men call the *indiscrete* or irresoluble, because it is the primary element which no one can resolve into minuter parts; rather indeed no one reaches it, except by the necessary inferences of an acute understanding. You may, however, consider it as it were preformative life, or the seed of life; it flows like water, or like quicksilver, into all shapes and forms and combinations. Out of it is evolved, under some circumstances and in some compositions, one thing, and in others, another; but its first and greatest evolution, or offspring, is intellect."

BLAN. "May I here interrupt you for a moment?"

SAD. "Certainly."

BLAN. "I don't quite understand how you make intellect an evolution of *Pracriti*, even on your own system, I mean, or at least considering it in relation to its affinities. For the Baudha Múni has made intelligence something eternally coexistent with

matter; and you, I believe, consider soul as also eternal; so that I should have expected you to speak quite as honourably of intellect as the Bauddha does of intelligence, which seems nearly the same thing, and I should have thought you would have made it an accompaniment of soul, rather than a mere evolution of matter; for this Pracriti after all seems only to be the most subtle and plastic form of matter."

SAD. "Pardon me, the facts do not lead us in that direction, and accurate knowledge must follow facts. You will readily acknowledge that intellect understands something. What does it understand? Evidently it takes cognizance of objects before our eyes, of things that are born and decay. Again, by what means does it apprehend them? Evidently by instruments of sensation, or organs more or less bodily, that is, either of the grosser or the more subtle body. What is intellect then, but something correlative and congenerate with these organs, which are themselves evolved out of the Pracriti, with the kindred evolutions of which they are again conversant. Intellect involves sensation, and therefore the pre-existence of Pracriti, which you may term, if you please, primary or plastic matter. Whereas, on the contrary, soul is that observant and eternally existent principle, before the eye of which, if it be duly purged, nature exhibits herself like a dancer going through many postures, and twisting herself into a thousand shapes."

BLAN. "It would seem then as if you meant by intellect something different from the Bauddha intelligence, while something more nearly resembling the latter seems implied in your term, soul; although indeed the Bauddhas appear to make their intelligence capable of a certain development, whether it should be called refinement or evolution; so that I am almost embarrassed by the resemblance of your doctrines and at the same time by their discrepancy. But pray tell me, is nature then in your theory soul-less, and does she move under the control of any higher principle, or independently, and as it were collaterally?"

SAD. "If you understood clearly what I have already said, you would see that nature, containing in herself the plastic element of life, neither needs the control of soul, nor would indeed submit to it. But doubtless each stage in the self-evolution of *Pracriti* has a connexion with the stage which follows, as well as with that which precedes. Therefore intellect, being once evolved, exercises a certain influence on what follows, and becomes capable of inserting by its inherent power a certain modifying control, such as I should not wonder if you were to call creativeness, but which is with me rather a result, and again a relative cause to what follows."

BLAN. "But on such a theory, where is the necessity for what you term soul; or why do you encumber your system with such a supposition?"

SAD. "Surely you would not have a theatre and many cunning performers without a spectator? Evidently there must be a looker-on, in order to enjoy. Soul, then, is the enjoyer."

BLAN. "I should like to ask, if I was not afraid of perplexing the statement of your opinions by extrinsic arguments, what is the meaning of that word 'must,' or, again, of the corresponding word 'ought,' and why one thing must or ought to be, rather than another. But I suppose you would send me back to your old answer about inherent qualities, though I am not at all satisfied that being is owing, or that 'is' should be considered an equivalent for 'must be.' Perhaps, however, you discern in the system of nature, or rather collaterally to it, certain evidences of the existence of what you term soul."

SAD. "Indeed we do. For it is clear from our own consciousness that soul exists, and that it is multitudinous. For although men are often blinded by a passionate conception of being something distinct in themselves, and doing something each man for himself, so that he says, I am the cause of such things, and, I will also effect others, it becomes, on the other hand, clear to any vision purged by knowledge, that it is the great working of nature in us which implants certain instincts,

paints as it were pictures, and lures or propels us as parts of herself into whatever inclination or action we blindly fancy is some origination of our own. Nature, I say, develops herself in our being, exhibits herself in our form, and plays as it were a manifold drama in the series of our passionate struggles. So that the conception of a man's independent individuality, as if he could say in building kingdoms, or rearing children, I did, or I will, must be utterly discarded as an illusion; for it is clear that we could do nothing of the kind, if such effects were not already involved in their causes; and the causes operate in us from the unceasing evolution of nature.

“But now, you will please to notice, that besides all this human development which flatters itself with the conceit of an independent personality, each man has also in him a certain principle which observes, and reflects, and knows. Now this principle indeed may be so blinded by passion and darkness, the two great obstructions of knowledge, (though again these are capable in some combinations of giving forth a certain higher product, as we have farther back seen them to be phases of intellect,) that it consents to the illusion I have already spoken of, and believes each man to stand himself as something apart from nature. But when this observant principle has risen clearly above passion and darkness, like a man on some mountain-peak, below whose feet the clouds roll heavily, it discovers itself to have been distinct; it recognises as it were its own being, no longer as a mere human consciousness of a personal agent, but as a faculty of most bright and spiritual vision. Then it takes note calmly from aside of all the processes of life and action, and pronounces them to be mere displays of nature, which once disturbed it, but are now for its amusement. Nature then having been discovered in the dressing-room of the theatre ceases to delude with her imagery, and ceases even to be, according to the vulgar conception of being. For all her ordinary forms and manifestations are resolved back by knowledge, which is the eye of the soul, into mere *Pracriti*, that is, as I have already said, into the



mere essence of life sporting itself. The world therefore in a way no longer is; that is to say, it no longer is the world, but only a play of nature; the illusion is discovered, and the play is over, but the soul enjoys knowledge, and by knowledge, as it is written in the sacred Veda, obtains the water of immortality."

BLAN. "This is a wonderful sort of drama which you describe. It is not however clear to me, why the whole performance is undertaken, since at the end the only result attained is the knowledge of the illusion."

SAD. "Such a remark implies blame on the art of the poet; and neither our great poems of the Ramayana and the Mahábhá-rata would be written, nor would our famous plays, either the serious ones, such as the Prabodha Chandrodaya, or the more playful, such as the Mrichchakati, ever have been presented on a stage even before famous kings, if mankind did not feel a pleasure in observing them, and also in discovering the illusion. For you know, men often rejoice in observing things represented dramatically, which, if they conceived of them as real actions, would be considered painful and horrible. Even so to the blinded individualist, who thinks himself and all other men are independent persons, each doing or suffering I know not what in a personal freewill, the crimes and sufferings, which abound through the world, must necessarily be a source of pain; but when soul has triumphed over such an illusion, and, on looking back, sees only the sport of Pracriti developing itself, just as water flows into any vessel or crevice of any possible shape, without being injured or anxious, soul then rejoices, and is pleased both with the drama, and also with having dissipated the illusion."

BLAN. "If such a knowledge be ever actually attainable, it must be, I conceive, because the things really are as you imagine; but then such a picture would almost dazzle the mental gaze, and its very idea would be too tremendous and overwhelming for any finite soul to apprehend. But possibly you may conceive of the soul as partaking somewhat of the

divine infinity, or perhaps you think in some way approaching to the Vedánta doctrine, that all souls are one."

SAD. "The two suppositions of which you offer me an option are neither identical, nor does one necessarily imply the other. We admit the soul to be in a way infinite, for no bounds can be set to its knowledge, either of things past in time or distant in space; so that it is present as much with things supposed to have been acted a thousand years ago, as with things appearing to pass before our eyes. Each soul then is infinite in the sense that no limits can be assigned to its capacity of knowledge. But, on the other hand, we are as far as possible from conceding to the adherents of the Vedánta philosophy that all souls are one. On the contrary, one of the ends of the more discriminating system, which we call Sánkhyā, is to dissipate such an error, and bring men back to the simpler truth affirmed by our consciousness. It is almost self-evident that, if all souls were one, all men would be simultaneously feeling alike; and if one man married, and another lost his father, they would both be rejoicing and both be mourning in the same instant. Many other absurd consequences would also follow. But, as the case stands, we find the soul of one man rejoicing, and that of another afflicted; one enlightened by knowledge, and another ignorant; nay, even the different conceptions which the Vedantists and we ourselves form of the same opinions, sufficiently prove our souls to be distinct. Neither again do I, myself, follow Patanjali and other doctors, who have partly taught the Sánkhyā wisdom, and partly departed from it, in making mere devotion, or mystical contemplation, the best way of liberating the soul from such illusions as have been described. On the contrary, Capila has more correctly taught us, that the soul is to be liberated by knowledge; and to this opinion, even the Vedas, already quoted, partly assent."

BLAN. "Souls then, it seems according to you, are many, and they are to be liberated by knowledge rather than by mystical contemplation. Your method then is scientific, rather

than devotional. But am I to understand that those deities, whom you mentioned with respect, and especially Vishnu, the preserver, are at the head of all souls; or what conception am I to form of them?"

SAD. "Clearly from what has been said, it follows that the deities are not above soul; for then they would no longer be preservers. Soul, I must remind you, is the enjoyer, the observer, or the recipient; and it is the excellence of soul to be liberated from anxiety about this lower world, or any other interest in it, except such enjoyment as a contemplation of the play of self-fashioning nature may reasonably afford. But the deities are employed in regulating and controlling all sorts of lower processes. It remains then only that they be high forms, and probably very glorious and eminent forms, of intellect."

BLAN. "But I understood you that intellect is the first evolution of nature."

SAD. "Rightly so; for it is clear that intellect is so evolved out of the plastic energies of the lively principle."

BLAN. "But who then is your creator, your *Iswara*, or your supreme Lord? Can any less than such a one be the preserver? Who then put the drama of nature on the stage, or built the theatre, on which those wonderful evolutions display themselves? You know the earthly poem implies a poet, and every building, whether intended for a drama or for other things, must have had a builder. Supposing then all nature to be, as you imagine, a certain divine or world-long drama, we require for so grand a performance a master-manager, and a builder as much above earthly architects as this framework of the heavens and the earth is above all earthly mansions and theatres."

SAD. "Your question shews the danger of introducing into scientific discussion ornamental imagery. When our treatises speak, as they do, of nature exhibiting herself like a dancer, they mean only to illustrate an abstruse subject by a common image. You must not, however, push a metaphor beyond the purpose for which it was intended. We have already seen that

all visible effects in nature are resolvable into one infinitely subtle element. Now as to any creator, he could (as a matter of possibility) bring nothing out of this element which was not already involved in it, for effects must be contained in causes; and again, (as a matter of necessity,) no external care seems particularly needed to produce what goes on reproducing and fashioning itself; though I do not mean, as already has been made clear, that intellect as an evolution of nature is not an efficacious principle in helping forward the various processes as they continue up to a particular point of the cycle, and then, being resolved, re-enact themselves. Now if, as you appear to wish, we represented soul as a creator, we should first disturb soul with unworthy anxieties, instead of leaving it the serene contemplation which is its highest excellence; and secondly, we should assign it an impossible task of creating; and thirdly, an unnecessary trouble of guiding. Whereas, by the scientific analysis of principles, we find all that is required to be contained in these two things, nature the blind worker, and soul the enjoying spectator. As to the deities then which we honour, different opinions may perhaps innocently be held; but we see no harm in considering them as glorious and eminent links in that grand cyclical series of living things, in which nature by her mysterious power is developed. They pervade, they control, they preserve. Their destiny perhaps is higher, and their existence more protracted than that of man, in proportion as higher or subtler intellect has evolved itself in their sacred forms; but in the infinite roll of ages they, like ourselves, must become subject to the eternal law of change; their wisdom and their power have bubbled up out of the froth of the abysmal ocean as it heaves with existence, and in time they will subside, and give place to others, whether better or worse. For time is hard to overcome. Many things have been, and many will be, but the grand whole suffers neither increase nor lessening. You have seen a spider throwing out a hundred threads along the dewy branches of the lotus in the early morning, and again the

same spider draws in the same threads, neither losing nor gaining any particle in its vital totality. Thus the Vedántists teach ; and, without confusing, as they do, Soul and Matter, we agree so far as to say, thus the world of nature puts forth threads of existence. Some are longer, and some are shorter, but all are alike resumed into the capacious form of the universal mother."

So far, or at some such point as this, for perhaps I have not the exact words, Sadánanda had arrived, when Blancombe uttered, as it were involuntarily, an exclamation of astonishment, and said he had neither expected, nor could he quite understand, on what principle it could be held that divine beings could pass away. Then after some discussion how far the deities ought to be held to have souls, which Sadánanda declared had nothing to do with their personality, but so far as souls were attached to divinities, he said they would enjoy the same capacity of liberation by knowledge as the souls of human beings, Blancombe proceeded : " I cannot conceal from you that this Sánkhyā doctrine, if it be the most scientific, is also to my weak faculties the most awful, not to say alarming, of any I have heard. For, in listening to our Bauddha friend, I cherished a sort of hope that his Supreme Intelligence, however apparently tranquil, might still have arranged matters for our happiness by some far-seeing wisdom, or at least, in any extreme peril to poor mankind, might be so far roused as to put forth some energy for our help ; but with you soul is apparently passive, and nature blind, and those deities, to whom we might look up for succour, are themselves mere evolutions of nature, divine plants, as it were, blossoming for an hour, and fading. So that, whether the jaws of extinction yawn for me, or whether any error springing from passion or darkness obscure the glance of my soul, and lead my footsteps astray, there is no provider of help for me mentally to lean upon. Nor again, can I quite reconcile your doctrine with the professions of allegiance which you made some time back to the received deities, and your worship, for example, of Vishnu."

“That indeed,” interposed Vidyáchárya here, “is very difficult.” Sadánanda however answered,—“We neither wish to annoy any one by obtruding our knowledge on those who have been educated in different notions (and I have not attempted to change the religion of England), nor again would we withhold correct knowledge from those who inquire, as you seemed yourself to inquire for it. But this alarm of yours proceeds partly from your having learnt differently elsewhere, and partly from your not considering how vast are the periods of time over which we recognise the existence of the gods as ranging. When we speak of a day of Brahmá, we mean a period of 2,160,000,000 years, and perhaps a full hundred of days of that length may go to make up the existence of Brahmá or of Vishnu the upholder. Now, beings whose wisdom preserves them so long, may well be more powerful than man, and may play an important part, even as any very eminent man may, in the great drama of Nature. They may reasonably be conceived therefore to give assistance to lower beings, who are like ourselves in part, products of the same plastic force. Our doctrine therefore does not discourage piety, though we lay more stress upon accurate knowledge of things than upon mystic dreaminess. But as to our conclusions, they are forced upon us by the state of the case. For, if there had ever been a time when an Iswara, all-wise and all-sufficient, such as you imagine, existed alone without a world, he being happy in himself would have had no inducement to create, nor again could he have created without materials; and, if even he had created a world, being all-wise, he would have made it more perfect far than the state of things around us. Living things would not have preyed upon life, nor man have injured man. But now consider again this argument. You think that the world is sufficiently good to imply an Iswara; we ourselves think otherwise. But your argument sufficiently shews that a certain order is observed, and that too very much such an order as would arise upon our theory of like begetting like, or causes containing their effects. For all things you see

proceed in the gross, and as it were by waves of the tide, rather than by droppings from the hand. The more perfect then you conceive this order to be, we make no objection so far, but advise you to derive consolation from the comparative certainty of things in respect of cause and effect. Such a certainty may well assure you, that by adapting your conduct (if you believe that a man is a free agent) to the revolutions of nature, or, as we should say, by contentedly suffering the unavoidable, and liberating the soul so that it can rejoice in the grandest of all spectacles, you will both secure such a happiness as it is in the nature of things for you to enjoy, and also act consistently with piety, whether your notions or ours may be the more correct. Not, however, that I venture to offer you the above counsel, as if I thought our opinions doubtful. For you have already seen them to be founded upon scientific investigation.

“ You may also please to consider one argument for their truth, which is not generally given in our books, and which therefore I have not yet mentioned. Many people imagine that the world is daily becoming better. That, indeed, is not our own received belief, either as derived from our religious books, or as dependent upon reasoning. Let us, however, for a moment entertain the opinion as not an absurd one. Why then should the world become better? Is it not clear that nature is daily struggling through her manifold forms of activity, so that, upon the opinion we are now supposing, there is an upward growth, and an evolution of higher forms of being? Whereas, on your theory of a creation once for all, the world would remain as it came from the hands of its Iswara. But the course of things, evolving daily life and novelty, especially if, as some suppose, the evolution is of the nature of a higher development and aspiration, shews that *Pracriti* must be considered as the primal element, which is the fruitful womb of many successive births. Let it however be remembered, that the analogy which I above borrowed from the *Vedánta*, of the spider putting out its threads and drawing them in again, is a more instructive

illustration of what we consider in general the nature of the world."

"Perhaps," rejoined Blancombe, "it would not be proper for me to deny that your system may turn out to be founded, as you believe, upon systematic investigation; though, as far as we have hitherto gone, I observe only illustrations or analogies, rather than arguments, adduced for its groundwork: but at least the reflexions, which you suggest as consolatory, do not remove from my mind the overwhelming awe with which I contemplate a theory in which the universe seems whirled on a blind career without compass or guide. Supposing however, upon greater familiarity with your views, this alarm of mine should subside, as you imagine it would, I almost fear that it might give place to even a greater disease of the mind."

"What might that be?" asked Sadánanda. "Why perhaps scarcely less," answered Blancombe, "than an incurable recklessness of the difference between right and wrong, or a readiness to indulge whatever vicious temptation, either the promptings of *Pracriti*, or of whatever is lowest and most bestial in man, might engender. Not that probably such an effect is produced in persons like yourself, in whom it may be neutralised by some better disposition; but with many men your doctrine would at least tend, either to alarm, or to corrupt; either taking away the stay of their mental hope, or the safeguard of their moral conduct: and that this latter apprehension is not merely imaginary may seem proved by some of the sectarians whom you do not willingly acknowledge as associates, and who, indeed, appear ashamed of their own secret worship. For you are aware, and indeed I have heard pious Hindús lament, that bodies of men exist whose worship is addressed merely to the productive powers of nature in their animal aspect, and who therefore indulge secretly in a licentious ritual; while, although the opinion of other men tends somewhat to check their vile propensities, it can scarcely fail but that their belief must act injuriously upon their general conduct in the relations of life.



You call such persons, I believe, left-handed worshippers of Sakti; their sacred books, if such books can in any propriety of speech be designated sacred, are the Tantras; and they are themselves so ashamed of their degrading ritual as rarely, if ever, to profess it in public; thereby shewing that evil shrinks from the light. Now I think it quite needless, in arguing with yourself, to condemn such men; but it seems not irrelevant to remark that their conduct might derive some sanction from your opinion of the all-absorbing activity of *Pracriti*, and from the passive character of the soul of man. For thus you appear to degrade mankind from accountable beings into machines; and to leave thereby little room for either praise or censure. At least you allow, I apprehend, that praise and blame imply at any rate volition, and probably also some kind of sequence between volition and action; whatever therefore magnifies the mechanical power of nature, and so lessens the sphere of volition, seems to leave bad men a greater liberty of obeying whatever evil impulse a good man would, by the energy of conscience and will, endeavour to restrain. So that, on the whole, your doctrine, if it does not create uneasiness of the saddened spirit, seems to encourage a licentiousness of the animal appetite. Whether then that can be true knowledge, which tends to such evil results, appears to me at least a question."

"Say rather," here answered Sadánanda, "that there ought to be no question of such evils as you describe being due to ignorance and passion rather than to knowledge. The first form of intellect is virtue (*dharma*); and knowledge (*jnyána*) is followed by dispassion (*vairāgya*); for he who knows the practice of the pious is animated thereby to strain after their felicity; and having distinguished the excellence of soul from the elements of whatever partakes of *tamas* (darkness), a man accomplishes its liberation. Whereas for want of knowledge, not only lower temptations may corrupt a man, but even the scriptures (*sruti*) may become to him the means of entanglement. Thus, for example, a man

who reads of bloody sacrifices in the Vedas, is tempted to shed blood; whereas by knowing that such ordinances were only temporary or faulty, he will learn to respect life. Thus you see that all true knowledge has a constant tendency to improve, even to an indefinite extent, until man becomes truly divine, and so enjoys the highest blessedness. By no lower means, such as human works, could he aspire to such a reward, for it is evident that, as they are themselves finite, so their recompence must have an end; but since knowledge is capable of indefinite expansion, and since the soul enjoying it is completely extricated from the trammels of *Pracriti* in any of her manifestations, so it alone renders perfect and eternal. But even venerable persons who suffer themselves to be fettered by scripture without true knowledge, must find impediments to their onward progress; as, for example, they may feel compelled to sacrifice blood, or authorised to practise incantations against the life of their enemy, because such actions are enjoined or sanctioned in the Vedas. Much more then, such left-handed worshippers as you alluded to, sin not from knowledge, but from ignorance. Thus you will find the *Tatwa-samāsa* justly class intoxication, sloth, and impurity, with atheism, as fruits of *tamas*." "Very well," answered Blancombe, "but the proper remedy for ignorance is instruction. How then shall we proceed to give those benighted persons of whom we have spoken true instruction; or by what method of enlightenment would you propose to reclaim them from their errors? For surely we could do them no greater service, than by imparting to them that knowledge upon which you believe the salvation of their souls depends." "Why," said Sadānanda, "we have not been wanting in efforts of the kind." "But to what then," asked Blancombe, "are we to ascribe the vicious practices, the low idolatry, and the ignorance, which prevail among so many men who may naturally be capable of better things?" "Perhaps the reason may be," replied the other, "such men are not really capable of improvement. They may have committed sins in a former life, for which their present

degradation is a just punishment; or they may come of some stock hopelessly incurable. We have already seen that all things act according to their qualities; and in certain families there are hereditary diseases; for which reason our wise lawgiver Manu forbids the Brahman youth to marry into any tainted family, however large may be the dowry he might purchase by doing so. If then persons are for any reason cursed with incurable blindness, it is not wonderful that the wisdom of our Sāṅkhya teachers should not have been able to rescue them from an inevitable lot." "But at least," said Blancombe, "you must feel that it would be a great triumph of benevolence and enlightenment to succeed in such a task; perhaps, indeed, if any doctrines should appear more capable of such success than others, that circumstance would alone go far to prove the superior excellence of the doctrines which so prevailed. What then if we both try, by disseminating the highest truth, to lift up a larger portion of the benighted children of Manu into the enjoyment of knowledge? It will be no mean testimony either to our sacred books, or to your profound and subtle doctrines, if either of us renders a whole community of men purer in life and more enlightened in understanding than they have ever hitherto been. There are parts of India, as I have heard, where men murder their children newly born under the impression that such murder is an act of piety; nor need I enumerate to you a thousand acts of wickedness which we daily observe, and which are forbidden even by the laws of Manu. Tell me then, how you would proceed in such a benevolent undertaking as the reformation of the moral sentiments among vicious or ignorant men. Or if, as you imply, your efforts in that direction have not hitherto been successful, may not such a failure imply some want of adaptation in your doctrine to the eternal conscience of mankind. At least let me repeat here some such declaration as I have already ventured to make in reference to the duty of searching after Truth. Just as there it was admitted that we should not lightly despair of finding that treasure, the existence

of which somewhere is implied even in the term knowledge, so here let all the virtues of which the Múni has spoken, and which you also endeavour to practise, persuade us to think hopefully of the possibility of enlightening large masses, even though they consisted of the Sudra and the Chándála, and let us not desist from this inquiry, until we have decided, either what is truest, or at least most likely to lead men into the paths of knowledge, and to the waters of immortality."

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### NOTE ON CHAPTER II.

IN addition to Colebrooke may be mentioned as authorities for this and for the following chapter, the texts and lectures published for the use of the Benares College, on the Vedánta, Nyáya, and other philosophies ; the Rig-Veda hymns, translated by Professor Wilson ; the same eminent scholar's lectures, his account of Hindú sects in general, and his editions of the Vishnu Purána, and of the Sánkhyá Karika.

For the Benares College texts I am indebted to the kindness of Mr Muir ; and I understand that the comments, by which the difficulty of the original texts is so much mitigated, are due to Dr Ballantyne. They tend to place Hindú thought in a more favourable light than some works more generally read ; such as the meritorious, but far from penetrating, work on Missions, by the Rev. Dr Duff. Many of the Hindú deities are described by Sir William Jones ; whose account, however, should be tested by the more accurate ideas derivable from the Rig-Veda and Professor Wilson's other publications, such as that on the sects of India (published in the *Asiatic Researches*, and reprinted at Calcutta) and the analyses furnished in Colebrooke.

A friend tells me that the infanticide occasional among the Rajputs is not connected with religion ; but that at Ganga Sugar, at the mouth of the Hooghly, it was so. The challenge in the text, however, might be applied to either.

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## CHAPTER III.

*What the Sâiva Vedântine thinks.*

“It must be clear, from all that has been said, that such a system, if it be even perfectly comprehensible, cannot be represented by language, but must be inferred by the mind from the principles.”—SIR GRAVES HARGHTON.

“The highest point of speculation is that in which *thought* and *existence*, formally considered, become one ; and the *logos*, or reason, as an emanation of the Divinity, reigns alone, at once the *essence* of all *being*, and the *content* of all *thought*. Every complete system of philosophy, accordingly, rests in GOD, as its highest idea and its final aim.....Thus it is the goal, that God should be ALL IN ALL.”—MORELL.

“The Supreme Being has no feet, yet He extends everywhere ; has no hands, yet holds all things ; has no eyes, yet sees all that exists ; has no ears, yet hears everything that passes—His existence has no cause—He is the most subtle of things ghostly, and the greatest of things great ; yet is He in reality neither small nor great.”—RAM-MOHN-ROY'S *Exposition of the Vedânta*.

HERE Sadánanda, after a little pause, replied, “What you say has a very reasonable sound ; but we cannot alter true knowledge, for the sake of gratifying the prejudices of men, who, after all, may perhaps be incurably blinded by passion and darkness.”

Blancombe then was silent for a little, seeming to be either weary or discouraged ; and Vidyáchârya took the opportunity of making some remarks upon what had been spoken. “It appears to me,” he said, “not wonderful that the wise teachers whom our friend here represents should fail in endeavouring to reclaim men from errors possibly of a darker kind. For if the remedy which they themselves bring forward is somewhat vicious, or at best is but imperfectly drawn from the only infallible source of enlightenment, how is it likely that they should be able to enlighten others ? Now true knowledge must be of God ; and we are well taught to pray, in the sacred words of the Gâyatri, ‘May the adorable light of the divine ruler enlighten our minds.’ But Sadánanda has himself confessed, and therefore it is not harsh to say of the Sâṅkhya philosophers generally, that they set aside many passages of holy scripture as not consistent with their own human speculations ; hence although I am pleased with the acknowledgment, which indeed

truth extorts from them, that the Vedas are to be respected, I cannot recognise the Sánkhyas teachers in general as faithful interpreters; nor is it wonderful that, as they wilfully set aside some parts, so they are strangely mistaken in others. Now I do not complain of what Sadánanda here has told us, that he considers Vishnu as a supreme object of worship preferable to Siva; for on such points many things are held differently by wise men, even of similar schools, and the wisest are thoroughly aware that the Deity whom they worship is at last essentially One; but it seems to me a graver matter of complaint, that Sadánanda loosens the authority of the Vedas; and that his friends generally consider our sacred revelation of the supreme Being as a thing merely relative, or as instructing mankind, as if for a temporary purpose, in their duties or sentiments towards each other<sup>1</sup> and towards the Divinity. Whereas it surely ought not to be doubted that our sacred books have the fullest inspiration, as indeed some of our Rishis have held that they proceeded from the very body of Brahmá; and those who have not affirmed so much, must still admit the revelation to be of positive, and unalterable truth. For want of paying due honour to our religion, by such a recognition, even the wisdom of Sadánanda is betrayed into lamentable errors. He thinks, for example, that all the forms of life may be resolved back into one fluid of a most subtile and irresoluble kind, which therefore has been called the *indiscrete*, but which still he considers a material fluid; though indeed soul is distinguished by him from matter, but yet rendered impotent by the passive character assigned to it as compared to the active powers of nature; and I could scarcely refrain from exclaiming aloud, when that plastic fluid was represented as more permanent in duration than even the heavenly rulers, and as having been apparently the mere cause by which all things come into existence. Against such a blind nature, then, we affirm that God the Almighty is the Creator; for the scripture calls him soul (*átman*); and against the conceit

<sup>1</sup> See *Aphorisms of Vedanta*, IV. 5.

of magnifying human knowledge above scripture, we also affirm that God the all-seeing is the teacher. He was alone; he thought, I will be many—or, I will create<sup>1</sup> worlds; thus he created these worlds; namely water, (which means heaven,) light, mortal earth, and the waters. Although then the theory of a plastic fluid, or Pracriti, may have appeared to some wise men probable, and I do not dispute in this place how far it may be a way of conceiving of the divine energy, or *Máyá*, yet at least I speak moderately in saying that the all-embracing Deity to whom the sacred Veda ascribes both volition and soul, ought rather to be taught to mankind, than the mere play of this Pracriti. Nor again do I blame the Sánkhyas teachers for despairing, as you say, of large masses of mankind: since whatever sounding phrases Christians may use about the brotherhood of mankind, any observant person must admit there is a difference between races, and this difference our hereditary laws have taught us to observe as the institution of caste. What then we observe out of pious obedience to our ancient laws, Europeans themselves take sufficient account of, when it suits their pride or their interest to do so; for they behave very differently in the usages of life to men differing in rank or in country. In one or two points then I rather agree with what has been said by Sadánanda. But whoever may be the persons addressed, it is quite necessary, that the doctrine inculcated should be true; and in order to prove its truth, we must find it in harmony with the sacred Vedas.”

Here for a moment the A'chárya paused, and Mountain, the elder of the two strangers, appeared much interested by what he had heard. “It seems then,” he said, “that the Sánkhyas teachers respect the body of Vedas in word, rather than follow its guidance in forming their sentiments of doctrine. Or, at least, you conceive there are considerable discrepancies between your religious books, and the philosophy

<sup>1</sup> See the *Aphorisms of the Vedanta*, 2—4, and Colebrooke, Vol. I. pp. 33, 47, 57, 64, 338.

which we have just heard expounded?" "That is precisely the case," answered the A'charya, "and we are of opinion that no human conjectures ought to be put in comparison with the teaching of divine inspiration." "In that sentiment," said Mountain, "we are entirely agreed; and I expect from this beginning to be able to concur with you more nearly than with Sadánanda. But let me venture to ask, for what reason you appear to select Siva by preference as the especial object of your adoration?" "I do so chiefly," answered the A'charya, "on that principle upon which we are agreed, namely, that scripture should be followed; for I understand Siva to be the form of Deity which is mainly, though manifoldly, alluded to in the Vedas, and I gather the same truth with greater distinctness of enunciation from the Puráanas."

"Your answer somewhat surprises me," remarked Mountain; "for as far as I remember what appeared to be spoken of in the Vedas, those books, which you so highly honour, consisted of many hymns to a great variety of beings, among whom I hardly recollect that Siva is so much as mentioned. Far more frequently, at least, it is manifest that the hymns are addressed to *Indra*, who seems to be what in our language we should call the Heaven. He chiefly, as the slayer of Vritra (whatever that may mean<sup>1</sup>), appears to be mentioned with honour; and besides him, I remember particularly Agni, whose name seems akin to the Latin ignis, and to denote what we call fire, while Súrya, and Váyu, and Aditi, and Púshan, with Mitra and Varuna, the Aswins, the Maruts, the Ribhus, and Ushas, not to mention Twashtri, and perhaps some others who do not now occur to me, are also addressed in strains of poetry or adoration. One of the Vedas indeed abounds in hymns, of which by far the larger number are apparently in honour of Soma; and Soma, if some one informed me rightly, means the sacrificial libation of the juice of a certain plant. But perhaps you will tell me if that

<sup>1</sup> Vritra is the obstructive mass of dark clouds, which Indra, as heaven, dissipates, thereby giving the earth rain, and so slaying the hostile giant.



interpretation be correct." "Certainly it is," answered Vidyáchárya. "And may I then continue to ask," proceeded Mountain, "what is meant by some other of the names or deities mentioned? For example, what is Súrya?" "The word Súrya, in its simplest sense," answered Vidyáchárya, "means naturally the Sun, as also does Savitri, though perhaps the words may often designate emblematically something still more divine." "I thank you; and what is Aditi?" he continued asking. "Perhaps by Aditi," answered the other, "is meant mother earth, or the Universe, who may very prettily be represented as the parent of the Adityas." "I see; but who are the Adityas?" "If you remember, there are twelve Adityas, and these are the twelve manifestations of Savitri, or the months of the revolving year." "A certain light begins now to dawn upon me; only I should like in the same manner to ask who is Váyu?" "Clearly Váyu is the god of the wind." "But what then are the Maruts?" "The Maruts are the winds in general, and therefore they are with great propriety called the allies of Indra in his contest with Vritra." "Pray why so, or what is the meaning of the contest?" "The contest is between the divinely blue heaven, as you have yourself not amiss interpreted Indra, and the sullen mass of clouds which, like a hostile giant, withholding the rain in their lap, threaten mankind with dearth. Indra then, the beneficent and the divine, makes war against the sullen giant; the genial winds, who are his friends, and indeed his offspring, as well as the sons of Prisni, or earth, come to his assistance against the withholder of rain; so Vritra, or Ahi, who may well be called the king of hostile Asuras, is slain; and hence it is divinely sung:

## RIG-VEDA.

*First Ashtaka. Fifth Adhyaya. Varga XXX. XXXI.*

'Thy thunderbolts were scattered widely over sixty and nine rivers; great is thy prowess; strength is in thy arms, manifesting thy rule.

‘A thousand mortals worshipped him together ; twenty (priests) have hymned his praise : a hundred (sages) again and again laud him : so, Indra, is the offering lifted up, manifesting thy rule.

‘Indra by his strength overcame the strength of Vritra : great is his manhood, wherewith, having slain Vritra, he made the waters flow, manifesting his rule.

‘This heaven and earth trembled, thunderer, at thy wrath, when attended by the Maruts, thou slewest Vritra by thy might, manifesting thy rule.

‘Vritra stayed not Indra by his trembling or his clamour : the thunderbolt of many-edged iron fell upon him ; Indra manifesting his rule.

‘When thou, Indra, didst encounter with thy bolt Vritra, and the thunderbolt which he hurled, then, Indra, thy strength determined to slay AHI was shewn in the heavens, manifesting thy rule.

‘At thy voice, wielder of the thunderbolt, all things moveable or immoveable trembled : even Twashtri, O Indra, shook with fear at thy wrath.’

So again in another place,” continued the A’charya, “it is sung, ‘Indra upholds, and has spread out the earth ; having struck the clouds, he has extricated the waters.’ ”

“In fact, then,” here remarked Blancombe, “some of the most striking hymns in the Rig-Veda describe merely the slaying of Vritra, in the sense of making it rain ; and if that is the language in which you metaphorically describe the operations of nature, it is not difficult to conjecture why the Sankhya philosophers yield only a partial assent to the Veda, or perhaps interpret it in a peculiar manner.” “But we have not finished the explanation which you are kind enough to give me,” resumed Mountain, “and I have not yet asked you who is *Ushas* ?” “*Ushas*,” answered the A’charya, “is the goddess of the dawn.” “Then again, who are Mitra, and Varuna, who are called, as I observe, dispensers of waters ?” “That,” answered the A’charya, “will not be obscure to you, if only you notice that one is called the ruler of day, and the other of night. Mitra also is called one of the Adityas, and hence it is clear that he is either the sun, or a manifestation of the sun ; and similarly Varuna,

though in modern times he is considered merely as the regent of the waters, must properly have been the moon<sup>1</sup>. You see, therefore, how divine wisdom instructed us thus early in our scriptures of that which Europeans were many centuries before they fully discovered; namely, how the heavenly bodies govern the movements of the vast ocean below.” “But I observe,” remarked Mountain, “that the words *Púshan* and *Aryaman* are also applied apparently to the sun, and yet in a way contrasted with each other.” “That arises,” answered the other, “from the difference of aspect under which the same thing may be considered. When we call the sun *Púshan*, we consider him as the nourisher, or the great vivifier by heat and moisture; but again as *Aryaman* he is represented as the god of twilight, or the divider, there being a period at which the sun seems to separate day from night.” “Very well; and now the Aswins?” “That,” said the *Āchārya*, “is not altogether an easy question to answer. But you may remember that the Aswins are called the sons of *Sindhu*, or the sea; they are also termed physicians of the gods, since they bring healthful alternation; and they are said to pervade all things, one with heat and the other with moisture. Hence, although some have explained them either as Heaven and Earth, or again as Sun and Moon, I should myself more gladly consider them as Day and Night, who with pleasant alternation heal all living things. Thus they are very fitly termed *Dasras*, or destroyers of diseases; and *Násatyas*, having no untruth, since their promise of return is never broken, like that of unfaithful friends, but they come day by day.” “Once more, then, what do you mean by the *Apris*, or who is *Twashtri*?” “Why, the *Apris* have been understood to mean deified objects in general, but especially *Agni*, of whom I have much to say: and again, *Twashtri* is called the workman or artisan of the gods; and since he is also represented as an *Aditya*, perhaps

<sup>1</sup> This inference is the speaker's own. But WEBER's comparison of οὐρανός seems to have etymology in its favour, and may remind us of the οὐρανός, ἀθροίζων ἄστρ' ἐν αἰθέρος κύκλῳ.

it would be not improper to consider him as another phase of the sun: if, for example, the sun were contemplated as performing the behests, or executing day by day the vivifying functions of the gods, then probably he might in that aspect be termed *Twashtri*."

"I am exceedingly obliged to you," here resumed Mountain, "for giving me a clearer notion than I had before of those among the names in the Rig-Veda which just now I felt a curiosity to inquire about. Only all this time there has been no mention of Siva; and indeed, since my friend Blancombe here happens to have a copy of the Veda, if you do not object to take it from him, perhaps you would be good enough to turn to some passage in which the *Mahéswara*, or great lord, is pointed out as the Deity to be especially worshipped." "Just at present," replied the *Achárya*, "perhaps you will be good enough to excuse me; though many wise men conceive that *Siva* is in the Veda called *Rudra*; but indeed the question is not of any such importance as you appear to imagine: for the *Puránas*, which are also a portion of our sacred scriptures, clearly set forth Siva in the sense which I humbly adopt. If you wish an instance of this, perhaps it may be allowed me to quote to you the *Linga Purána*, in which we read how *Brahmá* and *Vishnu* contended together for the superiority, but were put to shame by the appearance of the fiery column. In vain they both attempted to traverse the extent of that mysterious emblem of lifegiving power; and after observing it to have neither beginning nor end, but that upon its extent was written the triple monosyllable *AUM*, and that from it proceeded the Veda of inspiration, they learnt that the destroyer is also the restorer, and that neither the creator, who indeed only seems to create what has really been before, nor the preserver whose thousands of years, during which he upholds the perishable, are but a moment compared to the larger circle of death and life, are worthy of veneration when compared to Siva, who was before *Brahmá*, and who swallows up *Vishnu*, the puller down and also the rebuilder, who drinks up the worlds and breathes them forth again. Such are the conceptions of the

primeval and archetypal Deity which we gather from the Linga Purána, and which might be confirmed by reference to other Puránas, such as the Matsya and the Kúrma. Nor are they inconsistent, as some strangers appear to insinuate, with the general tenor of the Vedas: for all the hymns in those venerable books are addressed either to some of the divine agencies in nature, as we have already seen, or to some holy beings in whom the excellence of the all-embracing Deity has more especially manifested itself. Nothing then hinders us from saying that Súrya, or Savitri, whether he nourishes or whether he divides the seasons, and the Dawn, and the Stars, and the Skyey Influences in general, as well as Heaven which embraces them all, and Holy Men who by prayer or contemplation have become worthy of a like serene felicity, are all alike manifestations, if our friend here prefers it, I will say of Vishnu, or if any other follower of the Vedas should so require it, I would say of Brahmá, but this or these again both, of Siva, from whom we come, and to whom we go, who was before all thought, and who although he is eternally modified, or rather because he is so, will be for ever one. Satisfied with the calm contemplation of this great truth, I am not much disturbed by little differences, though in themselves persons who introduce such things may be blameworthy, and they should beware of the invisible witnesses who will accompany them to the house of Yama; but leaving all such things, I endeavour to take refuge with the Eternal, that I may escape further contact with this disturbing world, and pass into participation of the unspeakable blessedness of Swarga."

Here the A'chárya paused, but Mountain made no answer, seeming to be either satisfied with what he had heard, or rather perhaps to be considering it inwardly; so Blancombe asked, "What, then, is Swarga?" "By Swarga," answered Vidy-áchárya, "we mean nearly what you term paradise, or heaven. It is the name of one of our places of blessedness; only you need not understand me as if I intended to assign local limits to either that presence of Deity which is universal, or to the abode of

spirit which ought not to be confined. Since, however, men in general approach divine things only by means of parables and images, our scriptures are mercifully adapted to the needs in this respect of people in general; and, if this seemed expedient to divine wisdom even in former times, much more it must be needed in this degenerate age." "I understand," said Blanche; "but this loss of the local appropriation as it were of the term does not appear to deprive you of the happiness which should be connected with it; for you evidently enjoy a tranquillity of mind in the prospect of an hereafter, though in the uncompassable sort of extent of the revolution of life and decay which you speak of, as in the somewhat analogous one mentioned by Sadánanda, my own frail intellect sees matter for awe and blank prostration rather than peace." "Certainly," replied the A'charya, "I enjoy tranquillity, which indeed seems to be the gift of our religion in a greater degree than of any other I have heard of: for in the first place we are taught to subdue all the turbulent passions from which war and misery arise among mankind. To refrain our senses, and to keep them low, has been in all ages the virtue of the Hindús, as you may read it to have been a characteristic of the heroes in our earliest poems. Again, although Manu, our wise legislator, has taught us to consider the duties of life and family as having a certain claim on our regard, we are still permitted after a proper time of life to retire into a state of contemplation. Most indeed of my countrymen, even of the better sort, are prevented by the circumstances of these times from enjoying such a retreat; but to those who do so, what can be happier than to prepare for a higher union with the Eternal Spirit from whom we come? Yet indeed something of the same happiness belongs to every regenerate man; for in the first place he is bathed from sin, since his daily bath represents the purification of his mind; hence Medhátithi, son of Kanwa, divinely sings in a hymn of the Rig-Veda:

'Waters, take away whatever sin has been in me, whether I have done wrong, or have pronounced imprecations or untruth.

‘I have this day entered into the waters : we have mingled with their essence : Agni, abiding in the waters, approach and fill me, thus bathed, with vigour.

‘Soma declares, that all medicaments are in the waters.’ (*Súkta*, xxiii.) Compare Elphinstone’s *Hist. Ind.* Book I. Chap. iv.

Secondly, the regenerate man who is duly instructed in our religion, has the consolation of knowing that the divine benevolence has often been incarnate to deliver the world from evil; hence, whether he worship Rámá or Crishna, or whether he judge otherwise, still he holds in reverential regard that which pious persons declare to be their divinity, and in which he himself also perceives something divine; then again, whatever accidents befall him, he knows them to be the divine rule, and thus he has an unfailing source of tranquillity. With respect, however, to the grandeur of the scale of that vista of things eternal, opened by our religion, we readily confess not every gaze to be so purged that it should sustain the contemplation without being appalled. Surely, you would not yourself say that eternity can be a little thing, or that men whose souls are laden with sins and absorbed in evil passions, can look over such a precipice unamazed. Rather the power of so doing must be the reward of many prayers, and much meditation, and a lifelong struggle; thus to the devout, the resigned, and the passionless, the great God gives justly as a reward the capacity of that divine vision in which all things are very good; and so they return, like sparks re-absorbed into a parent flame, into that one everlasting and unutterable Being, from whom they were separated only by ignorance and then blown about through existence as if by gusts of wind. Why should any one not think such a prospect happiness? To those indeed who separate the divine from humanity or the human from divinity, many things must happen terrible in the progress of this present world. They may lose friends, or suffer pain, and see mankind subject to war and oppression; while it is certain that many living things destroy life, and the wrong in

many ways seems to triumph. Then again, if a man seeks for a reward through human works alone, it is clear that he builds upon the sand, for such things pass away with time, and leave no trace behind. But when a man has learnt that what appears free-will (*Swátantrya*) is really the operation of the Deity, or divine grace (*Iswara-prasáda*) in each part of the whole, and that what seems an individual is really not distinct, then by faith (*Sraddhá*), and by devotion (*Yoga*) resigning what appeared himself more entirely to the guidance of God, he is lifted beyond the reach of accident; and even in this life we think it not absurd for him to be believed to perform supernatural acts<sup>1</sup> (*jivan-múkti*;) then when his soul quits this body, it ascends to the supreme light which is Brahm, and comes forth identified with him, being conform and undivided, as pure water, dropt into the lake, is such as that is.

‘ You in this fair world  
 See some destroying principle abroad ;  
 Air, earth, and water, full of living things,  
 Each on the other preying ; and the ways  
 Of man a strange perplexing labyrinth,  
 Where crimes and miseries, each producing each,  
 Render life loathsome, and destroy the hope  
 That should in death bring comfort. Oh ! my friend,  
 That thy faith were as mine ; that thou couldst see  
 Death still producing life, and evil still  
 Working its own destruction ; couldst behold  
 The strifes and tumults of this troubled world,  
 With the strong eye that sees the promised day  
 Dawn through this night of tempest ! all things then  
 Would minister to joy : then should thy heart  
 Be healed and harmonised, and thou shouldst feel  
 God always, everywhere, and all in all.’ ”

“ All that you have said,” here again remarked Blancombe, “ about the happiness which you conceive to be connected with your views, only renders it more wonderful to me, that you should

<sup>1</sup> Colebrooke, Vol. I. pp. 369, 376.



not attempt freely to impart a knowledge of them to all mankind. No man's light is lessened because his neighbour's candle is lighted, and goodness should not grudge to others a portion of the happiness which it enjoys. Yet you distinctly agreed with Sadánanda, that it was unprofitable, if not wrong, to give all men a knowledge of the sacred books of your faith." "How far it is wrong," replied Vidyáchárya, "ought to be settled by those sacred books from which the knowledge of our religion proceeds; and it might suffice to observe, that we are forbidden in the Rig-Veda to give a knowledge of its contents to a Sudra. But it is more in accordance with my own disposition to remark, that the attempt to raise the mere masses of men, in the manner you recommend, has not been successful. So far indeed as very gross and dangerous errors are concerned, the great Sancara exerted himself with more than human wisdom and energy to root them out; you can scarcely be ignorant, how for example he refuted the worshippers of Sakti, or the mere female principle in nature, as well as the Sauras, the Chárvácas, and if it were not for the Múni who is present, I might truly add the Saugatas. In short, it may be said that every heresy of his time was refuted by him, and that his own doctrine was alike pure and lofty, being a revelation of Brahm, or the eternal spirit, as the one cause and supreme ruler of the world. But 'in the present impure age,' he said, 'the bud of wisdom being blighted by iniquity, men are unable to apprehend pure unity; they will be apt therefore again to follow the dictates of their own fancies, and it is necessary for the preservation of the world, and the maintenance of civil and religious distinctions, to acknowledge those modifications of the divine spirit which are the work of the supreme<sup>1</sup>.' These reflexions having occurred to Sancara, he sanctioned the many varieties of worship which may be found innocently subsisting among us. The reason however of such sanction, you see, is the necessity which arises from the ignorance or fancifulness of mankind."

<sup>1</sup> The passage is quoted in Wilson's *Hindú Sects*, Calcutta, 1846.

“ But is this reason so invincible as you suppose ? ” here again asked Blancombe ; “ or how does such a notion agree with what I understood of your doctrine that all men come from God, and to him, I think you said, they return ? Can there be any radical or insuperable difference between persons of one origin, and perhaps of a destiny ultimately alike ? Or, are we to retract this doctrine of the unity of the human race, inasmuch as we despair of a large part of it ? ” “ Your question implies,” answered Vidyāchārya, “ that there is some inconsistency in deducing all mankind from the divine Being, and again, in making a difference between them. We do however the first, because religion teaches us so, and the second, because experience compels us. Many men appear born into this world under a necessity of sinning and suffering, as the just consequence of their guilt in some former state of existence ; and hence they differ widely from those who by holy living had already almost attained liberation (*mócsa*), and who perhaps are only travelling with pure feet the last stage before their deliverance from earthly life, and their absorption into Spiritual Being. Yet there is nothing in the fact of such difference to interfere with the identity of their original source. In a thousand drops of water you may find a thousand degrees of purity or of muddiness ; yet they may come nevertheless from one fountain, and be slowly or quickly filtering again into the ocean. Just then as one water may be sprinkled in many different-coloured vessels, or as one string may support many beads of coral, thus one soul is diffused through many forms of nature, and supports the bodies of all living things. Or again, as the Moon, though but one, appears multiform in many vessels of water ; thus in all living things, movable or immovable, dwells only one soul, by which this universe was spread out. It is one alike in the Brahman, the worm, and the insect ; in the Chándála, the dog, and the elephant ; nor is it deprived of its identity in the goat or the cow, the gadfly, or the gnat. Yet these humbler creatures no one, I suppose, blames us for not teaching : on the same principle,

then, among men, it is no defect in our religion that the Mlechha differs from the Brahman, or that vicious persons obscure with impurities that in which they participate of the divine soul. Yet for doing so, they will render each man his account.”

“Are we then to understand from you,” asked Blancombe, “that the one divine soul dwells actually in brute creatures, or perhaps by soul do you only mean what we call life, and therefore possibly you assert a certain similarity or unity in kind of the vital principle everywhere?”

“If you prefer,” answered Vidyáchárya, “to mean by soul merely *jivátma*, or the vital principle of animated beings, certainly I shall be slow to contradict you; but the doctrine of the Vedánta-sára, and, as we believe, of the Vedas, is very different. Not but that I know Madhwa Áchárya, though a great teacher, erred in this point, for he distinguished between *jivátma* and *Paramátma* in such a way as to make life different from soul, and communicated to matter by God, therefore so far indissolubly connected with him, but still not identical with him. ‘As the bird and the string,’ said Madhwa, ‘as juices and trees, as rivers and oceans, as fresh water and salt, as man and the objects of sense, so are God and life distinct, and both are ever undefinable.’”

“What you say of Madhwa,” here remarked Blancombe, “makes me desire hereafter to learn more of him; but at present it will be more agreeable that you should proceed to explain how you differ from his doctrine, which appears at first sound not to be an unreasonable one.”

“We then on the contrary hold,” proceeded Vidyáchárya, “that whatever is the internal check in man, and whatever is seeing in man, and whatever is breathing in any man or animal, and whatever is etherial above, and whatever is light in heaven or earth, must each be truly and in its innermost being soul, and soul is in one word God\*; for it can be nothing less, since all things

\* Slightly varied, but essentially the same, is the doctrine of the Bhagavat-gita, in which part of Crishna’s speech has been prettily rendered :

I am the Best ; from me all beings spring,  
And rest on me, like pearls upon their string ;

save itself are inferior to it, and it can be nothing greater, for God is the greatest of all things." "But when you say," asked Blancombe, "that all other things are inferior to soul, you admit a difference in things. Does it not then appear strange to you that such vast diversities and differences of objects should all contain one identity, and that the most divine? When some beings are ignorant, and animals brutish, and light is extinguished before our eyes often, does not it become manifest that God cannot be in all, for their qualities are not such as you would ascribe to Him?" "You have exactly hit," said Vidyáchárya, "the same objection as Madhwa, only he applied it more to the future. He argued that 'from the difference between omniscience and partial knowledge, omnipotence and inferior power, supremacy and subservience, the union of God and life cannot take place.' But then he must have failed to notice, that cause and effect are often dissimilar; yet you see hair and nails, which are without sense, grow from a sentient body; and vermin which have life spring every day from substances without life. The same food is transmuted in the animal frame into all sorts of flesh, blood, and bone; so the same soil produces different plants, and the vast bosom of earth, which is one, becomes pregnant with every variety of vegetable and mineral. There is nothing therefore absurd in saying, that as milk changes into curd, and water into ice, so spirit assumes different shapes; and as the spider spins a thread, such as you might not expect, out of its own substance, so Brahm, being omnipotent, puts forth the world and all that it contains, in

I am the moisture in the moving stream,  
In sun and moon the bright essential beam;  
The Mystic Word in Scripture's holy page,  
In men the vigour of their manly age;  
Sound in the air—earth's fragrant scent am I—  
Life of all living—good men's Piety—  
Seed of all Being—Brightness in the Flame—  
In the wise Wisdom—in the famous Fame.

*Griffith's Specimens of Old Hindú Poetry.*

the infinite modifications of the form which he has thrown around him."

"Perhaps we may consider by and by this answer of yours," said Blancombe; "but in the mean time if the unlikeness of earthly objects to the Divine Being does not compel you, as it compelled Madhwa, to discriminate between them, tell me if a certain reverence towards the Supreme Ruler, whom you justly invoke as the Giver of knowledge, does not teach you to shrink from treading, as it were, upon Him, when you confound that Divine Majesty, to which the wisest of mankind can never even allude without a certain sobering awe, with the meanest of things under our feet? And especially, is it not a matter of trembling that we should make our Master as it were our servant, or our Judge the agent, and therefore a criminal answerable as regards every impure or bestial action into which animals or men may fall?"

"Your question," answered Vidyáchárya, "being a double one, will require a double answer. First, then, our doctrine is so far from being an irreverent one in its tendency, that it rather leads us to reverence every living thing upon this very ground, because it contains in it a particle of the Divine breath. That gross abuse of life, and sensual indulgence in horrible eating of even any animal, which some nations do not scruple to practise, is with us an abomination. As one of your own poets says,—

All shapes that creep, swim, fly, or run,  
Are of the same clear substance spun;  
The elemental heavens are one.

Therefore, instead of lowering God, our doctrine ought rather to be represented as raising all things below. But, secondly, with respect to impurity or sin, which guilty persons may commit, this is not, in so far as they know themselves to be partakers of the Divinity, but in so far as they are ignorant of it. Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the individual soul sympathises with body through its association with it, and although it is guided

by the universal soul of which it is a part, even as being a branch of that great soul-tree which stands firm in the heavens with faces in every direction and embracing all, yet that guidance, you see clearly, can only make it act according to its own acquired propensities; just as the same fertilising rain causes one plant to bear good fruit, and another to grow up barren or poisonous."

"Your answer," said Blancombe, "is certainly very ingenious; but yet it seems to betray the existence of something in the world separate from God, as for instance those very propensities, or whatever it is which produces, or enables the individual soul to acquire them. Here then possibly we ought to inquire what that something is; or perhaps it may lead us in the same direction if I venture to ask, whether the consciousness of every man and all men does not utter an audible protest against all this theory of our imperfect intelligences being identical with the Omniscient, or our weakness, folly, and sinfulness, with the Divine? Do we not feel and know that we are flesh and blood; that the animals around us are even lower than ourselves in the scale of creation; and that the earth we tread is solid matter?"

"Why, that we feel something of the kind, need not be denied," answered the A'chárya, "but that we know it, is quite a different assertion; for, in fact, that very feeling is partly *ajnána* and partly *Máyá*."

BLAN. "By *ajnána* you mean probably ignorance."

VID. "Certainly."

BLAN. "But what is *Máyá*?"

VID. "Clearly, *Máyá* is illusion."

BLAN. "Are we then illuded, when we affirm ourselves to be here present, and to be conversing, as in fact we are?"

VID. "Why, that our souls are here present, I am not obliged to deny; but that they are only present in virtue of the presence so far of the supreme soul, is what I steadfastly maintain; and again, that we are flesh and blood, as you seemed,

perhaps without duly considering it, to say, as if these limbs which may be mutilated in all sorts of ways without destroying ourselves, made up our actual self, is what no pious person could concede. But now, how much of ignorance or mere *ajñāna* there must be in all the conceptions which you have rapidly glanced at, is clear even from the tenor of our conversation; for the Mūni, in expounding the opinions of the Saugatas, has both made the soul to consist in intelligence, which rather belongs to bodily organs, and also has avowedly rejected all our sacred revelation; and again, Sadānanda, because he thinks natural objects act according to their inherent properties, removes all necessity of an Iswara, or supreme Lord; and again, to me that which he calls *pracriti*, or plastic nature, appears to be purely *Māyā*: so that somewhere among us there is certainly ignorance; and no one has yet shewn, at all events, why it should not be ignorance, as I contend, for the individual soul to conceive of itself as distinct from the supreme, rather than to think in whatever way other persons may prefer."

"Well," said Blancombe, "I have to thank you for correcting me as to the flesh and blood; by which, however, all I intended to say was, that there is an external world patent to our observation and consciousness, which I am not able to identify with the essence of the supreme soul."

"Neither do I wish you to do so," answered Vidyāchārya; "but if you wish to avoid ignorance, you must conceive of the external world as *Māyā*."

"Once more, then, will you be good enough to explain to me more distinctly," asked Blancombe, "what you understand by *Māyā*?"

"I will endeavour to do so," answered the A'chārya, "though indeed the subject is a very difficult one. But now you are aware that whatever we feel or perceive externally may fall under some one of three descriptive heads, either under goodness, or passion, or darkness, or possibly under a blending of more than one of them: for either we rejoice, or at least acquiesce in

things around us, or again we are irritated or roused by them, or again we are stupid and bewildered as regards them. These three, then, are the three *Gunas*, which make up what I have heard certain Europeans, in attempting to explain our doctrine, have called the limitations of human thought, but by which I seem to myself rather to mean the conditions of sensation, or the circumstances within the range of which all outward sensation or perception must necessarily fall. You may, if you please, call them impressions, or the three categories of impressions. Most briefly, perhaps, *Máyá*, which comprehends the three, may be termed the seeming of things so and so, however they may seem. That objects, however, seem to us as they are, or even that they are at all in any true sense of being, we have nothing to assure us; for change, fluctuation, misconception or false appearance, and insubstantiality, seem to be their characteristics. This follows as a consequence, partly from what you have heard in the reasonings of our friends here about the difficulty of reaching any substance underlying the manifold appearances of the outer world, and partly from what I have heard European philosophers have argued with more or less subtlety in a similar direction. The existence of a stone or a tree consists, as far as we know, in certain sensations only which we have of its hardness, or its solidity, or its growth; but what is underneath, hard, or solid, or growing, no one has ever manifested, so that in fact it may be called *Máyá* or appearance. Thus the *Múni* almost proved to you that matter is ignorance. If ever, then, the individual soul fancies itself to consist of such appearances, it is as much in error as a man who, seeing a rope coiled up, mistakes it for a serpent."

"But if I understood you aright some time back," Blanche here said, "you objected to the doctrine of the Saugatas or of the Bauddhas generally, that it made the existence of external objects uncertain, and you relied upon our perceptions as sufficient proof to us of such existence. How then do these two positions of yours agree together?"



"They agree well enough," answered Vidyáchárya; "for the Bauddhas, in taking away the substantial existence of external objects, are not careful to put in their place the visible Máyá. Now we do not so much annihilate external appearances, or the results of our perceptions, as resolve them into Máyá. You will perhaps understand me better if I tell you what I once saw on the esplanade at Calcutta. Some Italian stranger, who had come to India by one of your vessels, took whoever chose of the passers by into a darkened chamber. In the middle was a plain white table, and upon this table we were made to see the figures of men, horses, and carriages moving to and fro, as if they had possessed a real life. Yet all this was Máyá; for though the figures moved regularly, yet the table was a plain white surface. Something of the kind again takes place in what you call a magic lantern. There, too, the beholder sees pictures, which if he is simple he may take for realities. Now I do not say that the pictures of the visible world do not exist in some sense, but that they are simply pictures."

"But pray does it not occur to you," again asked Blancombe, "that in the darkened chamber the figures which you saw were reflexions of persons outside, who were actually moving, as you saw their reflected shadows move? So that the Máyá there had a substantial something which it represented."

"Similarly, I doubt not," answered Vidyáchárya, "has the Máyá of the world."

"What, then, is that?" asked Blancombe.

"What can it be," answered the other, "but the picturing energy of the Divine Being?"

"Then if I understand you aright," remarked Blancombe, "all this world is a sort of pictured reflexion of the thought of the supreme *Iswara*."

"You probably are not far wrong," assented Vidyáchárya.

"But, then, why call it Máyá?" asked Blancombe; "for if the Divine Being is Truth, the reflexion of His thought must be true."

“So far,” answered Vidyáchárya, “as men apprehend it for what it really is, the manifestation of the Divine energy, it is true enough; but so far as they take it for a reality in itself, it becomes illusion. In fact, it is appearance caused by God; and this meaning is properly expressed by *Máyá*. Now if I proceeded to say that the world is a sort of dream, I should do violence to the sacred power of sleep: for really in sleep the soul is free from many external illusions, and being undisturbed by the external world, rests in the quiet of the supreme Spirit. But since perhaps you apprehend, as many men do, that sleep is less real than a waking state, you may understand the matter better if I compare the life of an unthinking man to a person dreaming. Just as a dreamer sees things which you would say were only pictures, so the ignorant man awake sees a world of appearances, which he fancies to have some real existence of their own.”

“Perhaps I understand you,” said Blancombe, “though the very explanation is difficult to me; so that I almost begin to doubt what you mean by existing, and what by appearing. I suppose, however, you admit the same things cannot both exist and not exist; which then ought we to affirm of the world?”

“On the contrary,” answered Vidyáchárya, “we hold that things may both be in a way, and not be in a way. What, for example, are we to say of a thing pictured; or again, of a whole series of things ever fluctuating and changing? But of the world this much is clear; so far as any thing truly exists, it does so by virtue of the Divine energy manifesting it; and so far as it does not partake of the Divinity, it is at best mere appearance.”

“In the next place, then,” asked Blancombe, “are we to say that the world is created on the whole by intellect, or by ignorance?”

“By both in a way,” answered Vidyáchárya.

“Pray explain that to me,” said the other.

“We have already seen,” proceeded Vidyáchárya, “that all appearance, or *Máyá*, is made up of three kinds of impressions:

now to apprehend these impressions requires a certain kind of intellect; but to mistake the impressions for substance is again a kind of ignorance. The mere human intelligence, then (*prājña*), being very defective in each individual, both apprehends the impressions and unduly substantiates them, so that it both understands and is ignorant. Now it is evident that, as a wood is not different from the trees which constitute it, so any whole whatsoever is not distinct from all the parts which it contains: therefore all the intelligences of individual men make up one intelligence, and all their ignorances make up one ignorance: again, the higher intellect (*Chaitanya*) of the Divine Being which presents the impressions above spoken of, may be called Iswara, but still is so mixed up with its representations that they become its sheath or its covering; the aggregate then of impressions or ignorances may be called the body of *Chaitanya*; but now farther, just as a wood occupies space, and all spaces require an absolute space, or illimitable expanse, which comprehends them, so even this *Chaitanya* is intelligent only in virtue of that which I despair of expressing in words. It is what we call the FOURTH. Possibly you may rise to a conception of it in this way. A very ignorant person will say when burnt by a mass of ignited iron, that the hot iron burns him; but he means that the heat in the iron burns him. Thus then Intellect, when associated with *Máyá*,—that is, external impressions in general (or when considered together with the organisations which produce those impressions)—is indeed Iswara, and him we address as Brahmá. He is the Creator and the Ruler; but then as heat would not be in the iron, if there were not absolute heat apart from the iron, so neither could Intellect have created objects, or have become associated with *Máyá*, unless it had for its ground an absolute and pure Intellect, which is Brahm, or eternal Spirit, the blessed, the tranquil, the single without duality, and the unutterable God. But again, beware of understanding me as if I thought the trees or the water were distinct from the wood or the pool which contains the aggregate of each; or as if there could be any intelligence dis-

tinct from, and not in virtue of, the One and indivisible, even that beyond the supreme Soul. That then is Brahm, but our sacred books wisely call it *That* (*Tad*), because of the difficulty of expressing it in words. It is the unseen and ungrasped, therefore inexpressible. In your language probably you would attempt to expound our doctrine in some such way as this: There are the impressions of the natural world, which make up one ignorance; there is the individual intelligence of man, which is overpowered by those impressions; there is also the creative or representing intelligence of God, which being possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, and all-pervading, is rightly called the Lord (*Iswara*); this is Brahmá; and beyond these, but containing these, or dwelling in these, is the potential or the præ-creative, (and if such a thing may be said in your language,) the præ-eternal Spirit, before all thought, and itself the possibility of any thinking. That is Brahm. Again, to invert the process, consider it in this way. Out of Brahm comes Brahmá. By Brahmá, associating himself as *Chaitanya* with organisation, and throwing before himself various modifications of Máya, some grosser, and some finer, all things and beings whatsoever there are, consist. Existing by Brahmá, and also his offspring, the human soul shines more faintly, like a spark detached from a fire over which there is a veil, and hence it even supposes in its ignorance that the clothing of organisation given it is something more than an appearance thrown around himself by Brahmá, or the reflexion, as we have already said, of his thought. Otherwise, if the immortal soul within us were mindful of the Being from whom it comes and to whom it is kindred, all earthly actions, and their consequences which are connected with earth, would perish from it; alike its past sins would be blotted out, and its future offences would be prevented. Thus in the *Upanishad* of the *Chándógya* it is written, 'As water wets not the leaf of the lotus, so sin touches not him who knows God; as the floss on the carding-comb cast into the fire is consumed, so are his sins burnt away.' Thus again it is said, 'All

sins depart from him ;' and again, 'The heart's knot is broken, all doubts are split, and his works perish, when he has seen the Supreme Being\*.' For indeed, my friend, we are not ignorant any more than yourselves, that neither sin, which is of passion and darkness, nor any earthly act, which must be of imperfect goodness, can abide in the heart and consciousness of him who has looked upon the unveiled being of the blessed and indivisible ; but rather such things are burnt away by gazing on that heavenly presence, as alloy is purged by fire out of gold. Only perhaps the consequences of past sins may remain even with pure knowledge for a little time in life, as a wheel continues turning from some former impulse even after the hand which turned it is removed. But at least, when liberated from the body, the soul of one who has attained such blessedness of knowledge goes straight by the shortest way, whether it be, as some hold, through the solar rays and the realm of fire, to the abode of the Gods, and from thence, being helped at each stage by the presiding deities who for that object chiefly dwell at convenient distances, it is conducted, like a faint person by a guide, until it enters the realm of Indra, and thence attains the very abode of Prajápati, who is no other than pure Brahm—or even if the path of spirit should be in any respect different from that which our sacred books have presented to the imagination in wise parables—still in any case the soul which has never prostrated itself in worship to any meaner or more earthly being, but gazed steadfastly with the eye of devout knowledge upon That ineffable, which is without stain as it is without duality, goes straight whatever may be the shortest way, to reunion with the pure and divinest being of Brahm, and having been long ago freed from every trammel, or impression, or personality, is restored to Oneness, becoming therein not a thinker, but thought ; not omniscient, but omniscience ; not joyful, but very joy. Not indeed that I myself,

\* These striking passages are quoted in Colebrooke's *Essays*, Vol. I. 'On the Vedánta.'

my friend, (would that it were so!) profess to have attained as yet the certainty of this blessedness, but rather shall count myself happy if I gain possession of the lower liberation which belongs to the humbler feelers after immortality. Yet the impediment alike to greater achievement by myself, and which prevents so many men from even thinking of these things, or suspecting their own glorious capacities, resides chiefly in that which we have already spoken of as the first when we began with the outer world, but which now having begun with That ineffable, we shall inversely and less properly call the fourth, namely, Máyá: for the human soul, being cased in a body, as in a succession of sheaths, the first of which is intellectual or apprehensive, and the second affectionate or capable of joy and grief, and the third merely psychic or vital, unites itself with these so as to form a personality, and thus individualises itself in isolation from the supreme soul; therefore also in its many passages from life to life the unhappy soul of man carries with it this subtle body above spoken of, and thereby is constituted what we call a person, being subject to many pains and bereavements, as well as necessities of sinning, each of which in turn entails, by the righteous decree of the Gods, a necessity of also suffering; so that for many ages, to which I dare not ascribe either beginning or ending, it is possible for a wretched soul, thus carrying with it that subtle body which makes it a person, to be born in various stages of less or more degradation, as well as between each birth renewed to undergo whatever scourges the invisible Justicers may inflict. But besides this subtle body is also the grosser frame, which perhaps the very ignorant or animal among men would consider as our true body, by which men feed and grow, and do all things animal, whether seemly or unseemly. Of course it is evident that of such bodies as this outer frame, one soul may inhabit many in turns, being born either among the brutes, if it has so deserved, or again in the human form among Mlechhas or Chándálas, if it be somewhat better; or again, among those races which have not fallen so far from the

Divinity, and whose bodily frame is somewhat less coarse, and affects less injuriously the operations of the soul. We need not then wonder if any particular soul, being incased in so many sheaths, becomes obscured so as to burn dimly; or if, in its ignorance, it converts the impressions, whether dreams, or pictures, or shadows, or by whatever name you please to call them, of the outer world, into substantial realities, thereby creating what some men absurdly call matter, fancying perhaps that the primeval Spirit is inferior to *Pracriti*; or even dreading, with the *Chárvácas*, lest, consisting itself of mere material atoms combined, it may perish, when the grossest and most external of all its bodies is dissolved. Such and so great may be the ignorance of any particular soul; and the ignorances of all human souls together compose, as it were, what they call the world, out of *Máyá*; whereas the world is really, if you can apprehend it, only the body of *Brahmá*; that is to say, it is the aggregate of appearances, which He, the Creator, the Lord, and the Omniscient, has thrown around Himself as the embodiment of His thought, and even associated Himself therein, as intelligence, with all the forms of organisation. Supposing, therefore, any one chooses to call what some persons call matter by the more philosophical term of ignorance, I see no objection to such a mode of designating it. Perhaps also now you begin to understand with what meaning I declared the world to be created in part by intellect and in part by ignorance. Just as it was the heat contained in the iron which burnt, so it is intellect expressing and embodying itself in appearance which creates; or in other words, that which is truly creative is either *Brahm*, or partakes of *Brahm*; yet as man might affirm, the heated iron burns, so it may be asserted that ignorance, that is, what some call matter, being impregnated, or more correctly it should be said *animated*, by intellect, bodies forth the world; and here you will no longer doubt that you have together the body and the soul of *Brahmá* the Creator; nor will I run the risk of confusing you, as perhaps I might do by many distinctions, if I paused to explain nicely how, as the



human soul has four sheaths of body, so the Creator also has various bodies, more or less subtle or gross; [and indeed some wise men represent four forms of intellect, all distinguishable from Máyá, namely, the feeble in each man (*prájna*), and the collective in all humanity (*vaiswánara*), and the divine intellect pervading creation (*Chaitanya*, as Iswara) and then the Fourth, which is *That* unutterable One, nor do I say that such is not the most correct distinction;] but it is now clear to you in what sense ignorance as well as intellect creates the world."

"I have been humbly and sincerely endeavouring," here said Blancombe, "to understand you; but I fear that the partition wall is not yet broken down between the British and the Hindú intellect, or else perhaps you use the word ignorance in a somewhat different sense from any we are accustomed to, such as possibly putting an active substantive for a passive verbal, and by the term unknowingness meaning rather what we should call unknown. Shall I, however, understand you to mean a doctrine of this kind; that collective *Máyá* which comprehends the three *gunas*, or descriptions of appearances in the natural world, is in regard to man's senses illusory, unsubstantial, and fluctuating, but in itself, so far as it is any thing, or rather perhaps, since you call it unsubstantial, I should say in its relation to the Deity, it is the play of the Divine energy, and scarcely even so much as the dress of thought, but the very thought of spirit made visible: for from the very grand and meditative character of a large part of your doctrine, I am sure you do not imagine that the Deity is illuded."

"Very far from it indeed," answered Vidyáchárya; "nor do I know that any stranger has ever penetrated our meaning better than you now appear to have done. It is a pleasure to me to converse with a sober person, who, instead of cavilling at our language before he understands it, will endeavour to penetrate its meaning in a spirit amicable towards ourselves, and reverential towards the great Being of whom we inadequately reason. Henceforward you at least will be in no danger of misapprehending



our doctrine of the nature of soul, as if we imagined its true being to be fully expressed by the mere metaphors applied to it in the Vedas, as for instance when it is compared to a favourite son; nor will you accuse us of confounding it with the gross body, as some Chárvácas do; nor again, as others, with the more subtle organs; nor of making it the mere breath of life; nor of substituting for it the sensuous and affectionate mind; nor yet will you regard us as making the soul what many Bauddhas make it, our own intelligence or self-consciousness; nor, as certain Prábhácaras say, that ignorance or *substratum* in which our intelligence dwells changefully, being more or less from time to time; nor again,—which however would be rather more plausible, and not far from the truth,—will you consider us to compound soul out of our own intelligence and the ignorance or *substratum* animated by it; nor, lastly, will you accept the term *void* which certain Bauddhas offer you as an adequate description of the mysterious nature of the soul; but deeper than all these, and beyond these, and finer than these, yet bodying them all forth so far as they have body at all, you will clearly apprehend soul to be unseen and ungrasped, being thought, knowledge, and joy, and no other than very God.”

“I listen thankfully to your explanation,” here said Blancombe, “though not without a kind of awe at your conclusion. It also rather puzzles me that you speak of intelligence (*buddhi*) in the sense perhaps of what we generally term apprehension, and again, you speak of knowledge and joy, without clearly defining to whom each of them belongs. For example, whose property is intelligence?”

“Intelligence,” answered Vidyáchárya, “resides in organisation.”

“And organs?” asked Blancombe.

“Organs,” proceeded the other, “invest soul.”

“Then soul,” argued Blancombe, “seems to be your *substratum* of all things, which, considering what you have assumed soul to be, is not unreasonable. Only you added that the soul is

very thought; but thought must belong to some one; who then is the thinker?"

"The thinker," answered Vidyáchárya, "and the thought are One."

"Here, then, I am puzzled," resumed Blancombe, "and perhaps you will be good enough to remove my difficulty."

"What is it?" asked the other.

"Something of this kind," proceeded Blancombe: "in saying or doing any thing you start from some point. That point is placed, or put down as the beginning. In short, it is the subject. Thus a subject in speaking is the name which goes before the connecting-speech, or the nominative case to the verb; and again, a subject in action is the agent which looks at or acts upon something else. The subject, then, is not the same as that something else beside it, which may be called the object. Still less is it the same as its own action or contemplation, for it may cease to act or contemplate, and still be in its place. It does not then appear easy to understand people who compress the subject, and either the characteristic which may be asserted of it, or the object upon which it acts, or its action as regards that object, all into one identity; for they seem virtually to make no difference between cause and effect, or between agent, acting, act, and thing acted upon; so that, if the realities of the world corresponded to such men's reasonings, all opposites and distinctions, such as fathers and sons, friends and enemies, rulers and men ruled, would be confounded together. Some such difficulty as this appears to me to wait upon your conception of the thinker and the thought being all one. Or, again, if the thinker be merged in thought, so as to have no other self-substantiality, I fear our metaphysics will be in the same danger as that ingenious fable which is in some of your Indian books, about the earth resting on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise with nothing under it; for we shall have reasoned so as to make all things, without being balanced too against each other, hang upon nothing."

“Then it appears,” resumed Vidyáchárya, “that I must go somewhat farther. It is curious that you should have fallen upon the same difficulty as Canáda and other doctors of the Vaiséshica philosophy, which is employed about the particular parts of nature. They too, being ingenious men, but unable to grasp either nature or divine wisdom as one whole, thought it necessary to divide all things under certain descriptive heads, (*padárthas*) such as, perhaps, you would call categories. Thus they came upon the notion of there being what they called substances, and these substances they made nine in number, such as earth, water, light, soul, and the rest. Here, if it were necessary, I might remark how their own ingenuity deceived them, when they enumerated among such substances even time and space; to which it is only wonderful that they did not add nonentity, or classification, or arrangement; for these would be evidently as much substances as those. But it is more to the purpose for me to illustrate your difficulty by remarking, that although the Veda says distinctly, Brahm is eternal knowledge and joy, yet the followers of Canáda interpret this text as meaning that Brahm is the possessor of knowledge and joy; for they fancy that they must have what you call a subject, or a sort of substance, in which these things may reside as qualities, or to which they may belong as properties. Their difficulty then seems to be pretty much the same as your own. In the particular objection too, which you apparently have to the identification of Deity and his outshadowing, because you think there must be a certain chasm between the subject and object, or as in this case you would say, between the maker and the thing made, you again resemble Madhwa, and perhaps come very near indeed to the Pásupatas. They have just such a conception of the creature being distinct from the Creator as I gather from your difficulty must reside in your mind. Yet probably you would allow that the flowing stream may be considered as one with its fountain, and that any person’s preferring to distinguish them by two names does not distract their essen-

tial oneness. Nor, again, is it to be denied that the calf, whether an embryo or just born, may justly be called one with the cow, of whose substance in a way it comes. We, for our part, consider that there are two sorts of meditation, (*Samādhi*); namely, one which recognises distinctions such as this between the knower and the thing known (*Savikalpaca*), and another, which sinking all such distinctions (*Nirvikalpaca*), lays hold of the essential oneness in the projector and the thing projected, or in the thinker and the thought. Now this last kind of meditation, which is the highest, is neither disturbed nor puzzled by mere modifications of that which it knows to be essentially one. For instance, cold and heat are only different degrees of what is essentially one thing, namely, temperature. Or you may take for a good example, speech, and that which you call action. What underlies and animates speech is thought, for without thought it would be no longer speech, but merely noise. He then who recognises the oneness of speech and thought, preserves both, yet as one; but he who separates speech from thought, thereby annihilates while he endeavours to make it independent. Similarly action, if it be not animated by thought, is no longer acting. But we must also acknowledge farther, that the same Being may think of himself; he then being one becomes two, that is, two as the thinker, and the thing thought, yet remaining essentially one. He is no more multiplied in essence than any human body is changed by the modification of what is called time, or by change of place, or by accident of colour. Just as neither time, place, nor colour, change essence; so neither does modifying self-contemplation, or appearance, multiply the Supreme. The case is not unlike that of a man gazing in a mirror, and beholding himself so that he becomes both the subject seeing and the object seen in one; only that you will readily allow the primeval Spirit could have no mirror save his own thought which he threw forward out of himself. Here then we come back to that same appearance in three kinds of modification, which has now been several times spoken of,

namely, *Máyá*. Have you still, my friend, to apprehend that the same appearance, which to men from their ignorance is illusion, is also on the side which more nearly resembles substantial reality, that which the Rig-Veda calls *Vách*, namely, the speech of the primeval Spirit, the eternal yet transitory daughter of Brahmá. ‘I uphold,’ she says, ‘both the sun and the ocean, the firmament and fire, and both day and night. Me the gods render universally present everywhere, and pervader of all beings. Even I declare this self, who is worshipped by gods and men ; I make strong whom I choose ; I make him Brahmá, holy and wise. For Rudra I bend the bow, to slay the demon foe of Brahmá ; for the people I make war ; and I pervade heaven and earth . . . . Originating all beings, I pass like the breeze ; I am above this heaven ; beyond this earth ; and what is the great one, that am I.’ This same *Vách*, many wise men say, should be understood by *Sachi*, the wife of Indra ; for her name too signifies speech. Yet speech, we have seen, is nothing without thought. Hence it cannot be wrong to say, with our religious books, that, before any of these worlds, or sky, or aught above it, before day and night, and before death or immortality, the same *Vách* was sustained unshaken within the primeval Spirit, who was alone, breathing without breath. Besides Him nothing was yet, which since has been. First in his mind then was formed desire, which the wise recognise by the intellect in their own hearts, as the link of being where as yet is nothing. This sustained within Brahm, therefore, (*Swadhá*) becoming *Vách*, the daughter of Brahmá, presents herself throughout all worlds as *Máyá* ; so that whatever is anywhere seen in creation is the voice of the creating God, and His voice is the thought of the eternal Spirit. The appearance of all creatures is the voice of the Creator, and that again the volition of the Eternal.”

While Vidyáchárya was uttering the last three or four sentences, Blancombe appeared to be listening most attentively, and yet to be half lost in wonder ; for he exclaimed to himself

unconsciously, yet half aloud so that I could hear him, "How wonderful! wonderful alike in its resemblance, and in that, resembling so nearly, it still differs so much!" But at the pause, he said, "So far I have no great difficulty, however much in one respect you may astonish me; but still the essential difference between the thinker and the thought is a sort of chasm which to my feeble apprehension is not quite bridged across." "Perhaps, then," resumed Vidyácharya, "you have not sufficiently noticed how the same man often thinks of himself in different lights, and as it were from different points of view, according as he rejoices or mourns, justifies his own conduct or condemns it, and conceives of himself again as contemplated by other persons who pass their several judgments upon him. Yet many a man's mind is in reality a sort of inward drama, in which he being one plays in himself many parts, and sees in himself many apparent objects. So the Deity, throwing forth His own thought, throws forward Himself, and as on one side He contemplates Himself, so on many other sides all human beings contemplate the reflexion or the embodiment of his thought in a thousand various modifications as it happens to be presented to each; so that hence they call the world what is truly appearance, and the appearance is the outshadowing of the projected self of the Eternal Spirit. Just then as one man gazing upon many figures fashioned in clay might affirm, These are elephants, or tigers, or cows; but another might as truly say, All these are porcelain or clay; so the truly instructed will say of all living forms in creation, These are the appearances of the thought of the Eternal as He comes forth from Himself, and modifies Himself in infinite varieties of outshadowing. He then is not only the potter, but also the clay; for out of His thought the world is fashioned; by His life things live; and in Him everything rejoices. Only these appearances in which He dwells are indeed subject to the limitations already spoken of as the *gunas*; whereas no one can piously ascribe any such fetters, or sensations, or conditions, to the Supreme; and Him

therefore we call *Nirguna*, the free from all qualities. Here then, lest you should repeat to me the old difficulty which you have in common with Madhwa and the Pásupatas, how things subject to the *gunas* can be the same as the one *Nirguna*, let this suffice for an answer; it is the necessary condition of Knowledge coming into contact with Ignorance; or, in other words, the Illimitable can only mirror forth His thought by making its reflexion subject to limitations. Just then as one sun being reflected in many parts of water, has his brightness agitated in many or in fewer of them, as may happen at any time, yet is free from agitation; so the Supreme Soul putting itself forth in subjection to the trammels of feeling, whether goodness, or passion, or darkness, is yet free from trammels, being tranquil, and without duality. That human soul, therefore, which would be reunited, as a ray of light with the sun, must become daily more independent of all earthly sensations, and doing good acts rather than bad ones, yet not resting in any earthly acts soever, since all are alike perishable, must take refuge alone with the Eternal."

"I seem now," remarked Blancombe, "to have come as nearly perhaps to an understanding of your doctrines as it can well be in the nature of things for me to arrive; and after troubling you with so many questions, I will not weary you farther at present with doubts how far all your own expressions and those of your religious books cohere together in a system. In some respects, indeed, it appears to me there is less difference between your doctrines and those of some Indian speculators, as for instance, the Baudddhas, than you apprehend to be the case; for particular words seem to be used by you in different senses, rather than opinions radically different to be intended. But let that point now stand over. Yet here is a little difficulty which occurs to me. You began, if you remember, by explaining to me some of the sacred names in the Rig-Veda, and also you magnified Siva as the deity to be especially honoured. But in all this latter part of your discourse, in which you have



unfolded to me the profounder philosophy of your belief, all those names of the Rig-Veda have entirely disappeared, and not only is Siva left unmentioned, but the room which he might occupy seems assigned to a far earlier tenant. At least I understand that the province of Siva is to destroy what exists, and in destruction to reconstruct. Surely then creation must have gone first, as indeed you appear to lay down, when you make *Máyá* the earthly appearance of *Vách*, the heavenly daughter of *Brahmá*, and again identify her with the volition of that Spirit whom you consider so absolutely primeval, that to describe the absence of anything else you lavish phrases expressive of nothingness. Surely you meant me to understand all this of a beginning prior to any manifestation of the power of Siva?" "Certainly, you are quite right," said *Vidyáchárya*, "in your conception that I spoke of a beginning." "Then why not worship the author of that beginning?" asked *Blancombe*. "I have no objection to do so," answered the other, "and I trust you do not understand us to reverence under the form of Siva any other spirit than that which has been distinctly set forth to you as supreme, and without duality." "Very well; yet why as the destroyer, rather than as the Creator?" asked *Blancombe*. "You seem to think," answered *Vidyáchárya*, "that we have started from the wrong point of the cycle; and certainly we are not unaware that the beginning of this *Cali* age, for example, has already been, and its end is not yet arrived. But what, my friend, must have been before it began? Surely there must have been an end of all the former ages. You have travelled, as I believe, in that mountain range which our inspired ancestors happily termed in Sanscrit the abode of snow; or, at least, you have been in your lifetime upon other mountains. You have observed, then, how each of the lower peaks appears to you in turn to be the last; yet upon reaching its summit, there is perhaps a short descent, and then, peak upon peak again, each perhaps of greater altitude and difficulty; just so is it then with the successive creations of the



world. But still more justly, perhaps, we may compare them to a succession of circles, of which we ourselves stand in one of the innermost, and perhaps the smallest; whenever the line which bounds our immediate vision is broken down, we say, Lo, a beginning; and indeed things begin again and again. But beyond each circle to which the horizon of our contemplation expands, there is again another circle, and another. No Deity, therefore, or, to speak more accurately, no manifestation of the Eternal Spirit in any form can better represent the fluctuation of our worlds, or more worthily receive our homage, than the breaker down and the re-constructor of all things in succession; who Himself never ends, because He is the end of all things, and in Him all things begin again. From this explanation you will already have perceived, both why we worship principally Siva, and why all the benign powers, which are represented in the Rig-Veda as animating the lively agencies of nature, may be considered as forms of Him who is eternally changing, and in change remains the same \*."

\* Vidyáchárya seems to unite in his speech the philosophy of a Vedántist, and the mythology of a worshipper of Siva—things difficult logically to combine. But such inconsistencies ought not to surprise us.

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#### NOTE ON PAGE 74.

In considering whether Varuna be *οὐρανός*, we should remember that in early Hindú cosmogony the heavens are called *the waters*, (as the Hebrews spoke of the waters above the firmament?) and hence Varuna may possibly have got his function as "regent of the waters." Thus some think, that from the ambiguity of the word *Rishi* the seven stars became the seven wise men.

## CHAPTER IV.

## HOW CHÁRVÁCAS MAY BE REFUTED.

Ἐσορῶντες εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ ἀφραστον αὐτοῦ κάλλος, ἐρχόμεθα εἰς ἐννοιαν τοῦ Δημιουργήσαντος, ὡς φησὶ Πλάτων.—*Vet. Schol. in Aristot. Op.* Compare the *Timæus*, p. 47, a, b, c, d, e, (p. 40, ed. Tauchnitz.) ὅψις δὲ—καταστησάμεθα.

There is a spirit in Man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding.—*Book of Job*.

Bene adhibita Ratio docet quid optimum sit; neglecta, multis implicatur erroribus.—*Cicero*.

“WELL,” said Blacombe, “there is one consolatory result from all that has been said hitherto, however much the three doctrines which we have heard expounded may differ, they agree in a confession that there is something immortal in man, for the future happiness of which it is at least part of our business upon earth to provide. For although the Múni seemed to make his tree of eternal intelligence have its root in earth or nature, while the A’chárya rather conceives of his soul-tree as fast rooted in the heavens with its faces in all directions, yet the first conceives of what is rooted in earth as branching up into the illimitable expanse of immortality, and the second makes his heavenly outgrowth drop its pendant boughs along all the worlds, so that, like a venerable banyan-tree, it becomes rooted frequently, and all living things grow, as it were, in its growth. Then again, although our wise friend Sadánanda might seem to have departed much from all others, in that he removes farther from our visible world any need for a presiding and controlling intelligence, yet he too is warned either by nature, or by some monitor either inward or external, of the necessary existence of something, which must survive every possible dislocation of our earthly frame, and which should disengage itself therefore, in time, from whatever may disqualify it for entering

into the mansions of the blessed. Moreover, in the stress which our wise friend justly lays upon knowledge, I recognise an important testimony to the existence and to the value of unchangeable truth."

"Suppose then," proceeded Blancombe, "we all start together from these points on which we agreed, and add to them, if you think proper, any others which are not disputed among us, such as that the Divine Being whom we worship cares at least for man, and has even dwelt either once or oftener in human form upon earth; but in any case let us endeavour both to assure ourselves and to persuade others of the immortality which is reserved for man, and endeavour to spread the knowledge of whatever Divine Wisdom may enable us to lay hold on eternal life. For I suppose there is no danger of any *Chárváca*, such as those whom the Saugata refuses to associate himself with, being able to cheat us out of this hope; or to persuade us that, when this body is dissolved, there remains for the soul no hope of an inheritance to come."

"But, if you will excuse me," said Wolff, about whose lips there had been for some time an occasional twitching, as if he was itching to put in a word, "I am not quite sure that the materialism, as it is termed, of the *Chárvácas* ought so lightly to be set aside. There are at least a few difficulties which they probably would allege if any of their abler champions happened to be present; and such as, if you have no objection, without at all pledging myself as one bound personally by them, I should like, acting only on their behalf, to throw out for your consideration." "They will have in you, I am afraid," remarked Blancombe, somewhat drily, "as I thought, quite as able a champion as they could have found in their own ranks; but pray what are the considerations which you allude to as things which should be taken into account?"

"Why it appears to me," responded Wolff, "that a large portion of what has been brought forward by each of our friends, either in explanation or defence of their several opinions, would

be taken hold of by any perverse Chárváca, as throwing weight, so far as it goes, into his side of the balance. He would assent, for instance, to all that the Bauddha doctor suggested in disparagement of the Brahmans, and their sacred books, while he would embrace, with still greater eagerness, the Sánkhyā doctrine, expounded by Sadánanda, of all things acting according to their properties, and especially the notion that intellect, or perceptive apprehension, is only an evolution of matter; while, again, he might take occasion from the Vedantine subtleties about non-duality (*Adwaita*), to reject so clumsy a contrivance for explaining the world as that of matter and spirit; only instead of refining away the positive, and taking refuge in the impalpable, as the A'chárya has done, he would rather take his stand upon the solid substratum of the visible world, and desire farther proof before he assented to the necessity of anything else existing than that sensuous matter, which is evidently capable of being refined into sentient life, and which, when duly comprehended, seems alone to furnish as probable a solution as any one is, of the riddles of the world." "To be quite candid," proceeded Wolff, "we must observe, that whatever has been said of the fixed character of natural processes, and of the regular order in which all things proceed, or revolve, might be made to tell strongly on the side of any thorough materialist. If the control of any Deity is, as the Bauddha tells us, unnecessary, why should we imagine such a Being even to exist? Again, if things act according to their properties now, why should not they always have done so? Or why do we talk of beginning and ending? where, perhaps, there may be no room, certainly I see no necessity, for either." "But how do you account for the world's being?" some one here asked. "I might just as well inquire of you," replied Wolff, "how would you account for its not being, supposing there was no world. For there are only two contingencies open to supposition. Either the world was to exist, or not. The chances may have been equal either way, and I am no more bound to account for the

one, than you are for the other. There are many things difficult to explain; but we must not therefore have recourse to an untenable explanation. For example, upon the principles of most of the persons here present, the existence of a Deity is a mystery, which they cannot explain; but they do not therefore deny it. What if in the same manner I fully admit the existence of matter in general to be difficult of explanation; yet as a necessary preliminary to my own body I may consider it as necessary as others consider a supreme Spirit, and I may assume the one as my starting-point, just as priests in general may assume the other. Not that again I see any radical objection to admit of the Spirit of life as pervading matter; though, since life is not everywhere, it seems to be rather a product of particular forms and conditions of matter. But if we only assume existence in any sense, things must exist in some way; and that the way of their actually existing in our world is not the most intrinsically spontaneous, or the most likely product of the doctrine of chances, you would find it, perhaps, more difficult to make good than you may expect."

"Not that I am ignorant," proceeded Wolff, "of all that has been said by pious people on the subject of design; for they conceive themselves to find in the world certain traces of contrivance, which they argue must imply necessarily a designing or creative mind. Upon the whole of this topic, however, I am entirely agreed with the wisdom of the Sāṅkhya philosophers. They justly observe, that if a minute design had either arranged the several parts of our system, or if a special Providence controlled them severally in their motions, the result attained in each case would be far more perfect. For whether you suppose that goodness, or happiness, or anything else, is willed by the Creator, you do not find it produced so as to correspond with the will which you imagine. Nor do I speak here of what you would say results from the wickedness of man, but of things which would be parts of what you consider the original scheme. The seeds of life, for example, are scattered upon barren and

inhospitable shores, where they languish or perish ; desires are implanted in man, which in many cases he can never hope to gratify, but without the gratification of which he cannot be happy ; and if, by some perverse logic, you resolve this necessary disappointment into the fault or sin of mankind, you still observe the rest of the animal creation, without any such sin, are liable to similar sufferings ; nay, they seem even appointed to prey upon each other ; and thus mutual rivalries and lusts and slaughters, such as one of the speakers to-day has termed cannibalisms, come in aid of that stock of pain which was already engendered by the unequal operations of nature—storm and shipwreck, earthquake and pestilence, tropical fevers and Arctic freezings, with all the accidents of fire and water—which confirm what our friends here believe of Nature being blind, rather than any theory of her manifesting a creative design.

“ But, indeed, the pious people to whom I have alluded do not seem to reflect, that what they call proofs of design should rather be termed conditions of existence. Either water is to flow, or it is to stand still ; if it is upon a declivity, I want no design to account for its flowing down, rather than up, or for its cleaving itself a channel, which in time will be a torrent, and which men will call the handiwork of God. Thus, if a plant is to live, it must struggle forth into the light ; and all the organisation, which botanists explain, of stem and bark and leaves and calyx and blossom, with the moisture feeding it from below, and the air from above, are only circumstances, or conditions, within which alone earth and air and water could be refined into a tulip or a rose. The case, as regards the higher forms of life, is essentially the same. There is no chemist who cannot explain to you the proportions in which various earths are mixed, or ought to be mixed, together in our bodies ; and there is no part of our intellectual functions which may not be sufficiently explained by reference to the organs of which we are made, and the order in which they are disposed. Not that I deny the organising breath of life, as it is the last refinement of nature, so to be most subtle

in its operations, and most difficult to apprehend. There is no reason, however, for making it different in man from what it is in the elephant, or for supposing it to be any other than a product of sensuous matter. But so much of the systems of some one or other of our three friends might here be quoted in his favour by any materialising Chárváca, that it is needless for me to dwell longer on that point.

“Perhaps, indeed, with reference to any supposed author of the conditions of life already spoken of, it might be safer to observe a guarded neutrality, not very unlike that of the Saugata Múni, than either to adopt the direct negation of Sadánanda, or the positive dogma of Vidyáchárya. All that need be said on this branch of the subject is, we have no evidence of a supreme and designing *Iswara* so cogent as to justify us in making it an article of necessary belief, instead of rather leaving the whole question, as being a very intricate one, to the researches of speculative men. But the weak point in each one of the systems which has been expounded, is evidently that at which they begin to insist on a future state, as a thing either of certainty, or of imminent concern. As to those arguments indeed of an historical kind, which may be drawn from a supposed revelation, perhaps I am not quite competent to deal with them. But on this head it may be sufficient to balance the Saugata and Vidyáchárya against each other. When they have fully agreed, which of their opposite revelations has the greater claim on my acceptance, it may be time for me to consider it. But upon what ground the philosopher Sadánanda should agree with them in such a general principle as that of a future state, fairly passes my comprehension. The same life which dwells in man is also the vital principle of beasts, and since we do not find it careful to reanimate in their case the forms which it has once tenanted, and which have perished from its grasp, why should we imagine it to act differently in the case of man?

“We can have done nothing, as two at least of the speakers already agree, to merit a renewal of that life which it is sufficient

for us to have once enjoyed. The foundation for a hope of its revival seems either to be a certain knowledge which we are supposed to attain as an immortalising principle, or else the identity of our souls with the supreme Being. If then that knowledge be a dream, and that fancy of identity a delusion, what becomes of the inference which has been drawn from them? In fact, if our perception be the product of *Pracriti*, as *Sadánanda* informs us, or, as perhaps we should say, of organisation, there is no manner of reason, as Dr *Blancombe* justly suggested, for importing the supposition of a soul. For why humanity, or its life, should be like a stage-play, I cannot pretend to understand.

“Upon the whole, the simplest mode of belief appears also the more rational; or so at least the *Chárváca* might argue. He might plausibly enough urge, that no sufficient ground has been shewn for suppositions which are unnecessary either to the happiness of life, or to the logical completeness of our theories respecting it. Say anything that you please, of man being a higher and a more conscious form of life than a vegetable, or a being of nobler destiny than the short-lived beasts of the field; but any firm arguments for removing him out of the same great order of nature, and placing him apart, as a sort of supernatural visitor in this life, and by right an heir of immortality, are as yet to be adduced by the defenders of that theory.”

Some such sentiments as the above were propounded by *Wolff*, half in the person of a *Chárváca*, and half (as it appeared) in his own. But I confess that I may not have done full justice to him, for his speech was longer than I have reported. He said a great deal about the influence of climate and soil upon mankind; how some men under the sun of the Tropics became negroes, and others amid Northern snows were bleached and stunted into dwarfs; how the thoughts of men were as much the creation of circumstances as their forms; how imagination in all ages had been active, and all religions were so blended with error, that it was difficult to disengage the modicum of truth; how again, if spirit and matter were distinct things, it would be



impossible for the two ever to come into intelligent contact ; how some might consider the two as eternally incompatible, and others make form an out-bodilying of spirit, and others fuse the two into one self-modifying and self-contemplating consciousness, or activity ; but how all difficulties were best solved by the simple expedient of considering matter as the starting point of speculation, and then imagining this matter to be refined into various forms of life ; which, having enjoyed their day, might be again recast into new forms of inertness or activity, as the case might be. In some parts of his argument it nearly resembled that of the Saugata, except that he entirely rejected the religious teaching of Sákya, as a rule of life ; but again he allowed a certain weight to the humane affections and aspirations after good in general, which he represented as being in man something like flowers upon trees, the legitimate, and perhaps ornamental, outgrowth of our development. All such things, however, he contended, ought to be rigorously restrained within limits, lest, being natural in some men, they should be enjoined as a law upon others, who had no such tendency, and in whom it could only be a weakness or a servitude.

From these hints you will readily conjecture the nature of the man. Perhaps also you will be able to divine how each of the native disputants endeavoured to refute him. For example, they each and all appealed to their various sacred books, of which there is more to come hereafter. The Saugata seemed to lay much stress upon the necessary tendency of good men to grow upwards in a kind of devout intelligence. Sadánanda again urged the general need of some worship, and appealed to the consciousness of mankind for proof that soul exists within us as a spectator, and that it is something different in kind from the material agencies of life ; nay that it is even known by itself with more certainty, as of self-recognition, than they can be observed. But the more difficult arguments were those of Vidyáchárya. They turned partly on authority, and partly on moral grounds, but still more upon some subtle metaphysics, by

which he shewed all this material world to have no more solid existence than pictures or shadows in a dream, so that the only remaining substantiality was, as he argued, the eternal thought, or all-embracing spirit, of which he had before spoken. But, I must confess, that in listening to all this discussion, I lost occasionally the thread, and became so confused with over-strained attention, as not always to know upon which side any one of the party was arguing, or what he intended to prove.

After some time, however, Blancombe again spoke. "Well," he said, "it would not be easy for me to profess entire adoption of the sentiments of any one of the speakers hitherto. But, if my vote were to be given with either of the two parties into which this stage of the discussion is splitting us, it would certainly be with those who maintain a hope beyond the grave, rather than with the saddening ingenuity, which has endeavoured to take it away. Perhaps, after all the wisdom which has been exerted on the same side, it may be of no great use my speaking; yet, since there are some considerations which have not been brought forward, and which, without being distinctively Christian, still harmonise with the faith which we entertain, perhaps you will not refuse to take them into the general reckoning." Being here encouraged by the company, who were evidently disposed to be attentive, Blancombe then proceeded:—

"As we are sitting with our eyes more or less directed to each other, it is sufficiently clear, how much of our knowledge is gained through the faculty of sight. Nor would there be much use, in the presence of persons who have analysed the human frame pretty exactly, if I were to enlarge upon the other senses, such as our power of hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, if indeed these three last, or rather the whole five, are not simple modifications of one, namely, touch; or rather, of nervous sensation. All these, however, may be called the five messengers, as in some of your books I have seen them called; for by their means all kinds of intimations from the external world are conveyed to whatever constitutes our self, or, as

some of you say, mimics a personality within us. But we feel in ourselves at least one kind of knowledge, sufficiently distinct from perceptions derived through the senses, though not unconnected with them. For we not only record and classify our perceptions, but we form judgments upon them; and draw all sorts of inferences from them. This internal faculty of judging, which seems to me what I should call my self, but which any one who pleases may call the subtle person, or by any other name, does not always accept appearances as they strike the eye, but brings them as it were to its own tribunal, and judges them by a law of its own. Often, even although the bodily senses may affirm them positively, it rejects them as not true, or condemns them as it were to annihilation, if they contradict this mental law, which is in whatever way established."

"But may I interrupt you for a moment?" here interposed Wolff. "If you please," said the other. "Suppose then," said he, "our reason (as you think) rejects things manifestly contradictory or irrational as untrue, however strongly a diseased vision may paint them, still is this law of reason anything more than a collective inference, or a generalisation from things already observed? Or what is reason itself, but taking account of things perceived? Ratiocination comes out of counting, and perhaps counting from the formation of our fingers. So that, in fact, is it not the majority of appearances, after all, which being treasured in the memory, overbear the minority? Your mental law then, as an offspring of the mind, vanishes."

"Why," answered Blancombe, "there are wise men who hold, in opposition to what you have advanced, that pure reason, or the very power (and perhaps I may call it the ghostliness) of the mind, sees truths with as direct an eye of its own, as the life in the body apprehends external objects; and this directness of vision may be called intuition. All the highest and most general truths, either of a moral or an intellectual kind, are, as such persons conceive, presented to that power in the soul, which is the most godlike and illimitable element in its being,

so that it seizes upon them intuitively, and, in virtue of such appreciation of primal truths, becomes able to talk with the unseen destinies, which have moulded the remotest Past, and will direct the course of the Future for ever. But for my own part I must confess a suspicion, that what is often called intuition, is, in fact, only a rapid inference; and I have not argued as if the law, by which our mind tries appearances, would have been apprehended as it is in the present life by the mind itself; if it had not been first educated for the scene with which it is here conversant through those very perceptions which furnish it with facts to reason upon, though certainly not with the power which reasons. But even the act of comparison, without which the mind could not classify things, putting like to like, and setting inconsistencies asunder, alone implies a faculty quite distinct from any bodily organ. If indeed any one likes to say that it involves mental intuition, I will not object to it. Only it is sufficient for me to observe, that the necessary order in which perceptions must be noted and brought to account, so as to mould their results into truth, is not itself a product of sensation; but is either some instinct which may be educed from the mind, or rather perhaps a portion of that higher order, which the mind observes to embrace both itself, and all things whatsoever with which it comes in contact, and which it naturally conceives to imply a Thought, not to say at present a Thinker, presiding over the course of the world. You will perhaps catch my meaning more clearly, if you remark the different use made of the same appearances by a man in his sound senses, and a madman. There is such a thing as madness, and the sensations of persons suffering from it are often very acute. Yet they, seeing the same things as other men, draw most absurd and distorted inferences, for want of that controlling faculty which compares and arranges according to the law apprehended by the mind. Without then venturing to say that ideas are innate, or even inherent, in the mind, I certainly ascribe to any reasoning man a kind of knowledge, or at least an internal law and a

method of dealing with knowledge, distinct from that of the senses, and I conceive your objection extends only so far as to indicate a part of the instrumentality, just as one may point to a mason's scaffolding or his bricks; but you no more negative the existence of something higher, than in the other case one could argue that a builder had no power of contriving and measuring.

“ If now you ask for specimens of the kind of knowledge referred to, I fully believe that clear instances of it may be found in the general rules of right and wrong, and in all the broad principles connected with the conscience and the affections of man; yet many persons will conceive there to be more evident signs of it in the positive sciences which regard number, quantity, and space. You will tell me, as before, that arithmetic depends upon counting. But you may detach any sort of numbers you please from all sorts of visible objects; and you can deal with them as pure abstractions of the mind. Now it is only when thus abstracted, or set apart from sensation, that numbers acquire that certainty which all the world ascribes to them. People may differ by scores in counting a flock of sheep, and by much more in numbering cowries or sand; but remove your figures out of the range of sensible objects into the intellectual region of pure knowledge, and immediately you have the means of arriving at results, which our clever friend Sadánanda would not hesitate to adopt, and which persons differing from him widely in other things, and in countries far apart, still would never venture to impugn. There is then such a thing as truth, and it can be most irrefragably affirmed of things most within the range of the mind. If I had studied the measurement of space as thoroughly as some neighbours of mine in Britain, I could multiply a number of apposite principles, such, however, as Sadánanda will be good enough readily to recollect for me; for example, that any two sides in any triangle must exceed the third, though we may not have measured with our fingers the particular triangle spoken of; or again, that some kinds of figures, and some numbers, are commensurate; while

others (setting aside the unit) are not so ; or again, that parallel lines will never meet, which we foresee, though we cannot test it to infinity ; or that the whole is more than its part, or that the equal of one of two equals must be equal to the other. For these very simple instances will perhaps serve my argument as well as more abstruse ones. Now all these, and a thousand other such things, are truths intellectual, rather than sensible, though the senses may help in leading us up to them. We are also more certainly persuaded of them, in proportion as the pure intellect has more to do with them. When such things are taken hold of by men of deep thought and patient calculation, they grow up into vast sciences, such as are utterly remote from the ordinary perceptions of mankind, and yet such as are quite indisputably certain, even while they startle us most. You know that the mathematicians and astronomers of India were not uncelebrated in former times. It is related of Bháscara, who is believed to have lived six hundred years ago, that he gave clear solutions of some problems in algebra, which were not known in Europe until four hundred years after his time ; and the same priority is claimed for him as regards a certain method of calculating ; and yet as soon as the result and the method of Bháscara are known in Europe, the truth of the one, and the merit of the other, are immediately recognised ; for it does not depend on local differences, or on any choice of our own, whether we shall acknowledge such truths, or deny them ; because they are evident. You can therefore appreciate the kind of intellectual certainty of which I am speaking.

“Then again it may be worth noticing, that such general truths as are apprehended by the intellect in science, may also be applied to all manner of useful contrivances in the external world. All the practical arts and manufactures flourish most wherever science is cultivated by their side. Whether men make fire and water their servants, compelling them either to draw their chariots, like horses, or to put in motion all kinds of machinery, so as both to lessen human toil and increase the

comforts of life, or whether they extract from the earth minerals and medicines such as ruder ages never dreamt of, you have the intellectual process of knowing in every case supposed as a preliminary. By such means the face of countries has been changed, and nations have attained power or civilisation. Whereas other nations, among whom intellectual knowledge languishes, either gradually lose whatever useful inventions their fathers may have possessed, and fall back into the state of savages, or at least they are outstripped in the race of greatness by more intellectual nations.

“Here then I doubt whether to argue, or only to prepare you for my arguing hereafter, that general principles, or truths of the most intellectual kind, may be observed by us as clearly involved in the very fabric of the world. You see, already, to how great a conclusion this idea points the way. I am not in this place employing the old argument from design, in the sense of adaptation of means to ends, though probably we shall see hereafter that it is a thoroughly sound one. Only, as you have attempted to explain that away, and the refinements of our Sāṅkhyast friend on the subject of Pracriti, as well as his observation of irregularities in the world, will render him unwilling to admit it, so I here suggest to you a distinct idea. The argument from design will apply to such a thing as a watch, or whatever is made with art, by hand. It holds good for the world therefore, so far as any one can reduce the world within that description of things. But now, suppose an artist could throw down the materials of a watch apparently at random, yet really in such definite proportions that they should unite and begin to proclaim the time, the process would be still more wonderful. Or again, suppose he threw on the ground a vast and apparently infinite quantity of materials, with silver, steel, glass, and so on, or even their ruder elements, all in confusion; yet suppose he had so contrived these, that, although the mass was indefinite in quantity, its several parts should unite in clearly defined proportions, so that in each case either a watch,



or something like a watch, should be produced ; and this not so much by special contrivance in each case, as either by the affinities and tendencies skilfully imparted to each kind of component element in the general admixture of materials, or else, if you please, by the unseen hand of the artist associating whatever might duly correspond, you would certainly say, this forecasting power, which implied an intelligence acting upon the most general laws or universal truths, was also a more manifest exhibition of Mind. That then which I would here observe in passing is, if the world does not shew special design in each particular case, it shews something more wonderful. It shews general laws, which imply ideas or thoughts in a mind, which at any rate must be to the whole expanse of the universe nothing less than the mind of a man in proportion to the house which he builds by his mechanical knowledge. An ancient Greek, whose thoughts were somewhat akin to the better wisdom of India, said that God works by geometry ; and in the same sense another said, Mind must be the arranger of the world ; for both, as I imagine, found the most positive and yet the most general ideas to which science leads us, involved as principles in the combination and evolution of the universe. No one, for example, would ascribe a balance on the grandest scale, or the power of maintaining the universe in equilibrium by a combination of opposing forces, to chance ; or imagine it possible without such a knowledge of mechanical principles, as cannot be without Mind. But surely I need not instruct you whose ancestors<sup>1</sup> are said to have suspected the key to the solar system, while the centre of its gravitation was yet inverted in Europe, how wonderfully the planets, of which our Earth is one, revolve around the central orb of the Sun, being at once attracted to him by his greater weight, and yet repelled by the swing of their own career, so that they persist in regular revolution throughout countless years. Why then should I stay to argue, except by a passing

<sup>1</sup> Compare Colebrooke's *Essays*, and Elphinstone, Book III. Chap. 1. and the authorities there quoted.



suggestion, that this wonderful balance, even if it did not minister to purposes of life and beneficence (which however makes my inference stronger), still would come of a law, which implies thought, and that by thinking we are led up to Mind?

“Or again, to take a case, which will fall in tolerably with some of your atomical philosophy to which the Saugata has alluded; though Canáda and his followers among you have very ingeniously reduced the existing forms of life to minute atoms, they were apparently not aware that such atoms combine in certain fixed proportions. For they are not mere particles, consisting all alike of an indiscrete mass, and differing only, or resembling, in size. But they are of different kinds, harder or softer, and heavier or lighter, with different properties of all sorts, such as metals or salts, and so on. These kinds are perhaps upwards of fifty in number. Some of them do not appear to admit of combination, so far as I know; but most of them may be combined and mingled, so that from their mingling, some third thing results as a compound. An atom of hydrogen, for instance, and eight times its weight of oxygen, whether this weight come of one atom or of more, combine in water; or again, an atom of hydrogen and sixteen times its weight of sulphur, give you hydrosulphuric acid. Now these proportions in which the atoms, estimated by weight, are found to combine, are neither arbitrary nor variable. Wherever you have water, you have the same proportion in its elements; and whatever elements combine, do so either in one or more proportions, as the case may be, but not indefinitely, or without a limitation tending to some result, as a mean tends to an end. Again, if two kinds of atoms combine with a third, then they also combine with each other in such degrees or quantities as admit of being compared and measured against the degree of combination with the third; or in such quantities as can be measured, for example, by the numbers one, eight, sixteen, and thirty-two. Perhaps this proportion may be more nicely traced in the rolling fluid of bodies melted and made volatile by heat, or in what are called *gases*, than it can in bodies of a more solid kind.

But so fixed are the proportions of combination, and so evidently natural, that if in experiments you put the right quantities of two kinds of atoms together, they will all mingle, and be mutually absorbed; but if you put too much of one, the other will take up so much as is naturally due to it, and leave the rest unaffected. So again, when you have learnt the proportion or degree in which single atoms of certain kinds combine, you may calculate the ratio which the whole mass of the one kind will bear to the other in any given compound. All this may be followed out by close observers of such things into very complex combinations. But you must allow, that nothing is traceable as a system by thought, but what thought first devised. For the observer's method is the author's design. Chance, if there be such a thing as chance, has no rule; and mystery, so far as things are really mysterious, admits only of imperfect reasoning upon whatever law it conceals, or dimly hints to us.

“Here then I say, that to have embodied even in the primary processes by which particles in nature combine, the traces at least of a law, which thought can investigate, is a thing which implies ordaining Mind. It has also been found, that the more widely men extend their glance over nature, and the more minutely they pore over each part, the more vividly are they struck everywhere by such marks of intelligence, forecasting as well as preserving, though the range of the forecast may be too vast, and with too many aspects, for us to be able to tell out all its counsel.

“While then good men in general prefer, and perhaps wisely, to find those apprehensions of the Deity which they consider necessary, planted deep in the affections and aspirations of Man, I could not refrain from urging, that no less positive and binding testimony to the same need is furnished also by the naked intellect. So that, without denying that the lively and believing agent within us, may be in general most wholesomely appealed to, in virtue of its hopes and sympathies, as the Soul, I still think a heavenward aspect may be won, not merely from

what it hopes or fears or is willing to embrace, but also from what it is convinced of in its unbiassed understanding, as the Mind.

“ But we ought not to be here anticipating the question about a Creator, so much as inquiring whether, apart from our bodily organisation, we have what is properly called Mind. It has sufficiently come out, as, at least in my own judgment, a necessary inference, that from our having a non-bodily or suprasensual knowledge, we have also a non-bodily knower; and I should not wonder if, just as our most intellectual science is if compared to the sensations of the moment, so our immaterial intellect may be when compared to the bodily machinery with which it is associated for awhile. Our most vivid sensations, and even the most violent passions of love or suspicion, pass away so entirely, that we almost wonder at ourselves for having ever entertained them. But the acquirements of the intellect are, at least for mankind as a whole, a more durable property; the deep thoughts of the mind fly upon the wings of speech, from father to son; and the sacred inheritance of knowledge is often transmitted, through the wreck of empires and the entire subjugation of races, to regions remote in time and space from the explorer with whom some great discovery began. It seems then to me not natural that an immortal fruit should grow on a perishable tree; and I conceive that, whatever element within us acquires or prolongs the kind of knowledge above spoken of, will at least outlive the bodily frame, whose sensations manifestly perish with itself. It confirms me somewhat in this opinion, that I observe no animals lower than man appear to enjoy anything of this kind of knowledge, or to have any higher guidance than blind instinct, and accordingly they leave no work behind them, or only such things as nests, which the storm of any year may sweep away. However difficult it may be to make good against your Indian ingenuity, so wide a gulf as we conceive to exist between Man and all other animals, you must admit the above difference to be a striking one. Man improves and perpetuates;

the lower animals follow each their species, and work, as they live, for a day.

“ One more remark I will here make, and then I have finished with this section of my argument. Just as the knowledge above especially spoken of, is most intellectual when it is most abstracted from combination with material objects, so the knowing principle which corresponds to it, or our mind, seems to use the bodily organisation as a necessary accompaniment up to certain points, rather than to consider it as any part of itself; and as the catastrophes which destroy men or nations often fail to extinguish the light of their knowledge, so the injuries which mutilate our body seem to have no correspondent power of crippling our mind. We find, for example, that a man loses one limb after another, without the power of thought being necessarily impaired; and even after death, no cunning of the anatomist has ever demonstrated any organ which constituted in itself the essential power of thinking. Rather indeed we observe that every limb may remain entire, but the whole bulk of the most comely or gigantic form takes no cognisance of either friend or foe, if that far more subtle and etherial spirit, which no one has ever touched with scalpel, or weighed with scales, has vanished into the unsearchable embrace of Him from whom it came. As then our knowledge, in proportion as it is purely intellectual, is permanent; and yet in this life it cannot be altogether disengaged from things which perish; so I trust the intellect which entertains it, will, when, separated from things corruptible, be itself immortal.

“ But secondly, as in the first place, I have attempted to sever the intellectual from the sensuous, so now let me distinguish the will from the appetites, which may also be called the lusts. Now here, again, it is very evident that men are prompted by natural instincts to seek certain things, for which they stretch out their hands greedily, as conceiving them to be either necessary or pleasant. For example, I mean the appetites or lusts of meat and drink, or any kind of seeking to which our bodily desires prompt us. It seems ridiculous to say that such things

are altogether wrong in themselves; for how without them would mankind exist? Yet to you least of all men living need I explain the calamities which men bring on themselves and others by over greedy indulgence in all sorts of appetites. Hence it is often said by men who do not much reflect on such subjects, that the will of man is depraved. If indeed by will they mean merely futurity, or what a man is likely to do, their statement might be correct enough. But pray consider, whether by will we do not rather mean choice, or that which a man chooses either to do or to have done, supposing he be free from any kind of coercion as regards his own conduct, or can guide the course of events as to what he wishes to obtain. Perhaps, indeed, we may conveniently apply the name of 'wishing' to the desire of objects which are at the disposal of others; and so we may retain the term 'will' as denoting rather choice in relation to our own conduct. But now what a rational man wills to do depends very much upon his knowledge. There can be no motives applied to the will stronger than those which result from our knowing how things really are. I should not then wonder if what is most properly called the will should be the determination of our reason, or that inclination to act in a particular way which arises from knowing truth. If then the eyes of the understanding are darkened, so that a man fancies whatever any lust may persuade him is pleasant for the moment to be also for his permanent happiness, the will is perverted by a wrong bias, and the man perishes for lack of knowledge. But very often, where the will is thoroughly informed, and is determined in itself upon full vision of the truth to choose the right, there arises a conflict against it from all sorts of lusts and temptations which endeavour to overbear its purpose, and make a man against his will embrace perdition. In such struggles a man cries out, What I will that I do not, but what I will not that I do. He is conscious that his true humanity and his will, or his innermost self, are on the side of Good, but all manner of appetites associated with the senses beset him so as to form the

mimicry of a will, or a spurious personality not unlike that consciousness which Sadánanda has called the subtle person, and which he distinguishes somehow from the innermost soul. Probably all men feel often in the course of their lives many symptoms of the conflict to which I allude; but the difference between good and bad men is that, in the first, by some power or assistance, the true will, which was the offspring of truth, triumphs gradually more and more; while in the second, I mean the bad, the lust thrusts itself step by step more into their inner being, and so darkens their perceptions of right, that it becomes at last the very will of the sinner, the light which God gave him of a purer knowledge, which should have kept alive a holier inclination, being at last utterly extinguished. What power or what help that may be, whether inherent, or supravenient, which keeps alive in the happier man a true knowledge and an undepraved will, perhaps here we need not stay to inquire. But it is clear, that whatever such power may be, it belongs to that which is most godlike, either in the original kindred of the soul, or in some heavenly alliance which it contracts; and what particularly strikes me is, that such a struggle being carried on, and often brought to a triumphant issue by the soul, against all the temptations with which perishable things encompass it, may furnish one testimony, and that not the slightest, to the probability of some better destiny's awaiting it hereafter.

“Thirdly, however, the will of man, which, in so far as it knows the truth, chooses life and goodness, is not only distracted by a false inclination from the lusts already spoken of, but is also associated with other desires and feelings, which perhaps generally we may class as the affections. By an affection we perhaps mean any lively personal feeling, of which one is conscious in regard to something external. For whether a man has something pleasant happen to him, so that he rejoices, or painful, so that he grieves; or whether he receives kindnesses or the contrary, so that he feels gratitude or resentment; or whether he regards his neighbour for any cause with either love,

hatred, or compassion; or lastly, whether he hopes for some uncertain advantage, or fears some possible evil, or looks upward with aspiration to whomever he regards as highest and best, in all these and in any similar cases, which come within the class of affections, there is implied both a lively activity, and also a reference to something external. Perhaps also the affections take hold in some measure of the entire personal consciousness, so that the mind, or whatever appears to us mind, claims a larger share in them than in the mere appetites. Whether then the affections are right or wrong, that is, whether they are exercised as they are due to their several objects, seems either to determine, or depend upon the question, whether the man owning them is good or bad. I need not prove what all mankind allow, as for instance, in the case of filial piety, or of unnatural hatred. Only here let us put aside those among the affections which are least dependent upon the will, such as we generally call the Feelings, because a man feels them involuntarily. Nor do I wish to include at present those of a religious kind which seem higher, since at least they aspire to the highest object. But of the great mass of affections remaining, some have the greatest power to torment, and some to bless. The furious paroxysm of anger, and the scowling brow of discontent, with all the pale pining, the restlessness, and the crime, which make bad men scourges no less to themselves than their neighbours, have been often described by poets, and are proverbial among mankind. The man who harbours such guests in his mind, if ever he awakes from the madness which they inspire, confesses himself miserable under them, but he seldom knows how to escape from their control. Yet there was, probably, a time in his life when he might have done so. But when such affections have waxed mighty, so that one suffers in constraining them, they are properly called passions, and the same change of name might have been applied to the appetites. When however any conflict, such as has been mentioned, takes place, it is far more terrible with an emotion which absorbs the whole personal



being than with an appetite which only torments the body. Here then, as before, I wish you to observe, that if any man comes off triumphant in the struggle with the worst enemies that ever assail his peace, and with calm brow leads resentment or jealousy a silent captive, he obtains this deep joy only through the religious sentiment which the theory of the materialist tends to obliterate."

"Is that altogether the case?" asked Wolff, "or do not scenery, music, and in general either quiet or distraction calm the disturbances of the mind?" "Perhaps in such things there is a mitigating power," replied Blancombe; "especially in the roar of ocean, or the deep stillness of the mountains. For in such places there dwells silently something of the majesty of their Maker; but after all, it is chiefly in virtue of the religious solemnity with which such things imbue the mind, that they have power to tranquillize it. Otherwise, the mere physical relief through any variety of silence or of noise can only divert for a time, and does not reach the deep sources of the more turbid passions. Or at least the case is so with many men, though possibly not with all. Whereas in prayer, which is the expression of the religious feeling, men find a wonderful relief.

"But turn to our more pleasant sensations of mind, such as hope and love. These are things so necessary to us, that the springs from whence their instincts flow can never utterly be dried, but if they are denied a healthy outlet, they turn into dangerous bitterness. Yet all these either seldom or never continue pure and blessed throughout any man's life, unless he has mingled them with that higher sentiment, which all along now we are beginning to have in mind. Who is a faithful friend, or who is righteous in all the temptations of love and hatred, or whose hope is unshaken in distress, and his calm trust in some unfailing resource continued throughout all the changes and chances of this mortal life? I will render for myself no answer, but only desire any one who has experience of the world to observe, whether such a description does not invariably apply



to persons who will be found on our side in this stage of the discussion, and not on that of the Chárváca. Go on now, if you please, to what I have called the higher, or more heavenly affections. We all know, there are such things as awe, and reverence, and trust, and love of that mental kind which fastens itself on unseen or ideal things. It would require many days for me to enlarge upon these affections, as each of them deserves. But any one can easily see, how one of them gives soberness, and another gentleness to a man's character; or again, how to trust in any friend essentially free from limit of time and distance, and darkness or dungeon, may strengthen an afflicted soul against every fleshly or mental enemy; while indeed none but those who have had experience can imagine, what deeds of self-devotion, and suffering, and charity, have been gone through by men who, in loving God, seem thereby to have imbibed somewhat of His nature. Whereas, on the other hand, these very feelings like the others, if they are not rightly directed, seem to fall back and harden in corruption. One becomes remorse, and another shame, and another a torturing superstition. So that, in short, all the affections of man, which, trained in a particular way would either have begotten religion, or have cherished it, and in that case would make a man happy, useful, and honoured,—all these, if they are not allowed to grow into religion, harden and corrupt themselves into divers forms of misery. What conclusion then can I draw, but that, for some reason or other, religion is as necessary to a man's mind as the light of heaven is requisite to aid his bodily vision?"

"But I have never denied," here remarked Wolff, "that for a man's feelings to be rightly directed, is a very happy circumstance; nor have I so much argued against any general devotion, in which the instincts find a satisfaction, towards whatever mysterious Power may encompass the world. It is the unnecessary minuteness of dogmatism, and the unwarranted assumptions about a soul and a future state, with which my Chárváca client would find fault."

“You have reminded me,” replied Blancombe, “of what I doubted whether it should not be mentioned immediately after the Understanding and the Will—I mean the Conscience. But since the affections have much to do with it, and, in my own opinion, contribute essentially to its operations, it seemed right to defer it; yet principally the Conscience is a product of the Understanding and the Will, especially when these are biassed against their choice by an inclination from any passion. I must not, however, omit to mention with due honour what the venerable A'charya will esteem a wiser opinion. Many have imagined that conscience is a sense of the clash between divine knowledge and our own guilty remembrance; as when our sense of doing a thing wrong, and God's sight of the wrong, come in collision. But, again, here it suffices me, if, either from want of penetration, or from a fear of thinking unbecomingly of the Most Blessed, any one will consider our conscience as ourself judging ourself; or as the Mind discriminating right and wrong, such discrimination being most keenly sensitive as we become conscious of wrong. Still please to observe, that conscience presupposes knowledge: and what kind of knowledge? Surely the most spiritual form of that higher kind which we have already seen belongs to nothing grosser than Mind; for neither the most abstract numbers or measures, nor the most subtle consequences ever deduced from any combination of them, imply a knowledge so little dependent on the bodily senses, as this faculty of forming moral judgments even on the thoughts of the heart, and awarding praise or blame according to a standard higher than even language can express. Much more then, I say, the whole power of conscience is an argument for greater faculties in man than belong to the brutes, and for a higher destiny awaiting him. If any one told us, he found a jury of tigers met to try any animal who had violated the laws of life, we should reject the story as not only a fiction but absurd; but there is no nation among men in which the power of conscience has not shewn itself so far as to devise some methods of aiming at justice and

arresting crime. You see then how much better we are than the brutes; and better in virtue of a power which implies a knowledge, such as only a spiritual faculty could support, and perhaps only the Highest of all possible spirits keep alive."

"But, if conscience were all that you say," interposed Wolff, "men of all nations would hear its voice alike, whereas there are all sorts of differences between the moral judgments of men."

"Different applications, no doubt," answered Blancombe, "but all men agree in the fact of judging; all men have some right, and call some things wrong. The words praise and blame are nowhere unintelligible. Then observe how the more that knowledge increases the more men agree in attaching praise and blame to the very same objects. Two thousand years ago the Saxons thought, as some of the wilder Tatars may think now, that cunning and cruelty were venial proceedings; but the English, who are partly descended from these Saxons, though mingled with gentler races, have learned to think, as our Hindú friends here, that humanity is rather to be praised and encouraged. Probably, if the Tatars are better taught hereafter they will also change their judgment. There is then a certain standard, though I have not said that ignorance follows it. Rather I argue all along, that our acceptance of that standard depends upon our knowledge; though in some things perhaps the voice of the human heart speaks alike in every clime. Again, it is very remarkable, how the faculty of Conscience, being enlightened by knowledge, tends constantly to clear itself from false associations. For example, it distinguishes easily between accidental or involuntary actions, and things done with treachery or with guilty forethought; nor does it acquiesce in any condemnation of a crowd, if it perceives the censurers either to be prejudiced, or not to be aware of the turning events of the case; nor, again, is it appeased by mere flattery, or ignorant praise. So intimately does our Conscience seem to be acquainted with the deep places of our being. It animates all through life the generous and the good; nor can any ingenious pleading about Pra-

criti, or nature and organisation, or any theory of man's not being morally accountable, altogether deprive it of its power to punish the wicked; but much more its power is apt to increase towards the end of life. You remember the story of the Emperor Alamgir (Aurangzeb); he certainly was a most utter hypocrite; and, after many crimes, strode over his father's corpse to a throne: but it might have been supposed that with long villany he might have hardened his heart so as to be at ease. Whatever empire and wealth, or revenge, or pleasure, or employment in strengthening himself against enemies and controlling the destiny of nations can confer, was all at his disposal, who reigned from Delhi over India. Probably also wise men could have told him that to deceive his brother or murder his father was only the operation of *Pracriti*, and that all his soul need do was to enjoy the spectacle; or again, a deadlier wisdom still might have taught him, that the belief of his having a soul was a delusion. Yet this most able and powerful Emperor could never, with all his knowledge or his armies, appease the sting of remorse, or persuade himself, as death approached, that he had no penalty to undergo; on the contrary, in those remarkable words, which are not the least striking in the history of India, he exclaimed, 'Wherever I look, I see nothing but God. I have committed numerous crimes, and I know not with what punishments I may be seized. The agonies of death come upon me fast.' Such a vision of wrath to come sat before his guilty mind. If you remember this instance of so powerful an Emperor, you will more readily believe me when I add, that in many countries there are well-attested instances in which the conscience has shewn that its power increases as death approaches. Such a circumstance does not appear as if then it spoke for the last time; for if any one observes two different *cavalcades* of persons, of which the one journeys with unfaltering step, and the other with blind or palsied imbecility, so long as both are in sight, he will not easily believe that the strength and attitude of both are changed, the moment that a distant mist

settles on the path which they have gone. So in beholding good men enjoy a peace of mind which increases as they grow old, and great criminals suffer, on the contrary, as their life advances, with growing restlessness, we do not readily imagine that when they enter the unseen world the progress of either will come suddenly to an end. All that we see clearly in this life is a group of figures coming suddenly out of unknown darkness, and again vanishing, after a few strides, at the entrance of the great Hall of Eternity; but, in the little interval of visible life, acts have been done, habits contracted, and the conscience and affections of man go severally with their burden of report before the Unseen Judge.

“Now, since conscience thus terrifies men often with a dim foreboding of some spirifual recompence in the world to come, it might be fancied that persons in general would wish no other life to be probable, and so that the doctrine of the Charvácas would become generally popular; but it is wonderful to remark how little such a kind of consolation accords with the unbiassed instincts of mankind; on the contrary, we all seem to shrink instinctively from annihilation. The forces of decay and darkness, as their stealthy footsteps make inroads upon our consciousness of life, are felt to be enemies which, if it were possible, we would repel; nor is our sensation, in this respect, confined to a mere animal feeling, such as a shrinking from gloom or a love of enjoyment. For men who contemplate with calmness the idea of their body being laid under the sod, still consider their inner self as having a kind of property in a conscious futurity; nor does this presentiment hold good of ourselves only, but still more vividly as regards our friends. For my own part, I have never been able to imagine that the persons whom I have known familiarly, and who have been taken from me by death, have therefore ceased to exist; their bodies, I know, have mouldered in the grave, but that better part of them, which was capable of thinking, and loving, and adoring, seems still to be a living dweller in some part of the unseen world, though I know not

in what part. You will perhaps smile at what you will call a fanciful dream; but the great concurrence of so many men and nations in some thoughts of the kind, appears to bring me the confirmation of many witnesses. There is no country or climate, however far apart and differing in manners, as well as separated from the probability of a one-stemmed tradition, in which some such great hope has not supported men in the prospect of death, and mitigated the pain of bereavement. Although then I dare not say a strong wish is itself an evidence, yet this widely-spread community of feeling, on so great a question, seems either to attest a natural instinct,—in which case the instincts of mankind may be expected to prophesy a fulfilment, as much as those of the bee and the ant who lay up stores for a winter, or those of the bull-calf which butts with yet unarmed brow, or else that feeling has found everywhere common grounds of reasoning, such as I have myself partly indicated;—and, in this case, the concurrence of so many thinkers in one conclusion will approximate to the most convincing kind of evidence which on any moral question is possible. Perhaps, indeed, it may have seemed best to whatever higher power has ordered the degree of our knowledge, that some obscurity should rest on our anticipations, in order that, by dwelling oftener and more anxiously on the possibilities of the unseen world, we might be roused to a far keener interest in whatever concerns it, just as the imagination has more play in gazing on some great painter's sketch of a new country than in copying the literal plan of a surveyor; for most of you will concede this, that mankind everywhere are ultimately governed through the medium chiefly of absorbing ideas, so that whatever method gives the amplest range to ideas of a wholesome kind, must therefore be the best.

“But although I have introduced here the strong wish of mankind, whether it be instinctive or whether it arise from a train of reasoning, or from anything else, yet you will have observed that its main force as an argument consists not so much in itself solely as in its connexion with conscience; for it becomes doubly

remarkable when these two things, which might be expected rather to clash, both co-exist together, and act each upon the other so forcibly, that there seems a certain kindred between them. Though I do not think the conscience alone generated the expectation of a future state, yet it constantly leads men in that direction, both by the presentiment which each one cherishes of some result awaiting his own thoughts, and by the requirement of some future arbitration to set right all the inequalities of this world. We see all things tending towards the confirmation of a rule of Right, and our heart and our wishes, no less than our conscience and our reason, cry out that Right ought to prevail; yet all things are not yet put under its absolute sway, so that it remains, as we hope, for the tendency, which hitherto has been interrupted by many exceptions, to be realised hereafter.

“ At such a junction of our thoughts with our feelings, or of that knowing faculty within us which apprehends the most demonstrable science with the purer class of our affections, we find the whole man as it were crying out for an immortality, and refusing to be deprived of its great hope. Here also must be remembered what I will venture to call the tentative experience of the best and holiest men. Some persons may mock at the expression experience, as applied to what has not yet come to pass; but it is easy to know by numbers of experiments under what kind of expectations men live holily or happily, as well as the contrary. There are thousands of instances in which men have either recorded the course of their mental thought in books, or embodied it in actions, or in some way made it manifest. We cannot indeed come familiarly in contact with men, without forming some kind of judgment on their belief and the influence it has on their happiness, neither of which can be altogether hidden. Just then as before I ventured to ask, whether the materialist and irreligious tone of sentiment, or the contrary, did most to chasten the affections; so here I ask, and I do not wish the answer to have any controversial bias, which carries to the mind of any one entertaining it the fullest witness of its being



true? You have spoken as if in praise of the purer affections; but theories like yours do not enable men to practise them. But now take the experience of praying men everywhere, and see whether it confirms their faith or militates against it; or consider that groundwork which exists in our mind for the affections of hope and trust, and observe whether these do not peremptorily require some object to fasten upon, and whether every attempt at religion, and every defiance of religion, has not been alike unsatisfactory, which did not encourage them to believe in the reality of such an object. We shall find here, as before, that the feelings and the intellect correspond. On the one hand, the mere act of praying earnestly, or singing devoutly, and, in short, any exercise of the religious affections, seems, either by eliciting an immediate answer, or in virtue of some general law of Providence, to be a great instrument of mental peace; and, on the other hand, persons who have enjoyed such a consolation could not retain it, unless they believed in the positive reality of that Being whom they address. It is not like the rage of a passionate child, which is soothed after it has vented itself, or like the mechanical pattering of a mystic, who, with closed eyes or mind excludes from his piety all intervention of his reason. But religious people in general, and at least in so far as they are intelligent or sound-minded, require intellectual belief as well as emotional faith; and when such persons have, from any clash of opinions in speculative times, or from any waywardness or sensual vice on their own part, lost hold of what they once firmly apprehended, they almost all agree in confessing that they suffer a sorrow to which no other earthly sorrow is comparable for magnitude. I do not here speak of mere animal men, who seem never to have risen into any conception of the great capacities of their souls, for indeed of such I know not what to say, except that one would no more envy them than one envies a pig or an elephant; but of all who unite intelligence and affections such as we call humane, it may be affirmed that they seem not to retain this standard of humanity uprightly and blessedly,



without acquaintance with that higher Being upon which man depends."

"Then I am to understand you to argue," here asked Wolff, "that because religion is desirable, therefore it is true." "I beg your pardon," replied Blancombe, "certainly that is not my argument, in such a sense as to bear being put nakedly and apart from the other considerations with which I have connected it. But to Man, considered as a being who naturally aspires to make the best of himself, either for happiness or beneficence, or whatever nobler end he may be capable of conceiving, it seems no slight argument that a particular class of sentiments require his most earnest cultivation, if he finds that without them the very nature of which he is possessed cannot otherwise thrive, or put forth its best powers. Of course this argument would have infinitely more force to persons already persuaded that the world's order is under the direction of Mind; for they would feel convinced, that whatever is necessary to carry out a design of the grandest magnitude, must have entered into the plan of an intellectual contriver, and it would be a part of natural piety with them to infer a high moral probability of such conceptions being true, as God's creatures cannot be good and happy without conceiving. Whereas at present without such aid, I am compelled to throw myself upon the deep necessities of our being. Nor indeed does this issue frighten me; but even if it should be conceded, to a greater extent than any philosopher has ever yet proved, that all things act, as Sadánanda tells us, according to their inherent properties, or that those acts which appear to us the free offspring of volition are only minute links in an infinitely subtle and all-embracing chain of causation,—for that men are a kind of human vegetables, only influenced by more delicate modifications of *Pracriti*, because we consist of such ourselves,—even so, my friends, I despair neither of morality nor of faith, which seem the cause of God amongst mankind. For I observe among plants too, that they are liable to disease, and that some things cause health to them, and others decay. The hyacinth can-

not lie long torn from its stalk, without withering: and I suppose no flower or herb can live without some kindly influence from the light of heaven. At least I observe that plants enclosed in any dark closet grow lank and pale; and if there should be any crevice through which a fragment of light enters, they stretch their consumptive stalks towards it, so as to imbibe a dubious life. Pretty much in the same way I observe men who in savage places are shut out from opportunities of sound knowledge, throw all their passions with more desperate swing into some wild or abnormal form of superstition: and generally it may be said, the religious sentiments of which we have spoken, are, at least in some form, as necessary to man's mind or nature, as the light and breath of heaven are to the flower of the field. So that, whatever is the cause of our being so, the fact of our being such as to require the mental nourishment of piety cannot be denied. Prayer, as our Bauddha friend here most truly observed, is a necessary part of human virtue, which the very relief it gives us in many ways sufficiently proves. We have also seen, that together with this experience we have others of the kind. For, not to repeat yet my first argument about Mind, we have seen the innermost will of man protesting against any grosser appetites, as well as any unruly passions which attempt to overbear our more righteous choice; thus also knowledge, in that it tends daily to more and more of concurrence everywhere in the purest standard of morality, is a witness against any blind materialism which makes virtue or vice a matter of caprice or organisation. More strongly still, it may be said the conscience refuses to be persuaded that sin is no evil; and in like manner the purest feelings of man, which agree with conscience, cry out aloud against the denial of a God to be worshipped, or against a surrender of our being voluntarily to annihilation. So that, on the whole, what is wisest and best in our nature seems to be on one side, with which also happiness takes part in experience; while what is most brutish, selfish, and miserable, only is left for the other. At this point, then, I should say to any Sankhyast,

or other speculator who makes the apparent freedom of a man only a deceptive form of necessitarianism, Be it so, if you please, but then at least religion is a necessity of our nature—there is either some heavenly influence, or at least the capacity of belief in such an influence, which is to the virtue, the peace, and the permanent happiness of Man, pretty much what the physical dew and light are to all plants that grow. Even then upon your principles, I must still turn the eyes of my mind to that light without which all my moral perceptions are in danger of being obscured, and my hope, of languishing away.

“Now, however, arises a farther question, Can we stop here? For my own part I cannot; and probably few can, if they only consider. Surely it seems absurd to find prayer necessary for man’s mental health, yet to imagine there is no one to pray to. Even logic, although the most remorseless of sciences, cannot refuse to recognise here the existence of the heart, and its practical needs. For the logician can only argue upon facts, and if he does not take them into account as they are, his art becomes useless. Again, it would be very strange if the same cast of sentiment which is most for the honour of a Divine Being should also be most for the benefit of all mankind, and yet that Being should have no consciousness whether this sentiment is entertained. Still more does my own impression of the strangeness of such an imagination grow, if I extend my thoughts from each man individually to men assembled in societies. For whatever happiness springs from a pious regard to the Deity, and whatever wickedness or misery creeps on with the reverse, it becomes in either case multiplied, when its effects extend over a family. Neither affectionate care for the helplessness of infants, nor again filial gratitude, nor in general the due reverence for the sanctity of life, and all the ties necessary to its improvement, seem to retain a firm hold upon society, except where each man considers himself accountable to a Divine Ruler, who has fixed the duties of his place. I should only weary you by attempting to follow out at large the same idea, as applied to the destiny of nations:

though indeed it is in the history of the kingdoms of men that the principle for which I contend is exemplified on the grandest scale. Not that in politics the nature of religion should be different from what it is in any man's secret prayer. Only, as the field extends, good and evil principles have a more complicated play. The history of India alone would shew that when nations are strong they believe firmly in God, as if not only virtue, but strength and success, could not exist without that principle to animate them. For if you mount up to that remote period when the Brahmanical tribes were extending their dominion from the Punjaub over Southern India, you will find a religious faith was then strong in them; and whether you modify the test by examining the progress of Sákya Muni's principles, to which our friend here has alluded, or whether again you read of the incursions of Sultan Mahmud, or, later still, of the establishment of the Mogul Empire, you would find a strength of religious belief animating in each case the conqueror. Again, at a period nearer to our own times, when the Sikhs organised a mixed multitude into a formidable kingdom, the great bond of union was a fervid glow of faith, which one might justly call fanaticism. But yet, if any one says to men, Let us believe, and in the strength of our belief succeed, such an exhortation, without reasons or disinterested motives to believing, has no sort of tendency to realise its effort. Rather indeed, those who have talked most loudly of the force of belief relatively to man's mind, without having an adequate object to propound, only fall into the greatest imbecility of heart and mind. For it is the very nature of faith that it cannot be purchased, but must be fixed on some one who has a right to it. Shew to mankind the person or the being who has that right, and they require neither bribery nor compulsion to believe; but discourses upon the energy of belief signify nothing. The case then stands thus. Not only the affections of every man severally require a Divine Being to trust in; but the whole history of families and nations everywhere involves the same requirement. Even

language bears the impress of that general feeling; and it may be added that all righteous laws are intended to embody principles such as men conceive to be the will of the Supreme Ruler of the world. Who or what however that Ruler may be, indeed, there are different conjectures, and we have still farther to inquire; but that he is some one, and that we ought to think of Him as far as possible as He is in reality, and not to dream of making Him be in a particular way by thinking of Him in that way, are points on which the sound-minded among mankind have long ago agreed. Here then let me revert to that first argument, which in recapitulating about the affections I omitted.

“The question here is, whether we have any reason to take for our beginning either Deity as Mind planning and governing, or Nature as matter blindly evolving itself. You may try it either by the existence of the world, or by its history; that is, as men generally say, either by Nature or by Providence. Certainly the second of the two will be stronger, but even the first appears absolutely binding. For every one allows that Thought is more motive than any of the physical agencies which it employs, and it is in virtue of thinking, and in proportion as he thinks, that man makes and disposes. Thought on man's part underlies all the greatness of mankind. Just then as a child, who had lost its parents among mankind, and went about searching for them, would certainly not begin with stones, or even with brute beasts, so, if ever mankind are to find their first Parent and Author of their being, they must begin with nothing lower than themselves, nor with the lower and less active principle in themselves. Whatever intellectual knowledge we have, certainly to the Deity we must ascribe more; and whatever we call Mind as that to which our higher knowledge belongs, far more eminently must that be attributed to Deity. You say it makes no difference, whether we start in our speculation from mind or matter, that is, from God or the world. I answer, fully as much as whether we say the living horse draws the dead chariot, or whether he is drawn by it. It is true that animal life can generate simply

its like; but we see only one kind of Being anywhere which can produce a multiplicity of things, some of which therefore are unlike: and this manifoldly creative being is merely Mind. Now that our conceptions of the Supreme Mind which is above all things, as an architect is above a house, must be inadequate, I most readily allow; and I will endeavour to explain hereafter, why the argument from design probably appears to you not so convincing as it does to men in general. But, though such a feeling of inadequacy may well induce one to wish for more light on the subject,—and perhaps none could ever duly image the Eternal without its throwing forward some likeness of itself veiled in flesh, and so coming in contact with our earthly humanity,—yet to the common sense of mankind there remains the conviction, that after all our researches in the world of matter and sense the Eternal Upholder remains behind. He may be higher than heaven, so that we know nothing, and deeper than hell, so that we understand Him not; yet the certainty of His being is as clear as that of an architect to those who observe a house, or of a poet to those who read a well-constructed poem. Willingly indeed we confess that our frail reasonings have need to be enlightened farther, and we shall gladly accept any intervention which, by bringing man more face to face with Deity, may open a fuller assurance; but however difficult it may be to settle what exactly man ought to believe, the necessity of some such belief as we contend for, is a matter of most solid reasoning, and not only of gentle feeling. The very language of all nations, as a record of their instinctive logic, bears testimony to what I am saying. You spoke, (here Blancombe directed himself towards Wolff), of a fixed order, and a regular order, and a character in nature. How remarkable that you could discover no words usual among men which were not fatal to your theory! For the very word *fixed* implies a thing done, which must have had a doer; so a *character* is something stamped, and an *order* is something arranged, and again, by the word *regular*, you lead us to a rule, which cannot be without a ruler,

It is not then the same thing as you suppose, whether we start with a conception of nature or of creative mind.

“ But if you ask what difference it makes, I answer first, that we have seen mankind want an object to believe upon, and yet are not able to believe merely because it is good for them to do so, unless the object proposed is satisfactory to the intellect. But our mind, of whatever it may be made, can rest in no cause for the universe less than mind. It observes a thousand energies, which may be called causes, in daily operation ; but although you may magnify any one or all of these together to an infinite extent, neither one, nor all, will upon any scale satisfy the mind when alleged as a creative or governing principle. For no one of these blind forces is capable of weighing and measuring, but the world is evidently made by weight and measure ; it is made therefore clearly by some being capable of conceiving laws and thoughts ; but these we do not find entering into the conception of a blind nature. That my distinction here is practically a correct one, is in fact clearly and thoroughly proved by the very names which are current in India for soul and for matter. We have heard the Saugata calling our soul by the term *intelligence* ; and again, many Hindús call matter simply ignorance (*ajnána*). They feel instinctively that the one has knowledge, and the other ignorance ; hence they describe the things by their characteristics ; for such seems to my mind the simplest explanation of this way of speaking ; though more subtle reasons are also given for it. In those two phrases, then, the Hindús supply us with a practical proof that in all speculation about the world, pure intellect cries out against matter, for the necessity of some governing principle more akin to itself than any material or sensible object. Mere intellect therefore associates itself with all those yearnings of the affections upward of which we have before spoken. But secondly, I observe that it cannot disdain to take them into account, as in turn it is purified by them. For when it observes them act over the range of nations and centuries, with a recurrence nearly uniform enough to admit of their effects being



grouped in masses, and classified under heads, it says of these too, they must have a cause, and it finds no cause worthy enough, except some being which must be to all the hopes and aspirations of man either as analogous as the fountain is to the stream, or else as transcendent as the fashioning thought is to the material wrought.

“Nor here probably will the intellect be able to avoid taking notice of what we call habit. I mention it, because you will not be able to say of it, as you implied of the affections, that it is a mere sensation or sentiment, implying no law of mind. At least, if any one were to imagine beforehand what sort of bias from the force of habit he would wish for the benefit of mankind should be given to our actions, he might perhaps despair of any such bias being made wholesome, expecting it to be the same probably in every kind of action. But if he were told that good actions would, however disagreeable at first, become easier and pleasanter as they were persevered in; while bad actions, being the perversion of some capacity for better things, might for a little time seduce, but would gradually lose the outside varnish of honey which gilded them,—so that good men would become stronger or happier, while the obstinately bad would become more and more loveless and miserable to themselves and others, so that at last goodness would be the greatest blessing, and wickedness turn out to be the greatest punishment,—I humbly conceive, any purely spiritual thinker, in considering from a remote world the possibility of such a law of moral recompence being established, would find in it manifest trace of some being who is to our conscience, what the highest Mind may be to the worldly fabric, or an infinite Love as compared to the holy affections of man. Especially also would such a conclusion be drawn, supposing it was seen that young sinners would, on their first going wrong, have many checks from violent emotion, and a tenderness of shame, like the blush on a maiden’s cheek; but yet that all these sanctities, being again and again violated, might fade away, and the safeguard involved in them be destroyed. But now I need scarcely argue at large



that such is the principle of moral recompence, which by means of the force of habit is intertwined into the constitution of the world. For if you either observe or reflect, you will find it to be so; and I should only weary you by illustrating in detail every step in this long argument. Finding then, as we do, that modesty as a safeguard against recklessness is only destroyed by obstinacy; and that all the holier and purer affections grow up into habits, which become a second and a happier nature to a man, while on the contrary, selfishness, in all its forms of insincerity or crime or sensualism, becomes an avenging scourge, must we not say that the logical reason in man consents to whatever element in us apprehends righteousness, and whatever feeling rejoices in things amiable, that both some being is to be worshipped, and that such being must be intelligent, holy, and lovely? Something like that, I suppose, is what most men intend by an Iswara, or what we call God. Was I not therefore right in saying, that the hard as well as the soft in man, or the masculine understanding no less than the feminine love, cries out for some such religious sentiment as your argument disparages?

“I say here some religious sentiment, or some worship of God, including therefore the belief in God; for let that suffice as our principal object of proof just now. It has come to light incidentally more than once in my discourse, that I conceive the common cause of my friends here and of myself against you, (here Blancombe turned to Wolff,) is best supported by arguments which they are not quite agreed about. Yet it is not impossible for some of my arguments to be wrong, yet for our main cause to be right. Suppose, for example, all the ideas which I have suggested on the subject of mind as distinct from matter, were to be so far mistaken that one substance in many modifications should turn out to be the cause and the material without duality of all possible causes or effects; still, the modification which this substance would undergo in its thinking stage and its wrought stage, would be so important as to render it for all practical purposes two distinct things, as to the popular

apprehension of mankind it undoubtedly seems. If then you prefer still to understand the term mind as meaning matter sufficiently refined to be the organ of mental powers, do so. Not but that, with such a change in our mode of viewing that of which the world consists, I confess, a strong argument for the revival of our personal being in an immortality after this life, would appear to me lost; but again, many pious persons, of whom our friend Vidyáchárya may partly serve as an illustrious instance, think quite differently upon that point; and whatever became of a personal immortality, I conceive that at least the necessity of worshipping and loving God in this life would remain. We should not be a bit more able to do without religion, though it would be more difficult to say in what manner we ought to be religious. Again, in the same way, I remark, that if the attributes of wisdom, righteousness, and goodness, have been assigned by me to the Deity with more confidence than they ought, yet at the very least you acknowledge that we are surrounded by tokens of superhuman power. What that power may be, in at least its relations to ourselves, and how we ought to feel mentally towards its intelligent wielder, if such be its origin, or how mould to our purpose whatever may be permitted of its lesser agencies, and triumph over any dread attached to them, are still questions of awful interest, and may well invite our most devout attention. Only I cannot look at such questions without including among the elements of the problem to be solved the moral experiences of mankind. From those experiences it appears that prayer is an instrument of obtaining peace, and of what to its possessors appears knowledge, whether, as we should say generally, because the prayer is answered by some higher power, or, as your theories would imply, because it is itself a mental effort of the most intent and aspiring kind. We must then take in prayer together with our inquiries as to either the being of God or our eternal destiny. Then it seems to me already self-evident that no kind of natural piety will allow us to deprive the Deity of whatever

attributes we should think holy, or pure, or lovely, in the higher forms of being; nor can I shake off a presentiment, which goes upon sufficient ground to deserve the name of a conviction, that we shall find at last the mass of mankind have anticipated with their feelings, what the keenest searchers may for a time make difficulties about, but must at last admit is a necessity of their understanding. So that it may be with spirit as with matter. We have already heard how difficult it may be made to prove that any solid substratum underlies the objects which our senses deal with; yet at last the thinker says by inference that something must be there, whether he make that something material or mental; a body or a form; an underlying solid or a combining principle of law; and, by saying this, he returns, in effect, to what simple people never doubted. In fact, even our positive knowledge of geometry, and perhaps all our cognition of the material world, may be said primarily to rest upon faith, or ultimately to revert to faith; although the most sceptical reasoners admit it would be absurd in this case not to have such faith. For any reasoning or knowledge which made this practically doubtful would make everything doubtful, so that it must be itself doubted. By being so universally destructive it would destroy trust in its own process. Even sceptics thus come round in mathematical science to agree with those who accept in a kind of faith the preliminary axioms and postulates. Just so, I conceive, will be the case with what we call Mind, which, at least so far as our common consciousness is a guide to any truth, we recognise as distinct from bodily objects; for it seems properly active, while they are comparatively passive. Perhaps we call by its name some appearances which may not be mind; but, beyond all or within, I know not how many subtle sheaths, as our friends would call them, either mind reasoning or soul feeling must dwell. Either of these seems a name for what is immortal in us; and so long as men believe that the highest lord of all is infinite in all which they feel highest in themselves, so long they have what we call a religion, whether

it be recorded in histories, or expressed in prayers, or in any other way embodied and directed to some one infinitely better than ourselves. Upon this condition only does a religion seem to satisfy all those portions and capacities of Man of which we have spoken, or exercise a ruling and wholesome influence. For whatever wonderful things may be said of Pracriti, no one is raised, or awed, or comforted by dwelling on an infinite fluid, or infinite electricity, or, in short, by the application of the idea of infinity to anything else than Mind in the highest and largest sense of whatever may be Mind. If instead of mind you would prefer me to say thinker, with the understanding at present that it is not settled how far a subtle modification of matter can think, I have no objection. Only, on your part again, there must be no hesitation in ascribing to this unknown author the most absolute infinity as regards all the higher powers of man, or, what would be the same thing here, as regards a power capable of creating those. You must not, therefore, exclude government, or providence, or dread majesty, or anything else which is noblest in man, except you do so by putting something nobler still and transcendent, because creative, in any one of their places; for it will be absurd to seek the Deity in anything less than ourselves. Moreover you will hence understand why, just as we exclude earth and water and electricity, so also I reject the mere range of human affections as adequate expounders of the sentiments which here we ought to entertain; and as they themselves cannot cling kindly, unless they are justified, or as it were upheld, by strengthening intellect, much less can that highest and illimitable object, which is to satisfy our whole affectionate and intellectual being, be less than infinite itself in all wisdom and majesty as well as goodness. Nor is any kind of worshipping belief worthy of being properly called a religion, as embracing what men in general mean by that sacred word, unless it have a positive and intellectual element referring to God, not merely as life, or as order, nor perhaps even as law, though indeed he is all these, but also as a providential governor.

Of the truth of what I am now saying many countries afford sad experience. Probably it is not unknown in India how men who have once believed intellectually in the historical traces of mankind being governed by an unseen governor, have fallen into strange crimes or delusions when that belief was lost or dreamt away. At least, in other countries, men have been brought up to fear the God by whom their religion has been ordained and history governed; yet, either from waywardness, or from finding that accidents of human error had clung round the essential belief, they have fallen away from their religion, until they knew not what belief to hold, beyond a vague confession of signs of power and life encompassing us. But then it is also found, that when men thus exchange the definite belief of intellectual beings in One who is mighty, good, and wise, and by whose laws they must shape their lives, for vague surmises about the sources of beauty and marvel, they appear generally also to exchange a calm and equable trust in one who is the upholder of their steps in life, for a feverish over-bubbling of the emotions, which may be called an animal enthusiasm. Thus, as their belief becomes imagination, and their religion mysticism, so their prayers become patterings, and flow from the affections of joy and grief; or, as they themselves would phrase it, from the spirit, but not from the understanding. Then, if they even continue in such a state, their reason is no longer hallowed, nor their entire manhood a sacrifice, but they have fallen back into such worship as is common to animals and vegetables; for these things also exult in the beauty of creation, and the beneficence of its author, as they look up towards his all-embracing light. But oftenest by far, man, who has had a higher guide assigned him than the mere impulses of even the most amiable temperament, is not able, after letting go the higher guidance, to sustain himself by means of the lower, in a firm balance of the capacities of his mind; but, if he is depressed by natural sorrow, he carries despondency into things heavenly; or, if doubts are presented to him, he accepts them as certainties; and especially if some strong temptation,

like a despot rising amidst anarchy, come over the unsettled feelings of his fluctuating mind, he bows himself in sinful acquiescence to its lawless rule; and then again, if his conscience awaken from heavy sleep, he suffers unspeakable pangs of remorse and bewilderment, like one of weak eyes unbearably scathed by lucid gleams across a shipwreck in darkness; and perhaps at last the man struggling back to the home of certainty from which he had strayed, takes shelter in some cave of the most abject superstition, having thus passed in turns through many phases of imagination rather than of faith. For it is the sentence of eternal righteousness, that when any kind of perversity has shrunk from even moderate constraint, it must bow itself at last to a heavier yoke. But many, not even so fortunate as we just now imagined, fall through bewilderment into monstrous sins, and suffer accordingly a greater abandonment of God. As they do not choose to retain him in their knowledge, he gives them over to an undistinguishing mind. Such as these are antinomians, anarchists, criminals without remorse, and, in general, they who stride on in an unblest career, ruining either their own bodies, or families, or the countries which nurtured them, owning no other guidance than self-will, and acknowledging no restraint, until, the hand of the Eternal laying hold of them, the retribution of their sin finds them out. Yet how heavy a scourge they have carried, though unacknowledged, all along in their minds, is clear even from the restlessness of their face and gestures, as well as from that rudeness which so often creeps over their manners, as the offspring of unhappiness rather than of intention; though indeed benevolence is generally weak in such men, if it be not altogether extinct: but especially we see the heaviness of the scourge appear from the violence of death, to which such men have often had recourse, because life had become unbearable to them in a world of which they disdained to serve the only righteous Ruler.

“ I do not then myself doubt, that of the two alternatives propounded farther back, it suits truth and humility best to

consider God as our Maker, and therefore as transcending even our spiritual conceptions, rather than as a source from which we might be said to have spontaneously bubbled into light. Yet so long as any one retains the spirit of subjection sufficiently to acknowledge the Governor, I will not presume to agitate much this question of Maker or Source. Indeed, I had rather abstain from it, out of reverence to him of whom we reason; as well as partly from respect to my venerable friend here, who deserves a distinct consideration of his views; and partly also I cannot help observing, that very devout persons are able to acquire modes of expression, which imply a nearness and a sort of acquaintance with God, such as I can scarcely describe by any less name than kindred, and which goes far to justify men in calling the Divinity a mysterious fountain, from which Humanity is a visible stream. Only such persons do not lose, and it appears to me we must not waive, the idea of government as belonging to God. Nor again do they throw away that positiveness of belief which belongs to things on which the intellect lays hold, and without which religion cannot fill the mind of the whole man. But some arguments, which here suggest themselves, cannot have justice done to them without going into those historical records, the discussion of which you have waived. For with the clear positiveness which we require, there must be a regard to the facts of history. Here, if you will excuse me, I observe you are ready to remark, that the variety of claims made by discordant histories presents a difficulty. But to this the reply is obvious, that such claims are so many reasons for inquiring more diligently; since they all agree that there is something to be inquired about.

“Here then perhaps we might proceed to discuss the claims of religious records. The mention, however, of devout persons leads me to consider the especial confidence with which they seem to entertain the belief of a future life as a certainty. We have seen the instincts of mankind rather pointing to such a hope, and the purer affections unwillingly letting it go. Con-



science also, though a faculty belonging to the scientific, quite as much as to the affectionate element in our mind, throws almost without hesitation its weighty vote into the same side of the scale; and pure intellect, without affirming that hope is demonstrative, encourages rather than checks the aspiration, both by the nature of its own processes and acquirements, and by the firm conviction which it is compelled to embrace of there being to the world and to our life some Author, among whose attributes must be contriving intellect, or wisdom, and who cannot be without the power of restoring what he made. But now let it be remarked, that all the above grounds of hope, either receive an important accession, or else are sublimated into a form more glorious than they naturally wear, in the experience which devout persons believe themselves to acquire by prayer and trust. It was not uninteresting to me to notice in the discourse of the venerable A'charya, that he distinctly affirmed such hopes to become more vivid in proportion to a man's sanctity of life. But much more, it appears to me, may devotion have a natural tendency to generate such confidence of hope, when it is directed to a personal Being whose power and goodness admit, on our hypothesis, of neither doubt nor limit, and to whose very likeness men appear to be in a way transformed, when they are both persuaded of the goodness of his moral attributes, and endeavour by prayer or effort to partake of like qualities. For such properties as righteousness, truth, and love, appear to fall away from that range of things to which accident or death can be fatal, and are in common with that Being to which we ascribe immortality. At least I suppose that in some such way, and perhaps in other ways, as for example by being brought nearer to Him who is emphatically the Life-giver, and whom nothing can approach without being quickened by His contact, but at any rate in some way, though possibly by thoughts more mysterious than I have fully apprehended, men imbibe a conviction of their souls being destined not to pass away. Perhaps they feel, that as they have contracted a sacred friendship, and



are become children of one who is alike all-mighty and all-truthful, he will not, either as their friend or as their father, give over to extinction those who have loved him and become akin to him. But certainly, for some reason or other, a pious confidence of everlasting life seems from experience to spring up in men who have a knowledge of the living God. For my own part, I neither dare to speak, or even to think, over-confidently in such things; nor is it my own business to assert the sufficiency of pious aspirations without the warrant of some historical groundwork, such as we have not yet laid in the present discourse. Only, I could not forbear from mentioning what is thought to be the experience of more saintly men; and I will add one more remark upon it. There is no doubt, that both individual men are happier, and also that human virtue flourishes most in communities, in proportion as the expectation of a future life is strong; so that undoubtedly men seek such a hope. Supposing, then, such an assurance as we have spoken of should exist among the best men, what would it be, but a crowning answer, and a satisfactory supplement, such as both our dramatic instincts and our trust in divine providence suggest as probable, to all those deep longings of the affections, that crying out of the heart against annihilation, and that inextinguishable foreboding of the rational conscience, which we have already found to pervade mankind. Or, if such an assurance were destined anywhere to exist, who would be so likely as men of deep piety to obtain the privilege of concluding these natural prophecies, and throwing the notes of joy amidst the uncertain sounds which divine influences seem ever calling forth from the strings of humanity? That such confidence may exist only among the few, appears to me, from the nature of the case, no clear argument against the probability of its being well-grounded.

“It suffices me, however, to mention these things only as reasons for seeking more earnestly what religion is true and acceptable to God. For that all human beings, if true humanity is to survive in them, have need to fear, love, and obey, some

divine object of worship, and that this object must be a being who has a right to their worship, and therefore can command it, are points which have been clearly established."

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#### NOTE ON CHAPTER IV.

With the above Chapter, and with portions of the next, may be compared the first part of Butler's *Analogy*; the *Natural Theology* of Paley, especially its concluding chapter; Dr Whewell's *Bridgewater Treatise*, and the extracts from it, published as *Indications of the Creator*; the first book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*; and the works of Samuel Clarke, including his correspondence with Butler. For readers of Greek, and even for thoughtful persons who have access only to translations, the *Republic* of Plato remains still a work worthy of being studied, as a very wonderful blending of the appeal to intellect and to conscience, though with some fantastic disfigurements. Cudworth, with Mosheim for his commentator, as a vast repository of ancient faith and speculation, I would rather recommend to the few, than expect to be read by the many. More succinct arguments may be found at the commencement of Pearson, and of Burnet, and in Thompson's *Bampton Lectures*; where, however, the argument from design in creation is not quite forcibly enough dwelt upon. Nor are the better among the English Deists, and others who have approximated to them in reasoning, such as Tucker and Culverwell, without some useful suggestions. But their general defect is, that they set positive history too much on one side; and, in attempting a sort of demonstration, not warmed by the affections, they make faith a dry problem, instead of a living spirit. Much better, therefore, are some of the life-experiences and confessions of great men, such as those of Sir W. Raleigh in his *History of the World*, Burnet, at the end of the *History of his own Time*,—instances, in short, where feeling, thought, and experience, seem to converge in a confession from Man's life to his Author, Preserver, and Governor.

## CHAPTER V.

*Criticism of Hindú Systems, particularly the Baudhdha and the Sāṅkhya.*

“Deus non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem constituit.”—*Sir I. Newton.*

“Tanto a te longius, quanto dissimilius; neque enim locis. Tu, Domine Deus omnipotens, in Principio quod est de Te, in Sapientiâ tuâ, quæ nata est de substantiâ tuâ, fecisti aliquid et de nihilo. Fecisti enim cœlum et terram non de Te; nam esset æquale unigenito tuo, ac per hoc et tibi; et nullo modo justum esset ut æquale tibi esset, quod de Te non esset.—*St Augustine.*

AFTER Blancombe had finished, there was silence for some time, as if the company were thinking over his speech. Then, on some one's asking him, “Which religion, since we have need of one, is the best?” “There,” he answered, “is the question which we have to inquire about; for it is clear that none can be best, which is not also the truest possible.” “Or, rather,” here asked Sadánanda, “is not the question an unnecessary one?” “What? do you, who think knowledge the liberation of the soul,” answered Blancombe, “conceive it unnecessary to inquire what ought to be known? If truth is a thing so indifferent, how is the soul to be liberated?” “Why, perhaps,” rejoined Sadánanda, “the knowledge which sets free the soul is not so dependent as you imagine upon what is generally termed religion. For there are many devout Hindus, who are far from having attained true knowledge, because they start by wrong methods; so in other religions, which in themselves are mistaken, or at least only fit for the countries in which they are professed, I do not say that liberating knowledge may not be attained.” “But surely,” said Blancombe, “it is a part of religion to have a right belief; and we have seen already, that the intellect refuses to believe anything which it supposes to fall short of truth. Either then you must take truth into your religion, or else you must strike the intellect out of it; and the first plan appears to most men the best; for unless we know the

truth, our piety may even offend that highest Being whom we profess to worship; nor can men in general be persuaded to feel devoutly, unless they have also reason to be in some measure intellectually satisfied." "Well," said Sadánanda, "I feel no objection to the inquiry which you propose."

"But I must confess," here interposed Vidyáchárya, "that to me, too, the question now arising appears not perhaps indifferent in itself, but, as regards the different natives of countries far remote from each other, not very necessary. We are abundantly convinced, as it is our duty to believe, that we possess in our sacred books a revelation divinely given to the people of India. If you think otherwise, we are willing to concede that perhaps your religion may be better suited to your country. We are often obliged to tolerate the sight of practices, which, if you will excuse my saying so, appear to us profane and barbarous, in the conduct of foreigners. Yet to you such practices appear right; and we endeavour not to blame you. Perhaps the mode in which the Supreme Spirit has instructed you is different from that which he has employed towards ourselves. And as I have already acknowledged that there is a great diversity of names and attributes among the deities which our tolerant creed permits to be worshipped by different men, yet under all these disguises the twice-born man who is well-instructed worships one eternal Spirit, so perhaps under your different names it may have been permitted you to express something of the one spiritual truth. So far, at least, as you fulfil the duties enjoined by your own religion, I am willing to hope you may have, not absolutely the best, but yet a sufficient form of piety; and such, you may be aware, is the sentiment which our wisest\* teachers entertain towards you." "Why, however, do you require of us, that we should be faithful in certain duties?" asked Blancombe. "That I need hardly teach you," replied the other; "for it is clear that there are virtues of justice and mercy, which all mankind agree to respect; unless, therefore,

\* Elphinstone, B. VI. *Sekander Lódi*.

you practise these, you are condemned by your own rules." "You would not then permit us to inflict wanton cruelty?" asked Blancombe. "Certainly not," answered the other. "Nor to practise treachery, nor theft, nor adultery?" "Certainly not." "Nor again, to pray with an outward show of devotion, but with an absence of sincerity and purity of heart?" "Certainly not." "And you would forbid all these things," continued Blancombe, "upon an idea that they were highly displeasing to the Deity?" "Precisely so," answered Vidyáchárya. "Do not you then observe that our conceptions of the Deity are at least so far alike; and the reason of our agreeing so far is probably that, notwithstanding other differences, we have yet in this respect the truth? What then should hinder this agreement from being extended farther? For I suppose the truth must be one; and if either of us could teach the other what is truth throughout, we should then agree entirely." "I do not see," answered Vidyáchárya, "why the truth should be one. Two witnesses may see things differently, yet both relate truly what they have seen." "Truly, perhaps, as they think," said Blancombe; "but not in truth as the things are. But for a man to have ever so much truth of intention, in the sense of sincerity, will not save him from suffering miserably, if he mistakes for food what is truly poison; or if in many other modes he conceives of outward things otherwise than as they are. So, perhaps, as regards this question of religion, if a man have an unworthy conception of God, he may, by so conceiving, deprave his mind, or insult the Majesty of Heaven; or again, if he associate his conception with untrue accounts of facts which have not really occurred, it may become gradually warped; or he may lose all anxiety about historical truth in the sense of reality, and all power of distinguishing it from falsehood. But if a particular fact happens only in one way, or if a being is of any definite kind, it is clear that one account only of either can be the truth." "I know," said Vidyáchárya, "that it is difficult for your countrymen to conceive of this matter as we do; and,

perhaps, that very difficulty shews we were intended to be different. That things, however, have happened to you, we do not deny; but that the same things have happened to us, we are certain is not the case. What, however, should prevent your accidents from being a vehicle for teaching you the spiritual truth which purifies the heart, and our accidents also from leading us in the path of ultimate liberation? or, if you wish me to use your term, I have no objection to say redemption. That we agree in praising certain virtues, and in making them moral requisites, is with you a reason for seeking farther agreement; whereas to me it shews clearly that anything farther is unnecessary." "You imply," said Blancombe, "that we may have the essential sentiment of piety in common, though we differ as to the facts or images which we associate with it."

VID. "Possibly so."

BLANC. "Just as the sentiments of love and hatred may be expressed in many different languages, with every variety of sound, and yet they will be essentially akin in every case."

VID. "That is very much what I mean to say."

BLANC. "Then we may notice, even in this illustration, that no one loves or hates, except under the belief that the object of either sentiment is really lovely or hateful, so as either to attract or to irritate. Probably then there is no such thing anywhere as feeling without an accompaniment of supposed fact; and belief, either true or false, must, after all, go along with sentiment, and be the mould in which our very affections are cast. But now consider our question in this way. Have you not a prayer which you call the *Gayatri*?"

VID. "Certainly; we pray in that sacred text that the adorable light of the Divine Ruler may enlighten our minds."

BLANC. "Thank you; and by the Divine Ruler in that text you mean the spiritual sun or the divine enlightener?"

VID. "Whom else could we?"

BLANC. "Then I should be afraid of asking you whether this divine being teaches truth or falsehood; but have you

considered sufficiently that whatever he teaches must be true altogether, and that you have in this prayer no feeble testimony to the sacred duty of searching for the highest knowledge we can attain of the only true God? Surely, my friend, that which he is to one man he must be also to another. You, who have such grand conceptions of infinity and spiritual omnipotence, can never think that our little differences of skin, and hair, and temperament, are worthy of mention, when compared to the deep thoughts of our souls in the sight of that pure Being whose thought, you say, is the world, and to whom you also imply that time and space are only conditions of his action, and infinity the range of his creative will. Especially, if we come forth from him, as you say, like sparks from a flame, we must be all capable of remounting to our source; and this affinity is a greater reason for our seeking alike the eternal truth than any external accidents can be for our acquiescing in distorted fragments of it. I can hardly, indeed, conceive how variety of country is to alter truth, unless it can first alter the very being of the eternal God; but as he has given to all mankind one reason, though from imperfect education they partake unequally of it, so I augur that he has for all men one revelation of himself, though from moral backsliding or inadequate teaching many men have as yet fallen short of learning it. Have I not, indeed, had a passage shewn me in one of your sacred books, which not only declares faith in Vishnu to be universally possible, but prophesies that it shall be brought about and rendered universal?"

"You may," answered Vidyáchárya, "have seen a passage to that effect in the Sri Bhágavat\*."

"Well," proceeded Blancombe, "that is a far more cheering anticipation, than the dreary prospect you held out of many races being doomed to almost hopeless ignorance. Suppose we start on this more hopeful track; and let us consider whether you or I can do most to improve those among the natives of

\* Wilson's *Analysis*, Pref. V. Pur.

India whom you lament as sunken in ignorance or vice, and whether also either of us can convince the other." "Why," said Vidyáchárya, "I am far from pretending to equal you either in enlightenment, or power of argument; but as regards our religion, I have partly explained it, and, if you wish it, I am ready to do so farther." "Well, we have gained something," remarked Blancombe, "if it has appeared, either from reason, or from your own sacred books, that as God is one, so truth is one, and that the tendency of mankind hereafter will be both to improvement in other things, and also to unity in the knowledge of God."

"Before we go farther," asked Sadánanda, "should not the stranger tell us what he thinks of the systems which he has heard expounded, and since he agrees partly with them all as opposed to the Chárvácas, which of the three he prefers?" "You mean," said Blancombe, "which of the three I prefer in itself, apart from the authority of the sacred books?" "Precisely so," replied the other. "Whether then am I quite justified in making such an attempt?" said Blancombe, hesitatingly, and half to himself. "For many things about the Deity may appear to our feeble capacity strange, which yet if taught us upon proper authority, we could not venture to deny. It is true that any immorality in a doctrine would shock the conscience, and self-contradiction would repel the reason; and, according to my own argument, our mental perceptions have quite as great authority to persuade, as our sight or hearing. So that there may be inherent in a religion a sort of internal evidence of its truth, so far as it is good or the contrary. Still, if I reflect, how inadequate all our faculties must be to comprehend the Infinite Being from whom they came, and how negative our ideas become, either of mind as a thinking principle, or of spirit as a creative power, the moment we attempt to describe their character, instead of contenting ourselves with asserting their reality, then I must confess that any uncovering of Himself by the Deity would easily outweigh all our refined speculations; and



I am half inclined to wait for some command to believe, instead of determining beforehand what is believable. There are, however, limits to this predisposition in favour of assent; since the laws of thought, or what perhaps my friends here might call the spiritual limits applicable to mind, seem to give us a primary revelation of God, which, as coming from himself, we may be confident he will not set aside. I particularly hesitate," he continued, now raising his voice, "as to offering any criticism upon the doctrines of our pious friend the Saugata Múni. For he appeals expressly to the authority of Sákyā or Gótama, though he considers him as an aspirant in the course of human development, rather than as a divine revealer. Now, certainly, there are parts of this Bauddha doctrine, which would not be incredible in themselves, if the authority which guaranteed them to us were sufficient; as for instance, that more than one agent may co-exist in the same Divine Being, and again, that one who lived in the weakness of humanity, sin only excepted, may now be exalted so as to be our representative of Deity, and a proper object of worship. Then, again, as to miracles, or acts of preternatural power, if they were also acts of goodness and beneficence, I see no objection to admitting them as divine credentials; and, again, that religious doctrines may be expressed in writing, or even important facts recorded in books, by men under the influence of a divine teaching, so that they may hand down after death the truths with which they were inspired, appears to me highly credible, and indeed only a result, such as spiritual feeling, which we ascribe, like you, to heavenly grace, would naturally produce, when once brought in contact with the practical understanding of mankind, which we also ascribe to divine providence. If the words of any living teachers were worth listening to, their writings after death will be about equally so. Then, again, it must be fully allowed, that the spread of the Bauddha faith by the innocent means of missions and preaching, may stand for one of the most remarkable facts in the history of the world.

“ When, however, we ask, what was the authority of Gótama, very great difficulties arise in the way of proving it satisfactorily. In the first place, if we examine the miracles you have alluded to, I certainly have read extraordinary things in the Maháwansa, but they are of a kind which repels rather than persuades me. For instance, Mahinda, as the missionary of Ceylon, is said to have travelled through the air; and something similar is related of his predecessor Gótama. Certain demons, or Yakkas, are represented as shivering around the Bauddha teacher, and as being alternately terrified and pitied by him. Then there are certain alliances of a strange kind. There is a king, for example, married to a female Yakka; I mean Vigaya; and perhaps one ought not to wonder at his marriage being strange, since his descent was extraordinary; for he is made the grandson, I think, of a lion. Then, probably, you remember strange stories about serpents; and how a king, called Susunaga, obtained his name from a serpent’s watching over him, and being frightened (*Su, Su*) by the people of the city. You may, indeed, object, that I am quoting from a Ceylonese book, of somewhat less authority than your Nepaulese Sutras, or the three Pitakas. But so far as I have seen the Sutras, they also abound in stories of a marvellous kind; or at least the legends of Sákya’s birth and life, of his contest at Sravasti, and general career, are different from ordinary history; but this is implied in your own appeal to miracles.

“ Now, of all such narratives we may say generally, that if they are brought within the range of that Sánkhyā philosophy which you praise, their credibility will be in danger. For men moving through the air, and sitting on fiery cushions in the midst of demons, and princesses marrying lions, are effects which would not be contained in any cause with which we are acquainted. You do not find such things happen now-a-days, because in fact there are no causes in nature likely to produce them. Why then should they ever have happened? If a supernatural power introduces a new cause we may expect an

extraordinary effect; and you have ingeniously remarked, that there is no reason why the Deity should not teach mankind often. But first, this argument from supposition of the Divine interference is somewhat less open to you, venerable Muni, than to people in general; since you are not strongly convinced of there being a Deity, and if there be, you think he suffers Nature to take care of herself. The more then you fall back upon mere nature, the more imperatively are you bound, by the Sánkhyā wisdom which you praise, to make all your assertions of results consistent with the most regular operation of causes clearly inherent in nature.

“ But secondly, if the Deity works wonders in order to teach, we cannot doubt that such wonderful lessons will be instructive; they will have something in them calculated to teach men. Whereas, except so far as some of the stories in the Pitakas may tend to magnify the personal renown of Gótama, the wonders I have alluded to in your books have in general no moral meaning; they do not set forth the connexion of human suffering with moral disorder, or shew the Divine mercy healing pain in proportion as it removes sin, or, in short, do anything but strike us as something extraordinary. Then why should our scrupulous friend Sadánanda here believe effects to have arisen of which he finds no causes in nature? you say, because they are written in your books. Then, excepting only from my next remark those moral precepts which many believe to have made up the original Sūtras, as containing the doctrine of Sákya, and supposing all those, so far as they were arranged at your first council, to be genuine, I must take a great objection to mere records of wonderful incidents in books written confessedly some hundreds of years after the date of the supposed event. Such an interval of time is allowed in the case of the Cingalese Mahāwansa, though I do not know how far in respect of some of the continental Pitakas.

“ You will see how great a difficulty such a fact involves, if you consider the tendency of all stories to grow (especially if

they are wonderful) in passing almost from one mouth to another. Mere oral tradition thus constantly expands itself even in a few hours, and in the course of a few years may do so indefinitely. How much more then in the interval of a century or two, when a whole generation has both caught from its father's lips all the expansions of their fancy, and had time to superadd those of its own? Nor does your answer satisfy me, that your sacred books, although in some cases removed from the date of the events, were still written in the age of inspiration. For although we believe firmly that the Holy Spirit of God enlightens the mind of man, we yet observe such enlightenment to have its most proper sphere as regards heavenly things, or spiritual doctrines, rather than the record of earthly events; and so far as it acts even upon this latter order of things, it does so by an extension of its purifying influence through the legitimate faculties of the understanding, rather than by setting them arbitrarily aside. For example, it would deepen a sacred writer's perception of the Divine dealings as shewn in earthly events, and by awakening in him a more reverential attention would also fortify his powers of memory, and perhaps might act in other ways of this kind. But as to any dream, that events which have happened in former generations of men are first suffered to be forgotten, and then revealed over again in circumstantial particularity in order to be recorded in writing, I have as yet found no clear instance of such a revelation in the history of mankind anywhere, and shall never admit it except upon very clear proof. For, hitherto, in proportion as any one has preferred on behalf of sacred books claims of this latter kind, either error or imposture has been found to prevail. Pardon me if I point out to yourself what a learned man (Mr Turnour) has shewn in reference to the Maháwansa. He there finds a prediction by Gótama of the conversion of Ceylon to the Bauddha faith. This book was written for Ceylon. But on referring to the continental Pitakas the whole passage containing that prediction does not occur. If it does, you can shew it me now. But if it does not, the

inference becomes too clear, that the prophecy was one inserted after the event, not having been in the original books. Consider also that very curious story of Vigaya marrying the female Yakka. His companions have been bewitched by her. He by wisdom and firmness resists her blandishments, until with drawn sword he has both compelled their deliverance, and extorted from her a sacred oath of true alliance. Now all this story is not written in Ceylon until about 440 years after your first council (or as we should say, about 104 B.C.), whereas it had been sung in heroic verse among the Yavanas some eight hundred years earlier, being in fact an episode of the Odyssey. Now you may urge, I cannot prove that the Greek bard did not get the groundwork of his story from India; but you will observe, even if he did, the author of the Mahāwansa is still necessarily wrong in placing the transaction so near his own time as the life of Vigaya, who preceded Mahinda by only three generations. Such an error in time must be considered as confirming the mistrust which the marvellous character of the story is itself calculated to inspire; not to mention, what some critics would say, that the Greek poet was perhaps the inventor, and the Bauddha annalist a borrower." Here Wolff, interposing, said, "That would be precisely my own opinion." "But, however that may be," resumed Blancombe, "you see, my friend, the difficulty of asking persons so scrupulous as your half ally Sadānanda to believe miracles ascribed to Sākya, on the strength of any inspiration which has first to be proved of books written long after his time.

"Here then it is impossible to avoid a doubt, how far stories of the kind alluded to may have been exaggerated by error, or by the overgrowth of later times. This suspicion will haunt us more, if we see reason to believe that the very doctrine and practices of Sākya have undergone some change. From what you have yourself told us, and from what I recollect of other accounts, Sākya appears to have been impressed with the transitoriness of all earthly things, and indignant at the exclusiveness practised

by the Brahmanical priesthood. Hence he threw open the doors of his religion to every caste ; and although it is disputed how far he acknowledged an *Adi Buddha* in some such reserved manner as yourself, it is clear that his faith had no artificial order of priesthood. His very word for religious rites, I have been told, was *Pújá*, or worship, as distinct from the older Brahmanic *Yajna*, or sacrifice. Thus he appears to have been a democrat in religion. Whereas, those successors of his who enjoyed the favour of king Asoca, or some who followed them, appear to have sought the transfer of sacerdotal dignities, rather than their annihilation. Thus their yellow-robed fraternity planted itself in the place of the Brahmans ; and the number of priests who came over, as soon as this transfer was affected, helped to change the character of your faith. At least, I conceive, the gentle nature of Sákya would be surprised at the pomp of yellow robes, and incense, and chants, with which your temples are now filled ; certainly, I think he would forbid the relics, consisting of his supposed bones, to be worshipped ; and in many things, if Sákya was a Divine teacher, you have need to return to the first principles of his faith. To myself it appears probable, that as his practices have been changed, so the story of his life has been magnified."

"But," here the Saugata threw in a reply, "you would not retain that supposition, if it appeared that our sacred books were arranged by the early councils of our Church, before any such developments as you conceive to be corruptions had taken place in our practice." "In that case," answered Blancombe, "part of my objection would be removed ; for wonderful events are better attested the nearer competent witnesses stand to them." "Well, but you know," rejoined the Saugata, "our Pitakas, were arranged at the very first council, in the year when Buddha entered on his blessedness." "On that account," resumed the other, "I feel compelled to admit the probability that such books give a sufficiently faithful account of the original doctrine of Buddha ; but I have been alluding to the case of interpolations, and of wonderful stories in books of a later date. Now,

if we examine that doctrine of your teacher Buddha, or Sákya, or Gótama, in its authorised records, has it such a character of novelty as to deserve properly the name of a revelation? You scarcely yourself affirm that it has." "Pardon me," said the Saugata, "we call Sákya the intelligent, or rather the enlightened, (Buddha,) in order to denote the fulness of Buddhahood, or Divine intelligence, which came upon him, as I have partly explained." "Yes," answered Blancombe, "and so the professors of any religion may consider Divine enlightenment necessary in order to apprehend spiritually their acknowledged truths; but that is a different sort of enlightenment, or at least is generally conceived to be so, from the one which communicates truths not previously known. For example, the A'charya has appealed to the Vedas as the doctrinal standards of his faith, but yet he has spoken of Divine grace as necessary to each believer; and I apprehend most Christians to make generally the same sort of distinction. Am I not right, my lord," continued Blancombe, here turning to his elder friend Mountain. "Certainly," replied the other, "the revelation of a new truth to the world, and a revealing to each person of grace to apprehend that truth, are distinct things." "Well," resumed Blancombe, when we ask what was that doctrine which Sákya taught, and in virtue of which he claimed to be a Divine teacher, we find it very much the same as the Sánkhyā philosophy. If at least we were to take the old maxims of this meditative sect, and superadd to them a certain devout contemplation of the Yoga kind, we should have the original of Sákya as a founder of a religion, sufficiently explained. We should have a devout mystic endeavouring to raise himself by contemplation and benevolence above the illusions of this transitory world, while also he would possess in his philosophy a weapon keen enough to assail the received religion of his contemporaries. You will observe, I am not denying the personal virtue of the man; and we may admit that the rapid progress of his religion was due to something good in it; a re-action, as it were, of spiritualised



humanity against the zealous sacerdotalism of the Brahmans. There is no longer, however, so much as a shadow of a pretence for considering the system of Sākya as an original downdropt from Heaven; and the very possibility of its having Divine authority at all depends upon whether your theory is correct, that nature or humanity can develop themselves, either by prayers or otherwise, into a kind of Divine enlightenment. But such a theory is the offspring of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. I shall, therefore, do you no injustice in classing you with our wise friend Sadānanda, and in considering both your theories as one. Or rather, I will look at the offshoot in its stem.

“Notwithstanding many things which puzzle me in this Sāṅkhya system, it contains some which rather attract me. At least, I am not startled disagreeably by the subdivision of man into different parts which are called the gross and the subtile person, and the latter of which we are said to carry about with us into different forms of existence, though it consists, like the grosser, of matter, but of matter in most subtile and primary form; for in such a doctrine, when it is coupled with the idea of a soul entirely distinct from matter, I recognise a sort of confession of the truth, that the personality of Man would not exist as a whole, nor what we call humanity be entire, without two elements. Thus, in one respect you, Sadānanda, seem to be nearer the truth than either the Vedāntine reasoner, who resolves everything into spirit, or any one, on the other hand, who approaches nearer to the Chārvācas, by making man consist only of sensuous body. Whatever our souls may be, there seems some reason in your belief that the consciousness we have of ourselves as a whole includes an organic development, or a balance of powers depending partly on the play of those natural forces around us, which yet we hesitate to call part of ourselves. Perhaps then you here supply an escape from a difficulty which some have keenly felt as regards the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It is the creed of Christians, that not only their souls will live, but their bodies be raised again. Some ingenious persons, who



think the immortality of the soul probable enough, have still cavilled at the resurrection of the flesh, as thinking it too humble and gross a conception; but if, as you say, the soul is so distinct in its kind from every particle of earth, that we cannot even conceive of ourselves as human beings, nor be what we are without some combination which is developed out of matter, and enables us to apprehend things material as we do, then it will be clear that any restoration of our full identity in a new life will require the revival of this sensuous companion of the soul; and as you see no difficulty in the conception of this subtle person's being revived, so the Christian doctrine of the body which was sown corruptible being raised incorruptible, and therefore in some way spiritualised, turns out not to have been a gross conception, but a profoundly refined one. So far I have therefore to thank you for a sort of confirmation of a Christian doctrine.

“ Again, I am still more pleased to find you acknowledge so decidedly the immortal soul of man as something distinct in itself, not dependent on things earthly, and not liable to death, nor yet flowing out of an undefined source of spirit, but as individual and immortal. The careful way in which you isolate this soul from any combinations or processes of matter has also an interest for my mind, as recalling somewhat the language of St Paul, an apostle of Jesus, and a bishop of his Church. For he also confesses that there was a something in him by which he was affected with passionate feelings, and which he disliked to call himself; yet without which his consciousness of his own being would have been other than it actually was; yet, again, inside he had a deeper something which he felt to be more truly himself, and which consented to the law of Right, though yet his whole being did not, but was at variance. ‘ I delight,’ he says, ‘ in the law of God after the inner man; but I find another law in my members\*.’ Only there was one difference between your doctrine and that of the apostle. You wish the soul to be reminded of her distinctness until she becomes indifferent not

\* Epistle to the Romans.

merely to the events of the outer world, but also, if I understand you aright, to the very actions of the entire man. Whereas St Paul wishes that inner being, in virtue of which he says, I, to suffer patiently losses or wrongs, as things both imposed on him by a Heavenly Father, and also as of little import to one who expected an eternal inheritance; as regards all actions, however, his feeling is very different; he does not attempt to persuade himself that whatever he does is the blind doing of *Pracriti*, in such a sense as to make him not personally responsible for it. On the contrary, he blames himself for whatever in his performance comes short of the idea on which he has fixed the eye of his mind. Here then is a difference as to which I could wish you to reconsider your doctrine. For although you call the soul *purusha*, and perhaps rightly, as if it were more truly ourself; yet if we are only conscious of our entire personality, or, in fact, only become men in virtue of a sensuous though subtle organism, it will seem to follow that whatever we do as one being we may suffer for as one. Remorse, shame, and despair may accompany our humanity revived in some new world, for the actions it either was guilty of, or suffered itself to be betrayed into, while it lived here. So far then I do but partially agree with your doctrine about the soul; nor indeed is the fitness of rendering the soul indifferent to moral actions a doctrine agreeable to the sacred books for which you profess not to have shaken off your reverence. Perhaps you will consider whether the human conscience, if properly cultivated, and the very instinct of right and wrong which the soul displays, if she is truly educated, instead of misguided, would not make your doctrine here nearer to St Paul, and also make it more consistent with itself.

“ It seems to me rather extraordinary that you should make knowledge in the highest sense reside in the soul, but agency generally in the body as a product of *Pracriti*. For surely it is clear that where there is knowledge there is power, or, as an old proverb says, ‘ to ken is to can.’ For although by power some men may mean brute force, we know that such things yield to

contrivance, which comes of sagacity and mental perception. I cannot therefore admit it to be reasonable that Pracriti should be said to do everything and yet be ignorant, while soul is said to know everything and yet to be impotent—these two conceptions do not well agree.

“ But now, what surprised me most in your system, as it seemed also to shock the A'charya, is this. You give the human body a soul, but you are not convinced that the vast frame of the world has any supreme soul, except so far as forms of power and intelligence may have been developed out of the sea of life, like other productions of nature. You made it clear that the beings you call gods should be described as having souls; but still you represent their divine personality, in so far as they are objects of worship, to be entirely a transitory thing, since it is an efflux of nature, and everything except soul must pass away. It does not in the least console me, that you talk of such vast periods of time; for how do I know they will be so long? or who told you anything about them? I certainly could have wished you would have persuaded our Vedantine friend that each human soul is distinct in itself, as we believe; and that he in turn would persuade you to believe in Deity as the Highest Soul, and that Deity exists at least as independently of nature, as primæval before her life, and as eternal throughout her every change or annihilation, as you conceive the human soul to be in relation to our body. Seriously, I would ask, can you think the soul of man so godlike as to have life in itself, and to survive easily any multitude of bodies until finally it exists as soul, though not as humanity, apart from flesh or blood; and do you think the supreme Deity could have no being apart from earthly shapes, or the moulding of nature?

“ You say that an independent Deity could have no inducement to create a world; but can we easily limit the range over which either the ambition, or the beneficence, or the desire to expand himself in any way, of even an ordinary human being may extend? One might as well argue that Alexander of

Macedon, or Mahmud of Ghazni, having Greece and Affghanistan to dwell in, could never have wished to overrun India. Yet the first is said to have wept for another world to conquer, and the history of the second I need not remind you of. But surely beneficence is with good men as strong a passion as the love of conquest is with kings. You see instances of it sufficiently in your own missionaries, such as those of the Bauddhas formerly, or in the life of Sancara who went about teaching. How can we venture, then, in either modesty or soundness of mind, to say that an Intelligence which must be to all others nothing less than the aggregate of worlds is to a peasant's cottage, can have the range of its beneficence restricted, or the depths of its motives fathomed, by guesses which our ignorance makes in the dark? Pray observe, that the motives of any supreme Mind creating and ordering the universe would, from the necessity of the case, transcend our comprehension. On my theory, therefore, I am not bound to explain the divine motives; for they may have been either any out of many such as may be piously attributed to an Object of the highest reverence, or they might even be of a kind beyond our conjecture. Having once reached the footstool of a Supreme Father, I can most reasonably believe His will a mystery, and acknowledge a point beyond which I despair of pushing the inquiry, yet without, on that account, being vanquished in our great argument; whereas, upon your theory of nature, you are bound to explain everything. If science would prove the world to have been made by ignorance, or by itself, she must shew how either of them made it. Take, for example, that primary plastic matter of yours, which I can compare to nothing but infinite quicksilver, but which you describe as a sort of ubiquitous fluid, and as being in fact the bubbling seed of life. Much more I ask, as even the greatest of physical inquirers have asked, where did such a fluid get its motive? could it even be moved at all, if law as the result of design or thought did not underlie its movements? You will readily admit that it moves in subjection to certain rules, and that however truly all the

forms of matter may perhaps be resolved back into one primary fluid, that fluid has at least been varied into a thousand forms of life, according to the conditions under which it has moved. There has been heat melting, cold condensing, liquid flowing, lightness flying up, and gravity tending downward—these things are not more facts historically, than the order in which they are on the whole arranged is metaphysically a thought. Indeed, I humbly conceive, metaphysically, that it would not be possible to trace back the process by thought, unless its arrangement, in fact, had been orderly, and such as proceeds from design. For if ever you arrive at things which are literally the work of chance, though it is not very easy to find such, no one then ventures to predict an order, or attempts to trace one. Thus, as to which of the myriad drops of salt water will wet each grain of sand on the shore we give no account, for it seems to be chance; but the great body of the tide we predict, and that seems to be law. The same remark of the utter uncertainty of pure chance may often be made as to the units, even when we have no doubt as to the aggregate. Thus we do not know which pigeon out of a flock will get a particular grain of corn when we throw a handful at random, though we may be certain the corn will be all eaten, and the pigeons in the mass fed. I have, in talking to Dr Wolff, already glanced at the idea of fixed proportions, according to which the primary forms into which we actually trace nature become combined together. If all these are evolutions, as you suppose, of one indissoluble fluid, they must have been evolved out of it, on some law of combination equally implying arrangement. Again, it seems a favourite theory with some of us, that time is the mental order of events, and space the capacity of arranging objects. So far as I at all understand\* such an imagination, it seems very consistent with my argument for a creative mind, though not perhaps necessary to it. For just as time would be nothing to us if we did not notice it and devise ways of marking it, so that, in fact, we create human time by thinking

\* Confiteor tibi, Domine, me nescire adhuc quid sit tempus.—*St Augustine.*

about it, and imprint it as an order upon our lives, thus the absolute idea of time would perhaps be an impossibility if the Highest Spirit had not designed an order, and marked out a succession either of causes and effects, or of days and nights and seasons in which events should happen. Similarly, I suppose the absolute idea of space implies a potential arrangement of objects by the creative spirit. What shall we say then? If time and space, and I suppose similarly many such mental classifications, such as causation, and gravitation, and combinations of number, are quite necessary in order to enable us to understand the world we live in, which, without them, would be a confused chaos—yet all these in their largest reality, which has certainly something external to ourselves, imply an eternal thought as the only thing which can give them substantiality—have not we already an Eternal Spirit as the Creator of all things standing out as visibly to the eye of the mind, as the world itself does to our bodily sense? Not but that an easier answer to those who doubt of a creative *Iswara* may be drawn for people in general out of special instances of design, to some of which I may presently refer; but to you, who err rather by boldness than timidity in your metaphysical speculations, some such argument as the above from thought shewing itself as law in the creation, may be properly addressed, and ought to be convincing. Perhaps you will permit me to remind you here of your own argument for the distinct existence of soul. I did not, when you used it, see why such an argument should convince you; but was too glad of your conclusion on that point to quarrel much with your mode of arriving at it. You said, as there is a spectacle in nature so there must be soul as a spectator. But why must or ought one thing to be rather than another? This inference of yours implies moral fitness; and it would be ridiculous to talk of fitness as regards the very nature of mundane existences, without a Supreme Mind to settle, or at the very least to judge of it. For you did not mean fitness in the sense of a key fitting a lock, though even that would imply, as

every one allows, some mental design ; but you meant fitness in a far more delicate and truly spiritual sense, of the correspondence between two things being such as to recommend the plan for admiration, or even its possibility for credence. Consider what far higher conditions of mental thought this latter problem involved ; and then tell me whether your theory did not unconsciously assume a moral governor, even while you professed to deny one. At least there seems to have been here a practical inconsistency in your argument. It is true that others whose wisdom is based on piety often reason from the fitness of our expectation as regards the moral government of the world to the probability of future events on the grandest scale ; but then the instincts which lead them to do so seem to be a testimony which God has planted in their mind of his own great being, and either a kind of faith, or at least a foundation on which a more perfect faith may be built. You, however, are open to the sneer of Dr Wolff on this point ; since there is no reason why the drama of the world's history should be wrought out in goodness unless its Author and Exhibitor be good.

“ But now, if any one were to ask me why you, in spite of all your wisdom, are betrayed into inconsistencies almost as great as those of the Chárvácas,—for you in effect put matter before mind, and the thing made before the Maker, as they do,—I should answer that perhaps the reasons are chiefly these. Both you, and all other Hindú thinkers on these subjects—for I may now include the venerable Vidyáchárya—are very desirous of carrying your inquiries about the Deity to the most subtle point of refinement. You observe with great justice that none of the phenomena of nature give an adequate representation of one whom we can suppose to be their author. He is neither Tempest, nor Fire, nor Ocean, nor Sun ; and though rude nations may have fancied the thunderbolt to be brandished by his hand, or the clouds to conceal his chariot, yet these and all other things in nature prove empty, the moment we search in them for the incommunicable signs of a right to our worship. For



they all obey something higher or deeper, and have nothing which answers to our heart. Thus, although they betray an order disposed by Divine wisdom, they shew no signs of partaking that very wisdom. One by one then we mentally separate from these things that which we believe to be very Deity. But the natural train of thought in such an investigation has been happily glanced at by the Saugata Muni. For thus at last there remains nothing in nature, that is, nothing we can touch, or hear, or see, by means of our bodily senses, which we either dare or condescend to address with prayer. To what then shall we liken our God? The mind, which by its refinements seems to be ever removing Him farther and farther backward, despairs of perceiving what He is, and because it cannot describe the fashion of His being, becomes in danger of disbelieving its reality. Here, then, is a terrible error. For although the veil of the flesh prevents us from seeing what sort of thing is behind the scene of nature, we should not the less infer there is something—just as the Bauddha infers a solid matter, or others would say, a combining principle, to underlie what we feel and see and handle in external objects, though these apprehensions on our own part may not be infallible clues to what the solid or essential and formative principle is in itself; so we must much more infer an eternal spirit to underlie what we conceive of spiritual things. Yet certainly it is not wonderful that the mere explorer of nature, being accustomed to measure things local, and weigh things solid, should not know where to place the more mysterious being of the Deity, and should therefore gradually lose sight of him. From the language used by the Saugata, I gathered that he did not wish to deny a Deity so much as to subtilise our conceptions of the Divine Being, by excluding as far as possible everything earthly. With that desire I so far sympathise as to go some way in that direction myself. If, however, something of vagueness thus creeps in around our idea of that great First Cause, which as yet perhaps we have not denied, we become in danger of obscuring it still more by apprehending the vastness



of the scale upon which all his doings are conducted. Here, indeed, is the second great peril of Hindú wisdom. You notice that the generations of living things have been by thousands such as no man can number. Perhaps, also, if something of European science is superadded, or if your own ancient astronomers should have gone so far, you learn that the earth we tread is but one among innumerable worlds; and vast as it appears to our limited senses, must yet be reckoned by the gaze of science as only a speck in the immensity of all the starry worlds which exist around us. Thus you learn to talk of infinite periods of time, and of boundless worlds, and of cycles recurring as if it were without beginning or end. The mind then amazed, and as it were stupified by the extent of a scheme which it cannot grasp, is in danger of acquiescing in the mere order which it observes near it, or even fancies that because this order is large in relation to our weakness, there can therefore be nothing beyond it. Whereas, if our faculties were enlarged, as our horizon extended, we should find at last that the necessity of a Governor and Preserver to the utmost whole of all smaller circles is as real and vital as it appears to be to some child or to some simple old woman, who perceiving only a part of what science reveals, infers rightly that this part could not exist by itself, but must depend upon something higher, even as it is connected with something larger. We ourselves have heard Sadánanda speak of Vishnú as preserving our world. But if this little speck of ours must be preserved by some intellectual being from falling into vague confusion, and undergoing physical or moral anarchy, how much more must the vast whole of space, and the infinite periods of time which belong to its career, require to be preserved and upheld by some supreme and eternal and all-embracing Intelligence. If order in little things implies design, how much more in great ones. Multiply as much as you please in imagination the extent of space or time, you do not therefore lessen, but rather increase the necessity for that higher and deeper Being, without which they could not consist. The

mind truly disciplined will easily overleap therefore whatever interval of generations any sort of history may multiply, and ascend in thought to the great Father, without whom there could be no offspring. The Saugata Muni points out the cycles of water as it is generated in dew, or descends in rivers, or collects itself in seas. Does he not then perceive, that these cycles depend upon our connexion with the heavenly bodies. It is the sun which by its heat attracts the dews, and the moon which by the attraction of her substance lifts up the body of the tides, so that they proceed in order and by method, as if the designer of them had entered into covenant with mankind, that His providence should not fail them, but afford daily proofs of His own wisdom, as well as marks by which we should shape our course, and take note of things by which life may be assisted. Now just as the earth depends on something higher, even so do we. Again, Sadánanda speaks of infinite cycles, and here I am sorry to observe, that Vidyáchárya, by the account which he gives of his preferential worship of Siva, appears too nearly to agree in considering creation in its largest sense as a vague infinity, with neither beginning nor end, but an eternal revolution of life and death. But do not you both perceive, that although a circle returns upon itself, yet every circle has a circumference? It has, therefore, a limit. Nor are our minds able to conceive of any circle, as a possibility, which is not thus defined, and which has not been drawn upon some design. But where there is design, there chance is excluded. Now if I was to say that the circle of all life and of all worlds has a circumference, I might appear either impious or unwise, in limiting the infinity of the Creator. But what shall we say—If anything is designed, has it not so far at least a mental beginning? and if anything attains its object, has it not so far an end? Or do we believe the circle of space to be infinite for any other reason than because we also ascribe infinity to the Supreme Mind, which has disposed, and which therefore (if we consider it as an appearance) underlies it as its unseen Cause? May we not then revert to that doctrine

of Madhwa, which was before alluded to, and endeavour to clear up the controversy between him and Sancara? Our most venerable friend here, as the follower of Sancara, whom he believes a true commentator on the Vedas, denies that the Deity has any Gunas, or qualities. I also agree with him, that we cannot piously ascribe any such limits to the Deity, as those of space or time, and whatever qualities we may venture to ascribe, should be in the way of reverential conjectures, and only attributed as pious suppositions, rather than assumed to express the ineffable Being of the eternal I AM. But Madhwa says the Deity has all good qualities, though not bad ones. I humbly understand him also to say that the Deity is limited by such Gunas as are consistent with perfection, though not by others. Here, again, I agree with Madhwa, that nothing done by the Deity is done at random, or by caprice, but by wisdom. Is not then wisdom in itself a limitation? for surely it excludes from its owner the arbitrariness of evil—and, again, is not all perfection a Guna? Would you then not agree with Madhwa, that the Deity is Sagúna, or limited by excellence, supposing in turn he should concede to you, that the Deity is *Nirguna*, in the sense of our not being able to ascribe to Him any of the limitations of passion and darkness which fetter us creatures of an hour? I have some hope of your agreeing with him and with me so far, since I observed that you contend against Sadánanda for the full certainty and correctness of that revelation of the Deity which you believe to be contained in the Vedas. For I need not explain to you, there could be no certainty in any revelation, unless it were certain that the Deity will abide by and make good that which He has revealed of Himself, whatever it may turn out to be. Agree therefore with us, that the Deity has *Gunas*, so far at least as to be bound by faithfulness, and by the truth of the declaration which He has made of Himself.” Here Vidyáchárya, appeared, as I understood, to give some kind of assent. “Well, then,” resumed Blancombe, “the Deity is not in such a sense infinite, as to be diffused in a vague atmos-

phere of shadowy immensity, but sufficiently positive and definite for us to trust in Him and pray to Him, and search after His truth, if haply we may find it. Having obtained this great practical concession, I am not anxious to push farther my own conception, which, however, appears to me not an unimproving one, of all space, however infinite it may appear to us, having still bounds in such a sense that it is all conceived and comprehended by the Supreme Mind which upholds it. There is, therefore, no infinity, except so far as He chooses perhaps of the volition of His divine wisdom to make it so. The worlds, therefore, throughout all space have metaphysical limits, inasmuch as they are subject to Providence, though whether in fact they have bounds of space, I confess myself not to know. For, on the other hand, I most freely concede to you, that whatever law of the Creator's wisdom may limit His creation or His doings, we cannot, except so far as He reveals it to us, compass it within the embrace of our faculties; and as even our own thoughts run to and fro and forward and backward in space and time, without being limited by the detention of our bodies in one spot, or by the number of years and events which may intervene, much more the absolute Mind of the Supreme Foreseer and Governor must have infinite knowledge of things above and below, and of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. Nor dare I ascribe to Him any limits drawn from our conceptions in general, though His own wisdom may come forth assigning to Him the voluntary limit of law.

“Indeed, that thought which Sadánanda has started with reference to the Vedas, that they may contain sufficient truth for human guidance, though not the highest truth absolutely, may be applied fairly enough to my own argument. For though in a history of facts, which must have been in one way or another, we require strict correctness, and though a distinct revelation of truth is not to be explained away, yet it is probable enough that our conceptions of heavenly things may be so imperfect as to resemble them only by way of picture, and may be true relatively to us, inasmuch as they guide us adequately on our way, while

yet the reality may in absolute truth be something transcending our thoughts, just as a mariner's chart serves to guide him, without representing to the eye the depth and majesty of the ocean. It seems, indeed, to be a necessary condition of exhibiting on the stage of our apprehensions a Being properly infinite, that it should empty itself as it were of its glory by assuming limits, and being subjected in our thoughts to that without which we can hardly recognise life. Only, is it not still an act of reasonable faith to believe, that the unseen reality corresponds, not of course exactly, but sufficiently for our guidance, with the fashion of it which we have conceived? It may be regulatively wholesome, though not speculatively adequate.

“For example, I can thus imagine the divine agency in either creating or preserving may differ much from what we term action in man. Yet I would not, therefore, lose sight of the idea of a divine agent, or an Iswara, properly so called. All the Hindú theories I have ever heard, either now, or on former occasions, appear tinged with that love of quietude which is characteristic of your people, as well as by the refinement already spoken of. Both Sadánanda in what he said of the soul, and others in reasoning about the Deity, seem to think it would be a degradation or a misery for any immortal being to be actively employed. Hence you leave neither the soul nor the soul's great Author anything but the passive enjoyment of extreme tranquillity. Not such, however, is the conception of happiness, which either men or nations would frame in their vigorous prime. I will not argue the point from pictures which Northern nations have imagined of gods delighting in war and the chase; for you would smile at them as inspirations of the blood rather than of the soul. Yet consider a little what sort of man is considered noblest, whether one who lives in passive enjoyment, even of a harmless kind, or one who serves his generation by undergoing peril, or achieving exploits, even at the cost of pain?” “Every one will admit the second is the nobler,” said Sadánanda, after a little pause. “Then consider,” said Blancombe, “what part

of our lives we look back upon with most pleasure. I believe, at least, so far as I can judge or observe, it is not the hours of ease, but the day of toil, or even of peril, and in general the scene of some duty well performed, which the mind lingers upon with instinctive satisfaction." "That may be so," said Sadánanda. "But certainly," proceeded Blancombe, "no one doubts which is most useful to mankind, for we all acknowledge that the active man benefits both his family and his country, while the indolent, in so far as his example is followed, becomes the ruin of everything. Supposing then beneficence to be an attribute of the Deity, I should doubt whether we do wisely in imagining the divine happiness to consist in a listless quietude. For if honour, inward satisfaction, and thanksgiving, belong most to the active, why should we remove from the Deity either these things or their cause? Yet please to understand me as not speaking of exertion, but of agency.

"I should agree with you in not imagining the Highest Being as painfully toilsome, but I see no reason for conceiving of him as helpless. On the contrary, it is not mere power which would command our homage, so much as the purposing agent. There are many physical things in the world about us more powerful than man. An elephant is stronger, a volcano and a storm more terrible, and the sea more ample; perhaps, too, a steam-engine may be called more useful; but no one of them engages our respect or veneration so much as a man who acts justly and beneficently.

"Perhaps we may consider thus what a good action implies: it has moral purpose in designing; it has intelligence in adapting; it has skill in performance. But the Being who exhibits these virtues, would be nobler than one absorbed in *Nirvána*. As regards action, therefore, on the whole, I am inclined to say something like what Madhwa would probably have said: we must not ascribe to the Deity actions in such a sense as they are limited and tinged by human imperfection, but we may piously ascribe to Him an infinite life of agency in all wisdom, justice,

and beneficence, such as calls for humble adoration and obedience with thanksgiving. Two remarks only I would add on this point, that agency such as proceeds through the instrumentality of intelligence or providence is both the noblest in itself of all that we can conceive, or at least more so than any activity of physical force, and also such is the most consistent with that refinement of speculation, which you love, respecting the subtile and eminently spiritual nature of the Supreme Being. Again, it seems to follow from the very idea of agency that it presupposes an agent. For though in a steam-engine, for example, you have force, yet you have not properly agency. Thus for our Paramésvara we clearly require a Being as personally intelligent and as sovereign by way of design, in His relation to the blind forces of nature, as the maker or guide of a steam-engine is in relation to the material force which he directs, and of whose instrumentality he avails himself to do his pleasure, yet doing so according to fixed laws. Moreover I think we need not fear to ascribe to Him agency in some such sense as I have mentioned, since to act is the property of those beings whom we instinctively reckon highest in this world, and to act well or beneficently excites veneration. Only if any one chooses to insist more on the possibly transcendent character of all divine agency, as being probably beyond our conceptions, I have no objection, so long as thereby he exalts the reality instead of lowering it. He may consider the process to be as subtile or as refined as he pleases, only he must not altogether take it away. Perhaps it may help him to retain his belief in it, if I remind him, that the more eminently the Deity works by intelligence, or anything higher, the more silent and mysterious will be the moving springs of His operation. It is only brute force that betrays itself by effort; pure mind is able to produce effects which strike us, without thrusting its very finger as it were before our eyes. For some such reason, I suppose, the divine agency, though clearly inferred by the understanding, is witnessed only by faith, and not by sight.



“ Again, what I have to suggest to you on the twin subjects of judgment and of moral retribution will be something of the same kind as what has just been said. When mankind punish criminals, they frequently do so, either from revenge, that is the desire of inflicting pain in return, or else from fear of suffering again ; but yet we recognise a justice in the punishment of crime apart from those somewhat selfish motives ; and we also consider that justice to be most perfect in proportion as the Judge is least affected by any such working impulses, and deals out his sentence according to the merits of the case in righteousness. We do not then suppose the Deity to judge or punish, as being warped by any such selfish passion or fear ; but yet the conscience of all mankind points by its forebodings to the fitness of a recompense for actions, even when they have been secret from man. The course of this world confirms such forebodings, to a considerable extent, by the unhappiness which in a thousand ways of natural consequence waits upon guilt ; and where exceptional cases appear of what seems to be an escape on part of the guilty, we shew by remarking such cases that they are contrary to what is usual, or to what we consider fitting. Perhaps we know not how rare they are, for the punishment in sore stripes of soul may be as secret from us in some cases as guilt is in others. Perhaps again, those general tendencies which we observe stamped on the course of this world for guilt to produce misery, may in some future life be more fully and in every case carried out, and justice deal its abundant doom. Our friend Vidyáchárya has told us that he thinks inequality and suffering in another life are the appointed penalties of sin in a former one. Sadánanda too speaks of the abode of Yama, and of witnesses to every portion of our life, and of dread avengers to come. Only it is obvious that he does not ascribe such sentences to the original providence of any supreme and creative Iswara. Even Vidyáchárya too appears to think such assignment of doom not consistent with the serene beatitude which he considers the lot of the præcreative Brahm. But why all this



imaginary intervention of inferior beings, unless it is that you are afraid to lower the Supreme Being by making him cognisant of such things? May it not then be reasonably suggested, that the justice of the most High God may be free from the trammel of every imperfection such as clings to man, and yet be from everlasting to everlasting, without disturbance of passion, but wise in fore-ordaining, calm in observing, and mercifully inexorable in suffering the wicked to eat by way of natural consequence the fruit of their own doings. I can imagine no other Being to whom the train of moral consequences in the Creation can be so reasonably ascribed, as to the Creator. I do not lessen, but rather magnify Him, by deeming Him to excel in that justice without some element of which no human being is other than contemptible; yet I am far from saying that our mental conception of justice is better than a faint picture of that which probably is bound up in the eternal Being of the Most High. It is not anger I ascribe to Him; not indignation at mistakes; nor such disproportionate judgments of the true value of complicated actions, varying as they do in all their circumstances of knowledge and intention, as we often find sully the sentences of man; but that calmness of justice, which by way of image you may assimilate, if you please, to your fancied *Nirvána*, but to which you must leave as it were the unsleeping eye, and an obedience of all powers in earth and heaven having the effect of a thousand swords in an ever outstretched arm. Truly His thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways as our ways. Often perhaps, as we would willingly hope, He may choose to reclaim by mercy, where man in the paucity of his resources would have had no remedy but to strike. Yet, considering how much greater offences are when committed against the greatest of benefactors than when against any ordinary person, we must expect the justice of the Deity, when it strikes the irreclaimable, to be terrible in its stroke. Perhaps also, as regards the interests of mankind, we require even from the love of our Universal Father some security for retribution upon secret and injurious

crimes, such as wicked men madly fancy they can escape the consequences of by stealth or by dying. Nor do I think we are without such security in the very framework of the world. For it has been already noticed, that the tendency of sin on this earth of ours is to produce suffering of some kind. But astronomers also tell us, that the same law of gravitation which suspends our earth in its course about the sun, controls also the orbit, and upholds the substance of every world. Supposing then it were possible for any atheist or wicked person to pass by dying into another world, he would be within the range of the same physical law, and clearly therefore of the same moral justice from which he thought to escape. Whereas indeed it is probable that by putting off the veil of the flesh he would only pass into more naked and undisguised proximity to that clear Spirit, from which no secret is hid, and which here too is about our path and about our bed and spieth out all our ways, but which we apprehend most distinctly when our sensations no longer disturb us with the noises of earth, or dazzle us with the colours of an hour. I will not ask, what imagination can measure the horror, which the remorse of all evil memories when brought into clear contact with judicial purity may awaken in the distracted spirit; for you too agree with me that there is in some form a judgment to come; only I could wish no metaphysical refinement to embarrass you, as if it were not possible for God Himself to judge the world, and yet be free from every trammel which attends what men call justice.

“Moreover, just as I hope some of your difficulties in believing what is justly credible may be removed by considering the difference between our conceptions of the Deity and the very realities which lie perhaps behind our thoughts, like some unseen substance which throws a shadow with but an imperfect resemblance of itself, so I think some of the doctrines which you or your allies have advanced imply an entire forgetfulness of this great distinction between what is true enough relatively to us, and what may be absolutely true in the external object. For

example, the A'chárya talks of the world's being made by *Avidyá* or ignorance. This singular way of speaking puzzled me exceedingly, only that the Saugata explained it in part, and other portions of your systems throw some light upon it. If, indeed, by *Avidyá* it were meant only that matter made the world, because matter may be called ignorance, just as mind is called intelligence, that would be only another way of saying that Pracriti made it, which is the very theory we are gradually discovering to be so irrational; but again, if it is meant that *ignorance* makes the world, I beg to ask whose ignorance? You give me no answer; and indeed, after what Vidyáchárya has said about Máyá, I could not expect one; but it is clear that he means our own ignorance, or that of mankind in general. All this mystery about *Avidyá* then means only that, if we are not mistaken in supposing the world to exist, we do not know, how it was made. Naturally, my friend, we do not; but it does not hence follow that other and higher beings do not. This internal darkness of ours does not call into existence an external and præ-mundane darkness which has the power too of creating light. Such an argument is just as if an Englishman who had never been in India were to exclaim on seeing Hindús, these men come out of ignorance, because he did not know the land from which they came. Yet the solid land of India, Bhárata-varsha, as your wise men call it, would not the less exist, nor would the Englishman's ignorance be anything more than a name for his not knowing. Very much of the same kind, again, is your account of the soul's resolving back all creation, by meditating upon it, into the primary and indissoluble element of Pracriti. For you mean only that the imagination can so fix its mental gaze on things as to see no longer their manifold variety of forms, but to take notice only of that primary principle which runs through all in common. Now such a meditation on our part may alter the look of things to us, but it makes no difference in the things themselves; although if it did, I must confess to you the gain thereby is not to me so evident. For I had rather

see the world in all its beautiful variety of mountain and sea, and shrub and flower, than have it all resolved into some moveable fluid, which you say is blind, therefore it has not the wisdom of mind; and is not separable into elements, therefore it has not the beauty of nature. Such a kind of liberation of the soul, in which I should see nothing but such a dull kind of universal quicksilver, appears to me so far from being a victory worth striving for, that I would pray to avoid it as long as possible. But, in fact, it is clear, and I think some of your doctors admit, that the connexion of soul with nature in being will continue, so that the liberation turns out to be an imaginary one; and you seem to me altogether to have overlooked the difference between conception and reality, or as people who make plain things hard in Europe would say, between the subjective and the objective.

“The great calmness with which you listen to me encourages me to ask, where after all is the science in that system of yours which professes to be so scientific? You surely have lived near enough to the disciples of Gótama and Canáda to learn that a mere illustration drawn from comparison between some points of resemblance, which may be either unreal or partial, has not the force of an argument which follows necessarily from proved sameness of being. Yet all your system seemed to me built upon such probability as may be drawn from illustrations, that is to say, upon mere comparison, which may be ever so fanciful. Again, there are in the Nyáya\* logic careful distinctions between different kinds of causes, such as the material, the conditional, and the instrumental. But you Sánkhyas philosophers appear to argue that every effect is involved in its cause, as the oil in the olive-seed; therefore the world must have pre-existed in Pracriti, as you say with Capila, and I suppose also the followers of Patanjali would, unless they evolve it out of their Supreme Soul, for I do not see that they attribute creation to their *Iswara*, though guidance† they do. Some affinity, or

\* *Nyáya Aphorisms*, Parts II. and III., and Dr Ballantyne's *Lecture*, Allahabad, 1853—54.

† See *Yoga Aphorisms*, §§ 22—25.

unacknowledged sympathy with your premises, appears so far to influence Vidyáchárya that he too makes the world come in a way out of the very substance of God.

“ But I must here ask, in what sense are you using the words effect and cause? for the wheelbarrow is not in the carpenter, nor is the statue in the sculptor, except so far as either may excogitate his idea. You cannot mean that the material is in the agent, though Vidyáchárya argued as if it were so. Nor yet should I understand that you find the effect in the instrument; for the sword-blade is not involved necessarily in the blacksmith’s hammer and anvil. Rather, I suppose, you mean that the capacity must be in the material, which again you confound with the instrumental. As regards the world, this is much as if you had said that the stream is in the source, or the plant in the seed; for you have chosen here arbitrarily to exclude the supposition of agency. But then who told us that the world was a flux or a growth? whatever signs the world betrays, either in its fabric of agency, or in all its history of an overruling providence, are all so many arguments against its being a mere flux, and, consequently, against your supposition of its origin having been in Pracriti. Here I should like to bring you and my venerable friend the A’chárya together, and ask each of you simultaneously a question. If the effect is in its cause, I ask you to what element in the indivisible Pracriti shall we trace back that which is truly spiritual in man, his conscience for example, or his purest aspirations, and again his guilty forebodings. These things certainly exist in us and not in Pracriti; therefore Pracriti is not our cause. Again, to Vidyáchárya I would put the question, if the Deity made the world out of His own substance, from what element in Himself did He make the passion, the darkness, and the guilt, which constitute the existence of so many depraved beings? You both agree, that in the world are contained goodness, passion, darkness; to you then I say, flux out of Pracriti will not account for the first, and to our friend here, creation out of the divine substance leaves the two others unexplained.

“ In one sense, however, I fully admit to you that the effect is implied in its cause, that is to say, every effect must have an adequate cause. But it is the necessity of this argument which leads me far and deep beyond the veil of Nature to a divine Iswara, who has created the world by mere choice of will and upholds it by wisdom. For though on this supposition I may not know how Pracriti came into being, I can give a credible approximation to an account of it; for you see I attribute it to an adequate cause, since any design conceived by power and wisdom (which perhaps are two names for one thing) is sufficient to have involved all the effects of Pracriti. The thoughts of a Deity may in a purely spiritual sense have contained, inasmuch as they forecast, the appearances we behold in nature. Here then we have a self-moving cause. Whereas, by observing capacities in the material of nature we trace no cause but only observe links. Even as regards nature, then, I humbly conceive nothing could be a cause in the sense we are seeking for one, unless it answered to the idea of a creative mind or an overruling governor. The cause we want must be an efficient or originating one. In the Nyáya\* logic I rather think the efficient and the instrumental kinds of causes are not clearly distinguished, whereas surely they ought to be; for the wielder of a tool is one thing and the tool wielded is another; just as the material wrought from may be a third, or may be so constructed as to be an instrument to itself. Neither then the tool nor the material are properly causes, but only the first or the efficient is the true cause, for only the first originates the action; but, if you please, I must here go a step farther, though on difficult ground, and must maintain that there is no true efficient, and therefore nothing which is properly termed a cause, as regards an action done, except where there is a personal agent. Perhaps person is not the happiest word to use, but I mean one who has a self-determining activity; and this, I suppose, requires an unity of self-consciousness; just as the Nyáya admits that knowledge can only reside in soul. Common

\* Dr Ballantyne's *Lecture*, pp. 28—38.

sense shews such an activity does not reside in the chisel or in the marble, and the reason of its absence is that these things do not possess consciousness, or understanding, or choice. Whereas the sculptor conceives a design, and proposes to himself an idea of his future work, which he might make differently if he chose. In him then we have, as far as humanity admits of such a thing, a true cause, for we have an originator of an action; nor does he owe us any account of his making his work one thing rather than another, except so far as principles of beauty or fitness guide his will; and these again depend, like everything human, upon some higher law, which the sculptor apprehends in virtue of his understanding. Every true cause, therefore, must be an efficient, and differs from capacities, or means, or any other things termed causes, just as the sculptor differs from the marble or the chisel with which he works. A circumstance which obscures this otherwise obvious truth from us, when we reason about the world, is, that as the divine work is by way of intelligence, so it betrays nothing of what we should call effort, but uses what we call capacities as not only instruments of its will but also as signs, if we are wise to read them, of its unseen forethought. Hence the silentness of its operation makes you liken it to a stream from a source, rather than a work from a worker. But it does not any the less really follow from what I have just been saying, that the only true cause even of a system of generations of life and death will be properly a causer of causes, or one to whom we may not only trace all intermediate links, as to a beginning, but to whom we may ascribe that self-determining activity which belongs to nothing less than mind, and which we call personality; that is to say, our true origin must go back to or imply an originator. I am not sure that a persuasion of this truth is not thrown around us as it were direct from God our Maker, by the natural experiences which we acquire like second instincts through the daily contacts of life more vividly than by any laboured arguments. Perhaps you see in the structure of languages, as obviously as anywhere, the common confession to



this effect. You have in Sanscrit, as well as in all the languages akin to it, from Persia to the Himalaya in the East, and to the extreme shores of Portugal and Ireland in the West, a kind of noun applied to the Maker or causer of anything, distinct either in gender or in termination from nouns which describe instrumental agencies. Brahmá the creator is with you a masculine noun, though Brahm, or potential spirit, is neuter; but all your names as applied to any one whom you suppose as creator are masculine. So are ours, and with us too in general they have a termination which is among nouns that which the active voice is among the inflexions of the verb. How well this unconscious testimony of language falls in with what I have said both of causation and of proper agency. It is not the thing done or made, nor the power of doing or making, but the doer or maker whom we reverence. It is only in the deep volition and the range of motives, whether more or less, which may be ascribed to a doer, that we find an adequate explanation of anything done. Perhaps also the wisdom of the Vaiséshica may here be alluded to as being somewhat to the point. You remember how in their aphorisms it is argued that there can be no quality without a substance, or no property without an owner, and, for example, we cannot call the Deity either power or thought, but must acknowledge Him powerful and thinking. Thus, even by the necessity of logic, no less than by the instinctive affirmation of our hearts, we find ourselves led on until we ascribe personality to the Divine Being, and find it impossible to acquiesce in any vague pictures of infinity. For we cannot remove from our notion of the Deity anything essential to a personal agent (unless indeed we suppose something transcendent in place of it), without removing what would alone be an adequate cause of effects, for which your theory requires some cause as much as mine does. Thus it seems that all our thoughts on the nature of agency, and even logic, whether philosophical or instinctive, lead us beyond Pracriti to a true Iswara or divine Creator. But I have been somewhat long upon this argument from causation, which perhaps



in its naked thorniness comparatively few persons will find attractive. Certainly it would become much stronger if it were applied at length, not to mere physical life, but to the history of mankind and the moral aspects of the world. Here, however, all that was said to Dr Wolff applies sufficiently for me to pass lightly over this part; only, if we find in ourselves traces of justice and the love of mercy, with forethought and the power of moral action, it would be absurd for us to perform *Sradd'dha*, under the idea of knowing our first parent, to any being which did not possess these qualities in at least an equal degree. It is not mere power, considering it as blind, nor fertility, nor expanse, nor, in short, infinity of anything less than that which is noblest in us as moral agents, before which I could bring myself to bow down and worship. You also, I conceive, will admit that if the world is governed by Mind at all, in the sense of a moral agent, that Mind will be of the highest kind and truly adorable; for, in fact, we have not so much disputed on the point of power or of infinity, as on the point of conscious providence.

“There seems to be only one reason of weight, in addition to those already mentioned, which leads you to deny such a creator and governor by foresight as I contend for. You said that if the world had been designed by divine wisdom, we should not have found such evil in it as now exists in manifold forms; especially you seem to be repelled by the fact of animals preying upon each other. The allegation of evil, however, in some shape, has been the difficulty all the world over with those who refused to find in the world evidence of a Creator. Are we then to suppose that the critics who thus censure the course of nature are themselves free from the general taint of evil which they find around? You probably would not say so, for you conceive the actions of a man to be so influenced by *Pracriti* as to be not quite his own, or so at least as not to concern his soul; but since they partake of *Pracriti*, they partake of its passion and darkness. What then if these judgments which condemn the

world should themselves be dark and passionate. I confess I think one who attempts to charge the handiwork of the Supreme Being with crookedness should himself be perfectly straight; or, at least, he should consider how liable his opinion must be to error, not merely from the limited field of his vision, but from the absolute distortion which may be inherent in his way of viewing things. In order to ascertain if this is so, I should like to ask what is evil, or whether anything is meant by the word more than the absence of good. Suppose, for example, you were going to Benares, you might find hindrances in the way, which might make your walk slower, and give you occasionally labour without progress. Yet I do not know that such hindrances need be evil in themselves, except so far as they impede your journey; but I can even conceive they may be very useful for some other end, or in their bearing upon something else. But, if there is to be any stability in the world at all, it would not be possible that things should be arranged for one purpose, and be simultaneously done away with, because they did not suit another. The help in one way may be a hindrance in another, or, in fact, one man's meat may be another's poison: but though in the multiplicity of uses to which objects may be put, some may be contrary to our wish, it does not follow that the things themselves are evil. Again, you might have a weakness in your limbs, which, together with such impediments, might make you hang back and even recede from your object. Here then would be not only hindrance, but backsliding. You will say there is something positive; yet I cannot for the life of me see what weakness is, except the absence of strength, just as the Nyāya truly teaches, that lightness is the absence of weight. It would not, therefore, be life, but it would be not having enough of life, or, in other words, not having enough of that which I say comes of divine support, and which you say is evil, that you would really be suffering from; so that, according to your doctrine, the absence of evil is an evil. Again, in going forward, it might happen to you to miss your road and step aside. Of course

you would not do this intentionally if you were bent on going to Benares, but from want of knowledge ; but, in fact, this turning aside would be only evil, because it was not in the right direction ; the wrong-doing would consist in missing the mark, and this would come from the absence of knowledge, or from the absence of that which I have all along argued it requires mind to entertain, and supreme Mind or Deity to support. I cannot therefore see, in your suffering from the want of knowledge, that the whole system should be arraigned as having any sign of positive evil. Again, in any plan so large as to contain many things for many different uses, there must I suppose be the possibility of accident, or, as I said before, of one wave falling on one pebble and another on another according to chance ; and especially if part of the plan imply dependence upon the faculties of any living beings, that they will do what they are intended to do, particular units amidst the mass may possibly injure themselves by not complying or not attending. I do not suppose, for example, it proves any positive evil in a bath, if a man who is careless gets drowned in it, for it may be his own fault : or it is such an accident as has its possibility implied in the fact of there being water to bathe in. If I was talking to a person less considerate than you, I should be afraid of his ridiculing these remarks as all very simple ; yet if you please to change the scene from a journey to Benares into any other action of human life, you will find there is hardly any mischance or calamity such as we call evil, but it may be resolved either into shortcoming, or backsliding, or perversion of some good capacity, or, lastly, accident. We may have difficulty in realising any plan ; yet the strain may help us somewhat forward. We may even fall back altogether from the object we aim at, yet the hindrances which thwarted us may have been for broader ends beneficial. We may, again, pervert, or suffer from the perversion of, what in themselves may be capacities of great good ; but of course power in one direction implies power in another, if it is to be in any sense a living one, not to talk here of mental

choice. Nor lastly could even the most consummate guide or general we can ourselves conceive, exclude the operation of chance among units, if not only the bodies handled were numerous, but the manifold bearings and relations of their parts in every possible aspect were innumerable. Hence, whether there appear to be much or little of chance in the world, it seems to me rather a condition of all action, or a necessary accompaniment of circumstance, than a reason for denying supreme agency. But you are well aware that the more even our knowledge of causes is enlarged, the less and less any effect appears properly chance; so that perhaps I have allowed too much for it, because our limited minds consider it a necessary accident to essential stability in the recurrence of phenomena on a large scale. You would not yourself expect day and night to have their duration altered because to some particular person's harvest it might be convenient; nor, again, some winter's cold which arrested cholera to be softened for some delicate invalid; nor similarly, the storm which purifies the elements into health to halt over a crazy fishing-boat. Out of wisdom comes law, and to law belongs either uniformity or something like it, and hence must arise the appearance to us at least of chance. But in all such things as I have mentioned there has been yet no sign of positive evil, or none at least of any which could be charged on the Ruler of the Universe as entering probably into His primary design. Partly the things we call evil are accompanying conditions, and partly the negation or abortion of something which the Divine Wisdom seems bent upon bringing to birth more fully from time to time. You do not blame an architect because the window which is opened for the air may admit the rain; nor can you accuse him of building your house positively dark, because the shutters may be occasionally for some reason closed against the light; nor do I know that evil can be better explained than by asking what is darkness? Some may say of a dark closet, there is darkness in it; but you readily understand that to mean there is a want of light there; so of many things which happen otherwise

than we would wish, it may be said there is a falling short in them of that good which is desirable rather than positive evil. In short, it seems verily to me, as if everything everywhere was blank, until those attributes of Intelligence which we have traced to Mind as a creative principle, supply or hold under the elements of good in any of its possible forms; then, by the wisdom of God good comes about, and evil is the want of something we might wish, or the imperfect realisation of something we might fancy the Supreme Mind to design, rather than anything positive such as could alone bear to be made an argument against a Creator. Very often indeed it means only the necessary condition of circumstance by which all actions as we conceive them must be limited. I do not mean to say such conditions need not be considered by the conceiver of any design, but only to distinguish them from that which seems to be aimed at.

“ You may here say, that this apology cannot comprehend the destruction of life by living things, which you appeared to regard as a kind of cannibalism. I grant it does not, for such a mode of shortening life in some forms and sustaining it in others, seems to be part of the original plan of the world, being inwrought (one may say) into the very constitution of nature. But then, will you let me ask, did you expect that insects and beasts should live for ever? Or, is any wrong done them because they receive a gift for a time, and are then expected to restore it? You would hardly expect, I suppose, a perpetual miracle to prolong existence for such creatures beyond the date when the weakness of their fabric, and the whole conditions of its tenure, would make it a burden to them. But probably you object to the mode in which their life is liable to end. Yet as you seem by a kind of dramatic instinct to enjoy what you term the spectacle in nature, I should have expected you to observe that many ends of combination and opposition and mutual stimulus may be gained by the plan we find actually adopted. Perhaps you could not have the strength and activity of the tiger, which, in some of your heroic poems, is made a complimentary epithet of character,

unless you had also the shrinking speed of the hare and the deer. Perhaps again the passion of fear, though we justly account it despicable when it makes men shrink from their duty, may yet be the instinct out of which the virtue of prudence is trained, and may in many other ways be needed to stimulate the forces of life. It seems to me probable that a system in which fear did not exist as a motive to vigilance or action, might be in many ways less perfect, and in particular less so morally, than we now have. Then again if you made a world, and determined to people it with mortal creatures, I suppose you would have some method of cleansing it from their carcasses. For if the bodies of all things that live and die, were to lie rotting around us, I am afraid the fevers and pestilences which would arise might shorten rather the days of the survivors, even if the stench and disease did not render the world uninhabitable. Nor do I think exposing bodies to the Ganges the most prudent or reasonable mode of getting rid of them. In what mode then, pray, would you dispose of the bodies of creatures whose kind have not reason enough to bury them? Fire, you see, would not be self-governing. Nor can I imagine any mode, so well calculated to renew the earth for successive generation, as the provision by which brute creatures act unintentionally as scavengers for the world. That some idea of the kind underlies the fact which I imagine it may justify, seems probable from this; it is only in the case of mankind, whose reason suggests to them burial, and whose nobler sympathies should render mutual destruction hateful, that people in general abhor the practice of preying on one another; whereas, with those carnivorous beasts to whom it is natural, few think of blaming it.

“Not but that I must fully admit, if my conception of life was the same as that of Vidyáchárya, it would seem to me horrible for even animals to prey upon each other. If all life were, as you imagine, the very substance of the Divine Being, I could not even think patiently of all that we see around us. But if two conceptions are incompatible, I must give up the

least likely of the two; and certainly, as far as probability of reasoning goes, I see nothing to support the A'ch'arya's theory of life. It seems born out of a confusion between the spiritual passing of thought into action, and the materialistic transformation of the Maker's mind into the thing He makes. Or, even if that be not so, our daily experience of life being given for a while and then resumed in such ways as it is, seems to justify us in considering it as properly a gift rather than an emanation, and distinct, as Madhwa conceived it to be, from the ineffable being of the life-giving God.

“Now suppose for a moment, that evil, either considered positively, or as I have represented it to be, the mere negation of good, were far greater than it is in reality, still you would admit that sinful creatures could not feel justified in murmuring at it with the confidence of perfect beings. For if our need of forgiveness is a reason, as you Hindús appear to admit, for our forgiving injuries from men, much more it may suggest to us patience under any evils which our Maker might impose. I say this would be a fair view of the case, even on the theory that human sinfulness were only an accidental accompaniment of pain, and not at all a cause of it. Whereas, we have next to observe, that all the possibilities of the idea of good being imperfectly realised, which I have enumerated above as forming the appearances of evil, must be infinitely multiplied, when the scheme of the world is seen to contain not only things but persons; that is, not only objects and physical contingencies, but thinkers and doers of right or wrong, such as technically are termed moral agents. For if all these are to act, in any real sense of action, they must enjoy some degree of freedom, or apparent choice. With the freedom then of every living man, there is imported into our practical problem a new element, and that one of some degree of uncertainty; for whoever makes a choice must be supposed capable of choosing otherwise, though the motives on one side or the other may preponderate. Any man then choosing wrong, may be expected, on the supposi-



tion of the world having a moral Governor, to bring on himself pain, or some other kind of evil; and perhaps here is the first footstep we have found of anything which can properly be termed positive evil, and this is of such a kind, as not to be any argument against a good and wise God, but rather to follow from His being such. But again, whoever chooses evil for himself, is likely to persuade others to follow him; for every one desires companionship; and thus the freedom of every moral agent, which originally admitted of being somewhat biassed by motives, may receive a decided impulse for evil instead of for good, by having its motives tampered with, or that knowledge of truth, which is the strongest of all motives to the reasonable will, debased. Suppose then, we took all these things, and wrought them into a sum in a kind of moral arithmetic. If we took all those necessary conditions, and all the drawbacks, chances, and contingencies, which might impede the realisation of any idea, even in dealing with malleable matter, and multiplied them tenfold by a like idea of uncertainty as applied to the motives and choices of free agents, and again multiplied whatever possibility of error, crime, and pain might thus arise, by all the corrupting contacts with each other of men who do wrong, we should have rather a formidable amount of either evil, or tendency to evil, which yet might form no part of the design legible in the constitution of the world, and therefore no impeachment of the wisdom of a Creator, still less a reason why we worms of an hour should shut our eyes to His existence.

“To sum up briefly this part, allow something for the probability of our judgments being mistaken; allow very much for what I will venture to call by a word of my own, *circumstantiation*, which I conceive to be what many old speculators have intended when they spoke of the perversity of matter; and again, allow still more for the possible self-perversion of all free agents, and subsequently for their mutual corruption; then I think the result of our speculation will approximate somewhat



to the Christian doctrine of original sin, or at any rate justify us in ascribing wisdom to our Creator, notwithstanding certain marks of crookedness in the creature. One remark only, which was half implied, I wish to draw out a little, and I have done. Just as fear may be an instrument not only in curbing, but in educating the world, thus many other pains, may be not only punishments of our moral disobedience, (which would be a sufficient account of them,) but they may be even benevolent remedies for the same mischief, considered as a disease. You fancy the 'indiscrete' or primary element straining itself into all possible forms. I, for my part, fancy the Mind of man straining itself under the influence of many sufferings which appear grievous to it, into far higher conceptions either of contrivance and ingenuity, or else of manly fortitude and patient meekness. Many men have become greater through suffering, and I believe also, some far happier, than if they had not so learnt either to do, or dare, or endure. Do not then let us be frightened by things, which after all, perhaps, are to real evil that which you suppose the spectacle of nature may be made by the soul, or what the A'charya would call Máyá, a mere passage of shadows, below which may lie a substance of blessedness upheld by wisdom. To me evil, considered as a positive element in the constitution of the world, appears to become more and more shadowy the more we examine it. That only is true evil, which comes of voluntary doers starting aside from duty, and so failing in that part of the plan which devolved upon them as fellow-workers with God. Perhaps even this may not be without remedy; for certainly in remorse and in forgiveness, even among men, we find instruments to both sides of moral health. But whether my account of evil be correct, or whether any one has anything better to advance, the utmost inference which can be drawn from its appearance is, that our view of the world's design, as a merciful one, may require to be less hopeful, and not, as you seem to argue, that there has been no design at all.

Nothing, in short, which can be argued on this subject, ought to obscure the proofs of a Supreme and Wise Creator; I humbly trust, for myself, that nothing need shake our confidence in a righteous Governor and a merciful Father."

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#### NOTE ON CHAPTER V.

The Yoga Aphorisms explain the Theistic section of the Sánkhyā, which is probably an accretion upon the older and more negative system. For Vigaya, see Turner's *Mahāwansa*, pp. 52, 53. For Sánkhyā sources of Buddhism, Lassen, B. II. p. 830, B. 1, and pp. 66—80, B. 2. For the legends and maxims, E. Burnouf; and as regards Ceylon, the Missionary Hardy. For Chinese comparisons, A. Rémusat's *Mélanges*. The Virgin-birth was ascribed to Sákya as early as St Jerome's time: but the age of the Bauddha legends generally is an unsettled, and a highly interesting question. Will not some scholar in India investigate it?

## CHAPTER VI.

*Farther Criticisms of Hindû Systems, particularly of the Vedântine—Design—Moral Government—Need of Hopefulness—Pantheism and Idolatry—Two Aspects of one Evil.*

“A little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to Atheism ; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to Religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no farther ; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.”—*Bacon*.

“Our Morphology ought not to prejudice our Teleology.”—*Whewell*.

“You have not forgotten I hope,” said Wolff, as there was here a slight pause in Blancombe’s speech, “your promise to explain, why the argument from design, which you still hold by, does not appear to me so satisfactory as you think it ought.” “Perhaps,” answered Blancombe, “this will be as convenient a time as any for me to do so. The first impression, I suppose you will allow with people in general, which we derive from the varieties of animal life, is, that they are designed so as to carry out some purpose, or that their structure is full of means applied to ends. The wings of birds, for example, seem intended for flying : just as the webbed feet of water-fowl and the fins of fishes are for swimming ; our own hands, with our thumb, as you see, placed conveniently opposite the fingers, appear designed on purpose for us to have the power of grasping, and certainly if our thumb with its complicated arrangement of joint and muscle had been differently placed where our little finger is, we should have been comparatively helpless ; and much more so, if the hand had ended, as on any principle of chance it might, like a serpent’s tail ; just so the claws of fowl in general are arranged with an eye to convenience of walking, or of clinging to their perch ; while the solid hoof of the horse, and indeed his whole shape, points him out as fitted for the purposes upon which men actually employ him. Nor is it only the general varieties of

animals which we find adapted to their abodes in air, earth, or water, whether they are beast, bird, reptile, or fish ; but there seems to be even special provision for cases of a peculiar kind. The double stomach of the camel, and its power of enduring privation for a length of time are not only wonderful in themselves, but appear particularly adapted to the deserts which the creature has to traverse, and have often stirred the admiring gratitude of men who must have perished but for what they hence considered as signs of a providential care. So the long neck which enables the Giraffe to reach its food from branches of trees, and the bodily organisation which enables the Sloth to live on trees, have been remarked as instances of the same kind. But illustrations innumerable, or at least as numerous as the species of living things, might be mentioned. For it is scarcely possible to look at any of the more remarkable kinds of animals, without observing that each has some gift, which perhaps another has not at all, or has in a different form, while each has generally some fitness for its abode, and apparently some purpose to subserve, whether work to do, or only happiness to enjoy.

“ While however we are making reflexions of this kind, two difficulties occur to disturb us, which though some persons may exaggerate their force, are not without reason.

“ In the first place it turns out, as we look more closely at animals, that these differences, which seemed intended to adapt each for its special position, are variations or deflexions from something radically common to all. An ostrich or a flamingo, for example, is unlike enough to an elephant, or a man. But if you look as it were with an unifying eye at what they all have in common, you will find not only a great backbone running through them all, and serving as a channel for the nervous fluid which, as it culminates in the head, we call in each case the brain ; but also the wings of one, and the arms of another, correspond in the idea of their outline to the fore legs of a third. Perhaps also something of the same kind may be observed of the fins of fishes. Certainly the web of waterfowl is the growing in a

particular way of animal fibre which is common to other creatures. So the formation of the human skull out of many bones, which seem multiplied and consolidated into a joint-work of such a kind as to give the amplest room for the swelling of the brain, and the best protection for its delicate tissues, turns out to be on the very same principle which obtains also in fishes, which we should have thought would have no need of such special protection. The people indeed who cut up animals and observe their structure, appear to have agreed, that all living things come under four classes, such as firstly creatures with back-bones, and secondly soft pulpy animals, then thirdly the dwellers in jointed shells, which seem almost distributed over bodies half jointed; and fourthly those which branch out like a wheel or a star, pretty much in the manner of a vegetable moss growing from a centre. Thus instead of infinitely numerous special forms among animals, we seem at most to have only four great outlines or types, according to the model of which the animal kingdom seems to be distributed; and some persons even augur that these four classes will ultimately turn out to be mere modifications of one type of animal life; which for my own part I see nothing to prevent our acknowledging, if the facts should happen to turn out so. To all which it must be added, that there seems no wide leap between what we call animals and vegetables, but intermediate beings partake somewhat of the nature of each, drinking in moisture like mosses, yet stretching out their venous limbs, as if with an animal presentiment of nourishment. So that even modern science does to a considerable extent support the favourite theory among Hindú thinkers of life being everywhere one. I have barely indeed hinted at an argument on which much more might be said, if one were to consider professionally the processes of digestion, and respiration, and the circulation of the blood, with other things of the kind.

“But now, since the mind of man is so limited in its range, that it is hardly able to consider both sides of a question at once, so on observing the primordial unity of type, out of which

all special provisions appear to have proceeded, many persons become so absorbed by the general, as to forget and overlook the specially distinctive, which does not, however, become any the less real. Not indeed, that they absolutely deny creatures to differ from each other; but this difference no longer seems to them a substantial thing, as having its root in some Divine forethought, but only an accidental result from the circumstances into which the young life, or its seed, is cast. Things become such and such, they say, by habit, or by the effect of place, climate, or food, or even by the instinctive appetite of food, as any or all of these influences, and others such, may act over vast periods of time. Hence although such men are obliged to confess, if they speak truly, that the origin of life remains to them as mysterious as ever, yet they fancy they understand the processes by which life is adapted in its various manifestations. Hence possibly there may appear to them less need of a supernatural Being, either as Creator or Governor, when like the Sāṅkhya philosophers they find existing effects contained in causes which are close at hand, and which appear adequate. Or again, if from natural piety, and soundness of reason, they hold fast the belief in a providential Governor, they still apprehend but faintly the argument from design, as urged in application to special instances of what we term contrivance. The world becomes to such speculators a flux, rather than a creation.

“So far I conceive myself to have stated fairly one reason why the argument from design may be obscured to your mind consciously, and perhaps also to our Hindú friends, without however their being ready to give a distinct account of the process.” “Yes,” here said Wolff, “I think you have stated it well enough.” “Then again I suppose,” resumed Blancombe, “that there comes in simultaneously the observation of many instances of failure as regards special provision. Desires, for example, the gratification of which is ordinarily attended with pleasure, and which so far we should allege as instances of the Divine goodness, are often frustrated, so as to cause in particular cases

exceeding pain, and even madness or death. All such things as famine, pestilence, and shipwreck, might here come in; but especially such sufferings as seem to be least probably traced to any individual transgression, and such as imply a neutralisation or defeat of what is generally alleged as the Divine plan. Now I conceive myself to have described your second difficulty as regards the doctrine of design." "Certainly," said Wolff, "things of that kind have been urged by one of the native speakers, and, it appears to me, not without a certain force." "I too," replied Blancombe, "have thrown out some general reflexions, in considering the nature of evil, which go a great way, as I conceive, to remove the difficulty; and I have also something to add about the largeness of the scheme in which we live. First, however, we must consider the effect of discovering that special provisions in animals are deflexions from a more general outline.

"Have you ever reflected, why it is that we draw our instances of design from our own bodies, or those of other animals, rather than from the grander structure of heaven and earth? Probably day and night, when taken in connexion with our need of alternate labour and rest, are as clearly convincing proofs of a benignant care being extended over the world, as any we could easily find. Or I might go a step farther, and remark, that all the genial processes of nature, as personified and deified in the hymns of the Rig-Veda, are in reality sufficient instances of a heavenly providence, supposing only we refer them to a more living power than dwells in the things themselves. Yet, somehow or other, it seems as if all persons who want instances of special design look for them not so much in the grand laws of the natural world, as in our own limbs, or beings, or experiences. Again, so far as they do take such instances from the larger laws of the universe, it is chiefly from the points at which those laws come in contact with our personal wants or constitution; so that the mutual fitness or correspondency becomes the ground of inferring design. That light,

for example, corresponds to the eye, and fragrance to our sense of smell, and other things to our senses severally; just as darkness also to our need of sleep, and the seasons of the year to our appetites for food, and the recurrence of variety in beauty and sensation, are all remarks which have often been made, yet which we need not be ashamed of repeating. So it is said that if the earth were all rock, it would not admit of vegetation, or much softer than it is, it would not admit of free movement; if the air had much more oxygen than it has on the whole, it would madden us; or if much less, it would not animate us; so if the water were not pretty much what it is, it would neither admit of inhabitation by the tribes of fish, nor of navigation by men; so that, in short, the whole world seems in the mass adapted for man, and such creatures as are the servants or companions of man, to live in. But now in all such cases our favorite instances of design are drawn from the larger, at points where it comes into contact with the lesser; that is, with ourselves. I apprehend, moreover, such a practice is quite right; for the great scheme of the heavenly bodies is far larger than we can comprehend in its ultimate design, though we may observe clearly enough that an order traceable by Mind, and therefore devised by Mind, is pursued in its conservation. Hence, as regards day and night, we might be puzzled by some laborious sophist, who should prove to us that these recurrences of light and darkness depend on causes very remote in space, and affect perhaps primarily regions very much more important than our speck of earth. We might, it is true, answer that the largeness of a scheme does not destroy its particularity; or that one who gives ourselves light is not less to be thanked by us, because he gives it simultaneously to a hundred others. Still this kind of explanation would be rather less gratifying to our natural egotism; our grasp of mind might be scarcely firm enough to take hold of the conception that we may be minute parts of a much larger plan, and yet abundantly cared for; and, in short, we might become bewildered. Whereas, that other class of things which



falls within our own experience of daily movements, wants, satisfactions, and conveniences, with all that we see more or less corresponding to us in creatures of the same fleshly natures as ourselves, we cannot be well mistaken about. No man in his senses has any serious doubt that feet are intended to walk with, and hands to take hold of things. So it is with other parts of our frame. And so all our capacities mental, no less than bodily, persuade us that we are intended to be social beings, and duties and affections thrust themselves in, as being in practice even more necessary to our happiness than appetites, and hence, according to our instinctive logic, as parts of a plan which some higher Being intended us to fulfil. Is then this inference of design, I ask, vitiated, either as regards our bodies or our souls, by any discovery of our special powers being a deflexion from some general type. It appears to me, we have only discovered that ends are attained through means; or that the Divine working is on a far larger scale than we had ignorantly supposed. Nothing is more common than to see all sorts of figures, cups, and jugs, made out of metal or clay. Some one may perhaps have fancied such things were fashioned by man's hand; then he may have discovered that they are made in moulds, into which the fused metal or earth flows like liquid fire, and there takes whatever shape it was intended to take. Such a discoverer may thus find such things made with a far more wonderful freedom, and in larger abundance, than he had previously thought possible; in fact, the operation may acquire in his eyes a look of comparative spontaneity; but he does not therefore really doubt that it is under control; nor is his perception of the uses to which the vessels may be applied, when made, for a single moment obscured. Whereas a philosopher of your stamp might here as well step in and say, the chances were equal whether these jugs should assume their present shape or any other; if they were to hold water, they must be rounded rather than flat; but I don't feel bound to account for their holding it, any more than I should for their not doing so; in short, he

might finish, I can trace no marks of design, or of contrivance applied to an end, but only necessary accidents to the fact of there being jugs at all. Just of this kind is really the entire reasoning with which people deny the marks of design in the world. They begin, with saying, If a thing was to exist—forgetting that the existence of a thing such as the world implies a Creator, as much as the jug implies a potter; then they go on to observe the general modified into the special; and they forget that this power of transforming one thing into another, or of adapting means to ends, is a proof of what devout persons all along contend for, namely, of a Maker who works by wisdom and not at random; and surely they must be cursed with a moral blindness not to see that existing diversities or species, however brought about, imply the pre-existence of Divine thoughts or creative foresights\*, to which things severally correspond, as the statue to the sculptor's conception; or, again, if they do not understand that all varieties of climate and place and circumstance are to the great Moulder of life, that which the moulds are to the earthly potter, that is, instruments of his process, but instruments which would not even exist, still less be arranged in order, if he had not first willed them. Just as the unity of the material in the metal or clay does not prevent the jugs and vessels from having different shapes and being intended for different uses, so the unity of life does not destroy the tokens of design in the various adaptations of species. Rather, indeed, I should say, that the doctrine of grand outlines or types in the animal world, not only consists very well with our humbler argument from design, but it gives a new phase of the same argument, and thereby transmutes rather than destroys it, by removing it into a higher region of generalisation. For such great types are even more manifestly the expression of thoughts; and as plain people say, that a special provision implies contrivance, so the deepest observer, without denying this true

\* Something of this kind was meant by the truly philosophical Realists, from Plato to Abélard, though they were often misunderstood.

remark, will superadd the broader conclusion that the general types, from which the special is deflected, represent pervading ideas. Nor do I see that any obscurity is thereby introduced into the argument, except so far as I all along acknowledge that the Divine idea may in everything transcend that faint human apprehension of it which is as it were its earthly shadow. You recollect what I said about the doctrine of Madhwa, and how far the Deity is in respect of our apprehensions, Nirguna, which I touched on with reference to justice and moral attributes, the same thought being equally true of power and intelligence as Divine attributes. But we should have no thoughts of justice, if God were not first just; nor of contrivance, if He had not first contrived; nor of marrying and giving in marriage, if He had not first balanced the sexes, though individual marriages (we all know) may be unhappy; nor, again, should we either have great outlines pervading the animal and vegetable kingdoms, if pre-formative thoughts had not first sprung from Creative Mind; or special contrivances, for the bird to fly, and the fish to swim, and the camel to traverse the desert, if the Creator had not with more or less of pre-arrangement or supervision adapted the creatures as He apportioned their abodes.

“Need I now do more than add, that the primordial unity of life is only what might be expected by any one who started with the right conception of the unity of God? And again, it ought to serve as no inconsiderable argument in leading one who needs it up to that conception. If there were as many deities as are imagined popularly in the Hindú Pantheon, there might be many originations for life; but the true idea is, that the Will, the Wisdom, and the Omnipresent Life-giving which ever manifest themselves simultaneously and reciprocally in the world, are still of one Mind; for God is fundamentally One. The fact that life appears more mysterious, and becomes a less explicable riddle, the farther we trace it backward into its primal unity, should only teach us a wholesome modesty, as implying that we are not competent to judge of the scheme of God in its

large integrity, though we may observe sufficiently things with which we are ourselves conversant, to obtain practical principles for our guidance. Thus the special provisions of life remain for ever witnesses to mankind of a higher Being who cares for them; and the force of such witnesses will be multiplied the more that any right-minded man considers them not merely as regards his animal wants, but in the deep things which belong to the soul, his affections, his prayers, his sins, his sufferings, and his better aspirations. But if out of a mere desire of knowledge, rather than of the wisdom which endeavours to serve God, we constantly push back our inquiries about life into its primal type, and the mysterious provisions for modifying it, or bewilder ourselves over the design aimed at by our Maker for His creatures as a whole, instead of rather considering the part which falls within our own clear cognisance, we then involve the laws and processes of life in the same mystery which envelopes the being and design of all the worlds; for we then thrust them into that larger field, in which our limited vision no longer grasps the circumference, and therefore cannot comprehend the design. Yet even as regards sea and land and heaven with its stars, you will clearly understand me to say that all we lose is comprehension of the design, and not in any degree the reasonableness of believing that God has still a wise and beneficent thought, though it may transcend all thinking of ours. For even in the obscurest regions, and the most magnificent expanse of nature, we still observe links of causation everywhere prevailing; and causation is really the manifestation of a presiding thought. Nor ever can any one be justified in thinking that this causation is without an end proposed by design, until he finds the argument from design fail him in that narrower field which concerns our own bodies and souls. But there it never does fail; for every man, by accepting the evidence of his senses in things to which the senses properly apply, and his mental judgment in things which belong to it, and conscience in the things which it forbids, and advice in things where others have the duty or right of

informing him, and the moral instincts or sentences of his purer mind in aspiration and prayer for guidance,—in short, I say, every man, by accepting the evidence of his body and soul that he is designed for certain ends, and by attempting in dutiful humility to carry out those ends, arrives at the highest happiness of which man in this life is capable—and probably enters into a new life with the firmest hope—whereas, on the contrary, by refusing to perceive the Divine design in his own bodily and mental being, and therefore living a lawless life, he is very apt to bring down on himself tangible penalties, and certainly fails of attaining that peace which good men enjoy at heart. You see then, the argument from design does not fail us, so far as we can trace it, but turns out eminently true for ourselves; we have therefore no reason to doubt that higher spirits behold it equally true for all creation. Possibly in some future existence it may please God to give us, as the reward or climax of our struggling here, a far clearer vision of all things which now perplex us, and so justify His own ways to us, by merely shewing them as they really are in all their largeness of extent.

“Entertaining, as I humbly do, so great a hope on the witness of things open to me, I can afford to wait for the clearing up of things too high for me. For the same reason I am not much perplexed by the number of apparent exceptions to the realisation of a beneficent design, which some persons perversely rather than wisely would throw in my way. It may appear strange, or to our thoughts undesirable, that many lives should be swept away in a pestilence; but I cannot tell how many of the number deserved death as a penalty, or to how many it came as a mercy, and how many were fully prepared for it. So a shipwreck may be in itself a deplorable event; but the storm which causes it may have arrested pestilence elsewhere, or the natural conditions of safety may have been neglected by those who perished, or they may be taken away from some greater evil to come. At worst they only resign in one

way a life which they had received on condition of resigning it at any time in some way. Again, earthquakes are terrible, but they may be in part wholesome outlets for those subterranean forces which were necessary to vivify and warm the earth; and, in part, it may be observed, that when such things burst upon dissolute cities, the cry of whose vices, mingled perhaps with idolatry, had gone up to heaven, they do not negative, but rather confirm, that belief in a moral Governor of the world, which is the main point for which I all along contend. Again, it certainly has an uncomfortable sound, that our fellow men may die of famine, or suffer madness, and other terrible inflictions, from the want of things requisite to satisfy the cravings of their nature. Yet, how comparatively rare, and therefore exceptional such cases are, is almost proved by the notice we take of them; as we forget to give thanks for health, but complain of sickness. One reason why such misfortunes disturb our general reasoning more than they ought, is, that we overlook the abundant affluence of the Divine scheme, in which even human beings are scattered almost like seeds floating from the thistle; and, again, another reason is, that we expect the ideal or the best conceivable shape of things to be everywhere realised in performance; whereas, the sculptor labours much with his marble, and makes many rude essays, before he accomplishes his highest work; and so in the great striving of things upward, there must be many shortcomings before the whole body can be stamped with the glory which the Spirit would impress upon it. But in no case anywhere do we observe such a shortcoming of the Divine providence, as that anything of which we can positively say it is important, perishes out of the world without working some good, or leaving some seed of itself behind it. You may say that whole species of animals have perished; but I answer, never any species which was largely useful to others, or which was capable of falling in with the new conditions which the great training of the world upward from time to time required. We see wild and savage races both of beasts and men

daily tend to extinction. But why do they so? Clearly because they are either pernicious or useless, and unfit to be tamed; though, in earlier stages of the Divine plan, they may have been competent enough to enjoy a happiness after their kind, and to fill a place not yet prepared for better things. But, as a general rule, no noble or remarkable species perishes. Certainly, none fails, for want of the Divine bounty contributing largely to its sustentation. Suppose, for example, all males had been born in one part of the world, and all females in another, which is a result that on principles of chance might have come about. Then, indeed, we might have desiderated the Divine forethought. Whereas, in fact, like is born to suit like in all parts of the world. Nor is it less true of the nobler correspondencies of the mind, than of those of a more animal sort. When thoughts take so strongly hold of a man, that the expression of them becomes necessary to his mental peace, he generally finds, if he has courage by faith to make the experiment, that many other minds have been teeming with a growth sufficiently similar for him not to fail of finding sympathy. So ample is the embrace of the Divine forethought and instruction which encompasses us, although unseen. Or even if a man appear to speak so prematurely, that he suffers for it, yet, if his words are true, they do not die barren, but take root in corresponding minds and bear fruit abundantly. Thus the tears and blood of the witnesses for truth become the cement of a nobler society in the time to come. The man himself, if he is a teacher of truth, will be the last to regret his own sufferings, for they will be abundantly overpaid to him by the consciousness that he is a fellow-worker with God his Father in building up a better world. But again, are we not apt to overlook, how much of such shortcoming as seems to exist in the world arises from our neglect of the part allotted us in the drama? For we, my friend, may rightly be called fellow-workers with God; and this the more evidently in proportion as any one believes us to be either akin to the Deity, or as the A'charya says, ourselves emanations from Him. But if we



were intended both to take cognisance of each other's wants, and to relieve them, as being all children of one Father, it is very evident that a forgetfulness of this holy brotherhood of mankind, and an attempt to struggle on in selfish isolation, or in the pride of caste, must leave the wants of many without that aid which God intended for them, and in turn deprive us, who refuse the aid, of much sympathy and inward joy. I believe, indeed, it is a matter of world-long experience that whoever labours in the way I have suggested to aid his fellow-men, as trusting that it is part of the Divine plan for him to do so, becomes thereby less and less apt to complain of the world as being imperfect; for he finds such a satisfaction in doing good, that his eyes are opened thereby to behold more good existing than he would otherwise have thought probable. Indeed, I venture to say, the complaints of suffering in the world do not generally proceed from men who actively relieve what suffering there is, but from indolent dreamers. This is an assertion of sufficient importance for it to be well worth your while either to verify or refute it by close observation. For you see how much it involves. If the case be as I state it, then God is justified of His own ways to the good, though not to the evil.

“By such thoughts, I conceive, we are led on more and more to a lively apprehension of the personality of God. However grand all that Vedánta speculation may sound, about abstract thought, and joy, we, being led on to a conception of the Deity as one who justifies Himself to the affections, are led to conceive of Him as one whom we can trust; and such a one is a living agent, or what is commonly termed a Being with personality. Observe then how far I am obliged to break away from my venerable friend the A'chárya. All that he has said about Vâch, as the voice of God creating, and about Máyá, as being the representation of the Divine thought by nature, appeared to me not only grand but credible, so far as it traces the visible world justly to creative Mind. But, when he speaks of Brahm becoming Brahmá, I don't understand how mere potentiality could



ever become person, except so far as his theogony is a lively picture of the progress of the human mind in speculation. We may, in our attempts to grope backwards towards a beginning, figure to ourselves a time when God had not yet created ; when, therefore, it may be said, the Creator was not ; and the relative conception our flesh-bound minds are apt to form of a Deity in such a predicament, is that of something potential, or capable of thereafter coming forth. But then to think for a moment that the Deity must have been in that way, because our conception may be so speculatively fashioned, is to me an astounding childishness, put out in a guise of wisdom. Even the representation of Brahm, or mere spirit, as the object of worship, does not appear to satisfy the conditions which our heart and mind require. For mere spirit, if you take away from it personality, or ruling unity of consciousness, becomes as truly a mere power or agency, as fire, or steam, or electricity, though it may be a more wonderful agency than any one of them. Yet still it is just as little a ruling agent as they are. How then can we pray to it? We have lost the Father, the Governor, and the Judge, all of which attributes characterised our God, and we have got instead a dumb abstraction, only better than an idol, so far as the pictures of the mind may be somewhat higher than those of the senses. Now if there remain any difficulties in the world, either from suffering, or from exceptional shortcoming of design, I can no longer trust in such an abstraction, that either there are good reasons for such difficulties, or that they will be cleared up hereafter. Whereas, if the Vedánta philosophers had not, in their over-subtle fondness for abstraction, taken away the unity of consciousness and will, which denote personality, from the supreme Being, I should have been able to bring faith to the aid of my reasoning. Knowing some things, we can take some on trust, so long as there is a God to trust in ; but if you leave me only a mental abstraction, it becomes almost doubtful whether I shall oscillate in the direction of the Vedánta, which says that spirit is everything, or that of the Sánkhyā, which says that

nature does everything, or in that of the Chárvácas, who make man a vegetable.

“Again, there is something curious in what was said about Vâch passing into Máyá, or about the world being made out of the thought of Brahmá. If, indeed, this were only a parable, (as perhaps it may have been,) to represent that thought must underlie nature, or that the world must have been created by wisdom, then I should perfectly agree; but then true doctrine might as well be stated in plainer terms. But there is a certain sound about the statement, as if it materialised the Divine thought into a sort of clay, out of which the world might be fashioned; and I can quite understand how this apparently subtle conception of the Vedántists may in some hands have become a materialism almost as gross as that of the Chárvácas. Indeed it is certain that some texts of the Vedas do apparently speak of the Deity as being the clay no less than the potter; but whether those are right who take such language more literally, or whether the A'chárya here is right in spiritualising, it may be difficult to decide. Judging, however, from the text itself, I should say the materialistic interpretation was the more obviously literal, and the one which any plain reader would affix to the text. You know, for example, it is said, ‘This whole is Brahm, from Brahmá to a clod of earth. Brahm is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. He is the potter by whom the fictile vase is formed; he is the clay out of which it is made. Everything proceeds from him, without waste or diminution of the source, as light proceeds from the sun. Everything merges into him again, as bubbles bursting mingle with the air, as rivers fall into the ocean; everything proceeds from him, as the web of the spider is thrown out from, and drawn back into itself.’ So far the Veda, which is still more explained by the Vishnu\* Purána, ‘This world was produced from Vishnu; he is the cause of it; it exists in him; he is the world.’ Such words appear, at first sight at least, clear

\* These passages are quoted by Wilson in his *Oxford Lectures on the Hindus*.

enough." "Those words," here interposed the A'chárya, "certainly occur, but why should you give the least favourable interpretation of them, rather than the one we assert to be correct? I have told you that what seems the world is the thought of God, and so is God." "Well," answered Blancombe, "there are the words; let any one judge of them; but I was chiefly pointing out to you now, how this Máya theory of yours, though apparently at the opposite pole from a pantheistic materialism, had nevertheless something akin in its language. It seems also worth noticing, that your theory of creation, on the most favourable interpretation of it, is very difficult to understand. For we certainly do not think out our own bodies; we rather, if anything, think them to pieces. Nor, seriously, can we take a thought and make it palpable to the senses in the way that nature is palpable. There seems to be such a process as creation, which is unique in its kind, and the attribute of God alone; nor do I quite see why you should deny it to have intervened between the creative thought of Brahmá, and the outshining of Máya; unless, perhaps, it be that the Vedic texts already mentioned compel you to have only one substance, and that a Divine one; and then, starting from this premise, you see no other mode of avoiding materialism as applicable to the Deity for your conclusion, except by saying that the visible world exists only as the embodied thought of the Deity. I should like if you would shew me the Máya passage in the Vedas, for there I have never seen it." "The account of Vâch there," said Vidyáchárya, "comes from the Veda." "Or rather," answered Blancombe, "is it not from the Chandogya Upanishad?" "Yes, that is a correct distinction," said the other. "Perhaps also it is a very important distinction," resumed Blancombe; "for I confess myself quite unable to see, how the mere nature-worship\* psalms of the Rig-Veda harmonise with all that metaphysical theogony which you enlarge upon, and which does appear in the Upanishads. But if the Upanishads

\* Compare *North British Review*, No. XLIX. p. 218.

are a few centuries later than the Vedic songs, then I can understand how one arose after the other. Perhaps also those of your countrymen, my friend, who consider the Vedic Deity as making the world literally out of his own body, may be able to shew that their interpretation is the one agreeing best with the general tenor of the Vedic Worship. But, however that may be, I must confess that even the improved sketch, (or, if you prefer my saying so, the more primitive portrait) which you have given me of your religion, does not satisfy those anticipations or wants of the human mind which, on the side of natural reason, most crave a religion, or stand most opposed to either atheistic impiety or sensual indifference. For although your system appears more reasonable than the Sāṅkhya, in that it makes Divine Spirit precede nature, yet its mode of doing so is either embarrassingly mystical, if it means to assert a Creator, or else, if it does not, it seems liable to subside into a materialising notion of a flux; and then it would let us drop into all the dreary hopelessness of those who make life a seething cauldron, and mankind mere bubbles blown upon it for a moment. Then as regards the individuality of each man's soul, it is certainly harder to agree with you than with Sadānanda: for so far as we can trust our own mental experience at all, we are conscious of a certain unity in ourselves; and though all humanity may be called one kind, that sort of aggregate oneness is very different from the clear self-consciousness by which every man knows himself to have a unity of being of his own. I grant you an aggregative unity for all life: and this too as an unity of type which betokens an unity of idea in the Divine foresight: but you must grant me in turn a multiplicity of individualities for all sorts of living things. This multiplicity seems proved both by what we are conscious of in ourselves, and also by our observation of the different experiences of men, such as life or joy to one, and death or suffering to another; and again it is no less proved by the type in plants and animals. You may say anything you like of the same earth and air contributing to the growth of trees: yet

indubitably there is a peculiar form, and so a oneness of life, according to which each tree shapes itself. Whatever that secret germ or type of life may be, which makes the fig-tree grow differently from the cedar, it sufficiently isolates each kind from other kinds, and again individualises each specimen. For if that mysterious germ dies, the whole tree dies. So in man, we are separated by the law of our kind from all other species; and yet each man is driven into himself to find that mysterious dweller of our flesh\*, which is born alone, and dies alone, and which in most of the experiences of life has no partaker of its bitterness, or intermeddler in its secret joy. This mysterious power of self-consciousness, which we call each man's soul, is that for which you allow immortality, and for which we also claim an individual unity. Nor, indeed, will any doctrine which denies that unity, satisfy the better hope of man; for the strong desire of doing something worthy to be remembered, and the expectation of looking back with great gratitude on our own experience, and with adoration on the unfolding work of God, must all be lost when the individual man merges in a kind of spiritual ocean; and though this Ocean of yours is better than the Bauddha one of physical life; yet, in that it has no unity of consciousness on which we can rest as on that of a doer capable of caring for us, it is still vague and appalling in its unsatisfactoriness. For your spirit is not truly a God, but a kind of stream of potentiality. Indeed, my friend, it is no wonder to me that nations among whom so dreamy a belief is dominant, should neither have the wholesome energy, nor the indomitable tenacity of purpose, which belongs to men conscious of their own identity, and holding fast a faith in the living God. For mankind, not having some one above them to obey and trust in, seem naturally to deteriorate, like a hound who has lost the master who encouraged him, or the plant which dwindles for want of wholesome light. Yet better still, I might say they are like children, who having lost kingly parents, go and gather

\* So *Manu. Institutes*, IV. 240. (Sir W. Jones's Works.)

their impressions of thought and manners from the wild creatures of the forest, which are naturally of a lower kind. Then, again, the hopelessness of your scheme strikes me more strongly, when I consider the grounds you give of your preferential worship for Siva. For when you relapse as it were from trust in the creative or preserving God into adoration of the destroyer and renewer, you seem to fall from a clear conception of directing providence into some such sense of the vast revolution of life and death, as the Saugata has explained to us on the part of the Bauddhas. He also believes in a kind of Divine intelligence, but he has not made up his mind whether that intelligence directs the world. Hence the belief in it becomes, except so far as his better conscience may bias his theory, an inoperative opinion. When indeed you refused to call the soul mere intelligence, I understood you to mean that it was something more Divine than any apprehensive perception, which some might make the result of our bodily organisation. So far I had no objection to go with you; but when you explained the soul to be a very portion of the Divinity, I rather trembled at your boldness; but when you went farther, and resolved your deity into mere spirit without clear self-consciousness or dominant will, I no longer saw in what respect either the soul or the deity is practically better with you, than when the Bauddhas make them mere intelligence. The more now, indeed, that I consider your Saiva doctrine of revolution, as one's thoughts grow with speaking, the more I doubt whether practically, and to any real end, you do put thought under nature; or at least, whether you are sufficiently careful to believe that the world is working out the design of a Divine thinker. For your Siva does not appear properly an Iswara, or a lord of life and death, so much as a vast circle comprehending metaphysically all revolutions and contingencies that either have been, or may come about, or can be conceived. He seems changeful eternity, rather than the eternal; and in such a cyclical recurrence it is difficult to say what comes before, and what

comes after. It is a perpetually mutual following. You seem then dangerously to re-approach the error of the Bauddhas.

“With respect to both you and them, on this point, an argument of some probability might be drawn from the generations of former living things, which have left vestiges in the structure of the earth. You are aware, that our mountains and plains are found not only to contain, but in parts to consist of, the bones of animals long dead, and the changed elements of plants decayed. We do not know how long ago such and such a species of animals lived; but we know whether each came before or after, or at the same time with, another unlike it, since the oldest for the most part lie lowest in the earth. I do not mean that violent convulsions may not often have disturbed the order, but for the most part we trace an order. Now it has been observed, that we find, from the vestiges of human bones, man must have existed in the more recent stages of the earth’s development; but at a period anterior to man’s existence there were creatures which do not now exist, yet which so far resembled him as to have backbones, and other similarities of structure; whereas in other successions of periods, farther and farther back, there were different kinds of creatures, until at last you come to a stage, in which there does not appear to us any vestige of animal life at all. In all this succession there is manifest arrangement; since many of the successive races of animals lived in places where the climate was adapted to them, though now it would not be so, for the placing of sea and land and climate appears to have undergone many changes in the course of countless ages. Nor yet do we trace only arrangement, but to a considerable degree progress. Higher races of animals for the most part come after lower ones, and last of all man the noblest of all. So far then as this progress is made out, it marks not only design, which would sufficiently appear from arrangement of any kind; but it also marks something opposite to that hopeless revolution of life and death which belongs to the Saiva no less than to the Bauddha doctrine. It



conveys to us an impression of something which we may compare in a way to a line, as being an onward course in something like a career of the world under the guidance of its Divine ruler. Nor here need I stay to refute at length Sadánanda's ingenious attempt to wrest this idea of progress onward into a theory of the blind striving of nature. For that is both negatived clearly by whatever appears of arrangement; and also by what most of us admit about the necessity of thought underlying nature; as well as by my own argument for the personal consciousness of the first Cause, which although used against the Chárvácas, will apply equally to the followers of the Sánkhyas. I do not even build upon this idea of progress as deducible from geology, anything more than an argument applicable to our present state of knowledge. It is conceivable that hereafter life may turn out to have extended deeper below the earth's crust, or farther into the abyss of ages, than we now consider probable; for even a small part of the Divine doings, if they happen to be disclosed to a greater extent than is generally apprehended, might well appear to us endless; but yet very much larger parts beyond those, and even the entire whole, cannot be without clear end and pervading design, (whether a growing and unfolding design, or a fixed one,) to that eternal Mind which arranges all. But of this I have already spoken in discoursing about Infinity, which I only admit as an expression of an Infinite Mind.

“Leaving then that argument from geology, I take refuge rather in the reasonings already urged; for if it was difficult for me to refute the Chárvácas, without using thoughts which are equally adverse to this vague and potential Deity of yours, it is clear that you too fall short of satisfying me. The world only becomes intelligible when we consider it as coming from the providence of a creative Iswara, and going on under his guidance to fulfil his design. We, my friends, are happy in proportion as we concur in working out that design, for ourselves or others; but since we cannot do so without the courage which comes of faith, unhappy is the man or the nation, whose Deity has melted away from their



gaze into the shadowy abstraction of a spirit, or the dim clouds of scepticism. It would not surprise me, if men, finding themselves in a world thus become orphan, should suffer any strange kind of phantom to assume the likeness of their heavenly Father. If the more speculative class of men, in endeavouring to fill an unnatural void, should become bewildered with throwing their inquisitive thoughts into all possible regions of metaphysics, that would be only such a result as I should expect. Nor will you take it ill, I hope, if I say that all the systems which have been explained to us here, have something of so cloudy a character, that we seem transported by them out of the region of realities into dreamland, and not only our sensations and their results are made uncertain, but all our mental perceptions become confused, and the laws of our being and thinking fall into a kind of anarchy. It is no wonder that many sects, and many modes of apprehending the Deity, which differ from each other so much as to be in effect different religions, should hence arise; and if they appeal to the same books, they must have very discordant interpretations; or if each successive line of thought has in its day left the record of its expression in writings deemed sacred, there must result inextricable confusion in the attempt to reduce the whole mass of such writings to one system. Then again, persons who cannot speculate profoundly, but who feel the instinctive necessity of worshipping some Divine Being, will be too apt to seize on the nearest emblem, however unworthy an emblem it may be, of that Ineffable One whom they know not otherwise how to bring near them. On this point, my venerable friend, let me earnestly beg your attention. It is very sad to see throughout India men and women bowing down to idols, or setting up dumb stones as objects of worship. But what is still more sad is, to find learned Brahmans often encourage, or at least palliate it, by arguments drawn from this very theory of yours about the Universal Spirit. Thus they carry out your doctrine to the worst side of its results. The world and all its parts, they say, are only the embodiment of

Brahmá's thought; nay, they are his body; therefore, why not worship him in that stone, where he is present, as well as anywhere else? But what an infatuated materialism is this! I feel confident, you did not resolve everything into spirit, for the sake of having God thus resolved into brute matter. I do not myself even think that the omnipresence of God should be understood to imply local ubiquity, in such a sense that the very Being of the most High can be said to reside in stones. For omnipresence, as we ascribe it to the Deity, seems to mean the embrace of all things within the providential will of an overruling and clear intelligence; whereas, ubiquity, such as the defence of idol-worshippers implies, would make the Deity dwell in everything senseless, unhappy, and unclean. But at all events I am certain that the making of a thing by our thought does not convert that thing into our body; or else you might as well pray to the ragged coat of a soldier in a dust-closet, as present a petition to the Governor General of India, by whose orders probably the soldier's uniform was made some years before. But in fact, when you called the world the body of Brahmá, you could only mean it properly as a metaphor; it was a figurative way of saying, that the world shews us in a visible shape the Divine design. Yet the application of your doctrine by those who encourage idol-worship, may shew that I was not without reason in noticing the materialistic tinge in your language; nor perhaps even they who impute such materialism to the old Vedic text."

"But we are not justly responsible," here interposed Vidyáchárya, "for the way in which ignorance perverts our doctrine." "That depends partly," answered Blancombe, "upon how far the practice blamed flows naturally out of your language, and partly upon the pains you may take to prevent the practice, whether it be a perversion or a natural consequence. You remember what your doctor Sancara said about the necessity of suffering people to worship all kinds of deities, whether truly conceived, or wrongly. Even you have yourself spoken with

some indifference on that point; although you have said nothing in praise of idolatry. But I could wish you not to be indifferent about who is the true God, and by what name He is most rightly called; for then perhaps you would be better able to aid me in rooting up all perversions of His truth. The plan of Sancara appears from experience to be so far from wise, that it suffers many thousands of human beings to make their very religion a mean of moral debasement; while it often repels the more intelligent by a sort of recoil into utter disbelief of all religion. This is the penalty of teaching men falsely with good intentions; they reject the falsehood, and then cast away the truth with it. Thus, in fact, the common sort of people give practically the lie to whoever says that wisdom could not be imparted to them; and some such result for evil might have been predicted from any plan which began with doubting either the truth or charity of God, or the great brotherhood of mankind. How far what I am saying has actually taken place in India, you all are better judges than I am. But at least it seems as if there was great difficulty in reconciling the higher education which your countrymen are in many places receiving, with any real respect for the popular worship, either of idols, or other things of the kind. Nor does it seem as if there would be any remedy in such a metaphysical spiritualising of the common worship as learned Hindús are apt to substitute; for, in fact, the esoteric pantheism and the common polytheism fall in together like two sides of one system. They are as two faces of one wandering from the living God. Thus on the whole, while simple piety of the more intelligent kind is repelled, the metaphysical searchers entangle themselves in a system so shadowy that it is apt to end in the very opposite of what they intended; and again, with bad men, who rather seek encouragement for their vices, the end of attempting to behold God in every part of nature is, that they obey and fear Him nowhere. The endeavour to deify the world ends rather with sensualising the Deity as Máya.

“Whereas, on the contrary, I think happier results might have been predicted, if instead of letting men set up idols, you had been able to persuade them to set ever before their minds the image of a spiritual Father. Not that I mean this, as if the mental picture of a God could, as some of your books seem to teach, save us, unless the true God in Himself correspond. But if we had any knowledge from without, such as is properly termed revelation, of the Supreme Ruler of the world being one to whom we are personally responsible, then we should seem to have a great safeguard over our secret actions; or if we were to conceive of Him as a friend, that might be a great encouragement in our distress; or again, if He could be known to have exhibited any lively likeness of Himself, as for instance, if the Divine wisdom had taken body and dwelt among us, giving us thereby an example of life, and a personal assurance of the Divine sympathy with all our struggles and experiences; or even if we had any certain hope of an appointed mode in which we might lay down our sins mentally, and be cleansed from the penal memory of the past, as well as strengthened with exceeding might against temptations for the future, such a religion would supply some deep wants which your subtle theories leave in the heart, and would correspond to those yearning anticipations in the better instinct of humanity, which I have insisted upon in arguing with Dr Wolff, as a kind of prophecies of some faith to be. But you understand me all along, as not meaning that such things are good, if they are imaginary, but that they would be very good if we could be satisfied by clear witness of their reality.

“Here then I should not have been displeased to find you lay more stress upon those old stories of the Deity becoming incarnate, which in some form or other have been prevalent in India. For it is quite conceivable that by exhibiting the Divine thus clothed in humanity the supreme Īswara might have given us such an image of Himself, as would be a true medium of conceiving Him, and a most blessed substitute for the idolatry

which degrades. Only I should not be quite satisfied, if such incarnations were supposed to have taken place in the form of a lion, or of a dwarf, or even of a great conqueror; for neither as bestial, nor as dwarfish, nor even as delighting in bloodshed, can we holily conceive of God. It may indeed be said that conquest becomes sometimes a removal of greater evils, as a tempest may be of pestilence; yet it is not as imaging his power in the storm, nor yet as giving free range to the terrors of the sword in necessary war, that we find the Deity most attractive to our affections, or most powerful to touch the conscience of man with that thrill of love which passes into meek obedience. Unless therefore your Indian stories of incarnation are somewhat better than the sort of things I have alluded to, they ought hardly to satisfy us; yet some idea of the kind, if it could be substantiated by historical experience, might be full of comfort and instruction.

“You have not however attempted to apply such an idea. You have alluded to your own sacred books; but it is evident even from your indirect admissions, that there is a vast discrepancy between divers portions of those books. Above all, it is impossible to doubt that the worship described so far as it is embodied in the hymns of the Vedas, which are the earliest and most sacred of your books, was very different from the metaphysical cosmogony which you have been good enough to explain to-day. That point may seem rather one for discussion between Sadánanda and yourself; or at least is premature for me here to dwell upon; but I cannot forbear saying, that your subtle metaphysics have the air of subsequent explanations, which pious learning appears to have devised in order to meet the less spiritual, but more literal interpretation, which the Sankhyasts and other philosophers gave to the Vedic hymns.

“Then we have seen, that all your elaborate result does not prevent either idolatry, or other degrading forms of worship. May I not add, that it seems almost a suicidal admission, for you to acknowledge that you despair of improving the vast

masses of your countrymen? For, just as you said, that the Divine soul is in the Brahman and the Chándála, so have we need of a religion which shall bring near to God not only the priest, the king, and the noble, but which shall raise the humble, enlighten the ignorant, and bind all mankind into one body by intersecting veins of sympathy and intelligence under the headship of a heavenly Father. Believe me, no religion can be truly of God, which fears to speak good news to the poor, or which has not a home for the outcast, and a possibility of rising by renovation of the heart and spirit for even the most abject of mankind. In that sense, but in no other, I accept your doctrine of one soul-tree, whose branches embrace the world.

“Least of all should I think that a true religion would leave women comparatively little taught, and liable from ignorance to become idle toys, or the mere victims of sensuality. If that Divine soul which you speak of, either in your sense or in any sense, animates alike with men the gentler partners of their being, the religion which is to train them in the sight of God, must begin early both by purifying the affections and also by awakening and enlarging the intelligence. Those early marriages which almost forerun the instincts of nature, and at least obstruct education, would be somewhat checked. It would become the duty of intelligent women to aid in making the home of man a natural temple, from which the unbought incense of piety and affection would ascend, and in which the Eternal Spirit Himself would not disdain by His instinctive teaching to dwell and be felt. Then, among other improvements, the conversation of common people would not be, (as I have heard some of your countrymen\* complain, for this is their saying,) such as to repel women by indecency, or else to vitiate their simple modesty. It is not by keeping the two sexes apart, but by instructing both and purifying both in

\* ‘*Strictures on Hindú Polytheism,*’ in Bengalee, by *Bruja Mohun*.—*Essays on the Hindús*. London, 1823.

the knowledge and fear of the true God, that all social virtues are to be best preserved.

“But such a knowledge would indeed change many other things in India for the better. It would above all teach and induce men to speak the truth candidly one with another, both as believers in a Judge who calls to account for the secrets of the heart, and as members of one great spiritual brotherhood, animated therefore by a common life, and each interested in preserving the just rights of his neighbour. Nor do I suppose that you would then see men irrationally praying against each other for success when they go to law, and perhaps attempting to ensure that success by false-swearing, instead of rather endeavouring that each should be in the right, and praying for their cause to be determined by justice. If they had even an intelligent conception of God, they would not pray to a blind idol; and if they had a moral feeling at heart, that the true God must decide things in truth and righteousness, they would never try to bribe Him by unholy prayers to an unjust decision.

“I say nothing here of caste as a mere social distinction; but so far as it implies spiritual pride, it would tend to fade, in proportion as men felt themselves brothers from their common bearing to one Divine Saviour. In the same manner also, I conceive, sectarianism and all its marks, with vertical strokes or horizontal strokes, and whatever rivalries may thus be cherished among men, would die out before the light. Much more, all barbarous practices, like the bloody sacrifices of the Khonds, the child-murder of other tribes, and may I not add, any inclination to restore the burning of widows, or encouragement for fanatics to throw themselves under the car of Crishna, as Jagannátha, would become as repulsive to people in this country, as they now appear to more educated nations. All the abominations sanctioned by the Tantras, the left-handed Sáctas, and the festival of the *Holi*, which I remember seeing celebrated last February, with obscene verses and disgusting attitudes in the open streets,

as well as the singing-girls, which are described as an unholy appendage to some temples, would all go the same road. You, my venerable friend, would rejoice at heart, I feel confident, to see all such things utterly vanish. Yet you might still practise the old Hindú virtues of gentleness and patience; you might respect life to whatever extent your conscience prompted you, though I confess I don't see why the life of a cow is more sacred than that of any other animal equally useful. You might also train up families in virtue, and still build water-tanks, and plant trees for the benefit of travellers, since these things are good and profitable for men; but you would find (I think) any true religion quite in harmony with what you have distinctly laid down, that mere human deeds\* cannot in themselves merit, as of right, either the forgiveness of sins, or everlasting life. I could wish you would persuade all your countrymen to think even on that last point, as you do yourself.

“But, in any case, we can entertain no sanguine hope of improving the people of India, unless we are able by the blessing of the true God to become the means of imparting to them that knowledge of Himself, which would alone go far to lift up the lowly. Your system seems in every possible sense stricken with the plague of despair; and as it has on it the marks of hopelessness, so I have shewn it to be contradictory to reason; and I doubt if even it is in harmony with the very scriptures from which you profess to extract it. We seem then still to have our faith to seek. For I fully acknowledge, it would be no use teaching another system as more hopeful, unless we had more grounds of either reason or experience for believing it to be true. Yet, again, some would say, true fitness of a belief for man's mental system might alone prove it to be true; but I am here rather arguing the converse, that what is truest is fittest;

\* The paramount efficacy of faith is a doctrine of the Bhagavad-gítá, and of *modern* hymns: but not ancient in India, and thought to be borrowed from the Persian Sufis.—Colebrooke, Vol. I. p. 376; Wilson's *Oxford Lect.* pp. 30, 31. But it may be a native, though late, development.



though probably the two will at last correspond. I allow indeed for the evidence of the mind at least as much as for that of the senses, and probably more. Hence it often occurs to me in speaking, that instead of labouring to prove a proposition, as if my side were the more doubtful of the two, I ought rather to say in virtue of that which we feel and necessarily believe, O come, let us fall down and kneel; and worship the Lord our Maker."

## CHAPTER VII.

*Outline of Indian Chronology.*

“The Hindú passes as it were a kind of spiritual existence in ages long since gone by.”—*Heeren, As. Res.*

“Bei den Hindú hat die Religion alle Geschichte zerstört.”—*Benfey, in Lassen.*

WHEN Blancombe had got so far, there was a kind of half-complimentary assent from the greater part of the company. It seemed also to be agreed that farther inquiry should be made about religious books, with a view of either seeing whether they had valid claims on our acceptance, or how far they warranted religions which professed to be extracted from them. “But here,” said Vidyáchárya, “I can go no farther. You are all going to discuss the claims of different religions, and I am already fixed. Not that I should not be glad to profit by your superior wisdom, and ready to learn anything from you. But I foresee that you are going to overlook the great source of our knowledge on the subject. Or, at least, you are going to balance other books against the four Vedas, which we know to have come from Brahmá; while it is not possible that our earthly disputations should be able to teach better than what he has inspired. If, then, you are willing to take them as the foundation of your argument, good; but otherwise, I may as well be silent.” “Well, I too have a difficulty in beginning this argument,” said Blancombe, “and it is of the same nature as yours, though not exactly the same thing.” “What is your difficulty?” asked Sadánanda. “It is a doubt,” answered Blancombe, “whether we are going to begin rightly.” “How so?” asked the other. “Why,” he replied, “every place, and in the same way every truth, seems to have a road leading to it, and many which lead away from it. Just, then, as a man would not reach Benares by

walking towards Seringapatam, so we are not likely to find the true religion if we look for it in an irreligious manner.” “You mean in an irreligious spirit?” again asked the other. “Just so,” he answered, “that is part of my meaning; for one reason why mankind so often miss the truth seems to be that they set out with some principle of falsehood in their minds; and when they have called their corrupt passion, whatever it may be, by some holy name, they think it religion.” “Then you mean to say,” asked Sadánanda, “that we must try to purify our minds of prejudice, and to come with a sincere love of truth, though it may happen to contradict whatever we have been accustomed to believe?” “I mean that,” replied Blancombe, “and something more. For even our past belief, if it has led us in any way to worship God, must have been to us, in some measure, a way of access to Him. Supposing, then, we should lose such a belief without opening up any better way in the course of our inquiry, there may be danger of our becoming more remote from God than before. Hence, I would hardly advise any man anywhere to enter upon intellectual speculation as to the religion which has hitherto controlled his thoughts, without earnest prayer that the eternal and unseen Being, whom we confess to be imaged by all sorts of worship, though in a distorted mirror by most of them, would either enable him to hold fast whatever is good in his present faith, or else lead him into something far better. Let the Brahman, for example, use the text of the Gáyatrí, praying for the most spiritual light of the Divine Ruler to illuminate his mind; and do you in the same way entreat the Preserver of the World to preserve you from mental evil, and to purge the gaze of your soul; and let the Saugata also endeavour both to purify his intelligence, and to associate it with deep feeling of that which is most Divine about us. For not without such prayers and aspirations do I think it either safe or holy to go about criticising the objects of our faith, and comparing those of other men. But amidst all

these, the more vividly we can fix our mind's gaze upon the certainty of a supreme Iswara who will hear and guide us, and the more clearly we can conceive of Him as the Spirit of very truth, therefore as something disengaged from all fictions, and idolatries, and compromises, the more likely we are to obtain from Him availing help. Yet this is not all. For supposing that He whom we seek should already have given, in any region of the world, a true revelation of His own being, we cannot well escape the blame of pride and negligence, if we disdain examining all the credentials of such a revelation; or if we suffer ourselves to be ignorant of the history which records it. We could not consistently pray for light, or expect to have such prayers favourably heard, unless we avail ourselves of whatever light is already given. Hence I do not see how we are to discuss the sacred records of any religion, without first laying a sound historical foundation." "But why is that so important?" asked Sadánanda; "for if the books are good they will teach us of themselves." "Perhaps they may," replied Blancombe, "if we give them an opportunity of doing so by taking them fairly in our hands. But if we set out with a prejudice that one set of books is as good as another, and read false rather than true ones, or if we accustom ourselves to say there is no more confirmation in the outward world for a Koran than a Purána, or for a Bible than a Koran, the best books in the world may then have no chance of teaching us. Hence it may be very important for us, and especially for learned inquirers, to have some knowledge of history, and not to mix all nations and generations into a confused mass, but to know what came before, and what after, and who lived in countries where sacred events are said to have happened, as well as who lived in other countries at the same time. For thus we may acquire tests of natural probability, and be able to say whether events are in themselves credible, whether the persons recording them were true witnesses, and whether any collateral testimony can

be derived from other nations whose prepossessions may have been of another kind. So important is all this kind of external probability, that any books which do not answer such tests may fairly be suspected, or, at least, cannot be put on the same ground of credibility as books which do answer them. Especially books may become very suspicious, which are of so uncertain an origin that their date may be conjectured, without violence, to have been a thousand years earlier or later. In the same way, books in the hands of a whole people, and especially of any community extending over many nations, are, on the first look of things, less likely to have been altered, either to insert prophecies, or for any other wrong motive, than a volume in the hands of a mere priesthood; and yet if the priests were either obliged or accustomed to read and expound their volume at short intervals to the people at large, this distinction need not be so emphatic. Then, again, as to the internal contents of religious books, we have to inquire whether they agree in character with the manners of the times, and especially in narrative with the accounts given more or less by other nations as independent witnesses; for the testimony of a stranger is one of double strength. But such an inquiry can never be satisfactorily conducted, unless we have first our groundwork of history laid out as a map before us. Hence, I almost venture to say, that nations in whom the historical instinct is not strong, or who have no conscientious and clear record of facts in their own history, can never claim to have been the depositories of a Divine revelation, at least for mankind. You see yourself, such people furnish us with no data by which we can test their books; or probably such data as they give bear record against them. Indeed, the very fact of not having been inspired with a conscientious regard to truth in recording events, may be said to put men out of the court of the nations as witnesses. Thus, if I read anywhere that a prince had 'brought all the earth under one umbrella,' when other authorities informed me that many independent

kings lived even in the same country, I should be afraid that the imagination of such a writer might carry its exaggerating tendency into religion, and paint a common event as a miracle, or any mendicant faquir as a great saint. Again, if I found the ordinary teachers of any religion represented not merely as earnest and conscientious, but as gifted with superhuman infallibility, and free from the common accidents of men, I should regard any reality answering to this description as at least sufficiently rare to be unlikely, and as requiring, therefore, more than usual testimony. The same rule would apply to events so strange as not to be traceable to the ordinary links of causation in nature. For although the Saugata justly argues that the Divinity may teach men often, and I should add always, yet, if we have discovered by large induction, that the Divine method of teaching men is by providence and blessing upon experience and aspiration, we may expect that method to be maintained with some such regularity as other great processes in nature and history, except where extraordinary results may seem called for by extraordinary need, and again certified by no common witness. Moreover, such wonders, as I have before hinted, will be less probable, in proportion as they are less instructive. For instance, if a religious book should tell us of an incarnate Divinity holding up a mountain as a parasol, merely in order to protect certain *Gopis*\* or shepherdesses from a thunder-shower, we ought in all soberness to ask whether such a story is credible; what moral lesson can it convey; or with what sort of stories is it mingled, and by what curious contemporaries attested, that we should believe a thing so much at variance with the Divine government of the world? What, indeed, should we be better for believing it?

“It is only in passing that I throw out the suggestion, if the doctrines about the Deity recorded in sacred books are very obvious, the fact of their being trivial will rather detract from their value; or, again, if they are quite contradictory to our

\* This is told of Crishna in the *Sri Bhāgavat Purāna*.

reason, or if they tend to any impurity, such a character of instruction is not likely to have proceeded from the Author of our mind and soul, or of our intellectual and moral being; for I suppose we are not seeking any other Deity than the One who inspires us to conceive and feel our best thoughts or emotions. Yet I have already admitted that religious doctrines may transcend, and even be expected to transcend, our comprehensions; hence for religious books to contain things different from what we should have expected, is not alone a just ground of objection to them. But we may reasonably accept such statements in things beyond our judgments, if all that accompanies them in things falling within the ken of our minds is both credible and easily verified. That is to say, if the writers of the books lived among a people accustomed to scrutinise facts; if they never disguise their own faults or ignorances; if they give you place and time and number, with evident desire to be accurate, and so as to be consistent with what we know from other quarters, or can reasonably conjecture, in such a case our general acceptance of the history for sound reasons may extend to some things which, if they had stood alone, or not in such good company, might have startled us as extraordinary.

“ You see by this time why we must require in a religious discussion, which is carried on so systematically as the present is, a firm ground-work of history. Will you then permit me to ask you, since no persons are able to inform me better, what has been the course of your stream of history in India, and what are the great epochs which you set up in it as landmarks?” “ Do you mean,” asked Vidyáchárya here, “ to inquire about the Divine ages?” “ Why no,” answered Blancombe; “ for that might not only revive the difficult question, which we before glanced at, how far the idea of Time can apply to the eternal Spirit, but it would also provoke you to mention periods, which can have little to do with the history of man, being formed possibly upon observation of the stars, and which moreover are so vast as utterly to bewilder me. I remember,

for instance, reading in a quotation from one of your books\* that a human year is only a day with the gods, and that four thousand years of the gods, each (I suppose) consisting of about three hundred and sixty such days, make up a Divine age, and four Divine ages make an age of the gods, while it requires a thousand such Divine ages to make a single day of Brahmá, and as many to make his night. Again, some have said that it requires a thousand of Brahmá's days to make an hour of Vishnu, and six hundred thousand such hours to make a period of Rudra. Now, since you, my friend, have instructed me that Rudra means Siva, whom you especially worship, it is clear that any account you might give me of the Divine ages would be rather alarming, even if after all we escaped the question about the nature of Time itself. But such periods have evidently nothing to do with human history, or at least nothing with history so far back as it is likely to concern us, or we to remember it. Hence, if you please, I had rather waive all discussion of those Divine ages, in which some say that thousands of years are put on or off at pleasure, while others again think that they trace astronomical calculations in them; and we will start more modestly with some striking event in the generations of men. When, for example, would you place the events of the Mahábhárata, or the great war between the sons of Pándu and Kuru?" "It is generally agreed," answered the A'chárya, "that the great war took place at the end of the Brazen (*Dwápara*) age, or at the beginning of the *Kali* age, which is now in progress. That would be just four thousand nine hundred and fifty-five years ago, the present year (*i. e.* 1854, A. D.) being the seventeen hundred and

\* Compare Sir Wm. Jones's *Works*, Vol. I. pp. 280—360. Colebrooke, Vol. II. pp. 474—5. H. H. Wilson, *Vishnu Purána*, and *Lectures*. Lassen, *I. A. B.* II. p. 500.

The aggregate of the four ages would be, 4,320,000 years; out of which the Kali age has 432,000. The identity of the figures, excepting *cyphers*, is worth noticing. But a *Manwantara*, (or a dispensation of humanity) is, according to Wilson's *Sanskrit Lexicon*, 308,448,000 years, and the Calpa, or period of fourteen such dispensations, would be 4,318,272,000 years, or nearly three cyphers more.



seventy-sixth of the Saca, or Sáliváhana's, era." "But you see, I suppose," observed Blancombe, "that even this is a very long time." "Perhaps so," answered the other. "When I say long," proceeded Blancombe, "I mean long as compared to any other human history; for this great war is of course not the earliest event in the annals of India." "Very far from it," answered the other, "for Ráma, the great king of Oude, who extended his conquests to Ceylon, and was, indeed, an incarnation of Vishnu, lived before the Brazen age, though after the Silver had ended; and from Ráma up to Icshwaku, who is the first descendant of Vaivaswata, recorded as having reigned at Oude, there are fifty-five according to the Rámáyana, but according to the Vishnu Purána more than sixty generations of princes. The Vaivaswata, whom you mention, is also, if I mistake not, called Manu?" here asked Blancombe. "He is," answered the other, "the last of the Manus, to whom Brahmá has committed the peopling of the world, and therefore the father of the present race of mankind." "He stands then, apparently for Adam," proceeded Blancombe, "or rather, perhaps, for mankind conceived generically, since I recollect that when the word enters into compounds, it clearly means man. From Icshwaku then to Ráma you have about sixty generations of solar princes reigning at Oude (Ayodhya), beside a parallel lunar dynasty reigning at Vitóra (Pratishthána). What then may we suppose to have been the interval between Ráma and Yudhishthira?" "Clearly from what has been said," answered the other, "the entire Brazen age appears to have intervened. For, the Brazen age begins after Ráma, and ends with Paricshit, the successor of Yudhishthira. During that interval, there appear to have been twenty-nine kings who were descendants of the Sun, whether they reigned at Oude, or rather perhaps at Canouj, and their reigns are said to have lasted about eight hundred and sixty-four thousand years." "You mention the number with as perfect tranquillity of mind," observed Blancombe, smiling, "as if it was usual for men to live about thirty thousand years."

Suppose, however, we merely strike off the thousand, and conjecture the number tentatively to have been eight hundred and sixty-four years. We shall then have between twenty-nine and thirty years for a generation, which is a sufficiently common duration of life elsewhere, and quite as long, I think, as the average of a generation at the present day in India. By the aid of some such expedient your genealogical table might hold its ground among possibilities; otherwise, I fear, it would be very difficult for either of us to persuade the nations of the world in general, that your history is reconcilable with what is believed of the progress of mankind from the most authentic annals elsewhere." "But it seems to us only natural," answered Vidyáchárya, "that our history should in the holy land go back farther than that of profane nations; and the earlier fathers of mankind may well have lived longer than their degenerate descendants. You have, I think, in the books which Christians acknowledge as sacred, the latter principle fully admitted. But why should our accounts be tried by those of other nations, and not rather theirs be tested by ours?" "Well," resumed Blancombe, "if you will not bring your Sástras to the test of comparative history in general, at least you will admit that they ought to be consistent with themselves. After, therefore, that very long interval between Ráma and the heroes of the great war, such as Arjuna and Yudhishtira, I suppose these latter ought to be many generations lower down in your lists of the Lunar dynasty, than Ráma is in those of the Solar kings. But pray, is it so?" "Not exactly," answered the A'chárya; "for it is believed that some of the Vitóra kings in the *Chándra-Vansa* (Moon-dynasty) had their lives supernaturally prolonged." "Then your lists do, as I had been told," asked Blancombe, "make Ráma full sixty generations from Manu in the Oude dynasty, while those heroes who lived so many thousand years after him, according to your reckoning, are placed even earlier, or barely fifty generations from Manu, in the list of the kings of Vitóra?" "What you have been

told of the lists is true," answered the A'chárya. "Well, you see," resumed Blancombe, "the more improbable a statement is in itself, the more one is apt to cross-examine the witnesses; and if their story goes on becoming less probable, or less consistent apparently with itself, at each step, you know what conclusion the lawyers draw. So, I confess, it appears to me the mildest course we can take here is to conceive either that names have dropt out of some of your lists, or else years been inserted without sufficient warrant; and in either case the chronology becomes so doubtful, that it can hardly stand alone, unless we have some confirmatory accounts from other countries on which it may lean. In fact, it is difficult to say, which out of inconsistent accounts ought to be preferred; only, if all men, as you seem to say, sprang from Vaivaswata Manu, or from Adam, it is probable that their history in one country would not go indefinitely farther back than in countries of the world generally; and hence, if your chronology for the earliest period should be brought, by leaving out the thousands, or by subdivision of multiples, into a range of parallel with that of other nations, it might be easier to believe. Or perhaps at a later date, we might be able to fix some point of coincidence, on which we might take our stand, and look about us. Have you not, for example, in your lists, a king called *Chandragupta*?" "Certainly," answered the A'chárya, "there was among the kings of Magadhá, one of that name. He was first of the Maurya dynasty, which succeeded to that of the Nandas." "Before we go farther," said Blancombe, "let it be made clear what places or lists of kings we are taking into consideration. You have mentioned the Sun-dynasty of Oude and Canouj, with its sixty generations down to Ráma, and about thirty more down to the Great War. Then there is the Moon-dynasty of Vitóra with barely fifty generations, supposed to extend over the same time as the other column of ninety. But who are these kings of Magadhá?" "They are the descendants," answered the other, "of *Sahadeva*, who lived in the time of the Great War, and, going into the

country now called Behar, founded there the city of Magadhá. He was himself tenth from Kuru in the Moon-dynasty. From him down to Ripunjaya, there reigned in Magadhá about twenty kings for a thousand years; then, after Ripunjaya, came five of the Pradyota-dynasty; and then Sisunága, the first of a dynasty of ten, who, I suppose, is the king you alluded to as having a fabulous account given of his name in the Bauddha chronicles. At least the fifth of his dynasty is Bimbisara, in whose reign the great deluder, Gautama, or Sákya, was born." "But Sákya was not of Magadhá, I think, was he?" asked Blancombe. "No," replied the other, "he was son of Suddhódana, whom I, following the Vishnu Purána, call king of Ayodhya, or of whatever city may then have been the capital of that region, but whom the Bauddhas call king of Capilavastu." "This interests me exceedingly," said Blancombe, "for now, by putting things together, I think I see a glimpse of light. But first, please to finish with your list of kings." "It is prophesied in the Vishnu Purána," proceeded the other, "that 'after the Saisunagas will come Nanda, the son of a Sudra mother; he will bring all the earth under one umbrella.' Accordingly, the event happened so; and then after nine Nandas came the new dynasty of the Mori tribe, which the Brahman Kautilya brought about, and of which Chandragupta was the first king. His son was Vindusara, and his grandson, as probably you are aware, was Asoca." "I am much obliged to you for all this information," said Blancombe; "and I suppose this Asoca is the king whose Bauddha inscriptions were so confidently appealed to by our friend the Saugata Muni, who has now been silent so long?" "He is so," answered the other. "And pray, my friend," said Blancombe, now turning to the Saugata, "when should you, according to the most moderate chronology in any of your books, such as the Maháwansa, place either your first Council, or the death of Sákya? In what year, that is, of the Saca era?" "Why," answered the other, "it was six hundred and twenty-one years before the Saca era begins, or two

thousand three hundred and ninety-seven years before the one now current; (therefore it would be 543 B. C.). You agree also in making the age of Chandragupta about five generations lower." "Yes," answered the Saugata, we make him reign from four hundred and fifty-nine to four hundred and twenty-five years before the Saca era begins." "That is not exactly what I hoped to hear," remarked Blancombe, "but it comes within a very few years, at least within few, as compared to the vast periods we have been discussing. For I no longer doubt that this Chandragupta is the same as Sandracottus, who is mentioned by more than one Greek writer as having made a treaty with Seleucus Nicator. You have often heard of Alexander, the great Yavana conqueror, who established a kingdom in Bactria, of which we have still the coins remaining, and did battle with the Indians of the Punjaub. You can readily understand how in his age history had been well fixed among the Greeks, by an inquisitive people, who learnt accuracy in the course of political rivalries, and were obliged to study it in their narratives. So we are able to fix precisely the date of Alexander's dying at Babylon as B. C. 322, and the reign of Seleucus, one of the kings among whom his empire was divided, as coming down to B. C. 310; that is, three hundred and eighty-eight years before the Saca era commences, or within thirty-seven years of the date at which you fix Chandragupta. Again, Megasthenes\*, an ambassador and writer among the Yavanas, actually visited the court of Asoca, Chandragupta's grandson, and from him very many of the notions entertained in India by the later Greeks were derived. His time also corresponds sufficiently with what, from the clue you have already given me, you would naturally make the date of Asoca. This date, indeed, is partly fixed even by the inscriptions already spoken of; for they have the name of Ptolemy, and since they have also the word *Magas*, it is probable they mean Ptolemy Philadelphus, whose brother was so called, and his date is about three hundred

\* *Megasthenis Indica*, ed. Schwanbeck. Bonn, 1846.

and forty-two before the Saca era commences. So that Asoca thus becomes contemporary of Antiochus in Syria, and Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt. Upon this firm basis, therefore, we can proceed to argue. For the triple coincidence of the Greek accounts, which are both numerous and reputable, of the Cingalese Bauddha books, and again, of the Rock inscriptions, which, although also Bauddha, yet having been but recently decyphered, came up with all the freshness of an independent witness, is far too remarkable to have arisen, except upon the supposition of the statements being, so far as they agree, correct.

“Now let us go back to the Vishnu Purána. When would you, my friend”—here Blancombe turned to the A'chárya—“place the last king of Magadhá who is eminent enough to be clearly traced?” “We place him,” answered the other, “three hundred and ninety-six years before Vicramáditya, the great king of Malwa.” “And Vicramáditya's era begins, I think,” resumed Blancombe, “one hundred and thirty-four years before the Saca era, or fifty-six before the Christian?” “Exactly so,” replied the other. “Then here,” said Blancombe, “we have standing-ground again. You have several dynasties, I think, between the Maurya and this last, which you call the Andhra, and the space of time required for them is probably considerable? Is it not so?” “Certainly,” answered the other; “for there are ten of the Mori family, who extend over one hundred and thirty-seven years, ten of the Sunga dynasty, who reigned for one hundred and twelve years, and four Kanwa kings, whom we affirm, if you have no objection, to have reigned between them three hundred and forty-five years. Then begins the Andhra dynasty, which ends with its twenty-first king, Chandrabija, four hundred and fifty-six years from its commencement.” “And after him you make three hundred and ninety-six years to Vicramáditya?” asked Blancombe. “Exactly so,” replied the other. “Well,” said Blancombe, “I have no objection to the kings being described as reigning, whatever number of years may really have been the fact; but these things cannot be altered at our pleasure; and

now we are landed in an inextricable difficulty. For, not to mention that the Kanwa kings appear unusually long-lived, you have given me as the entire interval between Chandragupta and Vicrama one thousand four hundred and forty-six years; or, in other words, you make the first Maurya king one thousand five hundred and two years before the Christian era, whereas we have already seen, from the irrefragable coincidence between thoroughly independent accounts, that he really lived only three hundred and ten years before it. Here then is an error in a comparatively narrow portion of your annals, amounting to about twelve centuries. How much greater then may be the errors in those vast and indefinite periods which have been spoken of above, if we only had similar means of testing them! How do you answer this, my friend?" "I don't deny," answered the A'charya, "that you understand these things better than I do; but we have received it as I stated it."

"I say not a word against receiving ancient accounts, either upon sufficient authority, or when they are consistent with themselves," said Blancombe; "but when chronological errors of so large a range can be demonstrated in a system received as historical, it becomes no longer what accurate people understand by history. Moreover this difference of twelve centuries may lead to some important questions. For either the number given may be arbitrary, and possibly wrong, or else the last Andhra king may have been long after Vicramáditya; or again, he may really have been before Vicrama, and still the numbers be right; only in this latter case we must bring down the famous era of Vicramáditya some centuries later than you have supposed. Nor should I wonder, myself, if in reality we ought to do so. But now, just observe, what important consequences would follow. For Vicrama is your great king, under the protection of whose court at Malwa\* Hindú literature attained its brightest acme, and many famous scholars flourished. Supposing then it should happen that they had appeared to invent any famous saying,

\* With Malwa Gesenius connects *μόλυβδος*, the Greek for lead.



such as Christians may, perhaps, claim for the Founder of their religion, it makes a great difference whether these famous Hindús lived some half century before Christ, or an indefinite number of centuries after him. Suppose even that he lived only a century and a half later than you imagine, that difference alone opens up a vista of many possibilities. Then again, so great an error in so small a tract of time suggests the likelihood of general error on a large scale, and, in fact, throws doubt over the whole system. More particularly it should be observed, that pretensions to anything like prophecy hence suffer exceedingly. You have quoted a prophecy from the V. Purána that Nanda should 'bring all the earth under one umbrella.' But Megasthenes, the Yavana writer I have already quoted, relates that India contained one hundred and eighteen nations, without at all mentioning that Asoca was lord over them all; yet Asoca was probably more powerful than Nanda. Or, if we looked upward, instead of downward, the Greeks who describe Alexander's empire or that of his successors, represent the Prasii and their king as eminent, but do not at all ascribe to them an universal dominion. Hence it would seem that Nanda did not exactly bring all the earth under one umbrella; and if the passage saying so in the Purána be a prophecy, it had the misfortune not to be fulfilled; or if it be a description, in case the Purána should turn out to be of a later date, then it is not historically accurate, but sins by exaggeration. Yet, if there were nothing in Indian history more hyperbolical than this, it might be comparatively trustworthy.

"Since, however, you have mentioned the Andhra dynasty, let us attempt a kind of conjecture. We will assume that *Chandragupta* must have lived until B.C. 305, and may have reigned previously perhaps thirty years. We will then take all your dynasties, only we must shorten hypothetically the reigns of the four Kanwa princes." "I should have told you," Vidyáchárya here interposed, "that in the Vishnu Purána the time assigned to these is only forty-five years, though in other books of ours it



appears from a variety in the figures to be three hundred and forty-five." "That will help us materially," said Blancombe, "and with this deduction if we sum up the dates of your dynasties, and bring the Andhra kings forward accordingly, we shall find their epoch extend down to four hundred and ten, or possibly four hundred and forty, of the Christian era. This argument is perhaps rather more plausible, since it makes their dynasty comprehend the time during which the Roman naturalist Pliny the elder lived\*, for he tells us, about A. D. 60, that in the neighbourhood of the Ganges—and it seems to be implied not far in order from Palibothra—there was a powerful tribe called the Andaræ; and, without disputing that there was an Andhra kingdom farther South on the Godaveri, I agree with those learned men who think there is some reference here to the Andhra kings of Magadhá. But perhaps their capital may not have been Palibothra itself, but some city in its neighbourhood, and somewhat to the South. Still they would probably be rulers of Magadhá. Here then we seem to have something that looks like corroborative testimony. Again, Chinese authors have been reported to me as saying, that in the year A. D. 408, ambassadors arrived in their country from the Indian king Yuegnai. If that name means Yajna, which seems likely enough, then it will exactly correspond with the last but two of the Andhra kings, whose dynasty we have been supposing to end somewhere before A. D. 440. As this coincidence is not my own discovery†, I may venture to praise and rejoice in it. Now, you see, we are on tolerably steady ground."

"Then ought not you, even at the worst, to allow that at this point our annals are strictly historical?" asked the A'charya. "Why, my friend, it is very awkward," answered Blancombe,

\* *Validior deinde gens, Andaræ.* Plin. *Nat. Hist.* vi. § 22, ed. Fransius. If the order of the names implies anything, it points to the vicinity of the Ganges, rather than of the Godaveri. But compare Lassen, Vol. II. pp. 271—345, and Vol. I. p. 178, with Wilson in the *Vishnu Purána* on the Magadhá dynasties.

† De Guignes, I. 45, quoted by Wilson in *V. P.* and *Journal As. Soc. Bengal*, May, 1837. So the Puloman of Magadhá becomes in Chinese, Ho-lo-mien.

“that as yet we have not been able to fix any one chronological point satisfactorily, without calling in the aid of other than Brahmanical documents. However, we have some farther inquiries to go through.” “But you admit, that our Bauddha documents have been of use?” asked the Saugata. “Certainly,” answered Blancombe, “and to the Bauddhas, as far as I am able to judge, belongs the praise of having first introduced a properly historical element into Hindú literature\*. Yet this praise must be accompanied by the blame of having also introduced a great many childish legends, some of which I alluded to a little time ago, and others I have reason to believe are worse. There is also an error of about forty years in your placing of Chandragupta, which Mr Turnour thought could hardly have been accidental; but, as compared to Hindú chronology in general, it appears to me accurate.”

“Then what course would you now suggest to be taken,” here asked Sadánanda, “in order to extract something like probability out of those earlier generations, over the history of which a certain confusion seems to prevail?” “Why, if one may venture,” replied Blancombe, “to employ a sort of conjecture, I should go back to those twenty-nine kings of the Sun-dynasty, whose reigns were reported by our venerable friend as extending over eight hundred and sixty-four thousand years between Ráma and the Great War; and just as with the four Kanwa kings of Magadhá, it turned out that we were right in striking off the hundreds, so, in this case, I think we might easily dispense with the thousands of years, and so reduce their period to eight hundred and sixty-four years. Nor does this appear to me altogether an arbitrary licence; for thirty generations of men might be expected on the average to extend over about nine hundred years. It is true, indeed, that a reign is seldom so long as a generation, and, if we were working without any clue at all, I should not in conjecture allow it so long: yet some

\* Lassen finds general causes in the state of India for the more accurate genius of Bauddha history, B. 11. pp. 1—15.

reigns may have been longer ; and since here the Hindú annalists give us the number eight hundred and sixty-four, which may possibly have been a statement for which they had traditional reasons, I am inclined hypothetically to accept the number. For at least it is within the range of possibility that thirty kings, with, as we may conceive, some time lost in interregnums, may altogether have occupied that period. Let the conjecture that they did so, therefore, stand for a few moments as an hypothesis. Only it must be understood, that the true time is likely to have been shorter, rather than longer ; for we have lengthened the supposed time out of deference to the Hindú annals.

“ We shall then have to consider, in the next place, the thirty-six kings of Magadhá, exclusive of Nanda, between Sahadéva and Chandragupta, or between the Great War, whenever that may have been, and the period of Seleucus Nicator, which is B. C. 310. Now a little lower down at Magadhá we find thirty Andhra kings occupy only four hundred and fifty-six years. This fact we are certain of, because it is not only stated so in the Vishnu Purána, but it also coincides, as we have seen, with notices of the Roman Pliny, and of the Chinese annalists. Now you will please to observe, that the average of reigns, when taken over this large number of kings, is only about fifteen years. In other words, it is just half a generation ; and this is very much what, on general grounds of probability, we should expect to be the case. In peaceful countries, like Great Britain, kings may reign longer ; but in troubled ones, as we see in the case of the emperors of Rome, they reign less ; and I would not venture to affirm more than that, for such stages of society as we find exemplified in the Indian Magadhá, fifteen years is a fair average duration for a king's reign. Is there, then, any reason why the thirty-six kings between the Great War and Chandragupta should have reigned longer ? ” “ We at least believe,” here remarked Vidyáchárya, “ that the twenty kings who followed Sahadéva reigned for a thousand years. ” “ But, if they did,”

replied Blancombe, "they must have lived very much longer than men in general do; for even the reign of every one must have extended over one whole generation, and two-thirds of another. Now, if such a supposition is in itself improbable, it does not become less so from our having already observed what errors creep into your chronology. Moreover, you allow, I think, only a like space of a thousand years to thirty kings who follow Paricshit in the Sun-dynasty either at Oude, or Canouj, or Capila-vastu, or whatever may have been the capital of the Solar A'ryans after the Great War. Why, then, should twenty kings of Magadhá be supposed to have reigned as long as a parallel chain of thirty in the Sun-dynasty elsewhere? Such a contradiction is so improbable, that, in the absence of proof, we may set it aside as impossible. You must forgive me, then, if I say, that we have a right to ignore your theory of a thousand years for the first twenty kings of Magadhá, especially as it seems to have been imagined only to give the Tables a look of symmetry; and we must group the whole number of thirty-six kings in a mass, reckoning backward from Chandragupta, who is a certain point, to Sahadéva, who is an uncertain one. We can then allot to the entire thirty-six, by way of conjecture, whatever number of years it is probable they might reign. I treat Nanda and his family apart, thinking them approximately fixed."

"But may you not," here the Saugata asked, "throw light upon at least the later of the Magadhá kings, such as the Saisunagas, from our Baudha annals?" "You remind me," replied Blancombe, "of what had for the moment escaped my memory. Only you must not ask me to take in the story of the serpent, or others among your accounts which have a decidedly legendary air." "But you admit," said the Saugata, "that our chronology from the time of Sákyá, or Bimbisára's reign, is tolerably correct?" "Why we found there," said Blancombe, "an error of nearly forty years; and it does not follow that a system tolerably correct for a contemporary period is equally so

for an age more remote. But I am quite ready, since we are treading after all upon conjectural ground, to accept your chronology of the Saisunaga princes, so far as it agrees with the genealogies of the Vishnu Purána, because so far we appear to have a concurrence of two independent witnesses. We will therefore allow not only for Nanda, but for his sons, who must be added to the thirty-six kings we had to consider, and we will admit the round number of one hundred years which is claimed for the Nanda family. There will then be no difficulty in recognising the place of Ajatasatru, in or near whose reign Sákya died, as about 550 B. C.; and we may admit, as not involving any great extravagance, the three hundred and sixty-two years claimed for the ten Saisunaga princes, and one hundred and forty-five for Pradyota and the four other Saunakas. We have gone back, therefore, without improbability, six hundred and seven years from Chandragupta; though part of the period, especially about the Nandas, and any interregnum which may then have been, is far from certain, and I suspect also that the duration of the reigns of the earlier Saisunaga princes is estimated too highly. I accept, however, the figures. But now the old question recurs, what average we are to assign the twenty remaining kings from Ripunjaya up to Sahadéva? You will not be angry, if I observe, that the ten Maurya kings, a little lower down, reign only one hundred and thirty-seven years, as the thirty Andhra lower still last only four hundred and fifty-six; and I can see no reason why the earlier kings of Magadhá should have been longer lived. Taking therefore the names, which are probably a better clue than the round number of one thousand years, which seems thrown in for the sake of symmetry, I should assign them conjecturally three hundred years, thereby allowing them to reign, on the average, as long as any Indian dynasty which we can trace clearly in any age when the Indians managed war and politics after their indigenous fashion. But even if their reigns were full generations, they would require only six hundred years.

“ We may now then come to a summary—Chandragupta is 305 B. C. Nanda and his family extend over one hundred years. Ten Saisunaga princes have three hundred and sixty-two allowed them. For the five next princes of the Pradyota dynasty, what number do the Puráanas say?” The A'chárya answered, “ One hundred and thirty-eight.” “ Be it so,” proceeded Blancombe. “ Then for the twenty earlier kings up to Sahadéva, until better data are supplied to us, we may allow as a conjecture three hundred years, or not much more. This would make Sahadéva about nine hundred years earlier than Chandragupta, and place the Great War somewhere about twelve centuries before the Christian era. The dynasties of Magadhá, with some help from the Bauddha chronology, and from impartial notices of India by foreigners, will have supplied our clue to this probable result.

“ Then, if we were right in our manner of treating the earlier twenty-nine kings of Oude from Ráma to the Mahábhárata, to whom, by striking off thousands, we allowed eight hundred and sixty-four years, it will follow that the date of your great conqueror, Ráma, and of the events imaginatively depicted in the Epic of Valmiki, will be rather more than two thousand years before the Christian era, or if you like, I will say, fully two thousand before the date you assign to Vicramáditya, (which is 56 B. C.) If then one might venture to go farther, and treat the sixty generations or reigns from your Adam or Manu to Ráma, in a similar spirit of conjecture, one might say that the earliest gleams of Hindú history, as yet in its most legendary form, appear to fall rather more than three thousand years before Christ. If, however, you persist in saying, that men in those early ages lived longer, or if you think that the reigns of kings, being free from modern treacheries and disasters, should be calculated then as fully equal to generations, I have no objection to throw you in another thousand years for that dim patriarchal period which preceded Ráma. This is allowing each of those earliest reigns, or rather generations, upwards of thirty years. Only it must be remembered, that for those earlier stages, we do not profess to

recognise a history, so much as an hypothesis, upon which scanty and traditional notices may be tolerated. Nor would I deny that the period beyond what we have clear historical accounts of, may have been longer and more varied in its features than many persons would suppose. Perhaps some inferences respecting it may be drawn by ingenious men\*, either from Vedic or other earlier songs, or from traces of common origin in languages which we know must have been long separated. Let such questions be here left by me undefined. I have only ventured to criticise such elements as you present to me of your own earlier history and chronology. Whether then I consider the vast vagueness of the numbers, or the lists of names, not to mention here the poetical character of some of the authorities, which must be touched on hereafter, I see no reason, which will stand the daylight of criticism, for supposing that any history of the Hindú race, or even any tradition belonging to them in your written monuments with the nature of history, need be placed farther back than about 4000 B. C.

“ Rather, indeed, there are many stray features in the general aspect of the comparative history of nations, which lead me to think, the chronological sketch I have attempted is right so far as it is positive, and not wrong so far as it hesitates. Not but that I am aware, that the interpreters of the Hebrew records in the Byzantine Church would put back the first dawn of the history of mankind as far as 5502 B. C.; and although British scholars have, for the most part, considered this date too remote, I should scarcely myself call it so; and again, I am aware, that those who consider the dynasties recorded by the Egyptian priest Manetho as having been chiefly consecutive, rather than contemporary in different cities, would make the kingdom of Menes in Egypt as early as 3626 B. C.; moreover, I am bound to remark, by way of concession, that we can dimly trace the existence of certain obscure empires in Central Asia during a

\* Compare Max Müller, in the *Oxford Essays* for 1856, and in Bunsen's *Philosophy of History*. London, 1854.



period at least previous to 2000 B. C., and that some theories would, partly from the analogy of Egypt, (supposing the date of Menes proved,) and partly from the dubious fragments of Assyrian and Chinese chronicles, make that period extend back for fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand years farther. For they say, that both the cities and the arts of the age we have assigned to Ráma, and such things as the use of fine linen, with a trade in spices, such as appears to have existed between Eastern and Western Asia, all require a long growth; and they conceive themselves to find, in the antiquities of various Asiatic nations, stronger testimony to such a period than we in Britain generally admit.

“ But, on the other hand, I have to remark, that so far as we can trace those early empires, previous to 2000 B. C., they seem to have been for the most part of Semitic or Asiatic affinities, or at least not of that Indo-European race, to which you in common with ourselves belong. But since these words are used in different senses by different people, let me briefly explain what I mean. You remember that in the hymns of the Rig-Veda the Hindús are called A’ryas, and as such, are opposed to the Dasyus, who are enemies, or such as by Manu would be classed under the head of Mlechchas, or barbarians. The first are called performers of religious rites; the latter, disturbers of them. The first are lighter\* of complexion, and come from the North; the latter are dark, and indigenous to the South. So it is said, that ‘the thunderer divided the fields among his white-complexioned friends, having slain the Dasyus, and the Simyus, with his thunderbolt.’ (Súkta. 100.) Again, that the A’ryas, your ancestors, came from the North-west, and were invaders of India, is clear from their sacred names; since *Saraswati*, the name of your goddess of eloquence, is also the name of a river in the Punjaub; and the holy land of the laws of Manu is also in the same country. The same sort of testimony to the quarter from whence you came, is also furnished by your language in

\* *Varna*, caste, means properly colour.



general; since its oldest form, I mean the Sanscrit, is most clearly akin to the oldest form of the ancient Persian. You might, therefore, be called a Medo-Persic race; and the name *A'ryas* seems properly to comprehend the people of Iran, or of central Asia, South and South-east of the Caspian sea, as well as the Hindús. But this affinity of language also extends more or less closely through various nations and tribes, radiating, as it were, from Iran to the extreme West of Europe, on the one hand, and to India on the other. All the people, then, falling under that class, whether Persian, Pelasgic, Slavonian, Gothic, Cimbric, or Gaelic, may be called Indo-European, or, from the ancestor ascribed to them in the Hebrew records, Iapetic. But, besides these early European ramifications in Asia, there are also at least two great Asiatic families of nations; the one called Semitic in modern times, under which are included all whose language is akin to that of the Hebrews; and another, which the great Hebrew genealogist speaks but faintly of, as having had less to do with it; I mean all the Mongolian and Chinese nations; and if it were necessary to be complete, I should also have to mention the mountain tribes to the North-west of Iran, who are rightly termed Caucasian, and the place of whose languages is not yet fixed. Certainly, however, they are not Iapetic, in the sense of Indo-European; but possibly of some older stock, or perhaps a strongly localised offshoot of the Mongolian\*.

“But it may suffice us at present to have distinguished the two more important Asiatic families from those white-complexioned *A'ryas* of whom the Rig-Veda speaks, who, although they have extended themselves over India, yet have on the

\* The speaker could not have seen Bunsen's *Philosophy of Universal History*, in which the term *Turanian* is proposed for the 'Allophylic' or Mongolian races; and which contains many weighty and novel illustrations of the ethnographical subject here sketched independently on narrower data. *Caucasian* means, in comparative philology, as in geography, the tribes of the Caucasus; but in Romance, with some colour from physiology, it has been made a general term, comprehending Shem and Japhet. Compare Latham's *Varieties of Man*, with Bunsen's great work.

whole their affinities rather towards Europe. Now, the earliest kingdoms of which we have anything like distinct knowledge, belonged to that Semitic race, which is of all Asiatic stems the most nearly akin to the people of Africa. It is in Egypt, the middle point, I may say, between the sons of Shem and the descendants of Ham, that we first find a civilisation of higher antiquity than any which can be shewn elsewhere. It was from Sidon, a city which I will here call Semitic, on account of its language, though without disputing whether it might not be attributed more properly to the descendants of Ham, whom I regard as philologically akin\*—but anyhow, it was from Sidon that the most famous navigators went forth in remote antiquity. So the earliest kingdoms of Assur, and Babel, and Syria, if not Elam, are shewn by their names and their deities to have been either Hamite or Semitic; and, in either case, they belonged to races which may be roughly compared with the Dasyus of elder India, rather than closely akin to the white-complexioned A'ryas. We find no Iapetic or as it were A'ryan kingdom in central Asia, until, at the very earliest, 2234 B. C., even if we accept a broken testimony of Berosus† to so early a date for a Median dynasty in Babylon; while people more sceptical than myself in early Gentile history, would recognise no Median power until that of Deioces in the eighth century before Christ.

“ Since the Chinese also are said to have a dynasty begin historically about 2205 B. C. we will suppose the earlier date for the Medes to be not incredible, and allow Elam to have been a kingdom of the same race. But, even thus, you see that a full two thousand years before your era of Vicramáditya, is the

\* Races seem to be classified in Genesis x. according to colour, rather than language.—Kenrick's *Phœnicia*, Ch. III.

† Lassen, Book II. pp. 751, 752, where the Babylonian and Chinese synchronism is suggested. Very recently, traces have been imagined or found by Colonel Rawlinson of early Mongolian or Turanian dynasties in Babylon. But such a discovery would be against general probabilities; and if it were confirmed, it would not weaken the argument as to the Arians.

earliest date at which any of your fraternity of nations can make good a place on the stage of history.

“Can any reason be shewn why the history of the Aryan race in India should be supposed to begin earlier? We have seen that your received chronology is of too arbitrary and legendary a kind to be such a reason alone; and such probabilities as we could extract out of the number of generations, would lead us to place the great conqueror Ráma about the same time as Chedorlaomer and Abraham in Syria, the shepherd kings in Egypt, the supposed Medes in Babylon, and the Hia dynasty in China.

“There would be at least a certain air of congruity in our conjectures about your history with what we know elsewhere. For if the Aryan race really radiated, as many learned men believe, from the regions of Iran eastward and westward, there is a general probability that the date of their Indian conquests might be not very remote from that of their establishments elsewhere. The same sort of probability rather confirms our conjecture that the Great War (Mahábhárata) should be placed about 1200 B. C. For there are many points of sympathy, if not of contact, between the histories of India and Greece, sufficient, at least, to suggest the experiment of comparing their chronologies together tentatively, without confounding points essentially unlike. I need not repeat here, what Sir William Jones and others have said, perhaps too sanguinely, on the resemblance between mythological stories in the two countries\*; but when I read what is fabled about Púrúravas, the son of Ilá, having to choose between Wisdom, Wealth, and Desire, and being per-

\* Subsequent in time to this Dialogue is Professor Max Müller's *Essay on Indian and Hellenic Mythology*. Wonderful as is the union in it of depth and beauty, does it not ignore too much the heroic element in legend? Ought not too Sanscrit to be made so very much the elder sister, as to be almost a mother-tongue to Greek? The immediate subject did not call for exposition of the radical affinity between the Semitic and Aryan languages, as shewn in words by Gesenius, and in forms (truly, I believe,) by Ewald. But there is yet room for an analytical comparison of Hebrew with Sanscrit on the one side, and with some African tongues on the other.

secuted by the two whom he rejected, I cannot help being reminded of the fatal choice of Paris the Ilian shepherd. Then I notice too, that Sákya in India precedes somewhat the movement of Pythagoras and the life of Socrates in Greece. Again, the most brilliant period of Hindú literature is placed by yourselves as somewhat subsequent to the conquests of Alexander, which must have given some kind of impulse; and perhaps something might be said about the same Saracen power, which in its inheritors overthrew the Byzantine empire, having extended itself, with another wave of its tide, over India. It would not, therefore, seem unnatural, if your Great War between the sons of Pándu and Kuru should be connected with that which the Yavana legends described as having been waged against Troy; whether the two events really happened in stages of society nearly corresponding; or whether one was moulded by poets out of dim echoes which had reached them through traditions of the other; or whether both may have been once parables of something different, but translated by legend into actual wars. In any case, it is to me rather satisfactory than otherwise, that as Greek chronologers placed the Trojan war about the twelfth century before Christ, so we have been led by purely Hindú authorities, though treating them in our own way, to place the events of the Mahábhárata about the same period.

“ If now I were to make any use of that grand period of four millions three hundred and twenty thousand years, which is assigned to the aggregate of the Four Ages, it would be only to ask, whether by striking off the last three cyphers, we might not reduce it to a figure, which your earliest chronographers may have intended to denote their conception of the utmost duration of Hindú history down to the period at which they first began systematically to review it, or perhaps to the era of Vicramáditya. But the want of a fixed date as a terminus at the lower end of such a speculation forbids me to dwell on so mere a possibility. But I trust you will allow that there is great reason for reducing Hindú chronology in general

to narrower limits than those in which you have represented it."

Here Wolff, at whose long silence I had begun to wonder, interposed with some remarks. "It appears to me," he said, "that you have been far too liberal in your concessions. For when once you had shewn the unhistorical character of the Hindú pretensions to records, you had no right afterwards to build upon them, as if they contained something solid. The demolition of part destroys the whole. Or, even if the later genealogies, such as those of Magadhá, should have some truth, this proves nothing for the far earlier stages of tradition. We may grant Queen Victoria's British pedigree as likely up to Owen Tudor, without condescending to reason upon it farther up to King Arthur, or to some remote Cadwaladr. Again, I cannot help noticing, that this Vicramáditya, who is to pass for the Augustus of India, is not even mentioned in the Vishnu Purána. What becomes, then, of his brilliant court, and of the antiquity of the Hindú drama? This is not a light question. For in what language, or even with what alphabet, I beg to ask, were either the dramatic plays, or much more those portions of the literature, for which so far higher an antiquity is claimed, originally written? The common alphabet is the Devanágari. Some say this is developed out of old Pali alphabets. It seems to me a debased Greek\*. But it is confessedly modern. I should like to see copies of those which were before it, and to know on what principle they were deciphered. It is only the other day that the ingenious Prinsep deciphered certain inscriptions called ancient. They were as recent as Asoca's time, or two hundred and fifty-nine years before the Christian era. Who would answer for alphabets claiming to be fifteen centuries older. The first thing certain in the history of India, even if I grant the certainty of that, is the rise of Buddhism. What is the language of this religion and its most characteristic literature?

\* The fact of Sanscrit letters *opening towards the left*, though read towards the right, suggests the question of a possibly Semitic origin.

Not Sanscrit, such as is called pure, but Pali; and Pali calls itself the *root* (*mula*), or the oldest Hindú tongue. I have yet to see evidence proving that it is not so. All the earlier Brahmanic period and literature may be either imagination or imposture. What external history attests any Brahmans earlier than the sixth century before Christ? Even if Megasthenes, from whom our best Greek accounts flow, were as early, his descriptions of certain philosophers\* appear to comprehend rival ascetics, some Brahmanical, and some Jains or Bauddhas, whom he calls by almost the Hindú word *Sramanas*; but this does not imply organised caste on the one side; and therefore it need not on the other. Was caste even in the time of Alexander known? Arrian says that all Indians were free. Diodorus of Sicily thought the same. These are unbribed witnesses, living, one in the first, the other in the second century of our era. Could they have heard of Sudras and Chándálas? Or, if I grant that the division of classes, *μέρη*, mentioned by Strabo†, (pp. 703—708 C,) means castes, and not mere occupations, how little will this go towards building up the vast antiquity of the Brahmanical system! If I maintain, as a probable hypothesis, that Buddhism is the oldest religion, and that its books contain the oldest religion of India, who can prove the contrary? The Pali language would be in my favour. For certainly it is ruder, and more likely to have grown into the Sanscrit, than out of it. Then what is the hair, or complexion, with which Buddha is represented in his images? Clearly dark, or negro; and this is more nearly the characteristic of the older races of India, than of the immigrant Aryas. We know that afterwards, say about A. D. 700, the poor Bauddhas were expelled. Nothing could be easier than for Cumánila Bhatta and his associates then to get up a representation of an earlier præ-Buddhist period. A large part of Sanscrit literature falls in very well with such a supposition. Its advocates boast of its many stages and periods, which

\* *Frag.* 41, 42, 43, ed. Schw.

† Strabo, Lib. xv. pp. 703—708, o. Schwanbeck's *Megasthenes*, p. 41.

they say require a development of centuries. But here are a thousand years and upwards from the eighth century to our own time. Considering the fervor of the Indian imagination, and the rapid transitions which religions and politics have run through, how many stages of letters does not this admit of? Many of the Puránas are undoubtedly very modern. They mention not only Mahometans, but other events or names within six or eight centuries from our own date. Even the Jesuit Missionary Robertus de Nobilibus\*, in the sixteenth century, invented one which passed current for a time. This shews the vagueness of tests of Sanscrit antiquity. You have yourself shewn how variously the date of Vicramáditya may be placed. Why should he not have preceded Mahmud of Ghazni by a hundred years, instead of by a thousand? If, again, we turn from literature, which may be modern, to the more fixed testimonies of inscriptions and temples, where is anything of this kind belonging to that supposed period of early Brahmanism? All the earliest instances I am aware of are Buddhist†. Such a hard fact is worth a thousand theories, not to say frauds. For if the literature and creed of the Brahmans had been as old as is pretended, we should have had ancient inscriptions and temples belonging to them. Just as very ignorant Europeans fancy the *Táj Mahal* at Agra is characteristic of the Hindú architecture, whereas it was built for the Emperor Shah Jehan, by a Frenchman, about 1650, so may others in a somewhat obscurer region trace to early Brahmans what may really come of Greek or Roman influence. You must, at least, allow it to be remarkable, that the Hindú drama, and the supposed brilliancy of the court of Malwa, come out, on your own shewing, almost contemporary with the Augustan age at Rome, and considerably posterior to contact with the Greeks under Alexander. The age of the Ptolemies was the most likely

\* *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XIV. *Calcutta Review*, Oct. 1844. Grant's *Bampton Lectures*. Maurice's Preface to *Lect. Ep. Hebrews*. Dr Mill, *Christa Sangita*.

† Colonel Sykes, *Journal R. As. S.* No. XII. London, 1841. *Foe Koue Ki*, par M. A. Rémusat, Paris, 1836. Ferguson on Indian Temples, in *Journal R. A. S.*



ever known to be a hot-bed of foreign influences, and rapid literary growth, with possibly spurious pretensions. How late even may have been the immigration of the Aryan race into India, it is difficult to say. We may admit them to have hovered about the Punjaub for some generations before the time of Buddha, and still contend that their Brahmanical religion did not develop itself until after the Christian era. But it is significant that Herodotus\* makes the Indians all black. The negro representations of Sákya may therefore be true. The reigns of the Achæmenian princes, or from Cyrus to Darius Hystaspes, supply as probable a date as any for an unfixed immigration from the Persian provinces. Such names as *Yadu*, *Puru*, *Madhu*, in the Vishnu Purána may denote a Medo-Persian connexion, and might fall, as I rather fancy, not far from the time of Darius Hystaspes. Again, India is called the land of Bharata, and the genealogies make Bharata descend from Puru. Those who say the Persian descent thus implied was prior to any aggrandisement of the Persian empire, or even to its existence, should shew ground for their belief. But you see we have found nothing Brahmanical which can be called clearly older than Buddha. Buildings are against a higher antiquity; language and the features of races are not for it; literature is doubtful; and whoever considers how vague dates are, both in Sanscrit matters, and in the kindred traditions of Persia, for which so high an antiquity has been claimed, but which can be traced no higher than Firdusi†, the poet of Mahmud, A. D. 1000, will probably agree with me in saying, that you have allowed Hindú chronology far too ample a range. If I had been arguing for you, indeed, I should rather have asked whether Buddhism itself be not a degenerate offshoot of a Nestorian form of Christianity. Nor would Chinese travellers, such as Fa Hian, deter me from this, because they say, as late as 412 A. D. that they found

\* B. III. c. 101.

† That Firdusi gives traditions of Vedic deities, transformed into fanciful history, is shewn by Mohl. See M. Müller's 'Results of the Persian Researches,' in Bunsen, *Phil. Un. Hist.* Vol. 1.



Buddhism prevalent in India. The testimony, however, of Fa Hian, when he finds Buddhism everywhere, and calls the Brahmans strangers in India, becomes of weight against the claims of the Brahmanical system to a remote antiquity. There is no proof that we ought to place either the development of that system earlier than Cumārila, (A. D. 700,) or the spread of the Arian race in India earlier than the dynasty of Cyrus in Persia. Nor would it surprise me, if their immigration about that period should turn out to be the vague foundation of fact, for what was afterwards expanded into the Great War of the sons of Pándu and Kuru."

Thus far Wolff stated his objections in a peremptory sort of manner, without noticing, perhaps, how much several of his hearers seemed to be disturbed by his discourse. When he had finished, however, Blancombe said, "It always appears to me, that whoever rejects exaggerated claims, should be careful to allow what is just in them; otherwise, he only falls into an opposite error. Thus, if we are bound to make large deductions from the swollen chronology of the Hindús, we should not the less admit their claims to a very early civilisation and a most interesting literature. In the first place, the origin of Buddhism can be fixed beyond reasonable doubt. Even the Christian saint, Clement of Alexandria\*, mentions the worship of Buddha within the second century of our era. Legends respecting him are appealed to as ancient by St Jerome†. The date of Asoca, in whose reign the Bauddha faith prevailed greatly, is not doubtful; for we have seen it fixed by inscriptions, and by the synchronism of Chandragupta. But when Buddhism began, Brahmanism had been before it; for the early Bauddha books are full of terms, such as *Brahmacharya* (*devotion*), borrowed‡ from the older ritual. Sákya himself had been the pupil of

\* Strom. i. If indeed he is not quoting the words of Megasthenes. Cf. *Frag.* XLIII. Schwanb.

† Hieron. c. Jovin. i. 44.

‡ E. Burnouf, *Buddhisme*, where the question of priority is well argued.

**Brahmans.** One of his most characteristic doctrines was a protest against the inexorable perpetuity of caste; which must therefore have been of far older date. This renders it unnecessary to examine what is pretended about the Greek authors not mentioning caste; though I think it clear that they do, for they speak of it as a thing of birth, or generation\*. The negro hair and features ascribed to Buddha seem to me most easily explained by the circumstance that his doctrine of the equality of souls tended to raise the earlier races, and hence he was considered their patron. Thus it was in the reign of Asoca, the grandson of a man of mixed blood, and who had been preceded by a Sudra dynasty, that the Bauddha faith became established at Palibothra. Thus too, the language† may naturally have been *Pali*; that is, not the language of a Brahmanical caste, though akin to Sanscrit, and not of any necessity prior to it; for rudeness is far from implying priority in linguistic development, but still the language of the lower classes, or of the people. If, however, as has been strangely suggested, Pali had been the language of the older races only, (whether they are to be called Dasyus or Nishádas‡,) it would never have been so nearly akin through Sanscrit§ to Persian and Zend, which are manifestly Arian tongues. All that shew of philology, therefore, goes for nothing. As to alphabets, I am willing to wait for more light on that difficulty: but there is no reason why alphabets should not have changed often, as we know they have in Europe, and even with the Jews, a people not easily given to change. We may admit that an air of uncertainty hangs over much of Sanscrit literature. Yet, certainly, it implies vast periods, not only of literary develop-

\* γένεας. Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* Sykes, p. 365. Schwanbeck, pp. 41—49.

† But Turnour, on the Mahawansa, may be compared with Lassen, B. II. pp. 490—493.

‡ Dasyus seems to me the Vedic term. Nishádas has been recently proposed in Bunsen's *Latest Researches, &c.* It seems taken from the Rámáyana.—Lassen, B. II. pp. 534—797, but may be older in a different sense.

§ Le Pali est dérivé du Sanscrit . . . . . il n'est pas besoin d'admettre l'influence d'aucun idiome étranger. Burnouf and Lassen, *Essai sur le Pali*, pp. 138—9. (Paris, 1826.)

ment, but of religious and social change. Things which are late in its course, are yet early, if tried by the history of many nations. The poets of the Augustan age in Latium mention the burning of Hindú widows; yet all this custom is a modern innovation upon the Vedas. The Periplus of Nearchus mentions the name of C. Comorin; and this comes from *Cumdri*, a name of Durgá; but her worship, (even if the Acharya will not let me say the same of her consort Siva,) is, if compared to the Vedas, quite modern. There has been an allusion to the expedition of Alexander. The Greek writers who describe either that, or the voyages subsequent to it, give glimpses of a picture of India, such as one might conjecture to follow not very remotely upon the laws of Manu. It is beyond fair doubt that they speak of caste, though not perhaps\* in its most rigid form. But over how many a generation must have extended the growth of that system, which Sákya, in the middle of the sixth century before Christ, found overshadowing the energies of human life! Then, again, we saw that his system had been partly borrowed, though with an infusion of a mystical glow of his own, from the Sánkhyā philosophy. But philosophy belongs not to the infancy of literature. Both Capila and Patanjali must come long after the Vyāsa of the Vedas. By reasoning of this kind we may certainly shew that Sanscrit literature is not a thing of a day's growth, whatever uncertainty may rest on portions of it. If our tests cannot always be minute, they become more so in proportion as our materials increase. If the Jesuits forged a Purāna, which they called a Veda, the forgery was found out; and if a higher date than ought to be is claimed for some to which we would not apply so harsh a name, the contents will often enable us to bring them down. But that the Aryan race had extended itself in India as early as a thousand years before Christ, is clearly demonstrated by the Hebrew Scriptures. For when we read of king Solomon's trade with Ophir (1st Kings ix. 26—28; x. 11, 12; 22, 23), we find the wares mentioned

\* Compare Elphinstone, Appendix, Vol. I.

are *algumim*, and *kophim*, and *tuchim*; but these are in effect\* Sanscrit words for sandal-wood, and apes, and peacocks. Therefore the speakers of Sanscrit had been settled in India long enough to organise a trade in the native wares of the country. Here is a strong confirmation from independent witnesses of the claims made by Hindús to at least a far older civilisation than the extreme school of sceptics is willing to allow. How much may be exaggerated in those claims, is a different question; and why the name of Vicramáditya is omitted in some genealogies, is for our Hindú friends to explain. But whether he is sufficiently fixed by the chronicle of the kings of Cashmir, which he is said to have conquered, or whether there is a possible confusion between him and the later Bhoja† king of the same name, we may here accept the date usually current for his era. Nor have I ventured to approach the earlier dynasties of kings otherwise than in a spirit of conjecture. But surely Ráma lived and conquered Ceylon, as even the great Epic of Valmiki, after allowance for its poetical form, may convince us. If he did not, some one did; and that other one may as well be called Ráma. There is nothing gained for true philosophy by approaching even dim traditions in a spirit of unreasonable scepticism. We have proved at least a Brahmanical period long prior to Buddhism; and both its duration and its features may be understood better by whoever will examine critically the various stages of Sanscrit literature. Our own business is to proceed with such an outline of chronology, as may serve for a scaffolding to the religious edifice we have yet to raise."

Vidyáchárya seemed to be rather re-assured by parts of Blancombe's speech; and Sadánanda, as before, asked how he proposed to proceed.

"I conceive," replied Blancombe, "we are sufficiently agreed as to the great landmarks of the stream from about the Christian

\* Lassen, *I. A. R.* II. p. 538.

† Compare Lassen, *B.* II. p. 409, and p. 760, with Weber, *Vorlesungen*, pp. 188—206.

era to our own time. We need not dispute nicely as to the date at which Scythians or Parthians curtailed the Greek influence in Bactria; nor does it concern us whether the pedigree of certain Jats and others about the Indus\* is to be traced to such invaders, or whether they are indigenous. But we accept the date 78 of the Christian era as famous from the overthrow of certain Scythians by Sáliváhana. We are agreed that the Mahometan arms under the Ommyade caliph Walid in A. D. 707 approached India. Sultan Mahmud in 1000, Zingis Khan in 1224, Timur-leng in 1398, Baber in 1526, Akbar in the same century, Aurungzeb towards the end of the next, the rise of the Sikhs about 1700, and Clive in 1757, are sufficiently known. We may now therefore construct a rude table with great landmarks of events, and afterwards fill in the literary epochs, so far as we are able to agree about them."

Here Blancombe took a piece of chalk and sketched out a picture of this sort, putting only a few figures at first, and then filling up the intervals with smaller ones. He began with the events, and only after the next stage in the discussion added the books; though I have copied them all together.

\* Elphinstone, *Hist. Ind.* Appendix, Vol. I.

# DATES B.C. OF EARLY INDIAN AND OTHER HISTORY, LITERATURE, &c.

Greek Church places Adam 5503, from no critical method, but need of time, and with Hellenistic concurrence, after Julius Africanus.  
 Ussher and Lloyd place Adam 4004, from Hebrew inferences.  
 Vaivaswata MANU, 4376??

PATRIARCHAL		Deluge, earlier than 2348; or else partial.	PERIOD.
Earliest known civilisation, Phœnician or Egyptian.			
Bunsen places Egyptian MENES 3626; more received date, about 2400.			
Period of dim Empires, Phœnician Commerce and Easterly Colonies.	2500—1500.		<i>Growth of Vedic</i>
Shepherd-kings in Egypt, 2100.		Medes in Babylon, 2234.	RAMA, 2100? (from Oude to Ceylon).
ABRAHAM, the Hebrew, with whom the history of his race begins,	1900.	Chedorlaomer, 1900.	<i>Songs.</i>
Mosaic Exodus, 1625, or 1490, or 1314?			Three Vedas, 1850.
Sesostris, and Raameses, 1400—1200?	<div> <div>Monumental evidence for distinctions of race, caste, trade, religion, conquest. Written implication much earlier.</div> <div></div> </div>		Great War, 1400—1200?
Eastern? settlers in Greece, 1500—1200?		New? Assyrian Empire, 1200.	Epic Poetry growing.
	<i>Earlier</i>		Brāhmanas, Sutras.
	Solomon's Temple, 1000. <i>Psalms written.</i>		Atharva-Veda, 1100—560.
HOMER, 1000—900.	Egyptian Shishac takes Jerusalem, 962.		

Hia dynasty in China, 2205.

# DATES B.C. OF EARLY INDIAN AND OTHER HISTORY, LITERATURE, &c.—*continued.*

History of Assyria, Media, Persia, Greece, Italy, } 800—700. clearer, yet legendary,	<i>Elder</i>	Manu's laws, 700 ?—500.
1st Olympiad, 776. Nabonassar's era, 747. Rome founded, 753 ?	<i>Zoroastrian-</i>	
Pharaoh Necho, his Phœnician sailors circumnavigate the globe, 616.	Deioces, 709.	
Empire of Pul, Shalmaneser, Sennacherib, ends ; } 606. Nineveh taken by Belshazzar, and Cyaxares, ( <i>one event</i> .)	<i>ism.</i>	Sāṅkhya philosophy.
Ionian Speculation. } Greek Republics } 600—500. developed, }		Growth of Speculation. Older Mimamsa ?
Pythagoras, 500. (or later ?)	Cyrus, 550.	BUDDHA'S death, 543. (1st Bauddha Council.)
Greek Tragedy, 500—400. Comedy later.	Egypt subject to Persia, 525.	Grammarians } 500—350 ? or Yaska, Panini, &c. } later.
Socrates* 400.	Alexander the Great, 336—323.	and Bauddha Council, 443.
Plato, Aristotle.	Seleucus, 312—305. (Megasthenes.)	Epic Poems <i>complete</i> , 200 ? or earlier.
		CHANDRAGUPTA, 305.
		ASOKA'S inscriptions, 259.

\* *Plato* mentions a Hindú visitor in Athens at this time.

**Maccabees, Asmoneans, 167—63.**  
**Septuagint Version, 300—150.**  
**Earlier Masora.**  
**Synagogue Meetings.**

**Easene ascetics.**  
**Alexandrine speculation.**

**Philo-Judæus.**

**Bactrian kingdom, 250—120?**

**BUDDHISM in Ceylon.**  
**„ in China, 217.**

**Spreads rapidly throughout India,**  
**Nepaul, Thibet, &c.**

**Parthian Power.**

**VICRAMADITYA, in Malwa, 56.**  
**earliest Drama??**

## CHRISTIAN ERA.

**Augustan Age.**

**GOOD NEWS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.**

**CRUCIFIXION, 29, 31.**

**Jerusalem destroyed, 70.**

**Rebellion of Barcochebas,**

**(an antichrist, or false Messiah,) } 135. Persian Ardeschid, and } 226.**  
**crushed by Hadrian. } New Zoroastrianism, }**

**Rabbinism and Literalism.**

**Spiritual Jews become Christians.**

**Later Masora.**

**Gupta kings on the Ganges.**

**Sassanian Dynasty, 226—651.**

**Patanjali. Yoga system?**

**Irenæus, 180. The Church widely spread; the Creed general;**  
**the Canon of N. T. Scripture nearly fixed.**

**Chinese embassy, 408.**

**Fa Hian's travels, 412.**

**Ammonius Saccas, 200.**  
**Origen, 200—246.**

**Andhra (kings?), 428—436?**

**Hiuan Thsang's travels, 630.**

**Scythians?**

**SÁLIVA'HANA, 78.**

**Principalities of Pandya and of Mad-  
ura, in the South.**



## CHRISTIAN ERA—continued.

S. Athanasius. Council of Nice. Constantine Emperor, 325, Ommyade Dynasty, 656—750. Rajput successes, 750.

Theodosius Emperor, 395. Theodoric, the Ostrogoth, 493. Bauddhas expelled, 760?

Age of Liturgies, fuller Creeds, Church development, } 350—450. Cumārila Bhatta. NEW POLYTHEISM.

and assimilation, SS. Ambrose, Chrysostom, } 350—450. Linga worship?

Jerome, Augustine, Haroun Alraschid, 800. Sancara, 800—900.

Charlemagne. Papal Power. Learning preserved dimly in Purānas, 800—1400?

Growth of Christian legend. Many corruptions of the Gospel; the Northern nations introducing superstitions, though unlearning their ferocity. mitigating feudalism, &c. Tantras. Śāktas?

The Crusades, 1095—1270. Mahmud of Ghazni, 1000. (Firdusi.) Bhoja Vicramāditya of Ujjayini, 1050.

The Mystics and Schoolmen, 1100—1400. Zingis Khan, 1206. Drama flourishing??

(S. Bernard and Abelard).

The Reformation, a revival of simpler Christianity, 1500—1600. Timurleng, 1398.

Luther. Henry VIII. Charles V. Baber, 1526. Rāmanuja, 1100.

As before the Reformation, Churches and Monasteries, so subsequently, Schools, Hospitals, equitable legislation, have Battle of Plassey, 1757. Akbar (in Malwa), 1578. Mādhwa, 1200.

attested the influence of Christianity in the world. East India Company, 1600. Kabīr, 1400?

Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1696. Aurungzeb, 1658—1707. Nānak Shah, 1490.

Slave Trade abolished, France, 1794. England, 1807. Warren Hastings, 1774—1785. Guru Govind, 1675.

Emancipation of Slaves in British Colonies, 1834. Battle of Assaye, 1803. Sikhs, 1606—1846.

Missionary Schwartz, 1750—1798.

Bishop Heber, 1824.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*Hindú Literature classified and found wanting.*

“Die Indische Literatur gilt allgemein für die älteste, von der wir schriftliche Dokumente besitzen, *und das mit recht*; die Gründe aber, die Man dafür bisher geltend gemacht hat, sind nicht die richtigen. \* \* \*

“Sind wir aus äusseren, geographischen, und inneren, religionsgeschichtlichen, Gründen berechtigt für die Indische Literatur ein hohes Alter anzunehmen, so steht es auf der andern Seite schlimm genug, wenn man nach chronologischen Daten für dieselbe sucht.”—WEBER, *Akademische Vorlesungen*. Berlin, 1842.

“WHERE now,” said Blancombe, turning to Vidyácharya, when he had gone some way with his table, “shall I put in the Vishnu Purána?” “The eighteen Puránas,” answered Vidyácharya, “are traced to the *Súta* (bard) Romaharshana, who received them from Vyása. Their name means *old*, and they are parts of our most ancient revelation.” “Then where shall I put the Vedas?” asked Blancombe. “They also,” replied A’charya, “were compiled by Vyása.” “Do you say the same of the laws of Manu?” “They were given by Brahmá to the first Manu (Swáyambhuvan), for the instruction of mankind; so that they are of the most venerable antiquity.” “But,” asked Blancombe, “does your account of the Puránas extend to such as the *Vayu*, *Vishnu*, *Bhagavat*, and *Matsya*?” “Certainly,” replied the other, “for it includes the whole eighteen.” “Then here is an enormous difficulty,” resumed Blancombe, “for let us look in the first place at the Vishnu. It professes in the outset to be taught by Parásara to Maitreya; but Maitreya is mentioned in the Mahábhárata as contemporary with Duryodhana, who is about the time of the Great War, therefore many centuries later than the primeval date you have been suggesting. This, however, is not all; for the four Puránas I have just mentioned give an account of Indian dynasties far down into the Christian era, as we have seen in the case of the Andhras. Your theory

is, that such things are prophecies. Nor do I deny that the Allwise God might, if he had so thought good, have inspired Vyása or Romaharshana\* to utter such predictions. But this minute sketching of history beforehand is not so ordinary in the course of the Divine government, that we can assume it to have taken place, unless the books which pretend it are remarkably well attested before the events come to pass. Can you quote any such testimonies to the Purānas, as they now stand?" "The name," answered the A'chārya, "is very ancient." "But we should want," resumed the other, "some precise verification of the identity of the books. Whereas, in fact, we have rather the contrary. For the celebrated grammarian, Amara Sinha, who was one of the nine gems in the court of Vicrama, defines a Purāna as a book of five topics, and then he mentions topics, such as imperfectly correspond to what are found in the works now called Purānas†. For they now consist of little beyond religious instruction, with some names of dynasties. How can we then assume them to have been written many centuries earlier than the dynasties which they mention? We are rather compelled by historical criticism to bring down the date of their composition. Nor is it necessarily wrong for us to do so, even according to your own doctors. For your treatises, I think, contain rules for discriminating between the *sruti* and the *smriti*, or between the earlier Scriptures and later traditions. It seems to be acknowledged in the Mīmānsā, that 'a mistake may be made, and the work of a human author may be erroneously received as part of a sacred book by those who are unacquainted with its true origin‡.' As to the Sri Bhāgavat Purāna, the story goes that Vyása gave it not to Romaharshana, but to Suka, his son. Does not this imply a difference of origin? Some Hindú scholars have gone so far as to ascribe its composition to Vopadeva, who lived A. D. 1200 or 1300. This may seem to you

\* A various writing of the same name is Lomaharshana.

† Colebrooke, Vol. I., and Wilson, Pref. V. P.

‡ Colebrooke, Vol. I. pp. 306, 307.

a very modern date: but when I remember that the *Brahmá Purána* celebrates the temples of Orissa, which were not built until 1300 A. D., while both this and the others which mention comparatively modern dynasties have no appearance of being the most recent in the body of the *Puránas*, I cannot help thinking you should reconsider your whole theory. Judging partly from what I have read, and still more from what is told me by men who have made your sacred literature their life-study, it seems to bear clear signs of falling into periods, divisible by great epochs of time. Even the language of the *Vedas* is different altogether from that of the *Puránas*. There are letters, words, grammatical inflexions\*, and idioms of speech in the one set of books, which are not in the other. Good scholars call the language of the *Vedas* prior to Sanscrit, rather than very Sanscrit. Still more evidently, the forms of faith, the objects of worship, and the range of ideas are different in the two. Nor is it only your sacred books, but Hindú literature in general, which carries marks on its face of having grown by steps, rather than sprung with unnatural impulse into life. Even the *Vedas* themselves have some variety. First, we have the *Mantras*, or hymns in honour of certain deities, who have been mentioned, destined probably to be sung at sacrifices. Then there are the *Bráhmaṇas*, i. e. (what we might call rubrics, or at least) ritualistic comments and directions. Probably the *Upanishads*, or episodical speculations, should be considered much later than the simpler hymns of the old nature-worship. Much later down will come a stage, (which must have been after a long interval) when all these things will require grammatical explanation; and, accordingly, the grammatical systems, first of Yaska, and later of Panini, will be developed. Again, some of your own traditions, and even the laws of Manu†, speak of three *Vedas*, and the *Atharvan* is not universally ranked so high as the other three. Scholars

\* Wilson, *Sanskrit Grammar and Lexicon*; Lassen, *I. A. B.* II. pp. 734—862; Weber, *Indische Studien*, and *Vorlesungen*, (quoted above); M. Müller, in Bunsen's *Latest Researches*.

† *Manu*, B. I. § 23.

who have compared it with the others critically\*, notice that its style is more formally liturgical. It no longer expresses the fresh burst of devotion, as of poetry, poured forth on the feeling into song; but it mutters ritual as a sort of charm, or formal incantation. Depend upon it, the *Vyása* (arranger) who arranged all such diverse elements under the head of the four Vedas, must have been not one man, but many; or else must be of a date far more recent than the hymns of the Rig-Veda. Good scholars think, they can even trace changes of place indicated in the hymns, as the Aryan race pushed forward its conquests into India. Hence they conclude, that the earlier kings of the solar race did not reign in Oude, but more to the North-west. It is sufficient for my purpose to make you notice, that the collection of books, which you call the Vedas, is not the work of a day, and not primeval. Nor do I ask you to believe this on my authority, but on that of your sacred books, which proclaim this of themselves. Ask the hymns of the Rig-Veda to tell you, if their authors were not older than those who altered them somewhat into the kindred hymns of the Yajúr-Vedas, and then of the Sáma, and still later, of the Atharvan. Ask them especially, whether they lived in the same land, or knew the same customs and laws, as either the legislator Manu, or the bards of the Mahábhárata.

“If we continue this sort of investigation, the question arises, where are we to place the great Epic poems? The Mahábhárata, again, has its Vyása; but it must be written later than the war it celebrates, and therefore much within twelve centuries of the Christian era. Again, it bears traces of having been traditionally recited. It has vast episodes of religious speculation and cosmogony; and it is exceedingly difficult to fancy that the *Bhagavadgita* was explained by Crishna to Arjuna in the intervals of a battle. This seems rather to be a highly imaginative mode of introducing in poetry some religious speculation. Nor is it easy to say, how far such introduction of matter comparatively modern

\* Lassen and Weber, as before.

may have been carried. But the narrative, or heroic portion of the poem, speaks a different spirit from that of the Vedas. It is not shepherd or priest hymning the genial influences of nature, but is the warrior caste putting forth their strength, and disputing in its consciousness the palm of priority with the intellect of the Brahman. Or rather, perhaps, we see the kings unwillingly accepting a yoke their fathers had not known, but which the Brahmans fastened first on their subjects, and then on themselves. The struggle of Viswamitra, as the soldier king, with Vasishtha, the ascetic Brahman, shews us Indian society fermenting, and not yet settled in its sad immobility of form. Yet, as a whole, the Mahábhárata is thought by good judges\* to be a more rounded composition, and to betray a greater development of the Brahmanical system than the older Rámáyana. The older poem is a simpler narrative of a legendary conquest, and has more of popular life, with signs of having been sung at feasts and sacrifices. You would tell me, it should be traced up to Válmíki, who is called contemporary with Ráma; but the interval of time must have been pretty long, for imagination to have magnified the heroes of the poem into a size which betokens the dimness of distance. When men are described as of superhuman size and prowess, and their exploits as the work of enchantment, and their enemies as now demons and now monkeys, this does not mean that the things were literally so, but that the describer sees them through a haze of distance and imagination. Speaking generally, however, we may say that the two great Epic Poems attest the growth of the Hindú mind out of a state in which the forces of Nature exercised a paramount influence over life, into one which had a fuller consciousness of human activity, and a series of struggles and developments, yet with the genius of the older time moulding the new.

\* There is some discrepance between the judgments of Lassen and Weber as to the two poems : but it is allowed that the Mahábhárata contains materials of very different ages, with more of formal speculation than the Rámáyana and less of popular legend.

“Something perhaps analogous may be said of the laws of Manu. It is very difficult to believe as literally correct, what you seemed to say of these laws having been given to the father of the human race, (and that too in a former Manwantara,) unless you meant it in a parable, that God wrote on the heart of mankind principles which should work themselves out into such a form. But as the book now stands, it bears clear marks of having been compiled much later than three out of the four Vedas. Its scene is in proper India, yet in the Northern part, with little knowledge of the Southern. The society which it sketches in the form of precept is more formally developed than that of the hymns. It shews more of king, and priest, and city, and fixed occupation. The entire system of caste has taken absolute form. You see also how this arose. Partly it depends on race; for the two higher castes, and in a less degree the third, are Aryas, as having sprung chiefly from the dominant invaders of India. The fourth consists of Súdras, their name being that of an indigenous tribe, which is described in the Mahábhárata as dark and small, and clothed in cotton. Again, the men below the four castes are Chándálas, and this seems the name of an indigenous race, whom the Greek geographer Ptolemy\* places near the Bhils of modern times. Partly again, caste comes of religious distinctions, for the upper castes are described as *twice-born*, or as having been initiated in religious privileges, and the characteristic of Brahmans is, that they know the Vedas†. Perhaps in the legislator's injunctions to marry only in certain families there is, joined with moral precaution, something of antipathy of race or sect. More distinctly, we see in the honours which kings are directed to confer on the Brahmans, the full-grown power of the religious caste. Whereas, an earlier stage in its growth is rather indicated in the Rámáyana by the bounty of

\* Σύδροι· Κάνδαλοι· Φυλλίται. Ptol. VII. i. 61—66; VI. 20—3; *Manu*, x. 15; Lassen, B. II. pp. 799—820.

† The passages referred to are found in *Manu*, B. I. 23, 31, 88; II. 17, 38, 62, 249; III. 145; VII. 37—136; VIII. 110; IX. 87; X. 1—16, 20, 45—108; XI. 51—60, 78, 85, 265, 266; V. 30—39.

Dasaratha to the same persons, and by their mode of receiving it. Again, the Deities of Manu are neither for the most part the Vedic, nor yet those of the Puránas. He speaks comparatively little of all the elementary agencies, which make the bulk of the elder divinities, but more of Naráyana or of Brahmá, who in the later portions of the Vedas is by a personifying generalisation made the Supreme Ruler; nor does he mention Vishnu, either in the subordinate sense of the Vedas, or in the magnified form of later times; nor yet Siva, who, at the time of the earlier Bauddha Sútras, was held in honour; still less the later deifications or incarnations, such as those of Ráma and Crishna, which are the favourites of the Puránas. If now you consider that such change of language is the mirror of changes in society, which must have been long in coming about, you will understand why the laws of Manu belong to a period long after the earliest Vedic hymns, though before the rise of Buddhism.

“Our friend Sadánanda is so critical, that he will readily enter into what I will offer conjecturally about Capila. There is in the Sánkhyā philosophy an acknowledgment of the might of Nature, which might well enough spring out of the Vedic worship. But the abstract tone of the philosopher’s speculation, and his way of reducing the deities into natural forces, is unlike the simple fervour of the old devotional song. We must blame Capila for not having substituted any clear conception of an overruling mind; but we must acknowledge he had reason for taking away that worship of blind elements which the older faith involved. Perhaps it was his mission, as a rationalist, to work out freedom for the human mind from undue subjection either to the material world, or to that elaborate system of the religious caste, which had become a superstition to some, and a policy to others. Thus he paved the way for Sákya, who added devotion to speculation, and extended to masses of men that freedom which Capila had given only to the few. Since however the faith of Sákya must have been to many a painful revolution, there would arise men desirous of a scientific freedom,



yet anxious to reconcile it with the orthodox religion. This seems to have been attempted by Patanjali the grammarian, who lived some time after Pánini, and therefore later than Sákya. The interval then between the two stages of the Sánkhyā philosophy comprises the rise of Buddhism. Later than these, though I dare not fix a precise date for it, must have been that orthodox wisdom, which the venerable A'chārya represents. For though attempts to explain the purpose of the Vedas may have begun early, and some of them may have been called the earlier Mimāṃsā, yet they evidently received an impulse from the opposition of less approved systems. The very phrase *A-dwaita* (non-duality) implies that the distinction between spirit and matter had been taught by others; and some elements in the A'chārya's system are traced by himself to Sancara. Nor should I wonder if some of them are even later. But Sancara lived not earlier than 800 or 900 A. D. How different this newer Vedāntine system is from the older Vedic worship, we have partly seen, and shall see farther. But all this stage of philosophical development occupies a middle ground of vast extent between the old poetical faith, and the new burst which gives the religion of India another form, as evident in the Purānas. It is in nearly the same middle region that we are to place the rise and fall of the Bauddha faith in India. Only there is this difference; a religious creed is so antagonistic to its rival creed, that we can fix definitely its date; whereas tendencies of thought may be at work when unacknowledged, and stretch over into their opposites, so as to be hardly disentangled. Thus the philosophical spirit may have anticipated its fuller consciousness by certain portions of the Epic poems, as well as interpolated episodes in the later of the two; and again it reaches on into the Pauranic stage, both giving a meaning to the legends, and suffering itself to be fancifully transformed in them. Again, as the philosophical sects supply the middle ground in speculation, so do the Epic Poems in both heroic legend and physical parable, between the hymns of the old Vedic ritual, and the modern mythology of the Purānas.

“ But we must not let our collateral inquiry overshadow our great object, which is now beginning to clear before me. I have been trying to familiarize you with the notion that Hindú literature has great epochs. If any portion of it is Divine, its Divinity does not depend upon its having come bodily from the mouth of Brahmá, nor upon its having been given to Manu by Brahmá; nor must you fancy that books, removed from each other by diverse customs and generations, were all arranged by one Vyása. This vast tree of Indian thought has put out a succession of branches in many ages. Nor would I venture to fix all the steps of its growth. But even in the sacred Vedas we saw signs, that whatever power inspired them must have extended its influence over no little time. And if some of the hymns attest occupation of the valley of the Ganges, while others go back to that of the Punjaub, and if Ráma be the great Áryan overrunner of India, then the age of Ráma will be a probable centre for the period over which we may suppose the growth of the hymns to have ranged. As, then, we have already placed Ráma about 2000 years B.C., we may imagine the devotional feelings of the Áryas to have been taking shape in the Vedic songs from about 2500 B.C. to about 1500. Some such theory is also confirmed by the astronomical notices in the collected books. For the Vedas contain a calendar, with the old Indian circle of five years. In this the ratio of solar and lunar time is given. The zodiac is divided into twenty-seven asterisms, beginning with the Pleiades. The solstitial points are reckoned to be at the beginning of the constellation Dhanisht'há, and in the middle of Asleshá; and this, according to astronomers, was the case in the fourteenth century before Christ\*. The three earlier Vedas therefore were arranged by some Vyása about 1400 B.C., and although this date may be more recent

\* Colebrooke, Vol. I. p. 106, states this argument on astronomical grounds : and Lassen, B. II. Vol. I. pp. 739, 747, seems not altogether to reject it ; but Weber (to whom the Indian astronomy appears borrowed from the Greeks) gives it up, as based on calculations backward. I cannot judge of its value, but think its correspondence with general data justifies its retention.

than you are prepared for, yet it falls in with the results of fair criticism, whether you look at the probabilities of our historical conjectures, or at the positive evidence of the stars, as implied in the books themselves. There is an interval of perhaps 2800 years from the Vyása of the Vedas to him of the Puránas. For the latter can hardly, after what we have said of the Brahmá Purána, and of the Sri Bhágavat, be placed before 1400 A. D.

“If you are now prepared to entertain the idea of growth in your literature, we may here consider two great results which come out with a review of the whole subject. The first result is, that Indian life has not, as is often thought, been fixed in immutable form from the beginning. See, how this comes out in a general review. The earliest hymns of the Rig-Veda shew us the Hindú not yet having earned his name by long dwelling on the Indus, but in the country of the Five Rivers, worshipping all the skyey influences, hailing the dawn in song, and personifying the dark cloud which withholds, as well as the blue heaven which liberates, the rain. His deities are *Devas*, the bright elements, which seem to bless him. He has not yet built temples, nor bowed down to idols, nor become the instrument of priests, nor does he fancy anything of the transmigration of souls, nor probably of the incarnation of deities, nor has he yet suffered the brotherhood of mankind to be outraged by division into castes. Nor again does he make the pitiless demand for widows to be burned. It is very remarkable that none of these things are originally Vedic. Whether the horse-sacrifice (*aswamedha*) was merely symbolical, as your commentators say, or whether the later symbol represents an earlier usage, of perhaps Persian or even Tartar origin, I will not determine. But at least sacrifices were common enough, and the flesh of them\* might be eaten; so that the modern horror of eating flesh can hardly have existed. So far the earliest Hindú we read of had rather the advantage of his descendants. On the other hand, his hymns shew no deep feeling of the moral evil of

\* So, even in *Manu*, sacrifices may be eaten, but meat otherwise not. v. 23—34.

sin, nor reverence for the deities as moral governors. Some have fancied that they can trace in the Vedas vestiges of an earlier belief in one supreme God\*. But no texts have yet been shewn me, belonging to the earliest stage, which bear clearly such meaning. On the contrary, physical nature seems to present the objects of worship, and animal nature to suggest the prayers. Man seems as yet the first among animals worshipping the elements. By degrees, however, the shaping mind modifies its impressions into an unity; and a deeper sense appears of the mystery which underlies the agencies of nature, with a feeling after some spirit which formed them. It is chiefly in the *Upanishads*, so far as I have observed, that this tendency develops itself; therefore not in the earliest time. Thoughts, however, of *Ātman* the great Soul, or Self, or Person, without whom it is as unnatural to conceive the world, as a human body without a mind, may have had many indistinct utterances before they grew into such reasoned poems, as that about *Vách* which you quoted to me. There seems also to have broken off from the A'ryas, while yet in the country of the Five Rivers, a section which carried westward some Vedic traditions, and ripened them in Bactria, or Persia, into the Zoroastrian lore. This remigration must not be confused with the original advent of the A'ryan race from Irán, still less must the ebb be made to account for the earlier flow. In the mouth, however, of Zarathustra, the mere nature-worship took a deeper tone, and spoke of strife no longer between cloud and sky, but between evil and good, or the malignant serpent and the Son of Heaven. Thus he divorced, in a way, mankind from physical nature, and brought out a deeper moral consciousness, with both its sense of suffering, and its manlier struggle. Whereas with the true Hindús remained longer, and almost remains still, something of the old childhood, which felt itself cradled in the elements of

\* Colebrooke, *Essays*, Vol. 1.; M. Nève, *Essai sur le mythe des Ribhavas*, Paris, 1847. The striking hymn about *Ātman* belongs to the 10th book, "*in einem der spätesten hymnen*," says Lassen.

the world and only asked their bounty, looking on it almost as a right. I need not stay to trace nicely how many hymns of the Rig-Veda reappear in both the Yajurs, and again in the Sáma, or how they are somewhat modified. But in the Bráhma-manas we have the signs of a priesthood or caste arranging and explaining the songs which were already ancient; and this tendency is said to reach a more elaborate formalism in the Sútras. Before the Atharva or fourth Veda had been compiled, the Áryas must have spread into India. It speaks more directly of the aboriginal races, among whom it mentions the Súdras\* as hostile. It has words which are said to betray symptoms of *Prácrit*, or at least of the older language already assimilating itself to indigenous idioms. It gives prayers, no longer as natural effusions of the religious feeling, but as formal charms against sickness. It deals more, in its episodes, with metaphysical questions, as about death and the spiritual world. It is the expression, in short, of a religious revolution, which already the Brahmanical caste was conducting. We may estimate both its comparatively recent date, and yet the antiquity of Manu, from remembering that the legislator recognises only three Vedas, though it is possible the fourth may already have been framed. Some also find in the Atharvan astronomical signs† of B.C. 1100, rather than 1400, but these I will not venture to argue from.

“When we pass on to the laws of Manu what a stride the Brahmanical system has made! The *puróhita*, who merely presided on great occasions of sacrifice, is now an hereditary priest. The families of singers, to whom early hymns were ascribed, are now sacerdotal clans. The Brahmans, who are not named as such in the earlier *mantras*, are now an exclusive caste. The Súdras, who in the earliest Veda were not known, and in the latest were enemies, are now the lowest class. The Dasyus, once hostile, have become vassals. The term *Vaisya*,

\* Roth, quoted in Weber, Vol. I. pp. 142, 143.

† Lassen, p. 745, but compare Weber, pp. 224—227.

which once meant *earthly*, or human, (so that *Vispati* might mean king in general) is now applied to mere cultivators; and these are partly, no doubt, the indigenous possessors of the soil. The mere tribes of A'ryan shepherds are grown into organised nations. The king must no longer sacrifice, but give presents to the Bráhmans. The character of Teacher is brought forward as having especial claim to reverence. The religious bath and the sacred cord are made important. Though sacrifices are still eaten, the rules for general diet are more precise. Oblations to the spirits of ancestors seem to be a new custom. The military art has been developed, and the use of elephants, chariots, cavalry, as well as archers and swordsmen, is described. Cities, and the mode of besieging them, are alluded to. The prices of markets are to be regulated. Many of the regulations are good enough, but the punishments are not always in proportion to the true character of acts. There is an excessive stress on the sanctity of the highest caste, and severe penalties for whatever tends to lessen it. There is an attempt, in short, to arrest society, and fix it in a mould, chiefly of priesthood and partly of race; while such minuteness of regulation in common actions may be natural for a speculator to devise, but has never been found wholesome in practical life. Here and there, too, appear allusions to Viswamitra, and, perhaps, others who vindicated the kingly freedom for a time, though the fatal victory, in the struggle, was, to their own cost, with the Brahmins.

“ Yet, however different the polity sketched in the *Mánava-dharma-sástra* may be from that of the earliest time, I would not affirm that it has no prefigurement in the *Sútras*, which have been mentioned as appended to the Vedic hymns. It has been noticed, that the same names are given as authorities for some of the *Sútras*, and of the Laws. The tendencies of the one find their fulfilment in the other. But this only affects the question, where the difference begins.

“ What now must have happened between the two social stages we have glanced at? We should guess at once some

such course of event and imagination as is described or implied in the two great Epics. We are, in fact, able to infer from these poems a career of conquest on part of the A'ryan race, however far the Rámáyana may be, as some conceive, from the time of its hero, and however scanty a nucleus of history may be involved in its fable. We see in them the clash of races, the older of which are represented in fantastic forms\*. We have the hermit life of the Brahmans beginning in the wild forests, where they must have been pioneers of civilisation. We have the conflict of king and priest, already spoken of. We have the rise of new heroes, whose memories are likely to be famous, though we should hardly have foreseen how entirely some of their names would take the place of the older divinities, as objects of worship. Perhaps in the oldest, and truly heroic part of the Mahábhárata, Crishna is not yet represented as an incarnation of Vishnu; just as, when his name is mentioned in the Vedic Brahmanas, it is only as that of a man who needed himself to be instructed by Ghóra†, a descendant of Angiras. We have, however, in the two great Epics, forecasts not merely of Manu, but of the Puránas. Nor is it easy to say how much in the form of episode and speculation is of later insertion. Nor, again, does it follow, because the Epics portray that long ferment of the Indian mind, which settled down in the polity of Manu, that therefore the poems themselves were written before the laws. As regards their fullest form, we must rather suppose the contrary. In the episode of Nala, for example, we have four Vedas mentioned, instead of three, as in Manu. But I have said enough to shew the significance of the Epic poems for our present point of vast developments in the Hindú mind, and must leave more learned persons to fix dates in a region so uncertain, that while your traditions make Válmíki a contemporary of Ráma, 2000 B. C.,

\* Ráma's conflict is with Rácshasas, or demon people, whose king, Rávana, has ten heads; and with monkeys, whose king's name is Báli. He crosses to Ceylon by a bridge. His earlier adventures have a tinge as if of the Odyssey.

† Colebrooke, Vol. II. p. 197.



some critics would bring down the authorship of his poem to almost the Christian era. If one must offer a conjecture, there is some reason for fancying that the Mahābhārata in its shortest form expresses the poetical youth of the people, soon after the consolidation of their settlements in India, while the Rāmāyana ought, from the date of its subject, to be older. As a special argument that this is so, we have the fact that in the Rāmāyana widows not only survive, but reign as queens; whereas in the Mahābhārata the fatal *Sati*, or immolation by fire, unknown in earlier ages, has already begun. But again good critics have ventured to bring down the Mahābhārata to the first reaction of the popular mind against Buddhism, such as we may suppose to have existed partially just before the Christian era; and they place the other poem even later, as fancying that the spread of A'ryan civilisation to the extreme South was later. If we knew for certain, what the first Bauddha missionaries or princes found in Ceylon, we could estimate this argument better.

“But if I can only give as doubtful the earlier date for the Epic poems, still less would one fix the Drama in point of time. We see clearly that it must have been subsequent to the Epics; for its subjects are sometimes taken from them, and its language is more modern. But the mere question, whether the court at which Kālidāsa flourished is that of Vicramāditya at Malwa 56 B.C., or that of another prince at Ujjiyini, nearly a thousand years later, shews the uncertainty of most things in Indian literature. Here also comes in the suspicion, which Dr Wolff has suggested, of the Hindú Drama's having profited by hearsay of Grecian models; and this is possible, whichever chronology we prefer.

“The mere literary question has carried me for a moment from what was more important. Just as in the Brāhmanas, or rubrics\* of the Vedas, and in the Sūtras, which are their supplement, we have the first footsteps of the later Brahmanism, so

\* The Hebrew *titles* to the Psalms, and the early Rabbinical comments, might serve as a rough parallel to the Brāhmanas.



in these and in the Upanishads, we have the beginnings of speculation. It is the office of reason in religion, to question the religious instincts as to their meaning, and so to restrain their wanderings, by directing them ever to the highest object. Unhappily, it has often been more skilful in criticising the imperfect, than in substituting a more excellent way. Yet we must not deny its real services. At one time it disengages the religious sentiment from irrelevant theories which, on the side of intellect, encumbered it. For example, it does not allow men to make their faith in God depend upon those conceptions of the mode of His working, which may at any time have been imperfect. Thus the views of earthly science, by which a sense of heavenly things is accompanied, may at any time be disengaged from what is more essential. Your great astronomer Bhāscara rightly teaches, that ‘in mathematical science holy tradition is authority so far only as it agrees with demonstration;’ and ‘accordingly this mathematical science has no end in eternal time\*.’ But still more important is the service to religion which reason renders by bringing out its ethical element, or by associating the glow of devotion with the sense of duty to man. It comes of human weakness, that because God controls our destiny, we are tempted to make our service of him a flattery; or, in milder cases we become so absorbed in the need of faith and devotion, that we lay too little stress on moral righteousness. Forgive me, if I say, that in the religious history of India, as of other countries, we find too many instances of the religious instincts thus absorbing the duty of right. But reason, which cannot be sound, unless it comprehends in itself that feeling of an eternal law which we term conscience, sees that God is not so bribed, for that the highest might must be in righteousness, and hence it purifies the impulses of religion, by sifting whatever had been merely emotional in their operation, and sets our duty to man ever by the side of our faith in the unseen God. Take an instance of this from your own Mīmāṃsā.

\* Colebrooke, Vol. II. pp. 380—381.

When its thoughtful framers reasoned of true righteousness, they felt unable to approve of those incantations to hurt the life of an enemy, which appear in your older religious books. Hence, although such practices have what is deemed Vedic authority, they are yet rightly forbidden by the *Mīmāṃsā*. Perhaps another instance may be found even in the *Purushamedha*. For that this was not always symbolical, seems to me proved by the hymn of *Sunah-sephas*\* in the *Rig-Veda*, as well as by the legend of his having been bound for sacrifice. Probably there was a time when the dread of an overruling Divinity made your ancestors shed even human blood; but as the conscience or reason of men under Divine guidance awoke to its full function, such a misjudgment of the religious impulse was set aside, and the rite turned into a symbol. Some such purifying process was perhaps intended by *Capila*. But as our weakness rarely attains in each man that great harmony which perhaps the eternal *Iswara* rejoices in seeing maintained on the whole by the partial jarrings of mankind, so *Capila* obscured the Deity by Nature. His successor *Patanjali* attempted to restore the religious balance, but went so far on the other side, that he obscured the reason, and fell into a devotional mysticism, which is called the *Yóga*. In such cases Nature revenges herself by suffering a quietude of the nerves, which is animal rather than spiritual, to obscure the vision which boasts of seeing direct into heaven. Nor under such a system can the mind of man attain its full stature, however specious may be its show of more rapt devotion. For our Maker has intended us to strive and contrive, as well as to pray. Of the later philosophical schools of logic, or of physical atoms, I need only say, that I should be glad to see you employ their processes in education. For the more reason is trained by method and observation, the better will she be able to judge, if her heart be pure, of the more directly religious revelation which the supreme *Iswara* gives us of Himself.

\* See *Vishnu Purána*, pp. 404, 405. It is also referred to in *Manu*.

“It might have been hoped that the Vedántists, either earlier or later, would work out a better harmony of faith and reason. But if your school did on the one hand the work of the Vedas by maintaining their authority, you did on the other that of the speculators by explaining the purpose of the Vedas in such a way as to be hardly reconcilable with the original text. Those psalms of a physical nature-worship were never conceived upon a theory that nature is only the play of the Universal Spirit manifesting its energies. What indeed can be less likely to give men a spiritual faith, than the practice of hymning Fire, and Sun, and the Winds? There is something pretty in making Agni, or Fire in its different forms, either as Sun, or Heat, or Flame, a sort of Priest of the Gods in the universal temple of Nature; but then, who are the Gods to whom he ministers? We want some clear spiritual Being, such as the earlier hymns at least do not clearly shew, who shall be superior to all these agencies; and these which are properly ministering, should not be made themselves the supreme objects of worship, as they apparently are in the hymns. Again, when your theory has embodied the Spirit in Nature, so as to take away the just contra-position of creature and Creator, prayer and its Hearer, mankind and his Judge, there is no more room for priest, as there is no worship except a Divine self-contemplation. If men like Angiras and Sákalya had foreseen your theory, they would not have sung or arranged hymns to Ushas and Agni. What your school originally meant, I suppose, was to dissociate the Deity from all fetters of time and place and matter, until they got themselves confused, as I tried to shew above. But here I want you to notice the greatness of their departure from the Vedic text. This is so wide, that your relation to the text is only in name rather than in effect, much more friendly than that of Sákya. You have alike that profound sense of the transitoriness of things earthly, which has come of later speculation, rather than of the Vedas. You believe alike in the transmigration of souls, of which they say not a word; and

even if your return of the soul to ineffable union with the primal Spirit can be speculatively distinguished from the Bauddha *nirvāṇa* which it resembles, at least neither of them is Vedic. I say nothing yet of apotheosis, or incarnation, or of the names of deities.

“If now we turn to Sákya, we see that he was willing to proceed some way in the old path of the Brahmans. He was evidently their pupil, and his early speculations have the Hindú cast of gentleness, a vague vastness, and asceticism. But he seems to have learnt that lesson, which has so often come to religious men elsewhere, that external restraints are rather a nursery for the soul, than the proper atmosphere for it to breathe; thus that asceticism beyond temperate limits is neither a virtue, nor even wholesome; while, if human life is bound in the fetters of minute ordinances by a dominant caste, neither true religion nor happiness flourish in such loss of freedom. Thus he became in the strongest sense a reformer, yet partly a mystic, as well as democrat in religion. It is no wonder that masses of men crowded eagerly to a teaching which had life and emancipation. Rather, I think, whenever Almighty God in any country raises up such teachers by way of reaction against spiritual bondage, he will always win them hearing in proportion to the need of them. But it may be feared that Sákya, in refining away (as the Sánkhyasts had done before him) some popular notions of Deity, did not hold fast enough his sense of the everliving God as moral Judge of the world. He felt life and spirit, but saw not clearly Him in whom they are, and by whom they stand. There seems however some uncertainty about Sákya's own faith in this respect. But it is very sad to observe, how soon after his death his doctrine grew into a system as elaborately formal as that which it had superseded. Many of the priests, we are told, in king Asoca's time, came over to the faith. They soon made it something of a priestcraft. Then came the many legends, which probably are accretions upon a simpler truth of the life of Sákya. Then relics were worshipped,

and Buddhism grew into what it is. If you, my friend"—here Blancombe turned to the Saugata—"wish to defend it, you can best do so by starting it afresh after the mind of its founder. Its strength was then in that freedom, which is now what you have least of. And as for your friends\*, who are not firm, as some think Sákya was not, in the belief of a God who governs the world, their faith is not worth keeping, except as a partial protest against something possibly distorted in a different direction. If Buddhism be really hollow on this point, we can understand its fading out of India after about a thousand years of establishment. We can also imagine that the zeal of the Brahmans, represented perhaps by Cumánila Bhatta, may have stimulated reaction; and the people themselves may have wished for the old traditions which were more knit up with Indian history. They may even have thought the new Bauddha priesthood more exclusive than the old caste of the Brahmans.

"At any rate, Buddhism seems to have disappeared from the greater part of India about the seventh century of the Christian era. Then comes that new period of Hindúism which has as its expression in literature the Puránas. This is the age of Cumánila, of Sankara A'chárya, and somewhat later, of Mádhwa, and of Ramanuja. I have hitherto dwelt chiefly on those developments which come of speculation modifying worship. But by their side was also the popular feeling, which found voice in legend and poetry, as in the Epics already glanced at. From such sources will now come new objects of worship, and the old Vedic deities will tend to disappear. Long ago their first stage had been gone. Agni and Ushas and the Maruts had given way to Brahmá as the representative of a more intelligent conception of the creative power coming out of nothing less than Spirit. Indra had been degraded from his apparent supremacy; and Vishnu, who in the Vedas is merely subordinate, had either

\* See above, p. 24, for the distinction of the Nepaulese and the Cingalese Buddhists, the first being thought to have a firmer belief in the Divine self-consciousness and government.

from admixture of races, or from the clinging of the popular sentiment to his name understood in a higher relation, been lifted into a place hardly second to the highest. By the time of Buddhism also Siva had become recognised as one of the three great Deities. Both Vishnu and Siva seem admitted to equal rank with Brahmá, from a sort of compromise on part of the Brahmans with the popular feeling, which perhaps hardly rose to the more abstract conception of the Creator, or refused to abandon names more native. These three, however, with their wives, Saraswati, Sri or Laksmi, and Durgá or Káli, stood long at the head of the Hindú Pantheon, and make the second great stage in the development of your religion. They compose, I presume, the *Trimurti*, which ill-instructed persons have represented as if it were the Christian Trinity, whereas the conceptions, beyond the coincidence of mere number, are very different. How Siva can be termed the same as Rudra, except in so far as conceptions of the god of the storm, with those of Agni as the god of fire, may have been taken up into the more metaphysical conception of the Destroyer and the Restorer, I cannot understand. Nor is Vishnu the preserver the same, except in name, as the sun-god of the older hymns. The theory of his *avatars*, or incarnations, is as novel as his change of rank, or more so. You allow this, do you not?" here he asked Vidyáchárya. "Why no," answered the other, "for the strides of Vishnu across the earth are mentioned in the Rig-Veda, and this must refer to the Avatar as a dwarf; and again in the Yajur-Veda Vishnu is mentioned in the form of a boar, which is the Varáha Avatar\*." "But how far," resumed Blanche, "do these things go towards establishing what you suppose? If we consider the Pauranic legend of Vishnu's stepping, we find that he stepped only twice, there being no room left for a third stride: whereas in the Veda it is said, *Thrice* did Vishnu stride. The legend may have grown out of the text, but it involves a different conception. The Veda probably

\* See *Vishnu Purána*, end of ch. i. ch. iv. and *Preface*, Colebrooke, Vol. I.

refers to the three stages of the sun, as it rises, culminates, and sets; whereas the Pauranic story sets forth in a parable the omnipresence of the Deity. So the Yajur-Veda text of Vishnu as *Viswa-karman* appearing in the form of a boar, seems to indicate the elevation of the earth physically out of water, or into space, and may have been also applied to the extrication of the world from evil; but in neither case did the text mean a gross incorporation of the Deity in a boar. There is a confusion constantly recurrent in India between the meaning mystically conveyed in certain stories, and the grossest acceptation of their literal sense. So the enthronement of Indra in the Veda was meant, I presume, as an allegory, though hard to explain; but many of your countrymen take such things in the grossness of the letter. So the traditions of Vedic Deities which I mentioned as carried westward in early times, were twisted in Bactria into stories of earthly kings, and your Yama, the god of death, appears in Firdusi as king Jemshid, and the serpent *Ahi*, once the dark cloud, as the tyrant Zohak\*. Thus in India, too, the old physical parable was sometimes exalted into a more metaphysical conception, and sometimes literalised into a marvellous story.

“On the whole, I think we are justified in saying that no clear signs of incarnation (or of the *avatars*) had appeared in the genuine Vedic hymns. This idea came in rather with the Epic poems. When the great exploits of Rāma and Crishna were to be accounted for, it was natural to suppose that some Divine force dwelt in them. Upon the question whether such force was truly Divine, or was magnified by imagination, will depend the farther question, whether such *avatars* are only a deification of what was properly human, or whether there was a real indwelling of Deity. With such questions is connected too your theory which identifies the human soul and the Divine Spirit, or blends God and mankind into one. Our own faith, and I think also any true humility, would forbid accepting all

\* Lassen, *I. A.* p. 517. Weber, *Vorles.* p. 36.

that you have said on that subject; but I would willingly explain it as obscurely meaning the great nearness of the Father of our spirits to all those who approach him in prayer, together with the true feeling, that every human excellence comes in a way of the Spirit of God. But however your incarnations are to be explained, their belief comes in with the period of the Epic poems, and associates itself with Ráma, and with Crishna. These, you now hold, were manifestations of Vishnu. Yet it was long before this theory made such way as practically to encroach upon the honours of the three great Deities.

“Perhaps in the reaction against Buddhism the more human heroes, as taking hold of human passions, were brought more vividly forward. Perhaps again the defenders of Brahmanism felt the theory of incarnation necessary to present some continuity in a system which had been so changed. In the time of the Puránas, however, which may range from about A.D. 700 to A.D. 1400, this new Hindúism develops itself. One of its differences from the older religion is the stress it lays upon Divine grace\* and faith, and this may possibly come of indirectly Christian influence. Or again, it may be a native growth in the progress of religious zeal, and have been somewhat stimulated by the rivalries of sects. In either case, we can only allow it to be wholesome in so far as it is joined with purity of heart, and recognises the Almighty for a righteous Governor, as well as for the Giver of all good gifts to body and soul. Its working, as a doctrine, must be less pure from the sectarian rivalry with which it is mixed. For amidst all the emulation between the worshippers of Ráma or Crishna, or those who choose Vishnu or Siva by preference for honour, a passionate devotion to either name seems exalted above that upright life and clear conscience, which are chiefly acceptable to

\* See the close of Wilson on Hindú sects, and Colebrooke's account of the later Vedánta; and for the *possibility* (hardly more) of Christian influence, Lassen, Vol. II. p. 1099.



God. This tendency appears even in the Vishnu Purána, and I am told also in others. Much more, I suppose, it must come out in the *Tantras*, or the devotional books of impure sects. But of such facts you can judge better than I can. It is, however, indisputably clear, that many features of the third period of Hindúism are not at all to its advantage. You would hardly defend idolatry, though your metaphysics have been abused to palliate it. Yet it is now the common practice. Temples need not in themselves be blamed ; yet they are probably an innovation upon earlier practice ; and as the earlier Brahmans did not use them, no one need wonder that the Bauddha temples are amongst the oldest we find. The worship of the Vedas was chiefly domestic. The reverence for the *Linga* is also modern. Far older, because it is mentioned in Manu, but probably not Vedic, is the custom of sacrificing to the *Pitris*, the progenitors of the human race. On the other hand, Brahmá, once the great Deity of the most educated caste, has receded into the background. Whether Vishnu or Siva should take his place is so disputed that six Puránas pronounce for the one, and six for the other. But neither of them enjoy such popular acceptance as the human heroes, who are termed manifestations of them. On the whole, the modern worship is more sensual, more sectarian, more idolatrous, and has a greater multitude of divinities, for whose worship there seems little reason in your oldest books, and which must turn men's minds away from the living Spirit. Nor perhaps is it altogether accidental, that the Hindú Drama, with its Prácrit speech and occasional licentiousness, has its fullest growth in the time of this New Hindúism, just as the Epics are nearer to the middle stage of the three great dcities, and the earliest Vedas represent the simple nature-worship of old time. Yet by the side of the now popular idolatry, I readily admit there has been a great development of metaphysical or mystical speculation, and I only wish that it had been used by Sancara to reform rather than palliate popular errors, or that it might be so employed by yourself now. It is not wonderful

that such men as *Kabir* should subsequently have made attempts at a spiritual reform, whether some of his ideas were borrowed from Christian sources, or whether they were entirely native. The sober distinctions of *Mádhwa* between the Divine and the human spirit are also in some respects worthy of being considered.

“But now, the great variety we have seen in the three stages of *Hindúism* leads me to the second result, which I wish to urge upon you. What has become of the positive communication from Heaven, which you laid so much stress upon? The vast differences we have now seen, forbid us to believe that the books which embody them came forth simultaneously from the mouth of *Brahmá*, or were arranged by one *Vyása*. The entire system, consisting of parts so different, and developed in successive ages, cannot all have a primeval authority, or one immediately Divine.” When *Blancombe* had got thus far, the *A'charya* said nothing, but the *Saugata* threw in this kind of speech. “You have proved thoroughly,” he said, “that the whole of the *Hindú Sástras* has not been from the beginning, and thereby you have justified *Buddha* in rejecting them. But you have not shewn, that the religion may not be Divine, or that it had not a true germ in the earliest time, which may have grown up into something more perfect, whether the perfection is the doctrine of *Buddha*, or, as others would say, some modern form of *Hindúism*. For, as you have allowed intelligence to reside in man, and as you term the Deity intelligent, why should not He, on your own theory, speak from time to time to that in us which is most kindred to Himself, rather than to the outward organs by speech? Or, from our point of view, why should not the human intelligence have grown up in expansion, and the truth have been developed in mankind? The term *Revelation*, I suppose, will as properly apply to this latter process as to any more external one. For this may, even better than any other, be an uncovering of Divine truth to our minds.”

“Your questions,” replied *Blancombe*, “are very ingenious. Nor would I deny that Divine Revelation may be by spiritual

development, rather than by sensible signs. It might be a teaching by experience, as well as by prediction; and by steps of growth, rather than by discontinuous leap. But if this is so, there must be a connexion in the steps of growing, so that an unity of idea may be discerned, at least afterwards, to have presided over the process. Again, the changes forward must be for the better, and not for the worse. As life has decay, so religion may have degeneracy: or it may have wild and fantastic offshoots. Your own worship seems to have degenerated from that of Sákya, and that of the Hindús in general to have taken many irregular shapes. These are wanderings, rather than developments. However true, then, may possibly be your suggestion, as applicable to what is really growth, it has no clear place in apology for a scheme like that of Hindúism. For here, when we reach the latest stage, we find the worship more idolatrous than in the earlier, instead of more spiritual; and the speculation more extravagant, instead of more defined. Or even if in some things the Hindú intellect has outgrown signs of childhood, yet on our friend the A'chárya's own principles, I may ask him whether his religion is in the Vedas or in the Puránas? If it is in both, how does he reconcile them? If it is in the older, why does he sanction the later? Or even amongst the later class, how can he reconcile the books which exhort to worship Vishnu, with those which prefer Siva?"

"But," said the A'chárya, "I have already explained, after Sancara, that it is of little importance which deity we prefer as representative of the primal and ineffable Spirit, which is the true object of worship. Again, as to supposed discrepancies between the Puránas and the Vedas, we are enjoined by Sancara, in such a case, to prefer the Vedas. They are our oldest, and our emphatically sacred books." "My dear friend," here resumed Blancombe, "I wish you would then, so far as your own intelligence permits, return in such things to the Vedas. For, I suppose, after speaking of that clear Spirit, which foresees and governs all things, you would hardly worship the winds and the

flame, or the dawn. But will you persuade your countrymen to rise above the use of idols? They are not authorised by the Vedas. Are you prepared to give up *caste*? That is not originally Vedic. Still less is any such limitation of priesthood, as would confine it to a clan. I will not ask as to the *Sati*, or burning of widows by fire, for it is happily abolished; but how many lives might have been sooner saved, if your Pandits had dealt frankly with our Government, and confessed that in the Vedas no such thing is enjoined; and that even in *Manu*\* the only *Sati* spoken of is a widowhood spent in pious austerity. Since also incarnation is not in the Vedas, will you reconsider its principle so far as to beware of deifying any unworthy object? The idea may somewhere have its fulfilment; but yet your reasoning presentiment of it should not be rashly applied to inadequate representatives of the Divinest Thought. The A'charya will not readily allow that the distinctness of immortal souls is taught in the Vedas, though some have thought so; but if it should be found there, will he accept it? In short, will you all start from the Vedas, so far as to discard any evil in your later religion, which they are found not to sanction, and yet superadd those deeper thoughts of eternal and spiritual things, which perhaps by some inward development are being revealed to you from time to time? Then, I almost hope, you would not be far from the kingdom of God.

“Now consider this. There are chiefly two kinds of proof possible for a religion as Divine. One is external authority; the other, inward excellence. This latter may perhaps have a spiritual authority of its own in the form of persuasion. But the first, as regards Hindúism, has been found utterly to break down. For obviously it requires history as its vehicle; but in history, native India eminently fails. You can hardly fix any early date or person, without help from more accurate observers. But where there is no sure history, still less can there be argument from prophecy, in the sense of prediction, which very

\* *Manu*, v. 160.

many persons consider also necessary to the external authority of a religion, and which, I think, you seem rather to claim. Just as little can miracles (or such wonderful displays of Divine power as confer authority) be brought into argument, where facts have not been carefully observed, and habitually recorded without exaggeration. All ground therefore for that positive belief of yours in the external authority of Hindúism, as being revealed with sufficient sanctions to overbear all human reasoning, has vanished from under your feet. Nor has it merely vanished, but its very opposite has come up in our critical proofs of Hindúism having gone through many stages, and been subject to all the accidents of human development. If your religion is to be defended, it must be on very different ground from that of its external guarantees, or the immutable authority of the Sástras.

“ But there may remain the second possibility of inherent goodness. Indeed, I think, God has made it so natural for men to pray to Him, and the manifold pleadings of His Providence, or of His Holy Spirit, so encompass us on every side, that any mode of approaching Him must be better than none. But yet He may in His unsearchable wisdom have taught mankind a more excellent way. Suppose now, that I wished to become a Hindú, or, which is more nearly the case, that I wish you to help me in lifting up that mass of your simple countrymen, whom we see whelmed in ignorance, what would you recommend out of your religion, as means of improvement? We have in England books of all sorts and sizes, which we give to the children of all ranks, after teaching them to read. Which of your Sástras should we distribute in that manner? Would the history of Ráma be improving? Not, if my impression of it, with its legends of monkeys and Rácshasas be correct. Still less would that of Crishna, with the stories of his playing with the Gopis, and holding up the mountain as an umbrella. Nor even out of the Vedas do I think that many hymns could be extracted, which would awaken men's moral nature, and teach

them to lead a righteous and sober life. There are certainly pretty hymns enough about Ushas, and about the liberation of the rain; and I remember some to Brahmanaspati, whose title as the hearer of prayer, pleases me. But how little a way would these things go towards building up the inner stature of the spiritual man! As to the invocations of the natural elements in general, I fear they would injure rather than improve. They would increase that tendency to a sensuous worship, and that forgetfulness of moral government, which some of your countrymen are prone enough to. Nor probably, would you, more than myself, wish to hear them invoking again Agni and the Maruts, any more than to see them bowing down to idols. The most hopeful part of your literature would be the laws of Manu. But these are not the most directly religious books; and although wholesome precepts might be extracted from them, a very large part of the code is now impracticable, and not even attempted. Nor would such portions of it as we could use go far in the way we wish for education. Again, in some of the Purānas, I grant that very grand descriptions may be found of the spiritual nature of the highest Deity, and that metaphysical thought may be quickened by them. But all these are so mixed up with transparent fable, so confused in their own associations, if even they have not the graver fault of a pantheistic mysticism which effects the opposite of what it intended, that I fear little use could be made of them. Nor should I know which of the rival Purānas to recommend. Nor is it so little a thing as you suppose, for contending deities to be thus brought forward. Surely, if the true and only wise God has given us in any way a revelation of Himself, He cannot have left it doubtful, whether the strange legends of Siva, or Vishnu, or Crishna, give the truest picture of Him. Rather, I think that when the holiest truth comes forth among men, all imperfect forms of it will droop their heads to our mind's eye by the Divine original, even as Nala in the poem appeared faint and earthly by the side of the deities uncovering themselves. If we saw God as most worthily He

might shew Himself, we should no longer think patiently of Him as incarnate in boar or dwarf, nor readily involve doctrines in such guise of parable, lest men be degraded by taking it literally. Least of all can such strange passages as you quoted me out of the *Linga Purána* be put forth wholesomely as lessons for the young, or lights to the simple.

“Now if I am right in believing that Hindú literature has a dearth of things we could use to improve men, and if this literary dearth be but an index to a want in the religion; and if, as we have already seen, education, morality, and spiritual religion require training throughout India, while your subtle metaphysics are impotent as means of moral restoration, what conclusion, my dear friend, must we arrive at? Surely this religion of yours cannot, in its present form at least, be destined to fulfil the prediction of the *Sri Bhágavat*, which speaks of all nations coming to one faith; but there must remain something better, which God has yet in store for you. The older way may in His manifold providence have been permitted as a sort of training; it may have many fragments of truth; it may have disciplined your minds into that contemplative wisdom, which should enable you to apprehend something at once higher and simpler. Nor would I blame you for following such light as you have been brought up in, until something kindred, but better, shall have been given you. But yet I would willingly shew you a more excellent way.”

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#### NOTE ON CHAPTER VIII.

Most of the data in this and the preceding Chapter are due to Englishmen; but the application of philosophical criticism to them is, I am sorry to say, chiefly German. Nothing can more shew the strength of German scholarship, than that it should have beaten us on what ought to be our own ground. The Anglo-Indian who came nearest to it in his comprehensive genius, was Sir William Jones; but

in his time the facts were less known than now. In the great work of Lassen the entire literature of the subject is surveyed in mass and in detail. The more recent lectures of Weber (1852) have a clearness hardly to be expected, and that scholar's instinct, which is in its kind an inspiration. He brings down portions of Indian literature to a lower date than Lassen, but leaves the earlier Vedic hymns a remote antiquity. Nor is it likely that either the early hymns, when duly discriminated, or the period of the first Aryan settlements, will in that respect be ever much brought down. Portions of the Epic poems, the laws of Manu, and the drama, are much less clearly fixed.

My citations from Colebrooke and Wilson shew that I am indebted to them for substantial aid ; as in some degree to Turnour. My obligations to the late very eminent scholar, E. Burnouf, have been already mentioned. Some tracts by Roth reached me too late to be of direct service.

The following is a fair specimen of the Rig-Veda, as translated by H. H. Wilson :—

1. May auspicious works, unmolested, unimpeded, and subversive of foes, come to us from every quarter—may the Gods, turning not away from us, but protecting us day by day, be ever with us for our advancement.

2. May the benevolent favour of the gods be ours ; may the bounty of the gods, ever approving of the upright, light upon us—may we obtain the friendship of the gods, and may the gods extend our days to longevity.

3. We invoke them with an ancient text, Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, Asridh, Aryaman, Varuna, Soma, the Aswins, and may the gracious Saraswati grant us happiness.

4. May the wind waft to us grateful medicament ; may mother earth, may father heaven, convey it to us ; may the stones, that press out the Soma juice, and cause pleasure, bring it us ; Aswins, who are to be meditated upon, hear our prayer.

5. We invoke that lord of living beings, that protector of things immovable, Indra, who is to be propitiated by pious rites, for our protection ; as Pushan has ever been our defender, so may he continue.

6. May Indra, who listens to much praise, guard our welfare ; may Pushan, who knows all things, guard our welfare ; may the son of *Priksha* (*morning*), with irresistible weapons, guard our welfare. . . . .

8. Let us hear, gods, with our ears, what is good ; objects of sacrifices, let us see with our eyes what is good ; let us, engaged in your praise, enjoy with firm limb and sound frame, the term of life granted by the gods.

9. Since one hundred years were appointed, interpose not, gods, in the midst of our passing existence, by inflicting weakness, so that our sons become our sires. —*Sūkta*, 89.



## CHAPTER IX.

*Hebrew History and Christianity.*

“Produce your cause, saith the Lord; bring forth your strong reasons, saith the King of Jacob. Let them bring them forth, and shew us what shall happen: let them shew the former things, what they be, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them; or declare us things for to come.”—ISAIAH xli. 21, 22.

“Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel, and his redeemer the Lord of hosts; I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God. And who, as I, shall call, and shall declare it, and set it in order for me, since I appointed the ancient people? and the things that are coming, and shall come, let them shew unto them. Fear ye not, neither be afraid: have not I told thee from that time, and have declared it? ye are even my witnesses. Is there a God beside me? yea, there is no God; I know not any.”—*Id.* xliv. 6—8.

“I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.”—*Id.* xlv. 7.

“For thus saith the Lord that created the heavens; God himself that formed the earth and made it; he hath established it, he created it not in vain, he formed it to be inhabited: I am the Lord; and there is none else. I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth: I said not unto the seed of Jacob, Seek ye me in vain: I the Lord speak righteousness, I declare things that are right. Assemble yourselves and come; draw near together, ye that are escaped of the nations: they have no knowledge that set up the wood of their graven image, and pray unto a god that cannot save. Tell ye, and bring them near; yea, let them take counsel together: who hath declared this from ancient time? who hath told it from that time? have not I the Lord? and there is no God else beside me; a just God and a Saviour; there is none beside me. Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is none else. I have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, That unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear. Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength: even to him shall men come; and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed.”—*Id.* xlv. 18—24.

“BUT what sort of persuasives to a religion would you give us,” here, after a little pause, Sadánanda asked, “or what would you require to be the substance of the thing itself?” “Why, many things,” answered Blancombe, “may appear persuasive to each of us from early training, and from association of our affections with things which might have been otherwise: but if we are to find such an exemplification of Divine truth in history

as may recommend it to the nations at large, or such a fulfilment of the best prophecies of our conscience as shall win the willing allegiance of mankind, we must go farther to look for it. Nor do I think it difficult to conceive something more manifestly Divine in its fulness than anything yet spoken of.

“ Suppose, that, before the Brahmanical tribes left the land of the Five Rivers, there had been prophecies among them that it was their mission to overrun India, and their duty to keep alive certain truths in that country; but that, failing in this duty, they would give place in time to more faithful teachers of the highest Right, yet that God would still use them as witnesses or instruments in His kingdom,—suppose, I say, this, or, more directly, imagine a Rishi of the Vedic age saying, ‘ You shall inhabit Oude, and shall spread from the five rivers to the isles of the southern sea; but you will change the glory of the unseen God into images of things that perish; so you will forfeit in His counsels the rule of the country He is about to give you; there shall come a people whose wings shall spread to the wind, and with the wheels of their chariots in the great deep; they shall crouch like a lion in the cities you will have builded, and go forth like a young lion over the land you have yet to win,’—imagine, I say, predictions of this kind handed down in your most ancient books, and re-echoed or deepened by great teachers of righteousness, who might arise from time to time, and see more vividly the shadows of events to come, in proportion as moral decay or religious hollowness both provoked and caused evil result—; we should at least, I think, examine such a history carefully. Then, if the principles involved in it appeared broadly true, not only for India, but for all lands, so that by using them as a key we could better unlock the mystery of the world’s story, and awaken in ourselves thoughts which should go forth into wholesome deeds for our own souls or for our country, we should conclude, here is a divine lesson, worthy of all study. Nor would the significance of such a lesson be destroyed by particular questions about its mode or form. Some

might think that the predictions had been more external, and direct, or by distinct foresight of particular events. Others might conceive them to have arisen rather through the forces of experience and conscience; say, to have been suggested in part by observation of what the Almighty had done before, or to have been foreboded by a feeling of the righteousness which must run through the eternal counsels; and so to be bound up with a faith in the unseen, with a moral instinct, and with a trust in the Allholy; yet by no means therefore to be dissociated from earthly affections, or even from misconceptions as to the events and persons through which the eternal truth should find its way to fulfilment. Such differences of view as to the ancient predictions need not, I say, destroy their moral significance, which might even come out more strongly with the second view than with the first. Again, if a great lesson of Divine providence were taught us in the way I have imagined, we should not be at all disturbed by errors of human agency, or even by shortcomings in the sacred records through which the lesson was derived to us. We should not care whether India was rightly described as having nine *dwipas* (circles) and seven chains of mountains, or whether it had more or less. For we could conceive such things indifferent to goodness of life, and the knowledge of them left to natural means; while, again, the more important truths of justice and mercy and soberness would find an echo from that which is holiest within us; and this internal witness would not be easily persuaded that the things most vital to itself depended on external accidents, or that the great Author of our holiest thoughts could ever be found a liar. Such dissociation of the eternal truth from its temporal or written vehicle, would be still more justified, in proportion as the sacred record should all along put the Divine wisdom above its human disciples, and make the diviner breathing of godliness a thing but slightly connected with pride or even strength of intellect. Only of course there must be a ruling forethought in the history, and a true or blessed result arrived at in its course; otherwise there

would be no lesson taught by it. Do you understand what I have been saying?" "Certainly I do," answered Sadánanda.

"You are familiar," resumed Blancombe, "with the Parsís of Bombay. They are descended from the Persians who took refuge in India when the first flood of Mahometanism swept over their country. They retain their ancient faith and its symbols, with books and rites, which however they hardly understand. Again, you may have heard of the gipsies, a people of Hindú affinity, who seem to have been displaced in some of the commotions which attended the conquests of Zingis Khan, or of Timur, and who, finding the nations of the West too firmly settled to make room for them, have wandered through Europe, with no fixed home. They are probably the latest instance of the old tendency of nations to migrate from the East; but time and place did not allow them to find room. But there is another people, of whom specimens may be found in India, though perhaps you know less of them. They have an ancient faith, and books of their own, like the Parsís; and they are for the most part wanderers, with no national home, like the gipsies: I mean now the Jews, or descendants of the ancient Hebrews. They often adopt customs either natural to the countries in which they dwell, or forced upon them by the necessities of trade, and its ingrained habits. In so far, however, as they remain true to their ancient genius, they have a faith embodied in sacred books, which they call the Law, the Prophets, and the Scriptures, and which are grouped together as the Old Testament. In these books is a history of this kind. About nineteen centuries before Christ, there was a Hebrew, named Abraham, who became divinely impressed with the evils of idolatry, and of all impurity in worship or in life. The only true and eternal God spake to him in whatever way God who is Spirit can speak to man encompassed with flesh and blood, and bade him leave a land of unholy rites, and go forth in hope, though it were to dwell as a pilgrim among strangers, promising to be with him and his seed. 'Fear not, Abraham,

said the Lord, I am thy shield, and exceeding great reward.' Accordingly Abraham obeyed, his heart and conscience, I suppose, witnessing to him that the pure service of God was better than any earthly gain; and this faith of his in shaking off lower attractions, where the love of a holy God or any duty might be against them, is a sort of model, after which true men in all ages should shape themselves. By doing so they partake the mind of Abraham, and may be called mentally his children, whether they are of his blood or not. Nor need we doubt, that since the true God is eternal, therefore such promises as He made to Abraham must for ever come true in fit measure to whoever in love of things unseen, or in faithfulness to the call of duty, vanquishes any temptation to do wrong. First, however, the promise was to be made good to the natural heirs of Abraham's body, so far as they came within the mental condition of it. Therefore, according to the history, God by wonderful methods brought them out of bondage in Egypt, and gave them the land of Canaan, just as He gave India to the Aryan tribes. Out of the power of the tyrant Pharaoh, through the sea and through the wilderness, across the river Jordan, and through many enemies, God led the victorious ranks of the people, who had been slaves, into cities which they had not builded, and gave them the fields to till, over which their ancestors had wandered as strangers with their tents. Such a deliverance and triumph would naturally take strong hold of the imagination of the people, and accordingly became the theme of many famous songs, which were both expressions of the feeling of the nation, and chants in honour of the God who had preserved it. For to the Israelites\* was given the true feeling that nothing happened to them by chance, but that the God who doeth wondrous things had in His eternal counsels brought about what they seemed to win by sword or spear, and that His name must be honoured among them in truth.

\* The name *Hebrews* seems to mark the race; *Israel* the people in its religious aspect, and *Jacob* nearly synonymous, but less usual. *Jewish* meant properly belonging to the kingdom of Judah.

“ But the Giver of our lives is also their Master and their Judge. So in raising up Moses as a deliverer of the Israelites, God made him also their lawgiver. In the famous law of Moses are some things taken from that wisdom of the Egyptians\* in which Moses was learned; there are some merely temporary, and regulations of ritual or convenience; but there are also wrapt up in the precepts unchangeable truths, such as should enter into the life of every man, and the law of every nation. These main truths are chiefly in the Ten Commandments, of which I shall speak hereafter. There are also appointed sacrifices of animals, not as the most perfect or final mode of worship, but partly as witnesses that all life is the gift of God, and that its service is due to Him in whatever way He may please to employ it; partly as symbols of devout penitence, by which the offerer should express his contrition for sin, and acknowledge his own life to be forfeit, if God were severe to exact the uttermost; and again, some sacrifices were mere expressions of joyful thanksgiving, and might be eaten both in homage to the Giver of all good things, and in participation both with the priests as ministers of God, and with the poor who might have need. There are also in the law of Moses many purifying rites, such as Hindús should readily understand, intended to take away any stain, or rather, as I should say, to express and keep alive a mental carefulness both as to holiness and cleanliness. Throughout the law there runs a constant acknowledgment of the Eternal God as the source of all right: and many duties to the poor†, to the slave, to the vanquished, the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, are taught in His Name. The neighbour's beast must not be suffered to lie under his burthen without helping him. The harvest is not to be reaped without some sparing for the poor gleaner. No Israelite's land must be bought away from him, still less must he remain a slave for ever. Even

\* Acts vii. 22 : Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*. Spenser, *De Legibus Hebræorum*.

† Exodus xxiii. 1—12 : Leviticus xii. 12 ; xix. 9, 10 : Deuteronomy xv. 1—15 ; xxii. 1—7.

the stranger must have no injustice done him. The land of the enemy is not to have its fruit-trees wantonly injured. The bird, sitting over its young, must be spared for its affection and for its offspring's sake. Nor is any fear of man to make faint the feeling of that Divine presence which mirrors itself to our conscience as the Right, and which ever pervades with a kind of awe any congregation of true men.

“You can readily understand how men who apprehended vividly the principles involved in such regulations, would be trained by them to a righteous life: whereas, if men neither loved the thing intended, nor felt it strongly, they would take refuge from it in a formal observance of the letter; and by degrees might think there was no reason for the letter beyond the mere will of an imposing power. Thus the true spirit of the thing might fade away from among them. The law would become an external restraint, dreaded for its penalties, or for the power which imposed it, but no longer an expression of blessed truths, nor an instrument of awakening the soul of man to a true sight of things Divine. Especially this evil would grow, if the priests or teachers of the law, who ought to have known themselves its instruments, should become its masters, and lay stress chiefly on whatever nourished their wealth or power, while they neglected the weightier matters of justice and mercy. Something of this kind happened among the ancient Hebrews; but you should read it described in the Bible. The people yielded to all those temptations which surround men from flesh and sense and ignorance; and the priests, whose lip should have kept knowledge for them, turned their eyes only to ritual expiations, and taught a fierce zeal for the name\*, or the temple\*, or the book† of Jehovah, or even for the nominal sanctity of the people of Israel†, while they did not awaken them to do justly, and to love mercy.

\* Jeremiah v. 30, 31; vii. 4—10: Hosea vi. 6—9.

† Jeremiah viii. 8: Psalm l. 16: St John vii. 49: St Luke iv. 27, 28: Acts xxii. 21, 22.

“ But as in other nations we have already noticed that it is the mission of conscientious reason to prevent worship from losing morality, so especially in Israel we find great teachers of righteousness raised up, whose work was kindred, but more direct than that of such sages elsewhere. These are the Hebrew prophets and sweet singers of the temple, who might be compared roughly to your Rishis, or partly to the authors of the Vedic hymns, and partly to your religious reformers. It was the mission of these men to rouse in their countrymen a deeper sense of the eternal meaning of the law, or of that spirit which the letter was intended to realise. Thus on the one hand, they cry aloud against the sins of king and people, and on the other, they bring deeper remedies than the selfish policy or stupid formalism of the priests could devise. For these prophets are themselves full of that eternal Spirit of God, which breathes in some measure through every well-meant effort to realise righteousness on earth. Thus while they refer men to a study of the law, they express also its life in fresh forms of their own. They lay less stress on its external ceremonies, but they cry out for that which it expresses, even a conformity of mind, and by consequence, of life, to the unwritten Word which stands fast in the counsel of God. Thus temporary accidents fade from their thought; customs become changeable; outward ceremonies have their value only from the feeling which they embody, though in this feeling may be comprehended obedience as well as love; and in short, the sacrifices of God become the contrite spirit, the trustful heart, or the love going forth in righteousness to man. Only, as all things durable must be by method and order, so to the prophets the solemn services of the temple are dear, and the ancient words of the law retain sacredness: but the living mind of man is ever turned by them from resting in such things to the unseen harmony which lies behind them, to the shaping Will of God, and to the willing obedience of the entire man as dwelling in that presence apprehended by the mind.



“Certainly as events come not without Divine Providence, so neither do utterances like those of the Hebrew prophets come without the moving of the Divine Spirit, although its movement may be grandly general, and through links of order in the world of spirit, even as His visible works are regulated by law throughout the world. You would not be able to read such books as that of Isaiah, and of the Psalms, and then to consider calmly over what a number of generations this solemn utterance of prophecy extends, without concluding for yourselves that an eternal Providence has thus given the world an evolution of Truth. You would catch, as it were, a contagion of like spirit from studying such words, and enter into an unity of fellowship with the holy breathing which animates them.

“But, if lessons of the Judge of the whole earth are given in vain, there comes thus an undesigned disorder into His scheme of governing, and with disorder through human fault comes suffering, such as we call punishment. For man being once free to choose, if he chooses wrongly, must take suffering. Thus, as the prophets spoke mostly in vain, the predications of Truth became predictions of evil to men who rejected them. From time to time therefore the earnest command, ‘Do justly, and love mercy,’ becomes joined with cries of mourning and woe. Already in the law of Moses\*, though I know not whether in the earliest part of it, there had been a promise to the people, that God would raise up prophets of truth among them; and it had been threatened, that, if they followed sensuous diviners, or juggling teachers of evil, instead of the teacher of spiritual truth, they should perish from off the good land given them. There had also been solemn warning†, that if the iniquity of the people became extreme, God would raise up conquerors against them; even ‘nations from the end of the earth, swift as the eagle flieth, and nations of fierce countenance, who should besiege their cities, and make an end’ of their realm. These sort of warnings reappear in the books of the prophets, and

\* Deuteronomy xviii. 15—18—22.

† Ibid. xxviii. 48—59.

become deeper from time to time. So that, on the whole, the burthen of Hebrew prophecy is an utterance of profound spiritual truth, a condemnation of the people to whom it is spoken, and a prediction of their being scattered over the face of the earth.

“But this is not all. For, by the side of warnings of evil, we find a clear foresight that the cause of good, which is that of God, must triumph in the end. Though man is perverse, yet his shortsightedness must not defeat an eternal predestination of the good of his race. Although therefore individuals may cut themselves out of the kingdom by unfitness for it, the Divine kingdom of truth and holiness and right must go on fulfilling itself in the earth. Even therefore if the Israelites by blood should fall away, God will work out for himself an Israel\* of the mind, in whose heart the old sayings of His righteousness shall find an echo, and bear fruit in their lives. It is true the prophets speak mostly as Hebrews, and they naturally rejoice in hoping the Divine kingdom may come out chiefly in connexion with their own race. Their tone is national as well as religious. But they foresee clearly that no accidents of blood or place will interfere with a perfect fulfilment of the thought which the Divine Governor is bringing to pass in mankind. Thus they foresee that many things will pass away. Their kings then rejoiced in war: but the prophets look forward to a triumph of peace. Their temple was, according to the Scripture, a place of sacrificing beasts; but they foresee a time when the consecration of man’s heart (which the other only symbolised) will be held far better. Nay, while they foretell that their own people will be scattered† throughout the nations of the world, yet the nations who afflict Israel will not themselves escape, but in whatever degree they resemble her sin they will partake her punishment‡, with the aggravation of

\* Isaiah xlix. 5, 6: St Luke iii. 8: St John i. 12, 13: Romans iii. 12—18.

† Deuteronomy xxviii. 64: 1 Kings viii. 46—49: Jeremiah v. 15—19: Ezekiel xxii. xxiii.

‡ Ezekiel xxv—xxxii.

having their haughtiness humbled. For all violence and wrongdoing must make way for a moral kingdom, which through the lapse of generations shall go on perfecting itself. However unlikely it may seem that all these nations of Ammon, Moab, Assyria, Tyre, Elam, should fall, they will all be swept away before a better order of things. However strange might seem a king, without pomp of chariot or sword, there shall arise a King, representing the majesty of God, but reigning in meekness, and swaying men purely by a dominion of holiness and goodness. Strange things seem to be spoken of this King, who appears as a servant of God, and even as a servant of men. He is rejected, smitten, counted a sinner; all men turn their face from Him; yet to Him all nations shall come; He shall mould a new Israel, nay, a new heaven and earth; for so different will be the qualities He will require of His subjects from the warlike pride now held in honour, that the world will renovate itself under His sceptre. The change will be like that of all wild and poisonous things becoming harmless; swords shall be beaten into ploughshares; the dominion owned by men will be not that of Force, but of Thought and Right; old things will pass away alike as regards evil, and the external remedies of law applied to it; the meaning of the law must be apprehended in men's consciences, or written on their hearts; the sensuous visible kingdom and priesthood will give way to that of the unseen King, the spiritual priest, and God will make all things new\*.

Such are the sayings of the Hebrew prophets, which are collected in the Book I wish you to study for yourselves. Now their descendants carry with them everywhere the Book, and hold it in honour. They believe for the most part its history, and acknowledge that their fathers sinned, and were cut off from their land. So far there is no room for dispute. For these Hebrew books have now been in the hands not only of the Jews, but of their bitterest enemies, for more than 2000 years,

\* *Psalms* xlv. lxxii. lxxxix: *Isaiah* liii. xi. xxv. xxxiii.: *Jeremiah* xxiii. xxxi.

and no one supposes that any part of them was written later than a full century and a half before the Christian era, at latest. The earlier parts can be traced up to a far more remote antiquity. It is also agreed, that the Roman Titus utterly destroyed the great city of the Jews, A.D. 70, and that the emperor Hadrian extirpated them from Palestine in A.D. 135. And as the Jews acknowledge what is written of their past history, even when it tells against themselves, so they generally look forward to a fulfilment of the happier promises in their prophecies. But, in so far as they hold the stricter religious view of their race, they connect this hope of fulfilment with much of that external and formal view which belonged to their ancestors' observance of the law. There may, indeed, be differences among them. But the Jewish view, to describe it generically, seems to be a notion that Israel still means the descendants by blood of Abraham. If then Israel is to enjoy the Divine favour, this means to them a restoration of their race to their own land. If their law is to be observed, this ought in consistency to mean that the temple will be rebuilt, and the fat of rams smoke on its altars. The King, too, ought to be of the race of David, and to have a temporal throne in Jerusalem. Now I dare not set bounds to the counsels of the Almighty, or to the possibility of a national instinct fulfilling itself by His permission. But, you see, all this kind of expectation has a local and national air; it dwells on outward circumstances rather than on such deeper truths as the Father of our spirits and the equal Judge of all may be supposed to embody in his designs; it belongs, in short, to that cast of mind, which valued formal observance of the Mosaic law, rather than penetrated the depth of the human conscience and the truths of sanctity or righteousness which the Eternal by His Holy Spirit writes within it. May I not say, such a hope is of the earth, earthy? it does not pass within the veil of forecasting thought and of sanctifying truth; hence men who so read their ancient scriptures with a dim feeling of the life embodied in them, may be said to have a veil before their minds.

At least, for eighteen centuries the Jews have more or less cherished this local and national or sensuous hope, with no apparent sign of its coming to pass. And although God forbid we should speak harshly of men who by suffering and by fidelity to their own principles deserve our respect, while many noble spirits\* among them have risen above the faults of their race, yet I may fairly argue that they carry in the Bible which they value their own condemnation. For by restricting themselves to the national and the literal, they do violence to the deeper element which it contains. Hence their Rabbins have become proverbial for playing formally with words and texts. Their national exclusiveness also (not to speak here of the wrong persecutions which have deepened it) would somewhat harden them to the broader humanity, which considers all men the children of God. But especially we may argue, if their narrow and exclusive view of their ancient prophecies be right, then their hope has failed. Here, however, is the wonderful spectacle of a people homeless, yet boasting a land as the Divine gift; and carrying with them everywhere a Book, the spirit of which condemns them now, as they acknowledge that its history records their punishment of old. I do not however wish to make you blame the Jews, who have their own Master in Heaven, but to study these ancient writings for which they are witnesses.

“But now notice this. By the side of the Jews has arisen in the world a religion appealing to their books, but giving a new interpretation of them. That ancient law of Moses must be owned to have stood much in outward precept, and by the very minuteness of its ordinances tended to fetter the human conscience, and so to overlay the perception of deeper truths, which requires a certain freedom for its play. There is now a faith

\* Many a Jew may be a truer follower of Christ than formal and literal Christians; and whenever “the mind of Christ” is realised in them, there St Paul’s inversion of the old blessing of Jew and Gentile will apply now to Christian and Jew: see Romans ii. 26—29. A little book called “A few Words to the Jews, by one of themselves” (London, 1855), seems as if its author read the Old Testament by the light of the New.

in the world, which acknowledges a holy meaning in the Mosaic law, but lays its mental grasp upon the very principles of righteousness, reverence, purity, and contrition, which were expressed in that law in a form suited to the infancy of Man, rather than upon the outward adaptation of these things in the letter. It fully acknowledges the religion of the Israelites to have been divine in its inner mind, yet affirms that the Jews are wrong in now clinging to its outward letter. Incidentally, indeed, we Christians who hold this newer faith, affirm the Israelites of old to have fallen often from the mere letter; as for instance, they were guilty in some stages of their history of idolatry, and in others were betrayed into the common sins of men, which were aggravated by express command against them. But more especially, we say the Jews have never risen to a full conception of the ultimate tendency of their system in the Divine design. They think there was some especial favour intended to their race, either for the merit of their ancestor Abraham, or from Divine election. We say they were elected only as instruments in carrying out a great drama for the good of all nations, who are alike dear to the Father of all. This purpose of God, we argue, was veiled from the elder Hebrews in the natural course of things, but it came to light in the fuller unveiling of His own love which the Eternal God has by spiritual development or by fresh communication since given to us. They dwell with natural fondness on visible displays of the Divine power in leading them wonderfully out of bondage, and through enemies, and rivers, and seas, into a promised land. We think that wonderful as may be the Providence of God in outward act, yet it is far more marvellous in things of the mind. The inheritance for which we look to Him is rather the power of coming mentally into His presence, and knowing the grace and truth of things unseen with which He encompasses our spirits. Our greatest enemies are not Ammonites and Moabites, so much as evil passions, and all the forms of sin and of suffering which come together. It is not what happens to the

body which we dread so much as what hurts the soul. Our warfare is not so much in time and in external act, as in the presence of eternity, and in thought and intention of will. It is not by change of place that we draw near, so much as by opening the eyes of our understanding to that which is about our path and about our bed, but which without holiness no man sees. Instead of local temple, we put the power of lifting up pure hands in prayer everywhere. Our sacrifice is not bloodshedding, but consecrating ourselves and our lives to do the will of God. And as His will may often be the subjugation of something evil in us, so our victory must often be over ourselves, or consist simply in yielding. Our most perfect Priest will be He who most thoroughly makes this offering; 'Not my will, but thine.' Our Prophet will not be one who predicts external events, except so far as these are bound up in Divine righteousness, but rather one who utters truths to which the heart makes answer. So our highest King will not be one ruling by might, so much as some representative of a dominion over mind; one who rules by thought, or by truth, or right. And although we believe that they who accept such a spiritual rule, will by meekness give least offence to man, and so inherit any land they are cast upon, yet our inheritance of highest promise must be something which concerns the immortal in us, whether a place of sight, or rather a state of mental fellowship with One who upholdeth our souls in life. All earthly things become sacred to us, in proportion as they are witness or symbols of that which is eternal. Thus, however wonderful the history of the Jews was in itself, we find its higher significance even for outward life in those truths which lay behind its precepts, and for the inner life of the soul, by translating its events into thought, or taking them as signs of mental things, which more truly concern our peace. Not that thus we undo the facts, but we enter into the meaning of the great Spirit who permitted them, just as we learn a man's mind by studying its expression in his conduct. We take the letter

as a comment on Divine Providence in outward act, and find in the spirit an index to thoughts which concern the soul.

“The promises to Abraham, then, belong, as we think, to whoever reproduces the type of Abraham’s faith. The Israel of the future is, in the Divine goodwill, all mankind; and in effect, that company of upright men which suffers itself to be guided by the Divine Spirit. The Messiah, or truly anointed in meaning, is not any one set apart by external ceremony, so much as one consecrated by a gift of power from on high to a holy mission, and fulfilling it with devoted mind. It may be argued against us, that the language of the Old Testament was not intended by its writers in this largeness of meaning. But we cannot help seeing that there would be a natural tendency for thoughts such as theirs to grow up and enlarge themselves. They could not conceive deeply of goodness and equity in God, but such conceptions, when once put forth, would become extended to all objects capable of benefiting by these Divine attributes, as well as to the persons whose consciousness of them had embraced only a narrower circle of operation. It may be that the human agents or speakers saw but a little way; and so the fullest sense entertained by them may be but human imagery of the Divine plan, which yet extended itself by their means. Their consciousness, however, does not limit the Divine intention, which is not to be measured by what they said, so much as what their sayings tended to, and by what has actually come about in the world. For there is nothing done for good on a large scale, but what the Governor of the world first thought. Now it is manifest that the sayings of the Hebrew prophets have had a large development in fact; and it is upon our spiritual extension of them that the widest belief of the world is being fashioned. And as this actual result is to firm believers in the foresight of the Almighty no slight indication of what He must have designed, so, on finding it evidently better for the welfare of mankind, we judge it most consonant with His goodness; and we assent from goodwill, as well as from



necessity. For what if a powerful Hebrew nation were built up in Palestine, and their king extended his sway over the world? We should be none the better for another great conqueror, nor would an universal monarchy, which must produce all the faults of prosperity in the dominant nation, be any blessing to others, even if it were to themselves. Or what if one or more prophets should give minute pictures of earthly events to come? This would at best gratify mere curiosity, and perhaps impede exertion; thus complicating human affairs, while it would turn our thoughts from things eternal. Or what if priests should offer sacrifices of blood on altars at Jerusalem? We see mankind already grown, under Divine guidance, out of the thought that such a slaying is the truest hallowing in the sight of God. Your case of Sunah-sephas is not un instructive here. I do not doubt, on comparing the Rig-Veda with the Vishnu Purána, that human sacrifices were practised by your very remote ancestors, and that the story of Sunah-sephas points to a time of their being abolished. Nor is it without meaning that the hymn which promises the release of the human victim is said to have been taught him by Viswámitra. For this is the name of a king who opposed the Brahmanical caste; and it is by a kind of revolt of humanity, under the Spirit of God, against the professional formalism of a priesthood, that steps in the purifying of religion are gained. The Greeks have something of the same kind implied in their story of the princess Iphigenia, who in the older accounts was said to be slain; but as growing humanity revolted at the thought, she was said to have been snatched by Heaven from the altar. So when the Hebrew Abraham was tempted to sacrifice his son, his willingness to surrender to God his dearest was tested, but his fatherly instinct was not shocked, because such offerings of human victims were common in the land. But he was justified, that is, God was well pleased with him, not because of finishing a bloody deed, but because of his faith\*, and by faith he knew the love of God,

\* Romans iv. 3—18: Psalms xl. 6, 7; l. 8—14; li. 16: Hebrews xiii. 15, 16.

and that He is pleased with other sacrifices\*. Thus, in many countries we see manslaughter, which had been intended as the offering of the best, giving way first before a higher conception of God our Father; and in most, as in India among yourselves, this improvement continues, until no blood of any animal is shed in worship, but the life of the worshipper is dedicated to well-doing, and the incense of his heart goes up as prayer. Only among barbarous Mlechchas, such as the Khonds, ruder notions find still a more bloody expression.

“But now, how much better for mankind is the Christian growth into that thought and feeling which suggested the Hebrew prophecies, than the Jewish attempt to stand fast by the written law! All nations must be happier in proportion as a dominion of the highest right and goodness extends itself over their thoughts, thereby fulfilling on earth the kingdom of God. All men must become wiser in proportion as a clear mental sight of the Divine laws takes the place of anxiety about external events, and as a speaker of truth in meekness awakening the answer of conscience, and urging the heart to action, is allowed to be emphatically a prophet or forth-teller of the mind of the Heavenly Spirit. So in proportion as we come, with a feeling of the sanctity of life, to do the Divine will in ourselves and to others, we become a spiritual priesthood. These three fulfilments of the king, the prophet, and the priest, whom the old prophets described as having an unction of office, are far better than falling back upon force, or curiosity, or ritual. These also are being fulfilled in event daily, and were therefore the things essentially intended by the Divine author of the drama, however imperfectly the human players understood it.

“What then is the substance of this Christian religion, which we contend to be the natural fulfilment to which the religion of the Jews had a tendency of old? Or, to speak differently, what were the thoughts with which Judaism was pregnant, and which have come to birth in Christianity? We

\* Hebrews x. 9; xiii. 16.

cannot answer this better, than by taking the prayer which all Christians everywhere use, and which expresses the thoughts of the Founder of their faith in His own words. This prayer Jesus Christ taught His followers:—

Our Father, which art in heaven,  
Hallowed be thy name ;  
Thy kingdom come ;  
Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven :  
Give us this day our daily bread ;  
And forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass  
against us ;  
And lead us not into temptation,  
But deliver us from evil :  
For thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory, for ever  
and ever. Amen.

“The meaning of this prayer will come out more fully, if we look at the principal commandments in which the will of Jehovah was expressed by Moses. They are these:—

1. Thou shalt have none other Gods but me.
2. Thou shalt not make images to worship.
3. Thou shalt not lift God's name over falsehood.
4. Keep holy the day of rest.
5. Honour thy father and thy mother.
6. Thou shalt not kill.
7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
8. Thou shalt not steal.
9. Thou shalt not bear false witness.
10. Thou shalt not desire what is thy neighbour's.

“Like the wise Hindú, who told the Athenians that it was not possible to know human duties without knowing Divine things, you see, Moses begins with the fear of God. His God is the Eternal Being, by whose will all things stand. And as there is no greater sign or cause, than idolatry is, of men's losing the conception of pure Spirit, so this is the first thing jealously forbidden. For this entails a blindness from fathers to children, which degrades nations both in worship and righteousness. But where there is a pure mental conception of our

Divine Ruler, it begets a sense of responsibility fruitful in virtues. So out of sanctity will come truthfulness; and thus the legislator goes on to forbid false-swearing as not only deceiving man, but as mocking our invisible Judge. Again, a part of religion is humanity; and so a convenient day is appointed for the labourer to rest, and for all men to reflect, and for earthly anxiety to have intermission of thoughtfulness and prayer. Then, as God has made our parents both the first ministers of His gifts to us, and our first teachers in things wholesome, so that the life of men, and consequently of nations, will take a tinge from them at its commencement, so human duty is made to begin with honouring them. Then come the great sanctities of our social state; the life which God gives us, the marriage which He blesses, the property which He sanctions, the character which He bids us respect both in ourselves and others, being all hedged round with prohibitions of wrong. Certainly these simple commandments are more striking to the general mind of a nation than any wise speculations about morals; and yet, though a little child understands them, they imply principles which a philosopher might draw out, and acknowledge to be deep in the nature of things. These principles were indeed the cement of Hebrew society; and in their strength the nation maintained its unity, with partial interruption, for about fifteen centuries; while even now its descendants have a bond of coherence, and a capacity of personal (or even of national) revival, in the remembrance of these things, and in the moral strength which comes of them. Nor is it a slight consideration, into how many lands these precepts have been carried, and how many realms have adopted them, not only into their laws, but among the first principles to which the rest of the code must conform itself. So that, though the Hebrew polity has passed away, that which its framers felt of the eternal breathing of God lives on, and passes into the intellectual being of nations yet to be. Now it is not easy to suppose that words of such power did not come out of something deeper; or that the feelings which they tend to

awaken were not apprehended by whoever originally spoke them. But yet, so long as you look at the words themselves, they have something negative in their tone. They prohibit evil, rather than express good. Thus they dwell in the sphere of external law, which limits with threats, but does not implant life by goodness. Even of the Eternal God, there is little written, beyond His name, which should draw us to Him. Only there is a warning not to stray from Him. The second and third precepts have each a sanction of penalty, appealing to fear; and though fear may be a necessary step among our motives, yet it is a low one. The fourth precept speaks merely of keeping the day holy, instead of pointing out the good uses it may be turned to. We need not wonder, therefore, that to the old Jews, who were worshippers of the letter, one day seemed holier than another, though to Christians, whose law is the Holy Spirit, it never can appear so. Even the fifth precept, though expressing one of the deepest natural truths, has yet a mere temporal reason attached to it. The four next are merely prohibitive, and it is only in the last that there is a dim prophecy of the truth, how all our actions have root in thought, and how out of an evil or good heart proceed the issues of death or life.

“Look now at the more hearty rendering of the above things into prayer, which appears in the great devotional symbol of the Church of Christ everywhere. *Our Father, which art in heaven.* Who does not love his own father, of whom he comes, and of whom he has everything, and by whom he is loved beyond expression? But we have in the pure world of thought, One, of whose counsel all earthly fathers come, and in whose unsearchable depth all the fountains of human compassion have their rise. Nothing is greater than its only Source; nor can the love or wisdom of Man be more loving or wise than God. How then can we have any other gods but this One, who invites us by such a name? Thus He persuades us more strongly to abide by Him, than any penalty for leaving Him. There could be no greater loss than to lose Him. We want no other

God than one who both fills our affections, and enables us to feel them. Thus the faith of Christ fulfils the spirit of the commandment, and abolishes its letter. Again, no Christian can well say, My Father, for He is to all of us Ours. Thus we are assured, that He loves not only each of us, but all. So long then as we remain His children in the cast of our minds, we cannot wilfully injure those whom He joins with us in a brotherhood, as saying alike, Our Father. Hence alone might come every duty and love to man. This the Hebrew prophets began to feel, when they said, ‘Have we not all one Lord and Father? why deal we treacherously every man against his neighbour\*?’ But this doctrine of love was in the Divine thought before the enactment of law, and goes beyond the sphere of written law in development. Then, lest human images should mislead us, and we should forget soberness in prayer, we are reminded that God is our Father in heaven. Here might come in all your reasonings about time and place and limit, as inapplicable to that which is above, and beyond, and before them. But in the Hebrew prophets it is also written, *Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord*†. Nor is any doctrine more fundamental to Christians than that ‘God is a spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.’ We therefore transplant the Divine presence into thought, no less than yourselves; but how could we convey to others an impression of the ineffable majesty, except through words which have images to the senses? You have spoken of *Swarga*, when you meant rather blessedness. So I suppose, our own Master, in teaching us to say, ‘Our Father, which art in heaven,’ meant to invest the great God with every attribute of tenderness and sublimity, bringing Him near to sustain us, but leaving Him far off to understand. Thus if Christian faith has confidence, it has also reverence.

“We see this more in the second petition: *Hallowed be thy name*. The Law had forbidden to lift up the name of the Lord

\* Mal. ii. 10.

† Jer. xxiii. 24.

over falsehood. But the Christian prayer teaches more widely that God is in Himself the Holy One, and that what belongs to Him should be hallowed. With such a feeling we become fully aware of His presence; and since from this and from His government nothing is excluded, so all things assume in one sense a consecration in so far as they do what He intended them for, and in another sense are subordinated, so that we dare not give them what belongs to Him. In His light we see light, and all things put on their proper forms and bearings. This petition then renders needless both the second commandment of the Jews, and the two next which followed it: for we cannot while we gaze mentally on the Eternal Spirit, and bear His image in ourselves, bow down to idols of wood or stone, nor can we, even though not uttering His name, speak falsely within the illimitable range of His consciousness, seeing that He is the eternal Truth; nor can we either think one day in itself holier than another, since all days are the Lord's; nor yet can we forget those blessed ends of quietness and thoughtfulness and prayer, for which one day was of old consecrated, and for which it may be convenient that pious consent should persuade us still to make fit occasions. But we carry everywhere and always, with the echo of this prayer in our heart, an aversion to whatever worldly thing would blind us to the most Holy Spirit, and a reverence for truth, and a consecration of all our time and thought. And as the Jew set some things apart to be called holy by outward consecration, we make all things holy inwardly, and then leave them to be naturally called so. Nor yet is this extension of sanctity a thing of gloom; for He who loves us, and calls Himself our Father, and who gives even the kitten its play and the bird its song, leaves to our manhood as well as to our childhood whatever refreshment is innocently wholesome. Only, as innocence is but for a short time and imperfectly the lot of men, so they learn to deepen it with watchfulness into holiness. So the Christian prayer fulfils more widely the prophetic tendency of the old Hebrew precept, both having come from one Holy

Spirit, but the riper growth having a deeper drinking into His meaning. Our life has become a sabbath, and our heart an altar, and the whole world a temple, in which the living God dwells.

“Our two next petitions are, *Thy kingdom come; thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.* Here especially comes out that great principle of faith, which is the mainspring of Christianity. For here we are led beyond things visible which surround us with imperfection, into the thought of things intended, and to come. The first petition deals more with morality, or doing right to man, and the second more with religion, or the love of God. We cannot pray either of them rightly, so long as violence and fraud and superstition and sin and pain seem to us truly natural, or as having a divinely-appointed place in the world of God. They both imply that the higher and more blessed thought of our Maker is destined to overcome all hinderances, or to vanquish every enemy, by shaping the course of things seen more into the harmony of things eternal. The tyrant must not always oppress; the slave must one day go free; the worship of the Father of our spirits must not for ever be mingled with lies; ignorance must not cover the nations; men must not by sin entail suffering and shame, and charge their own shortcomings on the design of Him that made them: but freedom and truth and peace must go forth evolving themselves, and conquering, with subordination only to the law of the Highest Being; and the knowledge of whatsoever things are pure and amiable and of good report, must cover our earth, as the waters cover the sea. Then truly God will reign, not in visible pomp of earthly monarch, but by pervading men's thoughts with a knowledge of truth, and a willing obedience to right. The coming of such a kingdom we pray, and by praying bind ourselves to strive for. Thus by faith we vanquish the imperfections of sight, and become fellow-workers with a most loving Master in bringing about that good of men, which He desires, and which will turn to His glory. In some such hope of faith



the Apostles of old went forth preaching, the prophets spoke truths which the world will not let die, and all holy sufferers for righteousness' sake have fought a good fight. Thus they have thrown a fire upon earth which has not been quenched, and their winged thoughts have been seeds in the minds of men. But it is especially in the second of these two petitions that we rise by faith out of the region of sense, into that of pure mind. We here see as it were, though we speak in simple words, those heavenly shapes after which earthly beauty is moulded, of which Plato in his parables spake; for we conceive of the holiest will of God as having thoughts creative of good, and as forecasting happiness with right in His world; and in whatever degree the largeness of the scale, or the clash of relations, and impediment of circumstance, or, not least, the perversity of evil spirits working in men, may have prevented the good design from coming to perfection—like rugged marble which has not obeyed the shaping hand of the sculptor—we pray to God that all these things may be overcome, and that He would not cease working, until all His thought comes to light in act, and the trial of truth ends in victory. Doubtless, by such prayer we help forward the design in at least ourselves; for we become more conscious of the fitness of obeying the holiest dominion, and the madness of resisting it even in thought. Those who pray such prayers so as to mould their own mind in like shape, have no need of any of the remaining commandments of the Jews; for they could neither dishonour parents, nor violate life, or marriage, or property, or good name, without sinning against the manifest design of our Maker, and tampering with the play of the better motives, which He has appointed fruitful tendencies to good. Their life has regard to all such sanctities, because it has at heart a seed of living law which compels them by love.

“But until the kingdom fully come, since things which oppose it are not evil in their own essence, but become so by misapplication, or confusion of relation, so we trust that God will overrule even the working of these to good. Thus

of pain, the capacity of which must be coextensive with that of pleasure, we trust that it is often a remedy, or at least a warning. Perhaps even sin\*, though it must have remorse before it can be healed, yet is bound up with the knowledge of good as well as of evil, the tree which bears two opposites having one stem; and at least of all other things, except sin, we hope that their seeming clash will be harmonised, and the play of opposites be a development of what is best. Thus, if our prayer teaches striving for the will of God in action, it leads also to submission in suffering; and our faith is in one sense a lifelong stretching forward with earnest expectation to some glory to be revealed, yet in another sense a bowing down in meekness under the will which we desire done, not only around us, and by us, but even in us.

“Such a faith as this has much in common with the best wisdom of India. It owns with Capila, that the world which now is, represents but imperfectly the goodness we would gladly ascribe to the highest Iswara; but then it refuses to conceive of these things as the end. For it has unlimited trust in the illimitable God; and feeling that the past we see of His works is but a speck in the contemplation of eternity, it finds the highest reason in stretching itself forward beyond sight into that holier kingdom which is yet coming, and which must come more perfectly. It believes again with the Vedântists, that even now nothing truly exists but what has a root in the shaping thought of One Supreme Spirit; but it refuses to think that the clash of evil men’s evil wills, and the madness of wrongdoing, and all ignorance or passion, can have had a place in the eternal will of the most Righteous, and contends rather that all such evils come of rebellion or misplacement of that which is for an hour, and which has no existence in eternity. For the kingdom of God must come. The thought of His will must be fulfilled in deed. Nor is such a faith altogether adverse to what the Saugata believes of a certain development of intelligence.

\* Sunt, quibus expedit cadere.—*St Augustine.*

For certainly God, who is a Spirit, works chiefly by spiritual means, and His divine processes must be unsearchable to sense, as the thoughts of a human thinker are to sight. Yet Reason which infers the thoughts of man, has a kindred sort of logic, when in its higher growth as a humble and a loving faith it traces from His inworking in the world and in good men the will of God. Such an unveiling as it thus obtains of the highest mind, is not altogether foreign to its happiest inferences elsewhere in the region of thought. Only the knowledge which comes in Divine revelation is something higher, and more deeply inwoven with our best self, and yet more than any human exertion could reach, and so more evidently a gift, or a grace. It is an opening of the eyes of the mind, though not one unconnected with purity of heart, or conscience, and life. But our faith chiefly differs from that of the Saugata, in that it would feel cheated of its highest and dearest aim, or even of its own being, if it could lose sight of that eternal wielder of our destinies, by whom it has life and hope and thought, and by virtue of whose will only a better kingdom can come. Again, it differs much from parts of the Hindú speculations, in the strength of its conception both as to the existing conflict between the Divine will and the human, and as to the harmony which is natural\*, and which is to come between them. Hence this intense agony or struggle of prayer, of penitence, of action, which is eminently the distinctive life of Christianity, though it has analogies, and imperfect resemblances which may justify it, in the noblest spirits of all nations.

“ *Give us this day our daily bread.* If a man is so far the servant of God, as to have prayed deeply the two former petitions, he will include in this one the bread of the soul. He will pray for holy thoughts, for humane affections, for the sympathies of home and country, for wholesome food to his

\* By *natural* is meant not any sinking of a higher being, as of a reasonable agent, under the play of animal or physical impulses, but that which God intended to be or grow after its kind in each part of his creation, whether inert or animal in the lower, or thoughtful and affectionate in the higher.

intellect, and for happy memories to dwell upon. Also in simpler meaning he will own that good Providence which fills all things living with plenteousness. He will learn from the phrase *daily bread* how few are the wants which God has made natural to us. Nor will he forget that in asking on account of these he binds himself to such labour as may innocently satisfy them. Thus by bidding us pray for simple things, the Allwise teaches us to restrain that greediness which covets many, and in one prayer suggests temperance, labour, and may I not add charity? For as our prayer is all along in the name of many children, we could not innocently ask the Father to help others, if we were not willing to aid in such a design. The simplicity of human life, its dependence on the Divine bounty, the beauty of thankfulness, and the duty of sober honesty for ourselves, and of beneficence to others, should come before our minds, that we may present them to Heaven in these few words.

“*And forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.* If in one clause the Christian prayer has looked around to our bodily wants, it soon returns to the deeper things of the soul. It teaches us to feel that the greatest hinderance to God’s more perfect dominion, and to the coming forth of His design in beauty, is not so much the constitution of the world, as the working of an evil spirit in ourselves. It takes hold of that sense of having fallen from our own better mind, which deepens in men in proportion as they conceive worthily of what goodness is. Thus here too our prayer implies faith in the real difference between right and wrong, and faith in the righteous attributes of the Almighty, as one who has established an everlasting law. If men not hardened are ashamed of doing wrong, and feel self-reproach at loss of purity, having an uneasy witness in conscience to what no human eye has seen, these things are established by Him who writes His law in our hearts. If the sins against which conscience protests, disturb also the moral order of the world, they are rebellion against its Governor. If there is a perpetual contrast of

opposites, in which imperfect good so ranges itself against the higher good as to become evil, we cannot take part with the enemy, and remain in heart at peace with God. How far have you among Hindús a true sense of the evil of all sin, as both a breaking of the world's law, and the bringing of discord into your soul, and the building up a wall of uneasy mistrust between your conscience and that Holy Spirit which the pure in heart behold? I should have judged, from the extreme austerities and penance practised both now and of old among your countrymen, that God had not spared you this sickness of the mind, which He intends as a way of return to deeper health. Certainly such a sickness is better than death of the soul to any difference between good and evil. Some, however, have said, that all your penances are done rather in the way of self-righteousness than of contrition; for that you hope to gain reward by them, rather than testify your sorrow. If this should be so, your religion must have been worked into a worse formalism than I am willing to believe. But at least in Christianity there is revealed both what God blames and what He approves; or, as St Paul says\*, both His wrath and His righteousness. Whatever men may call righteous, this blessed sentence is not pronounced by Him that searcheth our hearts, either upon reckless sin, or upon formal penance, or upon any external rite, but upon the entire turning of the heart to Himself, and to His holy will. This looking up out of the depth to God is the beginning of being called righteous by Him. Then, as a sense of our own unworthiness grows with our sense of His holiness, and a sense of our weakness with that of His majesty, so we learn that our acquittal before God must ever begin with forgiveness, though by the Divine help it may go on to approval. Natural then to all men in whom conscience is not quenched, but especially necessary to the Christian, is this cry, *Forgive us our*

\* See Romans i. 18; iii. 21, 22; which are explained by St Luke, xvi. 15. Whoever finds the sayings of the Epistles hard, should compare them with the plainer ones of the Gospels.

*trespasses.* We say this as little children at our mother's knee, and we find no reason to cease saying it in our old age. But the same unveiling of God to our mind's eye, which contrasts His holiness with our sin, assures us also of our forgiveness in His love. He is represented by our faith as one who 'frankly forgives;' and we are assured that the only condition He requires for this is that fitness of heart on our part, without which the other cannot be, but the beginning of which is attested even by our prayer, and the perfecting of which will be our health and our reconciliation to God. So great may seem the gulf to cross, for those who have sinned deeply, or who repent deeply, that I can never wonder at any awful austerities which in India or elsewhere men may inflict upon themselves in seeking a bridge of atonement. But now consider, how can such things bring us nearer to God? Suppose, first, that they are done by way of repairing any wrong to our fellow-men. In this case they are morally right, and where feasible, are requisite. Suppose, secondly, that they have the nature of prayers or sacrifices, which both express and deepen our contrition or change of will before God. In this case they are religiously right, and are the appointed means of cleansing our conscience. Extend the same idea a little farther, and suppose them, thirdly, to be dedication of ourselves or our substance to some good work, as if, for instance, a man should expose himself to contagion of small-pox or the plague, for the sake of tending in charity the sick. Here also they are very right, and so far as they come of a loving or devoted spirit, are doubtless acceptable to God, as well as means of improving ourselves. But no rightminded man will claim payment for such works of love, which are their own exceeding great reward, although God may sometimes honour them with an overflow of happiness or accompaniment beyond their efficacy as claims. Still less will any deep thinker imagine such works which are done only through the Divine help, to be the causes of that Divine love, which first gave us 'the preparation of heart' to do them. They are not grounds of a forgiveness

which must have preceded them. Nor, as you have justly observed, could works done in time merit an eternal reward. How far He who is eternal, and to whom the future is as the present, may in His wisdom lay a train of conditions, so that what are with Him only links and processes may seem to us for a moment superficially causes, inasmuch as they may be indispensable, I will not too nicely argue. But certainly what we feel to be Divine gifts to us are not grounds of meritorious claim upon the Giver. They would lose even their animating spirit, and the glory would perish from them, if they were done mercenarily, or in proud self-esteem. Nor, as you will own, could we ever do enough to be more than unprofitable servants to Him whose right in us is as infinite as Himself. Such things then may come after the forgiveness of sins as its fruits, its witnesses, and I would not mind saying its indispensable conditions; but we must find in the very offering of them to God our happiness, and bless Him for them, rather than make them precedents to His forgiveness, or claims upon His favour.

“ But I have been speaking of good works as the sacrifices of a thankful heart, and even such I have denied to be properly propitiatory, or independently meritorious. I wish you to consider hereafter, how far you go along with such an idea, as your language might partly imply, or whether you have never risen to the full Christian conception on this point. But now suppose, fourthly, that the things pleaded as grounds of Divine favour are not good works, so much as formal penances, and austerities of self-inflicted pain. Such seems, to strangers at least, to be too much the character of the Hindú asceticism and mortification. In so far as this is so, your own better wisdom should teach you, that such miserable efforts of us worms of an hour cannot merit eternal reward. But I go farther, and maintain, they are not even pleasing to God, but injurious to His holy name. For men who torture their bodies till they become useless, unfit themselves for active good in the world, which is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof. They increase pain, which is

against His blessed design, and so they obstruct His kingdom, and enlarge that of the enemy. They cannot even change the Eternal Mind, which is 'without shadow of changing;' still less increase His love to them, which was infinite from the beginning. Rather see if they do not run counter to His love, which wills their good, and so dishonour Him by an unchildlike mistrust of our Heavenly Father. If He sees pain necessary for us, He can send it at His will, which in every way we pray may be done. But if you introduce it in self-will, and beyond the necessities of right nature, which is the embodiment of His law, consider if you are not wandering greatly from His mind.

"I wish I could persuade you, my dear friends, how much better than all this will-worship of self-inflicted torture, is that clear unveiling of the Divine love, which shews God as the Author and Giver of all good things to soul as well as body, and as more ready to hear than we are to pray. In such a faith the Christian is taught to say in simplicity, *Forgive us our trespasses*. The heart which breathes this prayer in confidence of its being after the Divine Will, and therefore granted, is, in the language of technical theologians, 'justified by faith,' and by that better breathing of God which has guided it so far, is led on into all holy impulses and deeds. That these things are so, is to Christians who live by their Lord's prayer, guaranteed in the following clause, *as we forgive them that trespass against us*. Here the Divine Wisdom teaches us how simple is the condition of our being forgiven in Heaven. Here also is revealed enough for our practical guidance, of the causes of misery in the world. Through pride we are angry and revengeful; through anger and revenge, all war and mischief from man to man come, like evil Rákshasas, into the fair garden of delight which God had planted. All things wild and tempestuous in nature are more easily controlled by law, than the agitated heart of man, whose immortal being makes his capacity for evil as boundless as for good. Yet the strongest passions may be tamed by that instinct of fear, which is a part of the law of self-preservation.



Thus then God tames our wrath to our fellows, by revealing to us the possibility of what may fall upon ourselves. If we forgive not, neither are we truly praying to be forgiven. But if the sins which so easily encompass us, and the adherent infirmities of our life, are reckoned against us, and much more, if our presumptuous violation of our better minds, and all the secrets of our heart, are brought to inexorable account in the light before which all thoughts are open, we may truly ask, who shall stand? Yet 'frank forgiveness' of God will not save us from such a trial, unless we forgive them that trespass against us. And as such a terror may with even the hardest natures impose the necessity of forgiving others, so to nobler spirits, and perhaps to all men once softened by an unveiling of the infinite compassion of our Heavenly Father, the sense of being forgiven is a more gracious persuasion to forgive. Thus the milder virtues, such as in India you seem to value, come out eminently in the religion of Christ. For as no other faith has so full a persuasion of that love of God which passeth knowledge, no other is so naturally fruitful in thoughts of kindness and words of meekness, and in well-doing to men. Such was the natural tendency, and such is in experience the fruit of a faith which more than any other in the world exalts both the dread holiness of God, and His infinite tenderness; which abases man by a sense of sin, and exalts him by assurance of forgiveness; and which, shrinking from the pride of putting our creature frames on a level with the very substance of the Creator, yet by participation of the holiest breathing, and so by a fellowship of spirit, binds all men into a brotherhood, as children of our Father which is in Heaven.

*"And lead us not into temptation.* If God justifies us freely by His grace, not putting down our human infirmities in a vindictive reckoning, but blotting them out with a frank forgiveness, we have need that by the same grace He should guide us into holiness. As our technical theologians say, we must not only be 'justified,' but 'sanctified.' Nor indeed would the cleansing of our conscience be complete, unless our minds were

hallowed by an implanting of that likeness to God, which He intended them to bear. So long as our consciousness is darkened by a sense of something in us, the knowledge of which it shrinks from sharing with the Searcher of our spirits, so long we are neither at peace with ourselves, nor with that Highest Being. The barrier thus raised between us and Him is but of thought, and yet we shrink from passing it. Then a sort of burthen bows us, so that we cannot lift our mental gaze into the highest Heaven. It is this sense of separation at heart from that which of all things we have the greatest need to turn to, which has lain heavier on many men than the dread of penalty, though that too might be felt. Whereas if any one could raise our life into harmony with our thought, and make our performance equal our aspiration, we should no longer shrink from the eye which reads our thoughts, but the Divine presence would be our infinite stay, instead of a thing to be at war with, or to tremble at. But such is our weakness, that this seems humanly not possible. Our very knowledge comes through many steps of ignorance; and thus conspires with impulses, which go wrong in striving to fulfil an instinct that yet ought to find fulfilment. Things which, moderately enjoyed, should have been for our health, become, when snatched at with greediness, occasions of our falling. We avoid dangers, as of society and lightness, and thereby run into greater, as of solitude and moroseness. Our activity risks mischief, and our quietude has the contempt of uselessness. What crimes do not come of starvation, ignorance, and passions differing only in name from insanity! Thus blameable as men become, their sins are so bound up in the mystery of a free agency limited by forces far vaster than itself, that we feel the sentence of God to be according to truth, when He compassionates us rather than blames. Our faith then looks up to Him for alliance in the warfare in which we are engaged, and for safeguard against temptation. Partly we ask Him to govern the changes and chances of our outward life, and partly to mould

the framework of our mind. Nor is it easy to define, how much help comes to us in the way of providence, and how much by more immediate gift, or by what Christians call grace. In whatever way thoughts are suggested to us, as now by outward event, or by teaching, or experience, and again by deeper impulse of the mind, which has laws and processes harder to trace, lying as they do beneath our more distinct consciousness, yet every good instance of such suggestion comes of the Divine gift. Only as Christians conceive of the body as the soul's instrument rather than its master, and of action as properly generated from within rather than from without, so they magnify the Divine guidance in its more secret workings (whatever method may regulate them) upon the soul, rather than in its lessons from outward events. The more, however, we know of the way in which thought is generated within us, the more easily we conceive how the Spirit of God may guide us. Even the sense of His favour is alone a kind of life. Like a man bound for death among cruel enemies, if he hears words of hope from some sudden ally, springs into a resistance which otherwise he had not courage for, so the poor soul of man, bewildered by temptations, and fettered by circumstance as if in a net, so soon as it sees clearly that it has an everlasting Helper, shakes away all bonds of evil habit, and starts on a fresh course of well-doing, with faith as an invincible shield over its weakness. Again, even in some worse moment of wandering, the remembrance of a Heavenly Father, whom he had once known, may come upon a man like a familiar eye in a strange place, and recall him by a reproof without voice, the infinite pity of which is stronger than blame. Nor is it the least preservative from evil, that when our Divine Master employs all our powers in some good work, we have less leisure to go astray, and that dangerous faculty of imagination is shut up from the sallies into which it is ever apt to tempt us forward. Again, to be watchful, as he who prays for the Divine countenance should needs be, against little sins, is to win half the battle against great ones. By holy

prayers good impulses are fostered, and out of impulses are moulded habits, which make strong. Thus in many ways, which better people could describe better, we believe that God *leads us not into temptation*. Such therefore is our daily prayer for His grace.

“*But deliver us from evil.* You have been curious to know whence comes evil? I have answered, from the largeness of the scale of creation and the confusion of relations in it, as when things intended for one end turn to another; from the possibilities which must of eternal fitness be implied in the very capacities of good, or, in short, from the conditions preliminary even to the thought of a world's existence; from the many tendencies frustrated, or shortcomings in the manifestation of an idea which strives to realise itself; and especially from the wrongdoing of agents, who cannot rise to their moral stature, without freedom of choice, either for right or wrong. It is only to be remembered farther, that such agents may choose evil, not only amongst mankind, as we see, but amongst the unseen beings, whom we may reasonably imagine God to have created of every kind, and with powers more or less than our own, in the spiritual world.

“But whatever are the forms of evil, we have an overruling Deliverer from them all. First, He lays the axe at the root, by persuading us that the greatest mischief is an evil spirit working within ourselves. By casting out this from our souls, He takes away the seed of many evil fruits. By taking away sin, He dries up the source of many sharp pains and pinings. By changing hatred into goodwill, He takes away envyings, backbitings, wars, and murders. By bidding us not be over anxious about things that perish, He both calms our own spirits, and cuts away covetousness and all the fraud and tyranny which come of it. And when He persuades us to love our neighbour as ourselves, and to be ready to dedicate ourselves as instruments of the Divine beneficence to man, He utterly abolishes the self-seeking, or self-exaltation, which in one or other of its developments brings

out the many-headed growth of all human evils. In whatever degree, then, we have entered His kingdom of thought and feeling with our minds, and bring out in our actions the design of His Will, and ask our daily bread only as He would have us seek it, and forgive offences to others because our own are forgiven of Him, while by His grace we are led not into temptation, in the same degree we are making effectual our prayer, that He would deliver us from evil. Again, as to outward accidents which must needs happen to us in this entangled world, not always as we would choose, our Divine Master partly persuades us that they are of little moment, as compared to the inward peace which He suffers nothing to take from us; partly He even overrules them for good, and makes them instruments of our growth; and, again, He comforts us with a faith that even things most adverse are bringing out strength by opposition, and all discords being blended into a harmony to be. The higher, indeed, and the broader our view becomes, the more we see already (what He who is without limit to thought is ever conscious of) that these oppositions in the world carry on a design, of which therefore in a way they are parts. We do not, for instance, call matter, or nature, intrinsically evil, seeing that it is moulded, however slowly, after a thought, which can only be of the highest Being. Hence we so far agree with the A'chárya, that we have no duality in existence, in the sense of two eternally opposing and equally originant Principles, such as of good and of evil. For with us too, Good is alone eternal and positive, and Evil is its instrument. The opposition therefore is but temporary, or seeming; so far as it is real, it must pass away, and so far as it abides, it must effect good. Thus it is a beginning of doctrine, with both Israelites and Christians, that the eternal God made the worlds out of nothing: not out of evil matter, but out of nothing; for until you imagine goodness underneath as a cause, there is nothing but blank, and no reason for anything, such as we find being, to be. How far, indeed, the Eternal Spirit should be conceived of as limited by time

in the effects of His goodness, any more than in its being, or whether the effect may for ever have partaken of the eternity of its causer, is a question of metaphysics rather than of religion; and I will not entangle myself in it. Since, however, that which we call evil, comes of eternal possibilities, or of necessities conditional to creation, so it has, in one sense, its root nowhere else than in the mind of the Creator. Thus the greatest of the Hebrew prophets is not afraid to imagine the Lord God as saying, *I make peace, and I create evil; I the Lord do all these things*. But in so far as the possibility thus created, or conceived, comes of God, it is also a capacity of a preponderating weight of good; and so far as it goes off in aberration or overflow, its effect is but as a spray of the ocean, which is dried up in the sun. Surely, to the eye of true faith the domain of good is ever enlarging itself, and that of evil becoming only a field of subordinate instrumentalities, and of conflicts which are capacities of something better. Of the physical world this is most manifestly true. Thus, if in any ruder age, the storm or the darkness should have been thought a messenger of some malignant demon, and nature have seemed as full of Rácschasas as of deities, even though such a conception should have tinged the popular sayings of religious teachers whom we venerate, neither our science nor our faith will suffer it to endure. For science says, that all storms are parts of the great scheme of nature, which its Author must have designed, and experience answers that their operation is in many ways wholesome, and our faith remembers how the Hebrew Psalmists of old represented storm and lightning and earthquake as messengers of Jehovah, and how the Hebrew prophet conceives of the same Jehovah as saying, *I form the light, and I create darkness*. In short, 'the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof.' Again, in human nature, we can strike out\* radically no appetite, passion, or impulse, without destroying also a capacity for good, which our

\* This topic is handled in the first sermon in a volume called "Rational Godliness;" London, 1854.

Maker designed. Only the abuse or perversion of such things is evil, and this neither our Maker designed, nor we can innocently fall into, but we avoid it in proportion as we enter His kingdom and do His will. But if we, having reason and conscience and choice, hang back from fulfilling His will in ourselves, we can neither wonder at senseless elements coming short of it, nor complain of hinderances from confusion in the vast theatre of their play.

“ Some of the wisest Christians, finding evil thus evanescent rather than essential in the scheme of the world, and in human nature, so far as its capacities are given by God, think that the same vanishing extends into the region of spiritual beings, as we learn more of it. Just as the rain-cloud of the Vedic hymns was transformed into a giant, and the smallpox is thought by some of your simpler people to be a goddess becoming incarnate, so agencies which seemed hostile have everywhere been shaped by rude imaginations into personalities reflecting that of the observer; and especially in the Zoroastrian lore, the play of seeming opposites, such as light and darkness, in nature, suggested an eternal duality of the Good and Evil Spirits. Much more in the region of mind, the quick play of thought, and the oppositions of passion, conscience, and remorse, suggest a duality, as of God and the great enemy. That which seduces, or irritates, or alarms and drives to despair with accusations\*, may well seem a devil, that is, an accuser, or a satan, that is, an enemy. Yet such things in the mind, no less than the tempests in nature,

\* The word Devil means an accuser, and Satan an enemy. Both are applied in Holy Scripture, often to *men*; as in Psalm cix. 6, 1 St Peter v. 8, where the hostile informer is compared to a roaring lion. Satan also, or his messenger, seems a term given to any obstacle in good, as a sickness, or a persecution: also to *Death*, as the last enemy; but in the widest generalisation, to the spirit of all hostile agencies considered collectively; yet most properly of an evil spirit *working in disobedient men*. No scripture older than the Babylonian exile speaks of Satan as a personal demon or fallen angel, unless it be the story of the serpent in Genesis, which the Jews did not so interpret, though St Paul, in his manner, adapts it. The Satan to Balaam is the angel of the Lord; and in Job is an accusing angel, conceived differently from the evil demon, bound in chains and darkness, of a later age.



may be born out of capacities for good, or be remedies for the evil we create to ourselves by sinning. Thus a man inflamed with desire, or swollen with anger, or trembling at the dark images which accusing conscience conjures up before him, is possessed with a legion of evil impulses, which are evil breathings or spirits in him; but if he could be turned truly to God, and sobered by deep penitence, and cleansed by confession, the mansions of his soul would be swept clean, and the perversion of better things having vanished, the thought of God might carry out its own design in the man, and he would be delivered from evil.

“Perhaps the friends of this theory do not quite remember, that we acknowledge human agents to have the power of creating evil in themselves by the volition of their spirits; and as this does not hinder the design of our Maker from being good, neither need it, if a like perversion is self-chosen by spiritual agents whom we do not see. Again, as men use the instincts of lower animals towards ends which the animals are not conscious of, though their agency in the acting is spontaneous, so it is conceivable that malignant spirits might use for ends of their own the spontaneous passions of sinful men. But I will not argue this nicely; for, no doubt, the field open to such spirits would be ever limited alike by the encompassing providence of God, and by the determination of our own free will; and again, the Christian faith is in God, rather than in any enemy, and not so much in evil, as in God’s delivering us from it. Some phrases current among simpler Christians, may partly come of that personifying power which must last as long as the human imagination, and partly be echoes caught lightly from older faiths, or times in which the same power was more vivid. Nor does it much matter, whether with an eye of imagination tinged by sense, we see the great enemy and his armed battalions quailing before the host of Seraphim, as in Milton’s great poem, or whether impalpable evil fades like darkness before our fuller consciousness of the outcoming of the goodness of God. In



either case, we say, 'Blessed be God, who putteth every enemy under our feet.' The last enemy that is overcome is death. He who leadeth not into temptation, but delivereth from evil, shews also His law pervading all that nature, over parts of which a hostile prince was once thought to have power, and brings daily more to light His thought evolving itself in mankind, and turns hostile accidents to good, or at least makes them tolerable by giving us an inward peace; He also comforts us through every bereavement and death, by a persuasion that neither height, nor depth, nor life, nor death, nor time, nor eternity, can ever separate us from the embrace of that power which made all things to be, and that love which brings all things to good.

"*For thine is the kingdom, &c.* Here the Christian hope of immortality falls in with the great instinct of mankind, and the aspirations of most of the noblest reasoners everywhere. We shrink from annihilation in death, not only from the animal feeling of repugnance to cold obstruction or darkness, but because we feel ourselves something more vital than the dust, and we grudge to the realm of naught both ourselves and our kindred sharers of thoughts which go beyond extinction, which therefore we hope the Eternal One, to whom they aspire, has not destined to fall from Himself into it. Yet we come in contact with death by our bodies, which are made of things perishable, and by the experience of bereavement and flux around us, and by the consciousness of our depending on a Higher Will, and of having fallen short of consonance with that Will in act. The more then we escape from the dominion of these bodies, by making them vehicles and instruments, rather than masters of the higher being encased in them, and the more we are purified from evil which is evanescent, and at the same time enter into the kingdom of Him who is the Giver and sustainer of life, so much the more our hope of some immortality is quickened. For we thus bring ourselves within the range of that universal law, that what is evil, perishes, and what is good, lives, according to the

mind of God which designed it. He that soweth to the flesh, of the flesh reaps corruption, but he that soweth to the kingdom of God, hath his seed in a soil whose leaves fade not. By partaking of the Holy Spirit of God, we partake of those things from which death and decay fall away, as having no power over them. Our thoughts, we see, do not altogether depend upon place, or time, or animal processes; our feelings of Good and Right apprehend them as things not changeable by any outward events; our faith in Him, whose name is the Eternal, suffers us only to conceive of Him as a God of the living, and not of the hopelessly dead. Thus we overcome the enemy death. We fear not them that hurt the body, but whatever defiles the soul, and lessens its kindred to God. We know not indeed the precise nature of the life to come. Most Christians think, in harmony so far with the Sāṅkhya philosophy, that spirit will only have its full consciousness, as of humanity, when embodied in some form of matter, however refined and subtle it may have become. Others think that this conception of 'a spiritual body' is fashioned according to our earthly experience of minds acquiring impressions and developing powers in conjunction with material embodiment, but that in the higher kingdom of thought, which eye hath not seen the fashion, nor ear heard the sound of, the Eternal Lord God, who is Himself a spirit, will waken us up after His own likeness, and satisfy us with the pleasures of His ineffable countenance. As then we ascribe not body, parts, or passions, to the clear Spirit of the primeval Deity, so some think these things will not belong hereafter to those who are also His offspring, and who will see Him as He is, and be as He is. Nor, again, dare I speak too presumptuously of the enjoyment of the life to come. Perhaps work of honour and of pleasant energy will be for those who have fulfilled the Divine thought, and so become perfect in well doing. Perhaps, again, as the operation of Deity is silent, and deep beyond sense, though not beyond inference of faith, so the life to come of spirits made perfect may be thought or contemplation. The

mere reminiscence of all that has been in our own lives and in those of others, and an obligation to watch all the results which may still be going on in the world from our own acts, and a comparison of our opportunities, when fully explained, with our actions, and again a review of the past history of all ages laid open before us, and a survey of the daily evolving plan of God, with awe-stricken curiosity as some new page of His dealings opens before us, may be to good men delight, and to those who have fallen into wilful rebellion against the spiritual kingdom of God, an unutterable torture. We should have fallen far from Christianity, in its better sense, if we were to fancy, that the powers of the mind, such as joy, thankfulness, love, sympathy, and holiness, were not enough to satisfy the blessed, or that the contrary feelings of remorse, shame, self-rebuke, and inward strife of surviving passions, could not fill to the brim the red cup of misery of those who refused to be saved. But, however these things may be, we do not doubt that *the Lord reigns* ; that the kingdom of God is in His clear sight for ever come, and, in that of all faithful men, for ever coming ; and in whatever degree we may be enabled rightly to enter into it, so far, and I suppose, so far only, shall we naturally partake of its immortality. Therefore we strive to help forward that kingdom of the mind, which, though it ever tends to mould the fashion of the outward world after its inner mind, is yet emphatically ‘within us ;’ therefore, I would persuade you, my friends, so far as God may permit, to learn what His most acceptable and perfect will may be ; and so long as we become truly subject to God, we are contented with whatever happens. For the beginning and the end of our religion is, *Not our will, but Thine* ; and we cannot fail of our will being done, so long as it is in harmony with the will of the Allrighteous and the Almighty. He knows what is best, and chooses it, and is able to fulfil it, even to the end. To Him then, even to the only wise God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and our Father, be *the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever and ever. Amen.*”

## CHAPTER X.

*Christ and His Apostles, and their Doctrine.*

“Behold my servant, whom I uphold ; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth ; I have put my spirit upon Him : He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles. He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause His voice to be heard in the street. A bruised reed shall He not break, and the smoking flax shall He not quench : He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till He have set judgment in the earth : and the isles shall wait for His law. Thus saith God the Lord, He that created the heavens, and stretched them out ; He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it ; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein : I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles ; to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house. I am the Lord : that is my name : and my glory will I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images. Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare : before they spring forth I tell you of them. Sing unto the Lord a new song, and His praise from the end of the earth, ye that go down to the sea, and all that is therein ; the isles, and the inhabitants thereof.”—ISAIAH xlii. 1—10.

“He is despised and rejected of men ; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief : and we hid as it were our faces from Him ; He was despised, and we esteemed Him not. Surely He hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows : yet we did esteem Him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities : the chastisement of our peace was upon Him ; and with His stripes we are healed.”—*Id.* liii. 3—5.

“It pleased the Lord to bruise Him ; He hath put Him to grief : when thou shalt make His soul an offering for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand. He shall see of the travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied : by His knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many ; for He shall bear their iniquities.”—*Id.* liii. 10, 11.

“One Jesus, which was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive.”—ACTS xxv. 19.

“When this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting ? O grave, where is thy victory ? The sting of death is sin ; and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.”—1 CORINTHIANS xv. 54—57.

“THUS we have seen,” continued Blancombe, “that out of the Hebrew history and literature the Christian religion has

grown. Judaism ought to have died, in giving birth to a child thus nobler than itself. For the lesser light is swallowed up in the greater. But the Jews in general reject Christianity ; for they rightly argue, that it does not correspond with the letter of their sacred books ; and they wrongly conclude, that therefore it cannot be what Almighty God was all along designing. Whereas, we conceive, that our eternal Ruler's forecasting thought, which was implied in the law, and became more distinct in the consciousness of the great preachers of righteousness, came more fully to light in the grace and truth which are manifested in Jesus Christ. It could not be, that men should always believe external rites to have a cleansing power, apart from the feeling and life of which they were significant ; or that law, which in its proper idea is restraint, and which is concerned generally about prohibitions, and always about external acts, should for ever seem to them the highest expression of the Will of Him who is a searcher of the hearts, and who by His loving-kindness gives every motive of attraction to the will ; nor again, as both the range of His providence and the spiritual manner of His being became evident to them, could they any longer think, that His sun shone only upon Palestine, and that His goodness was restricted to one race, or that prayer and praise would not be accepted by Him from men lifting up pure hands everywhere. Yet that great Priesthood which so long worshipped Jehovah on Mount Zion, was not to die barren ; the strong forebodings of the Prophets, of some glorified Israel to come, must find one day a fulfilment ; and when the letter of a law had educated men (whether it were through observance, or through recoil,) into a full intelligence of its meaning, they would both know its value as an instrument, and disclaim its dominion as an end, having a deeper allegiance to the thoughts which had been before, and which would be after it. Again, the slaying of animals would come to be felt a burdensome, or even a cruel, kind of worship ; yet the contrition and the consecration of life, implied in such acts, would come out in the same purer form, as

in the resignation of men under severe pain, or their forbearance under injury, and in their dedication of themselves to any good work required of them, with such a feeling as is expressed in the words, *Not my will, but Thine*.

“How far we could have anticipated beforehand such an outgrowing of the Hebrew polity, is difficult to say. For we might have dreaded instead a hardening into sacerdotal or formal scripturalism; and this fear would have been justified by the later Rabbinism of the Jews. Still the event of Christianity shews that the original framework contained, either in itself or with the aid of collateral influences, the capacity of such a growth; and, as in human things we judge the author’s design by the best of which his work is capable, rather than by its partial shortcoming, so much more we must ascribe the best of worldly events to the counsel of the Almighty. Some of you say that the very world is an embodiment of the Divine thinking, and in a certain figurative sense I admit this to be so. But then, neither can any dispensation of things on a large scale have come about, save of that thinking, nor yet can it have reached its destiny until it fulfil the highest good to which the thinking tends; still less is the best of its actual fulfilment to be deemed no part of the original thought. Christianity then, as we say, being the better result of Judaism, must have been its destiny, and so is prophesied in a way by whatever prefigurements of it existed, either in germ, or under veil, in the earlier dispensation. Nor does it fulfil only what is most significant in Judaism, but even in your own religion, and perhaps in all. For it mediates between and harmonises them, adding to the strong belief of the Hebrew, something of the largeness of thought of the Hindú and of the heroic humanity of the Greek, while it sobers these with the household virtues of the Roman, and with the deeper sense of truth and right, which the Hebrew had in his consciousness of having to answer before the Judge of the whole earth. Something correspondent to each part of its faith may be found in some one of the others, but none of

them so harmonised these as to reach its distinctive character; for it brings God as near to man as is possible without confounding the two: it fixes our gaze on immortality, yet so as not to forget the world which now is, and it abases by a deep sense of unworthiness, in order both to comfort with forgiveness, and to exalt with hallowing power.

“These things may come out more clearly, if I now describe the author and the origin of our faith, the doctrines of which I have expounded from our Lord’s prayer, and which you know, as a fact, is established in the Christian Church throughout many countries of the world. It was in Judæa,—the land in which, of all others, the fear of God had been inherited through many generations, and where, in that fear, all the ties of human life had been consecrated as Divine appointments, and where all the fears of the conscience had been expressed in expiatory ritual, and all the infinite hopes of the soul in prayer and praise, while a wonderful display of providence in history had schooled the nation through glory and downfall,—there our Saviour, Jesus of Nazareth, was born, as the Son of Man. He had in Him the fulness of human nature, and inherited with it whatever might mark the purest of His race. He was not, therefore, hostile to nature, or to humanity. He looked admiringly on the lilies of the field; He entered into the festivities of marriage, and felt pity by the bier of death; He remembered fondly the old glory of His country and of her kings; He shed tears over the city, upon which He foresaw that the same immoral fanaticism and love of power, which had formerly slain righteous men, would soon, in conjunction with narrow obstinacy, bring down a crushing doom; He loved especially the youngest, and many think the fairest, of His disciples; and before He resigned His spirit into the hands of His Heavenly Father, He commended His earthly parent to affectionate care. It is clear that there can have been no right belief amongst His countrymen, either as to the providence of God, or its manifestation in their history, which Jesus would not inherit; while even their temporal or local

associations would be things among which He grew up, and in accordance with which His hearers would understand His language, so that we might expect Him to have employed such things in speaking, no less than the native tongue of His country. For language in its full extent comprehends popular associations no less than words. But besides all this, there dwelt in Jesus the fulness of the Divine Truth; even as the image answers to the seal, so was the Truth in Him the ‘express image\*’ of the very being of the High and Holy One who inhabiteth eternity; and having without measure the indwelling of that Holy Spirit which joins the Father and the Son, He felt, alike through earthly life and in death, His perfect One-ness with the Supreme Father. He and His Father were One.

“The time when Jesus appeared was when the Jews were subject to Rome, under the empire of Augustus and Tiberius. The loss of their independence galled them; the stricter sort were daily more anxious for the continuance of their sacred law, which was endangered by contact with foreign manners and literature; hence the zealots were tempted to draw, if possible, a stricter† line than ever around the circle which they thought holy in proportion as it was narrow, but which, in spite of them, widened itself in many men’s conceptions: the common people were eager to hail any national deliverer who, according to the literal hopes of the prophets after the Babylonian exile, should build up the throne of David; while the more prudent, and those who had rank or Roman favour to lose, dreaded an outbreak, which could only end in destruction. Those sects or bodies of teachers, who adhered strictly to the law, and even fenced it round with commentaries, as the Scribes and Pharisees‡ did, were more popular than the Herodians who courted Rome, or the Sadducees whose worldly pride despised spiritual

\* Hebrews i. 3.

† See the early part of Gfrörer’s *Urchristenthum*, Stuttgardt, 1838.

‡ The word *Pharisee* is derived from *Pharash*, to expound; though from an homonymous root it acquired the sense of *separate*.



things, and despaired of the nation's hope. Yet the zeal of the common people did not save them from changes of thought, due partly to contact with foreigners, and partly to the fermenting of their own minds. The Essenes endeavoured to realise a hermit sanctity which the law had not prescribed, and which had only few models in their older history. It is probable, that foreign (and even Bauddha) influence, caught through Alexandria, may have conspired to stimulate this process in Judæa. Again, the mutual instruction and free prayer of the synagogue must have wrought in men's minds, and supplanted, except on rare occasions, the sacerdotal worship of the Temple, though they left it a recognised sanctity. On the whole, we see traces of an uneasy ferment in the Jewish mind, a longing after the Past, yet an awakening of thought which would hardly have welcomed its literal resuscitation ; and an intense jealousy of Gentile influence, with symptoms that the nation was being imbued by it. When Jesus began to teach, (after being preceded by the stern preacher John, who was to awaken men's minds to receive a new order of things,) He addressed the two great anxieties of His countrymen, as if He were about to fulfil their hope. *Good news*, He said, *the kingdom of God is coming* : And as to the Law, He said, *I am not come to destroy the Law, but to fulfil*. Hence both the common people in their simple patriotism, and the Scribes in their zeal for the Law, might be expected to welcome the new Teacher.

“ But it soon appeared that Jesus would fulfil such hopes, not in their letter, but in some higher meaning. One of His first sayings is, *Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven* : and one of His last, *My kingdom is not of this world*, which elsewhere He explains, by saying, *The kingdom is within you*. All the blessings mentioned by Him in His first great discourse, are ascribed to meekness, purity, hunger for spiritual things, and, in short, to what is purest in heart and conscience, rather than to kingly pomp and worldly success. Here is the whole question raised, whether a kingdom of sword or of

thought is the greatest, and whether happiness is most in grandeur and animal gratification, or in the health of our better souls. All that is best in your Indian wisdom should lead you here to take part with Jesus against the worldly and the animal. Again, Jesus was on the side of the law, so far as it condemned all sin, and subjugated things to God. But so far as it consisted of external prohibitions, and reached neither the root of things nor their fulness, Jesus abolished it to make room for a higher. Moses forbids murder, and adultery, and false swearing. Jesus persuades us to put away the thought, the glance\*, and the profane lightness which grow into such deeds. Moses, who deals with outward acts, rightly allows marriage to be dissolved, when the love which should bind it is broken; but Jesus, who by His wisdom fashions the thoughts, says, they do wisely and holily who love to the end as they began. The Law enjoined almsgiving: Jesus persuades us to double our gifts, by hoping for nothing again; thus only can they give us joy in our own mind. The Law could assemble men at prayers; Jesus enables us to pray, by putting before our minds a Father who is ready to hear, and who giveth more than we desire or deserve. The Law gives authority to priests and teachers according to their descent or their office; Jesus requires of them whom He sends, the good works which shall shew their calling and sending to be of God. The Law required many precepts, some wearisome, and some imperfect, and all becoming a burden to the conscience, if they even did not darken it by written formalism; Jesus opens a new and living way in our consciences, by summing up all in two words, which every one that hears them can apply fresh for himself: *Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*; and *Love thy neighbour as thyself*: and again, 'Whatsoever things ye would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them; for this is the Law and the prophets.' No wonder that such teaching seemed different from that of the Scribes; for they could only say, 'it is written, and it is delivered,' not seeing the

\* As Cicero says, "*ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est.*"

reason for the precept ; but Jesus draws water from the living fountain of truth ; and His words have a perpetual echo from the conscience, which is God's witness in man.

“ Thus Jesus abolished for ever for all believers in His truth every law\* of the letter ; and put in its place a new and a living law. But no words are so powerful as His own to awaken in our hearts that sense of the unseen which we call faith ; by which we see no longer mere precepts, but the reasons for them ; thus passing from the letter to the spirit, and apprehending the very truth. He spoke chiefly by parables, which simple people might understand, and which had an especial view to His own time ; but yet their meaning comes out true in some sense for all time, even as His kingdom is for eternity. The Jews are like an elder son who stayed at home with his Father, while the younger one spent his goods in a far country ; so many of the nations had wandered from the Father of their spirits into worship of dumb idols and vile passions, but yet God calls them from afar and has mercy on them, like the Father in the parable falling on the neck of His prodigal son. This, however, is spoken not only to Jew and Gentile, as it might be now to the Hindús, but to whoever grudges the grace of God, and to every sinner who turns his heart to God. Again, the Expounders and the Scripturalists among the Jews are taught by a parable of the shepherd seeking a lost sheep, that God will have even extortioners and great sinners to repent, so that His servants, who know His mind, must needs welcome them into His kingdom. This also is perpetually true. Again, the Jewish nation, having been freed from ignorance and taken to fanatical pride, is likened to a man from whom one evil spirit has been cast out, but who suffers him to return with seven others. So is now every man, who begins to be good, putting away some fault, if afterwards he turn back, and hardening himself in hypocrisy, or in despair, suffer his evil habits to be increased. But the kingdom of God is like leaven, which goes through all

\* See Luther, *Galat.* i. 14 ; and read the third chapter of 2nd Corinthians.

the lump of the meal; here you see, that the kingdom which Jesus preached was one of thoughts and feelings, which should work their way out of men's hearts into customs, and laws, and states. Again, it is a little seed, and it becomes a great tree. Here we have its growth from a little seed in a corner of Palestine, till it overshadows the earth; and again, in man's heart, from a single good thought, or prayer, till it fill him with good fruits. Again, on stony ground it perishes, and so in hard hearts; amidst thorns it is smothered, and so among worldly anxieties; by the wayside fowls devour it, and so with careless seekers after truth, the opponent easily takes away their good impressions; but in good ground it bears fruit; and so does the infinite love of God in every good and honest heart.

“ Even the common sayings of Jesus have a manifold meaning. He speaks of the coming fall of Jerusalem; but His words hold true of every great judgment of God in the world. *One shall be taken, and the other left*; so shall it be in the final judgment between good and bad. *Look not back, and return not*; so should no one look back to any place of sin, any more than to a city of destruction. *Where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered*; as Judæa falls, she will be rent by the Roman eagles; but also, wherever sin is ripe, there the ravening judgments will be gathered. *Then shall they see the Son of Man coming*. They saw unwillingly, when Jerusalem was fallen, Mankind taking the place of Jewry, and humanity more esteemed than a narrow fanaticism; but also they saw the name and doctrine of Jesus whom they had crucified, taking the upper place in the hearts of all nations. *Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up*: they thought it said of a temple of stones, but He meant one which should be an assembly of living minds, pervaded by the breath of God, and so tenanted by the spirit of Christ, that to His mind it would become an embodiment, and out of it should go sacrifices of thanksgivings, and incense of prayer, to the great Father. *Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into*

*the kingdom of God.* Unless Nicodemus unlearned that mind of prejudices which he had imbibed with his mother's milk, and rose out of the waters of baptism into a new world of thought, he could never know the power of that kingdom, after which God was fashioning the world anew; but again, unless we have the holiness of which our baptismal water is a symbol, and run counter to many humours that come of our natural birth, we cannot be kings and priests in God's kingdom of the mind, or have that peace which the world cannot give.

“As the words of Jesus teach, so do His deeds. As He is the great teacher against sin, so is He the healer of pain\*. Thereby we learn, how these two things hang together; the one being contrary to the will of God in our mind, and the other in our body; both therefore being invaders of His kingdom. But when the rightful Lord reigneth, all such enemies must be put under our feet. Sin, being the greatest, must go first; and suffering, so far as practicable, must decrease; and so far as it remains, as being, for wisdom or necessity, the will of our Heavenly Father, we shall not call it evil. Hence, when Jesus takes away the sin of the world, He says to the cripple, *Arise, and walk*; and to the leper, *I will, be thou clean*. Thus Jesus shews first the lovingkindness of the supreme Deity whose ‘express image’ is made manifest to our sight in Him; then He teaches the connexion of sin with suffering; He again sets to right the order of God's world, by taking away these things which disordered it; and altogether He manifests in His own person that image of divine power, healing, and blessing, and comforting, which men instinctively fall down and worship, as answering to the best prophecies of their conscience respecting the nature of the Godhead. As by faith He opens the eyes of our conscience, so He gave sight to the blind; as He purifies from sin, so He cleanses the leper; as He raises the palsied

\* It is worthy of note that nothing *suffers* but what *fears*, and so is capable of apprehending some degree of law; and as responsibility ascends in the creation, so generally sensibility to pain.

energies of our soul into better life, so He made the paralytic bodies walk ; as He gives an utterance to our better thoughts in prayer and praise and bold confession before any adversary, so He made the dumb to speak ; as He casts out evil tempers, so He healed men of disorders in mind or body, which seemed the working of evil spirits ; as He lifts our humanity out of the death of its nobler part, so He called forth Lazarus from the grave ; and as He gives us a victory over death and extinction, so He exhibited the same in His person and His cause, by dying and rising again. Thus His works are not only wonderful, but significant ; they are signs to us of might, and of right, and of holiness, and of a love rejoicing to overtake evil and to change it into a ministry of good. Yet, if some have dwelt too exclusively on the element of wonderful power in the works of Jesus, we will not altogether overlook it. For certainly His works transcend the skill or knowledge of man ; they run counter, not indeed to the highest law, but to the ordinary processes of nature ; they introduce, as it were, a new cause into the order of effects, so as to modify them, and this cause seems of a creativeness equal or kindred to that which originally designed the whole. They are works of healing greater than man's works, and certainly no one would think of ascribing their goodness to any malignant demon, or Rákshasa ; it remains then, that these apparent interpositions in nature come of a goodness above nature, or of the Mind which disposed all things. It is very wholesome to be reminded, on some signal occasions, that all this visible order is under the rule of a higher mind ; and we can more easily believe such mementos to come of the highest, when their working is for health, and in harmony with the will of goodness which is ever fulfilling itself by a law of love. It is also to be noticed, that Jesus heals chiefly those who have faith, or a certain concurrence of will ; and we not only find it natural for the will when touched by faith to brace the lower powers, but such a result is quite in harmony with the entire genius of that realm of thought, which

Jesus proclaims as the kingdom of God. Nor is the mere wonder or awe in signal cures altogether useless. For out of awe comes naturally worship; and if ruder races most require to be so awakened, yet the most disciplined thinkers will accept such process as a step to something higher, if they are so led on to find a higher order, and a display of the Divine wisdom in things strange, as well as usual. Nor is it difficult to believe, that the highest truth, or the highest wisdom, may work by order even in things strange; for it partakes of, or coincides with, that very wisdom which made the worlds, and knows all the laws which itself, or its Author, fixed of old. Since then Jesus spake as never man spake, and lived a life of God embodied in flesh, we think it but reasonable for Him to have done the works of God. How different are His wonders from those told in your Indian legends of mountains held over milkmaids, or of magicians riding through the air, or of demon-dwellers in Ceylon shivering as they felt a new power near them. Jesus does nothing for caprice, or for ostentation, or as it were of mere human will; but He works the will of the supreme Father, in both manifesting His power over nature, and the beneficent will which wields it. No one of His works, save at most two, are not works of clear goodness; and those two are striking lessons, as when He makes the stricken fig-tree a parable to barren loiterers on the earth, or the drowning of the swine an emblem of unclean creatures given up to evil impulses.

“Thus the entire life of Jesus is that of perfect man, and yet of the Son of God manifesting His grace and truth. His truth comes out from no less than the highest Being, which it visibly mirrors, and with which it ever remains One; His love is that of God calling through Him all His wandering children to the Father; His wisdom is that of Him who knows all the secret springs of nature, and holds in His hand the hearts of men, and the fountain of events. Here is truly an Incarnation. The thought of God here comes to fulfilment in man; the

likeness of God, in which man was destined according to his Maker's will to live, is here shewn without blur or spot; the Divine goodness and the human obedience are blended in one great Harmoniser or Mediator; and this outcoming or manifestation of Deity in our nature may truly profess to have been from the beginning, even from of old. For the Law did but faintly express its will; the prophets looked forward to a fulfilment in act of a thought which had been before them; the sacrifices were but symbols of a self-dedication such as this; and when the Scribes say, this highest truth is contrary to the letter of Moses, or trenches on the dignity of Abraham or of his children, none but the very Truth of God embodied can answer, 'Before Moses, and *before Abraham was, I AM.*' In a way, indeed, Man is before Israel, as Humanity before Nations, and Justice before Law, and Faith before Ritual, and Redemption before Punishment; but He who embodies in Himself all the eternal substance, says confidently, Before these shadows were, I AM.

"Whatever then your poets have fabled of the Divine preserver's becoming incarnate in Ráma or Crishna, seem to me shadows of the truth, that the thought of the eternal Spirit must come to fulfilment in act, and His wisdom manifest itself to our experience embodied in a living person, before we can know the counsel of Him whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways as our ways. How easily we may bewilder ourselves in speculations about that which is above our senses, and beyond our experience, is but too clear from all the former part of this dialogue, which I am almost ashamed now of having borne a part in. And although the visible world may be some shadow of the thought of the Almighty, yet how unworthy are the things we tread and consume, and even blame or abhor, to be taken as adequate images of Him who is above and beyond and higher and deeper, and by His wisdom causes these senseless things to be! But if you would know how human life brings out our Maker's will, read that of Jesus. See



Him obedient, holy, harmless, doing good, reviled, and reviling not again, caring for all save for Himself, resigning Himself to the reproach of the cross, and after saving all who drew nigh to Him, enduring to have it said, *Himself He cannot save*. If you would know God's judgment of sin, see what Jesus suffered to save men from it. If you would know that Divine love which passeth knowledge, hear the call of Jesus to all who are weary of the world, and laden with sin, to come unto Him and find rest; or see His deeds of mercy exemplifying His speech; and then be persuaded, that this should be the author and finisher of our faith, the Son of the living God.

“You will ask, how came the Jews to reject Jesus? This may seem strange until you consider it thus. To all those who could not pass from the world of the senses into that of thought, and so accept the higher meaning which He gave to the two principal hopes of His nation, He seemed to disappoint them in both. The Scripturalists and Expounders, who wished Him to support the time-hallowed system of Moses, were very jealous of that leading into the deepest spirit, which even in fulfilling the letter overthrew its authority; for thus the whole system of their ancestral polity, and temple, and law, was swept away. They then could hardly fail to call Jesus a Samaritan or an infidel, and as such they thought it their duty to punish Him. The common people again, who sighed to be delivered from the Roman tax-gatherer, thought it not only a disappointment, but a treason to their race, that one should place the kingdom of God within the heart, and turn all minds from national glories, to the palm won in a strife against evil passions and lusts. They then, though their first hope might cry *Hosanna*, would in the shock of disappointment say, *Crucify Him*. Again the sacerdotal politicians, who ever feared some popular rising might draw down Roman vengeance, thought it sound policy to rid themselves of One whose doctrines, whether understood or misunderstood, might ruin the nation. Add to this confusion of Jewish feeling that mixture of prejudice and carelessness in

human nature, which is ever uneasy at the cry of reform, and especially shrinks from a reformation of manners which may involve trouble and sacrifice. You will then easily see how the ancestral law of Moses, however burdensome it had become, could not be abolished even for a higher law of the spirit and of truth, unless He who wrought out such freedom purchased it with His blood. So the Priests, and the Scripturalists, and the Expounders, delivered Jesus into the hands of the Romans; and He was crucified under Pontius Pilate between two thieves; thus He, in whose mouth no guile had been found, *was numbered amongst the transgressors*; He who had wept over Jerusalem, was counted a traitor; He who had embodied the love of God in His life, was put to death for infidelity and blasphemy; and He whose kingdom was to be in the hearts of men to the ends of the earth, was rejected by those who might have chosen Him, when they said, *We will not have this Man to reign over us*. This seemed indeed a triumph of the great enemy. The mystery of evil, and the confusion of relations in the world, and the necessity for even love to work out its purpose through suffering, have had no hour in history so dark. The life had fulfilled all that our imagination can paint as most Divine; the death was of the most utter humiliation, rejection, pain, and shame. *My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?* were the words of Jesus from the Psalms; and the bystanders answered, *He trusted in God that He would deliver him; let Him deliver him if He will have him*.

“But rejoice not against me, O mine enemy. The policy of the priest, and the madness of the multitude, and the yielding of the governor, wrought out of their unconscious freewill the higher counsel of the Eternal. For thus, in the first place, Jesus fulfilled the sacrifice of His life, even to the end. We can all obey, when the will of God enables us to do good by being exalted. But Jesus was obedient even to the death of the cross. Nothing unforeseen had come upon Him. Nor yet was His death self-chosen, but appointed to Him. His mere

human will might have shrunk, but He said to His Father, *Not My will, but Thine*. Thus He fulfilled in His own body on the accursed tree that entire self-dedication which the old sacrifices of the law had been intended to express; and He made good the prophecy of the psalmist, that *the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit*. He had heard in spirit, what for each of us is written, *My son, give me thine heart*.

“Secondly, Jesus thus shewed His loving patience towards men. For in that hour, when God could refuse Him nothing, He prayed not for ease, or for exaltation, but said, *Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do*. He remembered, as no meaner sufferer would, what genuine zeal for their entire system of temple and scripture animated many of His slayers, so that in giving over into lawless hands Him by whom the whole Mosaic polity was being abolished, they thought they did God service. Nor is there anything in which Christians more require a return to their Master’s doctrine than in their tone of mind towards the Jews. If we remembered how little the present generation can help what their forefathers did, and how few even out of that generation could have borne an active part, and what mistaken zeal and fidelity to the God, as they thought, of their fathers, and to His written revelation, was their working motive, we should speak of them now more in compassion than in anger. But Jesus Christ is above Christianity, and you see here His very mind.

“Thirdly, Jesus fulfilled by dying, not only the thing meant in ancient sacrifices, but the martyr-type, or the character of all godlike sufferers for the right and the good. It is no strange thing for one who benefits others to do so at his own cost. You cannot give and retain the gift. You cannot warn without danger of dislike, nor teach higher truth without irritating those bound to the lower. You could not have had the old Jewish fidelity to Scripture, and temple, and race, without obstinate prejudice, and exclusiveness as well. There is no light without shadow, nor virtue without its kindred fault.

But God, with whom is no variableness, does not lightly change His laws, or suffer any principle to vary its operation, because persons come within its range or stand aloof. He blows with His wind, and the waters flow, either to bear the skilful mariner, or to drown the heedless. If we will do good, He gives us in doing it a reward above all we can ask or think; but He suffers us to pay the price of conflict with evil. He who puts naked foot on the serpent's head\* will be stung in crushing the monster. There is even in soberest martyrdom, (be it reverently spoken,) a kind of rashness for the man's self; for his eye is on some holier and far-off object, and he cares not what may happen to him by the way. Thus he breaks the immutable law of self-preservation, though he has the reward of keeping a higher law of self-sacrifice to the Highest. If he would change the law of a nation, or the thought of the world, he must pay the price of his good name or his life; though if the idea with which his mind† labours be a true one, God will give him a reward in fulfilling it; for he will be helping forward the kingdom. Thus Jeremiah‡ the prophet had been among his countrymen 'like a lamb or an ox that is brought to the slaughter;' and perhaps of him, or of some kindred prophet, or his company, it was originally said that he was 'a man of sorrows§' and 'afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb.' So of many of the prophets, and of the sweet singers in the courts of the Lord's house, we find it written that their heart was broken with heaviness, and the ploughers|| ploughed upon their back, as they went on their way weeping, and bearing good seed, of which the fruit could only come after many days. But by faith they all endured, as seeing Him that is invisible; and even the shape of things temporal became, through their words,

\* See the beautiful Sermons of the late Rev. Fred. Robertson, of Brighton.

† Ev. St John, xvi. 21.

‡ Jeremiah xi. 19.

§ Isaiah liii. 3—7.

|| Psalm cxxix. 3; Hebrews xi. 13—37.

moulded more after the beauty on which they had fixed their gaze of things eternal.

“ Thus Jesus, as the change which God gave Him to work in the world was above all, must go beyond all in suffering. Thus He becomes most eminently the ‘man of sorrows;’ and whatever things were written of old, of suffering saint, of crucified prophet, of poor man trampled on, of Moses\* rejected, of Israel becoming a spoil, of Isaiah sawn asunder, and of Jeremiah lamenting over Jerusalem, find a new and a higher fulfilment, for they come eminently to pass again in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He must die as a slave, and as one whom the nation despiseth, before He reigns as King of kings and Lord of lords. But all this is only in harmony with the great mystery of the world’s course, and because God hath given it a law which cannot be broken.

“ See now how this very humiliation brought about the rising again. If we ask, how Christ comes to reign over our thoughts, it is much by the words He spake, and much by the works He did. If He had only uttered great swelling words, and had lived at ease, or sat on the throne of Solomon, how little would He have touched our hearts. Even now a stranger to His mind is not readily followed by His sheep, for they do not know such a one’s voice. But when we see Him paying out of His own life the price of delivering men from evil, going about homeless, while He provides a shelter in which our souls can rest, and suffering poverty and need, while He makes us rich in holy thoughts and happy memories, we feel that this is a true teacher, and we follow Him as a safe guide. When He says, *I am come to throw fire upon the earth*, we foresee it will not be quenched. When in sadder tone He says, *How I would it were already kindled!* and again, *I have a baptism (of suffering) to be baptised with; and how I am straitened until it be accomplished*, we enter into His foretaste of shame and pain; we become convinced that He *came into the world* for

\* Acts vii. 35; Hebrews xi. 26.

no other cause than *to bear witness to the truth*; then, when He is rejected, scourged, crowned with thorns, and spit upon, we shrink back astonished; but our very indignation at the shame turns into more awful wonder at Him who bears it; and, in the dark hour of the judgment-hall, or by the cross, even more than in any triumph, our hearts answer with Peter, *Lord, we are ready to go with thee, both into prison, and to death*. Such is the kingdom God gives to Jesus over our souls. It is wrought out through suffering, and it belongs to the worthiest; so that our allegiance to it is like the sight of the eye to light, and the assent of our reason to truth, or the springing of our heart to what is lovely; we can neither withhold it, nor desire to do so, for nowhere else could we offer it so worthily.

“What I have said of Jesus as a king of thought, will apply equally to Him as a prophet. For though His words have strange power to touch our heart, they do so more from their entire harmony with His life, and from the price which He paid for uttering them. That Truth, which did not begin to be with the Incarnation, but which we see mirroring itself with fulfilment for good or evil in every age of history, has more power over us when we see it embodied in a life, and when this life is evidently hallowed by its presence, and passed in obedience to its law. We see how Truth can support its own messenger, and give secret strength in all trouble, rising in thought above that which rules the body, and though it animate many minds, yet remaining ever One with the highest Being. This highest Truth makes us free from prejudice, and hatred, and fear, and gives us access in the spirit of our minds to that which was, and is, and is to come. Yet it is only through a drama of suffering that it shews its fulfilment among men.

“Again, if Jesus was to be a priest, He must have some oblation to offer. So long as priesthood belonged to a caste, such as Brahmans or Levites, no common man might present his offering in the place where Divine presence might be more immediately apprehended. But when the older ignorance passed,

and the face of the unseen God was unveiled to faith as that of a Father, His presence was no longer in any high and holy place, but wherever men would feel after Him, as not being far from every one of us. Then, not even the least of His children would offer sigh, or prayer, or life, or good-work, or trust, or love, without full confidence of being accepted, as might be fit. Thus all mankind, so far as they knew the Father of Jesus, and their Father, became a spiritual priesthood. But Jesus, who brought to fuller light this freedom which the Patriarchs and Melchisedec had enjoyed, but which caste-worship had imperfectly expressed, became the head of the more spiritual priesthood, and offered above all His brethren an oblation beyond price, in His own life and death, and the anguish of His consenting will. In Him is the fulness, both of that which gave the old sacrifices their meaning, and of what must be in every offering of ours, if it is to avail in the sight of God. We all who drink into His mind, associate our feebleness with His more perfect self-devotion; thus as we give ourselves to God in solemn sacrament, or in action, or in suffering, we catch a virtue not our own; our lives become penetrated with the spirit of His death; and whenever heartfelt prayers and thanksgivings, or pure thoughts and deeds of patience, or goodness, or uprightness, are offered up by us in His holy name and spirit,\* He, being dead, yet speaketh in us, and is doubtless accepted of the Father.

“There can be no greater sacrifice to God, than for us so to associate our will with His will, as to melt ourselves up in the Divine purpose, and rejoice in its fulfilment, not asking what comes of ourselves, as if that were our own. Not to every one is such love given; but perhaps one sees a perverted form of it in that passion which has made some in past years throw themselves under the car of Jagannátha. For thus they seemed to

\* If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. *Romans* viii. 9. Compare v. 26, and chap. vii. 6, and xiii. 8—10; and *Galatians* iv. 6, 7; v. 13, 14, 22—25.

express a devotion without bounds, though He who gives and preserves our life is not pleased with such a sacrifice. Perhaps again in your doctrine of *Nirvána* is an overstrained and mystical expression for the joy of union with God, by making His design our will. But Jesus seems more perfectly to have fulfilled whatever truth may be in your thoughts, in that He rushed not on self-chosen death, yet most willingly gave His life, when the great enemy of the Divine will could only so be vanquished. Nor can we wonder, that out of a death so holy went forth power for life, as when a seed is cast into the ground, and dies, but there springs up four-fold. Thus by the death of Jesus, even more than by His life, men were drawn to His faith, as if their souls were purified in gazing with a tragical awe; and when they considered how much they partook of that sinfulness in the world which made the death of Jesus necessary to deliver us from evil, they seemed almost to partake of that which slew Him, and were pricked to the heart. You can imagine, what would be the revulsion in men's conscience when thus awakened. A sympathy with the holy sufferer would awaken attention to His doctrine; and its truth, when listened to, would prevail in proportion as there was good ground to receive it. Even the rude nations of the North (as the savage Clovis and his people) were awakened out of their native ferocity as they felt a better indignation at the griefs of the Man of sorrows on the Cross. Nor should I suppose that you in India would be deaf to the witness which unparalleled suffering gives to the highest Truth.

“He who is so identified with the holiest cause as to lose himself in it, will think its triumph no mean reward. Nor is this entire self-abnegation beyond the reach of that love which seeketh not its own, of which God makes the soul capable. Yet we have a presentiment stretching into a faith, that the very mind thus devoted will find from the Divine equity an acknowledgment of its work, and have a reward in seeing it prosper, and even an overflow of gift beyond recompense in everlasting



life from Him whose breath has come upon it, and dwelt in it\*. For certainly it will find in God no less love than its own, and it is easy for Him to give out of that eternal life of which He has the fountain, and which He causes to flow. Thus he who seeks not his life shall find it, if he seeks first God, who is life, and who gives over and above. Moreover the man will be thus kindred to God, who is love; and if he is a son, then is he heir of the Father, by whom every fatherhood on earth is both willed and stands. Or again, as one partakes of that thought and love which are beyond time and death, so the bounds of these will not hold that in Him which is above them.

“ Thus, even if Jesus the Son of Man had not risen from the grave, He would yet have rejoiced in His work of redeeming His own people from the curse of the law, and of binding both Jews and all nations in the fellowship of that truth which is before the law and beyond it. He would still have lived by His own spirit and the spirit of the Father in that temple which is made of living minds, so that it would be to Him a body, and His mind would animate it. This then would be the kingdom of the Father, whose express image would be seen in it by faith as the very truth, and His holy will would come out in it in act, as through eternity it is conceived in thought without bound. Such an eternal life, I say, would be a reward to Jesus; and it would fulfil many of His deepest sayings of what life is†, and what death is, and what freedom and bondage are, and many sayings of His Apostles as to what rising from the dead is, and of heaven and earth passing away, and of the Lord God Omnipotent reigning, and of His dwelling in His people for ever. Hence I do not wonder that some ultra-spiritualists, or mystics, among Christians, have thought such was the only meaning of the words of Jesus, and is their fulfilment. They think, as I

\* 1 Corinthians ii. 10—16.

† Ev. St John, xvii. 3; xii. 50, 25; vi. 50, 51, 63; v. 25; viii. 34: Ephesians ii. 5, 6: Romans vi. 11, 22.

suppose, (though their thoughts are not always spoken clearly,) that we could not doubt the life of Jesus after bodily death in that realm of thought which He has unveiled as encompassing and coming forth in the visible world, but that His own strong contrast between body and soul, and the spirit of His words and their letter, points to a spiritual rather than a bodily rising again; and as they find His words fulfilled in this spiritual sense, they think the literal may have been but a parable; but yet as the parables of the wise have analytical self-consciousness, while those of the sensuous Many are less conscious of their own meaning, and come forth in the form of poetry, thus translating truth into figure and thought into story, so our ultra-spiritualists conceive, that the victory of the mind and faith of Jesus over death and extinction took its popular expression in the form of a story of His bodily outstanding before the senses of His disciples, and of His visibly ascending into the heavens, and sitting, as in royalty, at the right hand of the Supreme King upon a throne of brightness.

“Possibly such views may not be without use in turning inward our thoughts and deepening our sense of moral good and evil, and so quickening our conceptions of the mental nature of the kingdom of God. But yet the overwhelming majority of Christian men believe, what the Apostles plainly teach, that Jesus rose bodily from the grave on the third day, and communed with His disciples for forty days, and after explaining to them the kingdom of God, was taken up from this earth into that higher realm which we call heaven, in which the Divine glory is more manifestly displayed. Nor yet, in saying this, do they mean to rest merely on visible things. They gladly own that there is something spiritual in the resurrection of Christ. Its evidence to them is not merely the number of witnesses saying that they saw, but the great likelihood that He who had lived a life of God, would come out of death with the clear power of God. We cannot crush the air nor quench the great breath of life by merely changing its form; still less can we

slay any thought of the mind which goes beyond death; and less still any truth which takes hold of mind after mind, and comes immortal out of every persecution. So the holiest Truth which dwelt in Jesus, and above all the Divinity which upholds it, and of whose very being it is the outshining, must come forth in calm victory out of trial, and be only glorified by the opposition of every enemy. But if it was necessary (because our sensuous conceptions do not easily rise to spiritual things) that this Divine Truth should be embodied in the life and death of Jesus, there would be the same necessity for its embodiment in His resurrection. Our faith is not triumphant until it has seen the victory as well as the suffering. If the Divine thought for this world comes to fulfilment in the flesh, so must it for the world to come. Thus He who shewed, as the Son of Man, our true life on earth, being lifted from the grave as the Son\* of God, shews our entrance into life eternal. Thus our Revelation becomes complete: and as you hold that the visible world embodies the Divine thinking, so Christians believe that the far higher world, or rather the mind of God which upholds it, is unveiled by being embodied to historical experience in the life, the death, the resurrection, and the ascension of Jesus the Mediator between God and man. Thus Spirit manifests itself in matter, both lying beyond, and upholding, and coming out in it; sin, or rebellion against the will of the forecasting Spirit, is taken away; death is triumphed over; and the kingdom of His thought, which it is the will of God should come, is not only seen afar by pure faith, but is brought nearer in light. Thus our eyes *behold the King in His beauty*.

“That these things were so, not in parables with a meaning† but in outward act, seems taught by the Apostles of Christ in all their writings. It was in the power of the resurrection of their Lord that they took courage to preach the forgiveness of sins against that external law which lay heavy on men’s consciences; but they put instead of it a better law, the love of God per-

\* Romans i. 3, 4; and viii. 19—23.

† 2 Pet. i. 16

vading the heart, and the deeper mind which comes as a gift of the Holy Spirit; and thus bringing men to the Father, through the Son who died and rose again, and through the Holy Spirit who joins together Father and Son, they turned Jewry into Christendom, and a world of sin, and shadows, and perplexities, into a realm in which the eternal Author of good daily more reigns, through the revelation of His mind in His well-beloved Son.

“When the Apostles reasoned how their Master had fulfilled in His own life the deepest substance of all that the law and the prophets meant or were intended for, they could not doubt that the mission He had received was the highest; so that whatever unction or consecration belonged to the office of king, or priest, or prophet, had a higher reality in the spiritual office of the Saviour. Thus Jesus was most eminently the Christ; hence we are called Christians: and the things spoken of men once anointed for office might be transferred, so far as they were good, to Him. But His anointing was one of the Holy Spirit\*, and of marvellous power over men's hearts. For a time it might be that some of the Apostles expected a visible reign of their Lord on earth; but such thoughts would fade in the deeper views of His kingdom of thought, which the Holy Spirit taught them with experience; and when Jerusalem was razed, and its temple swept away, the simplest must have seen that the coming of the Son of man, which was to be in that generation, meant His coming in spirit and in power. When the old world of Jewry, with its sensuous heavens, and its earth at a distance from God, had passed into a kingdom of the Eternal encompassing us, the spirit of Christ made all things† new in the Church at large, as from the beginning He had wrought a new and deeper mind in the hearts of those who received Him.

“Time would fail us to tell of all the deeds of the Apostles and martyrs who went forth transforming the world in the spirit of Jesus, as the Christ of God. It is far better you should read

\* Acts x. 38.

† Revelations xxi. 2—5.

them in their writings, which yet breathe of the Holy Spirit, by which they spake and lived. Unlearned, and ignorant, and of like passions with ourselves, they wrought by that love of God which breathed through them such a victory for His truth over violence and evil, as never men did before. The first in this noble army of the Prince of Peace is Peter, who in the weakness • of man denied his master, and then repented, so that he received strength to live and die for Him. He takes up the great lesson of Christ, that God is a Spirit; that our sacrifices\* must be spiritual; that all who come to God in spirit and in truth, are now a royal priesthood, and, no less than the Jews once thought themselves, a chosen race, and a people separate for good. Thus men are delivered from evil, he says, not by any external rite of purifying, but by the answer of a good conscience which should go with our acceptance of the grace of God as members of His Church. Nor was it an outward price, as of silver and gold, which bought men their freedom of knowing God as He is, and coming to Him as the Father, but the gift of His own life and precious life's blood by our great Deliverer. St Peter, indeed, for a time hesitated between a clear sight of the kingdom of God thus unveiled, and some natural feelings as a Jew. He hardly knew whether the old law had not still force, just as some Brahman, become a Christian, might have scruples about food, or caste; so he hesitated about receiving Gentiles, and eating with them before his countrymen, just as you might in reference to some Pariah, if high-caste men were looking on. But as God taught him more of the mind of Christ in prayer and tranquillity of slumber, he put away such relics of the old man, and rose to a fuller sense of our freedom before Him who readeth the heart, and of mankind's brotherhood before our Father in heaven. Thus he became the first to give Gentiles every Christian symbol of their entering into the kingdom; and so Christ fulfilled His promise, that he should have its keys, and open its gates, both persuading men's hearts to desire to

• 1 St Pet. ii. 9.

come in, and giving them the appointed emblem of allegiance with a blessing.

“ Thus upon Peter, as upon a living stone, very near to the corner stone, which is Christ, who binds Jews and Gentiles into one, was built the temple of living minds. Thus he too, and the other Apostles, bound and loosed ; for such was their simplicity of heart, and innocence of faith, that what their good instinct shrank from, we see still to be wrong, and what they praised, we still find right. Such is the power of ‘an honest and good heart,’ that without learning it discerns things that are excellent ; for it does not quench the Spirit of God, and so is sensitive to evil and good. But what such men speak so as to find answer in pure consciences for ever, is doubly an echo of the law of heaven. Their freedom from rules is no rebellion against the inner law of truth. Consider now these precepts of St Peter, and if you find fault with them, say so ; but if they seem to express binding truths, help me to teach them to your children, as the religion of Christ.

‘ Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit unto unfeigned love of the brethren, see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently : being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever. For all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away : but the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you.’

‘ As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God. Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the king. Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear ; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it, if, when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently ? but if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God. For even hereunto were ye called : because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow His steps : who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth : who, when He was

reviled, reviled not again ; when He suffered, He threatened not ; but committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously : who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness : by whose stripes ye were healed. For ye were as sheep going astray ; but are now returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls.'

" Something of a Jewish mind, as once in St Peter, appears in St James. The Gospel wears in him a half unveiled aspect. Its good news is chiefly to the poor, that the Lord\* of hosts is their ally against wealthy oppressors. Its righteousness is almsgiving. Its foundation of the Church is the equal value of souls in sight of one Judge. Its motive is fear of judgment, and its tone has an echo of the Law of Sinai. Yet the law which St James teaches is not that of the letter, but of a free and earnest conscience. His governing principle is, to love our neighbour as ourself. Thus he is a true disciple of Christ, of whom by birth he was a kinsman ; and yet he shews that he has received the Spirit only by measure. Here is some of his wholesome doctrine :—

' Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. Of His own will begat He us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures. Wherefore, my beloved brethren, let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath : for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God. Wherefore lay apart all filthiness and greediness of vice, and receive with meekness the ingrowing word, which is able to save your souls. But be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves. For if any be a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass : for he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. But whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed. If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain. Pure

\* Compare Neander's *Planting of Christianity*, or the Rev. A. P. Stanley's *Sermons and Essays on the Apostolic Age*.

worship and undefiled before our God and Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.'

"There might have seemed danger of the faith of Christ becoming a zeal for the law, or a mere reform in the religion of the Jews. But God by His Holy Spirit sent the Apostle Paul, whose turning with all his heart is a great sign of the power of the Gospel, as his life became an instrument in spreading it. His Hebrew name was Saul. He had been brought up in the strictest form of Scriptural Pharisaism\*, and was zealous for the Mosaic Law, which he had received by tradition from his fathers. How could he then tolerate 'the new way,' which degraded all that he valued into instruments of something higher? He looked on Christians as infidels, and thought it a duty to assail them. If it ever struck him that the old ritual was burdensome, and not even fulfilled by himself, while the life of Christ and of believers in Him shewed a higher righteousness, he kicked against such goads of conscience, and turned more fiercely to persecute. For this purpose he was on his way to Damascus. But then God gave him a true vision of the risen Saviour, harmless, undefiled, and blessing, and he became a new man. The scales fell from his eyes, and his old thoughts passed away. So he washed away his sins in the bath of new birth, and proclaimed good news of a wider deliverance than that of the Jews, in the name of that Master of the heart, against whom he had striven. He still needed instruction from human instruments, and may have gone through internal conflicts in his three years of retirement. But he came forth the greatest preacher of such a doctrine as I have expounded from our Lord's Prayer. He found that not by the written law, without something deeper, could man become righteous with God. For even if he fulfilled all its rites, they did not cleanse the conscience. And who could fulfil them? It rather taught a sense of sin, by standing with its threats over against the human

\* Philippians iii. 4—6; Acts xxii. 3; Gal. i. 14.



soul, not entering into it as a strengthener, but shewing an impossible standard. So it became an enemy, slaying the mind with a consciousness of discrepance between desire and performance, and giving even to physical death another terror. But if it could be shewn that this hostile law came out of love, and that underneath it was an eternal purpose to educate in the nature of evil, and to deliver from it, then it might become a schoolmaster to something better. But this Christ had done, having a mission from the Father, as an unction of the mind, to unveil this purpose. He had proclaimed the infinite love of God which gives strength to man, and unveiled the better meaning of the sacrifices, and given to faith a higher righteousness in reconciliation of our spirits with the Father, who may have ordered for His children precepts and terrors like stewards and governors, but who has loved them all along, and only educated them to do His will, which is their deliverance from evil. Thus the Law became no more a master, but an instrument; its letter was seen to be only the expression of a better spirit; its water was changed to wine; it was taken away as a terror, and only its instruction remained. It had been as a grammar which taught our souls the language of righteousness; and when this became instinctive to our thoughts, the letter of rules might be put aside. What if Christ could not reveal such a will of God without stepping Himself into the place of the old sacrifices, and buying our freedom with the price of His blood? His dedication of Himself then was that which should give the law of things to come, as well as the interpretation of things old. By remembering it in solemn sacrament, and renewing it, though imperfectly, in our lives, we should have the same pledge of God's 'frank forgiveness\*' of sin, as the Israelite when he made his sin-offering at the altar. For by lifting up the crucified Saviour from the grave, the Father shewed that His offering was accepted, and that His prayer for the deliverance of His people could never fail. Our righteousness then

\* St Luke vii. 42.

comes not of legal ritual, or of human strength, but of the love of God which forgives us, and of His grace which gives life to our soul, and through a faith which makes us partakers of the mind of Christ, and enables us to look up through the Son to the Father. But as love answers to love, so this free gift will awaken gratitude; the unveiling of what God calls righteousness, as something not external but converting the heart and reins, will both attract us with its goodness, and give us strength for a higher life, by writing a law in our hearts, and making it part of our spiritual being. As the Jew must not call his written law righteousness, neither must the Gentile anything of the same kind. We shall make no claim for almsgiving, though willing to remember the poor. We shall not think that any outward communion saves us, though desirous to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. Our new law will come of faith in the All-holy, the All-merciful, and the Spiritual Teacher. It would be written in the unseen world, and our faith would apprehend it. The grandest instance of its fulfilment would be the suffering upon the cross, which the Son of God paid as a price for the abolition of the old law of the letter. This, therefore, would be the type after which the new life we received from Him would fashion itself. We should offer ourselves willingly, as He was an offering. We should die at last to all stain of evil, as He died on the shameful tree; we should love, as He loved us, and rise out of the death of the soul into a life which His Spirit can sustain in us, and which will grow up into life eternal.

“But where then were the exclusive rights of the Jew, or as I might say to you, of any caste? Such a faith as Christ revealed, must be open to whoever would come thereby to the Father. As no claim, so no acceptance of persons. Not Abraham’s blood, but Abraham’s faith. They who thought themselves a chosen people, had to learn, that such choice was no merit of theirs, but a gift which in the fulness of time, or as men became fitted for it, would extend itself to true hearts everywhere. Nor was this such a new doctrine. The old

Prophets had spoken of all nations serving the Lord. However much it may have been veiled, yet what the eternal God is doing now, He had intended from of old. As thought in man runs before action, so the predestination of the Almighty had gone before Christianity. We could not know if we had not first been known by Him. His grace to Israel was only a local expression of a wider design. We see in all nature an instinctive stretching forward to something which each of its parts is destined to become. So among the Gentiles\* there had been a feeling after God, who was not without witness. Amongst all men there had been a shrinking from death, and an earnest expectation† of some higher destiny of the soul, with a groaning to be delivered from things which came short of it. These prophecies of what is immortal in us God had fulfilled for all men in the person of his Son. He has given our dim faith an assurance of hope. He comforts us in every sorrow by the persuasion that we are treading only in the steps of His most Beloved One, and so are having perfected in us that patience which led to His resurrection. For this is our highest destiny, to have that thought of God, which came forth in Him, fulfilled in us; then as sin is vanquished, sorrow is comforted, the will of God is fulfilled in us, and Death, having lost the sting of a hostile law, is no more an enemy; but we pass through its gates after Him who has gone before, to partake of His immortality.

“St Paul’s doctrine is not a narrowing one, but as wide as mankind‡. As in Adam, if we follow lawless humours of animal birth, all suffer a death of the soul; so in Christ, if we partake of His Spirit which does the will of the Father, all are made alive. Nor does he rest in the letter. Though sometimes after the manner of his age, he turns against his countrymen their own weapons, and plays with texts; yet his law of God has been written in the hearts of all nations; his fulfilment of it

\* Acts xiv. 17; xvii. 27, 28; Romans ii. 14, 15.

† Romans viii. 14—19, 22—39.

‡ Romans viii. 6; 1 Corinthians xv. 22.

is by Love; and the prophecies he most dwells on, are not of genealogies, or of birthplace, or of anything earthly and visible; but they turn on deep correspondence of feeling, and on the running through ancient books by the breathing of the Holy Spirit, something of that Grace and Truth, which was fully manifested in Christ our Lord. Nor does he care so much for Jesus known after the flesh; perhaps he knew more than all our Lord's kinsmen; but it is the eternal truth of the glorified Christ, as taught him by the Holy Spirit, which gives him power to persuade. Yet the epistles of St Paul only bring out in fulness, what the discourses of Christ had implied in simple words. You will understand them best by comparing them together. Again, St Paul thinks 'the power of the resurrection' is in its lifting our inner humanity out of the death of sin and worldliness which shut out heaven from our gaze. Yet he does not therefore doubt that the Divine gift of eternal life has been exhibited bodily in Christ; and as the Truth was shewn to men in His incarnation, so was it in His resurrection. For in that wonderful history it pleased God to sum up all things heavenly in the compass of an earthly life; that we might hear once for all His Truth speaking, and see His Love overflowing, and His Patience suffering, yet His Law exemplifying itself, and then His Life coming forth from death, and His spiritual Offspring entering into glory. For by no less a drama could our souls, under these veils of sense, have their eyes opened to all the mystery of the counsel, which God is working of old and for ever. But those will be most confirmed by this fulfilment, who have most of the faith which prophesies it throughout mankind. Therefore to you I speak the more hopefully.

"If St Paul could speak to you now, he would say much of putting away your idols. He would speak of all caste and sect, as he spoke of the separate sanctity of the Jews. He would say of all austere penances, that they profit little, compared to that change of mind which gives peace in the love of

God. He would compare all your ancestral traditions to those of Moses, and deny that they give you a true righteousness of God; thus he would turn you to a more living way of faith in our Heavenly Father, who also reads the heart, and requires sincerity in it. Yet he would find many things in your religion leading up to a higher faith, or containing germs of it. Thus he would allow the eternal God to have trained by such means the growing conscience of your race; but he would shew you a more entire harmony of Heaven and Earth in that likeness of Himself which God has given us in the faith of His dear Son. Both your sacrifices, and your putting away of them, your stories of incarnation, and your theories of spiritual growth, would have something answering to them in the faith of Christ; all your gentle virtues of meekness, and forgiveness, as well as holiness, are eminently taught by Him; and in the glimpse He has opened of a world beyond the grave, your imagination would find an infinity answering to the vastness of its own dreams, but with an actual fulfilment, which they unfortunately want.

“If you would read St Paul, comparing things that correspond among the Hindús and Hebrews, as for instance the old Brahmanical caste with the Levites, and the overgrown Law of Moses with your traditional system, and the new spiritual life which Christ breathed into the world with the attempts of reformers in India, you would find St Paul’s reasonings with the Jews apply often to yourselves; and conclude, I trust, that Christianity is more likely than any Indian creed to fulfil the Sri Bhágavat’s prophecy by bringing all men to the knowledge of God. But here is some of the practical advice which St Paul wrote from prison to his friends:—

‘If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth. For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory. Mortify there-

fore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and viciousness, which is idolatry: for which things' sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience: in the which ye also walked sometime, when ye lived in them. But now ye also put off all these; anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication out of your mouth. Lie not one to another, seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him: where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all. Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any: even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye. And above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body; and be ye thankful. Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly in all wisdom; teaching and admonishing one another in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing with thanks heartily to the Lord. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God our Father by Him. Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them. Children, obey your parents in all things: for this is wellpleasing unto the Lord. Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged. Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but in singleness of heart, fearing God: and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done: and there is no respect of persons. Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven. Continue in prayer, and watch in the same with thanksgiving; withal praying also for us, that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the mystery of Christ, for which I am also in bonds.'

“ You will not wonder that a religion which bore fruits like these in act spread rapidly in the world. For all men desire

happiness; and to follow counsels such as these is to become happy in this life, and to enter with a good conscience on a better. Nor is there a higher witness to God than goodness; and men found in the deeds of Christians who thus lived, the will of our Father who is in heaven. Thus, before St John, the youngest of Christ's disciples died, about a century from his Master's birth, the Church had leavened the world. This John in his youth had the fervent zeal of Elijah. In his first book, which is the Revelations, he records the visions in which God shewed him judgment about to fall on Jerusalem\*. Thus he is carried in spirit to the great Day of the Lord†. He sees the Son of God, who had suffered as a lamb sacrificed on earth, standing with all His company in heaven. The beast of worldly pride and idolatrous power makes war on the saints. The Church, or new society of believers, is as a woman giving birth to a man-child, who is caught up into heaven, but she is driven into the wilderness. God, however, avenges her by sending woes on the guilty City and land. His martyrs, slain in the body, live in the spirit. The imperial City, which sat on seven hills, is to be judged as well as the earthly Jerusalem. Therein we have a type of every worldly Babylon which opposes its pride to the spiritual kingdom of God. As Titus destroyed what was once the Holy City, so the Goths and the Vandals destroyed Rome. The Pagan emperors and nations made war against the Truth of God, but were overthrown in mutual strife, and with the sword of the Spirit. But the Truth went forth prevailing; and the spiritual Jerusalem, or the church and kingdom to which Christians say that the old promises of the Jewish Sion are now extended according to the divine design, came forth in majesty out of the counsel of God. Even during the siege of Jerusalem, those believers who fled, in faith of Christ's warning, to Pella, had been sealed,

\* Revelations i. 1; xxii. 7; xi. 8; xvi. 19. The expositions of Michaelis, of Moses Stuart, and of the Rev. P. S. Desprez, B.D., may be compared.

† Revelations i. 10. A day of the Lord is a signal judgment, or manifestation of His power. Revelations vi. 17; xvi. 14.

as it were, in their foreheads. In the subsequent confusions their faith and patience made them inherit the earth. Then the old enemy of lawless might and idolatrous tyranny was bound as it were in chains, for all the ages during which the Church shall evolve herself in the world. The kingdoms, once thought to depend on earthly might, acknowledge the rule of our Lord and of His Christ. So Christ came quickly, even according to His promise, before the generation which heard Him had passed away. But the new kingdom of God has gone on growing, and though, when the Spirit of her Lord has grown faint in her, she has become part of the world, and partaken of its judgments; yet in proportion as He lives within her members, she has become a tree of healing to the nations, and a gate through which men pass into life eternal.

“These things John, the son of thunder, saw in vision of the Lord’s day of wrath. But in his old age he wrote his more perfect Gospel, in which he sets forth the words which the Wisdom of God spake to men. It was now clearer than ever that Jesus had been the messenger of God; so He was the Christ, and His followers Christians; the entire thought of the Eternal had found fulfilment in Him, and the likeness of God was shewn in Man. In proportion as the Apostles learnt Him to be the Deliverer not only of Jews, but of all nations, the more strongly they felt His kingdom to be not of this world, nor His words to be of man’s speaking, but to come of His oneness with the Father. Thus Christ is set forth by St Paul and St John more clearly than by others, as the Son of God. To His perfect wisdom all the prophets give partial witness; and the better thoughts of great teachers everywhere are joined in His perfect truth. Thus the desire of all nations, the longing faith of men of old, even as the eternal will of the Father, is fulfilled in Christ. We have in Him the same Word which made the heavens of old, and which dwelt as Wisdom for ever in the bosom of the Eternal. From Him comes forth that Breath of the Lord’s mouth which makes all the invisible hosts.



He has emptied Himself of His own, by compressing infinity in the life of a man, thereby opening our eyes to the eternal world. If such a helper seem taken from us, it will be only to dwell among us unseen, or to give us His Spirit, as a Pleader on part of God with us, and on our part with God. Hence come our holiest thoughts, our secret prayers, and our quickened faith, which is no longer an obscure groaning, but yet one that cannot be uttered in words, for the manifestation of the glory of the sons of God. This is the water of eternal life, which alone slakes our soul's thirst. This truth makes us free from bondage of caste, and worldliness, and sin, and fear, and is the beginning of our eternal life.

“ Thus John writes of Christ :

‘ In the beginning was the Word\*, and the Word\* was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were born through Him ; and without Him was not any thing born, that is born. In Him was life ; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness : and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light, that the true Light, which lighteth every man, was coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name : which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth.’

“ These also he gives among the latest words of Christ before He suffered upon the cross :

‘ These words spake Jesus, and lifted up His eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come ; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee : as thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that

\* *Logos*, the Word, means also Reason.

He should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given Him. And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus, whom thou hast sent to be the Anointed. I have glorified thee on the earth : I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world : thine they were, and thou gavest them me ; and they have kept thy word.....Sanctify them through thy truth : thy word is truth. As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world. And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth. Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word ; that they all may be one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us : that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them ; that they may be one, even as we are one : I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one ; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me. Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am ; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me : for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.'

"I trust I have now said enough to give a fair idea of the faith of Christ. You have heard the preparation for it in Hebrew history, and of the change from letter to spirit, and from a nation into humanity, and from law into a message of grace and truth. You have also heard how the Son of God was the Author and Finisher of this blessed change, and how His principal Apostles taught after His death. There are many things, such as the great day of the coming of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles, and the later growth of the Church, which require yet to be treated. But I trust you see that we have a wonderful history, ending in a perfect religion, and a very wholesome literature recording both. These things should make you search for yourselves our sacred books, with prayer for that Holy Spirit, the teaching of which we declare our faith to be ; and I hope, if you compare these things fairly with the

entangled system of Hindúism, and with the better voices of your own conscience and experience, you will find the highest of teachers, the Father of our spirits, from whom every good gift comes, leading you into all truth. But remember, that, as water takes colour from its vessel, so you must come with pure heart and life, or at least with earnest crying to God for them, to drink of these fountains of immortality."

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## CHAPTER XI.

*Scripture Criticism, Miracles, Church History.*

“I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day according to the scriptures: and that He was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve: after that, He was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that, He was seen of James; then of all the apostles. And last of all He was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time.”—1 COR. xv. 3—8.

“The fearful strains of the Law are repeated, the grace of the Prophets recognised, the faith of the Gospels established, the tradition of the Apostles kept, and the grace of the Church triumphant.”—*Letter to Diognetus* [by an early ecclesiastical writer; not impossibly, as Bunsen thinks, Marcion (?)]

WHETHER Blancombe had intended stopping here I hardly know, but Sadánanda interposed some remarks. “Your exposition,” he said, “has been very interesting, and the practical part at least of your religion agrees so well with what we consider most reasonable and holy, that I see no objection to it. You have also shewn that Christianity is a legitimate growth from some germs in Judaism; so that any one, admitting the Divine authority of the older dispensation, might in spiritual freedom be led on to accept the newer. The question to me is, whether I might not be equally led into a right path by Indian history, as containing also an exemplification of Divine truths within a human theatre, or whether the Hebrew history contains so much clearer marks of Divine government, that I must change my native point of view, and adopt that of a foreign nation. For you know that men may be educated under different music masters into one essential law of harmony; and so men may find in different countries different instances of one governing law of justice and truth. Nor is love, I suppose, a different feeling, because it is expressed in a variety of languages. Why should not devotion then be one and the same

thing, though connected with different words, and exemplified as to its blessings in a variety of persons and countries? Hence I could wish you would do fairly for the literature of the Hebrews what you have done for that of the Hindús, applying the same tests to each." "What do you mean?" asked Blancombe. "Why," replied the other, "you have shewn that critical men can apply certain tests to decide the age in which books, claiming a high antiquity, may really have been written; and thus light has been thrown upon the claims of various books to an immutable authority. I find no fault with such a process, for the Sánkhyā philosophy admits that sacred books may contain errors, or at least only a temporary kind of knowledge, which will admit of improvement from reasoning. But I should like to hear what the most critical inquirers, and not merely religious teachers, say of all the Hebrew literature."

"In the first place," remarked Blancombe, "I could wish that you had been led by your own sacred books, or in any way, to acknowledge a supreme *Iswara*, who governs nature, instead of certain subordinate divinities issuing from it. For then we should have more ground in common, and you would have a great truth, upon which you are now weak. Perhaps it is just in this point that your Indian history has failed to lead you aright. In that case the difference is so essential, that it is alone a reason for your endeavouring to start from the Hebrew point of view; which I have tried to represent as the most reasonable *à priori*, and which has borne the positive fruit of Christianity; while your native views have not issued in the general adoption by your countrymen of any faith so wholesome. Our better fruit is a proof that our tree was better.

"But, in the second place, the mere criticism of the Hebrew literature is by no means so essential to Christianity, as that of the Vedas and Purānas is to the religion of the Hindús. For the orthodox view of these latter, as represented by our venerable friend here, is that they came from the mouth of Brahmá, and partake of his substance. They ought therefore to be infallible;

and even unimportant errors in science become fatal to such a claim for them. Again, the Hindú system is represented as immutably sacred, and as having been fixed from the beginning. Every change, therefore, in Hindú thought or society, as represented in the many stages of your Sástras, becomes fatal to the first idea of the whole system; and the great number of such changes cuts the whole ground of authority from under your feet. Whereas the faith of Hebrews and of Christians is eminently in the living God. The distinctive characteristic of Christianity is to assert an immense change, which has been in the direction of progress, and that chiefly by one great step, though also by smaller ones, in the Revelation of the same Eternal Being. Any discrepancy therefore between our earlier books and our later ones, so long as one great idea has gone on unfolding itself, is not at all a detriment to our faith, but an illustration of its very substance. As to changes of manners, and widening of the intellectual horizon from time to time, and all kinds of personal peculiarities which appear, these are, and ought to be, in such books as we profess to hand down. We say the earliest part was written by Moses, another part by David, and others by prophets in various ages. These works of many authors ought to wear every variety of feature, in manner, temper, and knowledge. To shew that they are so varied, is to confirm the account which we give of them, and they of themselves. For we have never said that our Bible sprung to light in a single hour, or dropt from heaven, as by magic. We think it rather a collection of the sacred records of a religious society, and an embodiment of that society's experiences, regarding as well the body as the soul. Nor do the accidents of human shortcoming, in any of our books, and least of all in the earlier, tell against our religion. For we do not worship relics of any kind, the authenticity of which would need to be guaranteed. Our worship is one of the mind, and is directed to the Father of our spirits. We heartily thank Him for having exemplified His grace and truth in many instances

of men who have gone before us ; but, while we cherish sacred records of such instances, our essential trust is in the Lord God Omnipotent, who doeth wondrous things, rather than in the human writings in which His works are recorded. We do indeed believe, that the same Holy Spirit, by which Christians are moved now, moved holy men of old ; and the experience of the past is an instrument which helps to awaken the consciousness of the present, as well as to give us the confirmation of many witnesses. Still the Christian has emphatically a dispensation of the spirit\* rather than of the letter ; and my comparison of the Jewish doctrine with the Christian must have shewn how much I mean by these words. Not only is Christianity Truth, but Truth is Christianity ; which some may not enough remember ; and while we love the truth as a thing of God, no discovery of what is true can hurt us. Hence it stands in the essence of a Christian's faith, that he should be less moved by human accidents in the historical records or written expressions of his religion, than Hindús should be, who claim an immutable infallibility for the entire system of their Sástras. Again, so far as we appeal to any books as authorities in our religion, we do so chiefly to those comprehended in our Bible. What these books say of themselves is to be believed by us, rather than what others say of them. But there is no better evidence for their age or meaning than what is written in themselves. In believing, then, as most probable what they thus tell us, we hold also the most religious belief ; and that to which our own principles lead us. For although learned commentators or Jewish traditions may have taught differently, yet we never ascribe to them the same authority as to holy Scripture ; so that their comments, either of conjecture or tradition, both may and ought to be set aside, whenever they contradict the internal witness of Scripture, either to reason, or to other sound tests. Whatever, then, critics may truly discover out of Scripture to be the age or meaning of certain books, as soon as their discovery is esta-

\* 1 Corinthians ii. ; 2 Corinthians iii.

blished, it is the Scriptural doctrine, and as such, our religion accepts it. How can followers of the Scripture be frightened by what it says of itself? Still less can those whose mental allegiance is to the very truth, and whose Master came into the world to bear witness to the truth, shrink back from anything true. The truer anything seems, the more Christ bids us to receive it."

"All that may be as you say," replied Sadánanda; "but still it would be agreeable to me to know, how far there is any discrepancy among Christians in such matters, and how far a criticism, like that you have given specimens of, could be borne by your sacred books." "Well," replied Blancombe, "I feel no objection to any fair criticism. But here is Dr Wolff, whose turn of mind as to our sacred books you may infer from his previous discourses. He will perhaps give you the advantage of whatever difficulties the critics have raised."

"I am afraid," began Wolff, "you are laying on me an invidious task. But I believe that many critics would place the contents of the Bible in a different order of time from that which most religious teachers prefer." "Do you mean," here asked Blancombe, "that they would do so upon the internal evidence?" "Yes, I conceive so," answered the other. "Then so far," resumed Blancombe, "as any critical view answers to the internal evidence, it becomes the Scriptural one; and no well-instructed Christian should object to it." "Very well," said Wolff; "but these sort of things are to be considered. It is not to be denied, that before the Christian era began the Hebrew canon was closed; nor are any of its contents later than the date you have assigned to the latest, or about 150 B. C. But most Christians claim a very much higher antiquity for the Old Testament. When we ask for proofs of it, we find that the Jews had very slender knowledge of such points, and no trustworthy tradition of theirs, external to the Bible, goes farther back than the Babylonian captivity. It is admitted that many books, such as Haggai, and Zechariah, and Ezra, and Chronicles,



are written after the return from Babylon. Now why are we to put the five books of Moses a thousand years earlier, or 1500 B. C. instead of 500? The reasons for doing so must be found, if anywhere, in the books themselves. Whereas the fifth book, or Deuteronomy, is according to its Greek name a new edition, or a recast of the Mosaic law; and possibly its date may be much more recent. We read\* in the reign of Josiah, 610 B. C., that Hilkiash the priest gave Shaphan a book, which he gave the king; and the whole kingdom seems to have been re-formed on the model of this book. We are told that Hilkiash found this book in the house of the Lord, but there is nothing to shew that he did not write it. Again, the age of Solomon, when the temple was built, was evidently one in which the Levitical priesthood was developing itself, and may have given birth to such books. Half a century earlier the influence of Samuel was in the ascendant, and perhaps a contest, such as you have noticed signs of elsewhere, may be traced in the reluctance of the prophet to consecrate a king, and in his subsequent quarrels with the chosen Saul. There are many points of resemblance, as seems even admitted, between the Brahmanical caste, and the Levitical tribe. The Magians among the Medes and the Chaldæans at Babylon might furnish a similar parallel. If any such officers were authors or guardians of the literature, they might edit it in the long period between Samuel and Ezra according to their own views. Yet they might act, not only as a priesthood, but as part of the nation whose traditions they shared; and hence popular as well as sacerdotal elements would find an expression, as we have found to be the case in India. But we must not point to Viswámitra and Sunahsephas, without remembering that Solomon† sacrificed, though a king, and that Abraham was tempted to slay his son. The Levitical system therefore must have grown, no less than the Brahmanical, and admitted equally of improvement in worship

\* 2 Kings xxii. 10, 11; 2 Chronicles xxxiv. 14, 15, 18, 19.

† 1 Kings viii. 62—65.

from a clearing of its faith by humanity. Why should not Deuteronomy express the fuller form of the Levitical system? Certainly its style has a more redundant flow than the earlier books. Again, the book of Numbers tells us in chapter xxi, that it contains quotations from earlier records, such as the 'book of the wars of the Lord.' Such a record could not be older than Moses, and if it were contemporary, would hardly have been quoted by him; so that the book quoting it must be of a later age. But often in the Pentateuch, and especially in Genesis, there are citations from older documents, especially genealogical tables; and this accounts for the same things being mentioned in one set of narratives with the name Jehovah, and in another with that of Elohim. I am very far from saying that such compilation from authorities implies even a shade of ill faith; but it points to more than one author, and more ages than one. But if the Pentateuch has portions later than Moses, still more evidently has the book you call after Joshua signs of a later date. For it mentions the name of Jerusalem, which was not borne by the city of Jebus until king David had captured it, and even expressly the partial occupation of the same city by the tribe of Judah, which was subsequent at least to Joshua's death. It mentions even the mountains of Israel and of Judah, and thereby implies knowledge of the political division not known before Saul's time. It quotes again the book of *Jashar*, or of sacred songs, which no contemporary would quote as evidence for what he had seen, and which may not have existed so early, certainly was not completed until the death of Saul. But the whole narrative is without disguise the work of a date later than the events; for the author speaks of posterity, and of certain things continuing 'to this day,' that is, to a later date. But if the book of Joshua was compiled not earlier than the time of Samuel, other historical books may require to be similarly brought down.

"Consider now the remarkable case of the Psalms, which are called after David. Some of them may have preceded the building of the temple; as for instance those which lay especial

stress upon the ark of the tabernacle. But others refer to many disasters or deliverances of most different ages, such as the siege of Sennacherib, the exile in Babylon, and, if the best critics are not mistaken, even the desolation of the holy places under Antiochus Epiphanes. Over what a lapse of centuries, then, do not these sacred songs extend! As to the titles prefixed to them, they may, as a bare possibility, have had some ground of tradition; but they so often contradict the internal evidence, that we may more reasonably ascribe them to the glossings of early Rabbins. They stand therefore on no better ground than the Vedic Bráhmanas and Sútras.

“But what will be the bearing of this sort of inquiry upon the prophecies? As to the book of Daniel, no canons of pure criticism will allow us to place it earlier than the time of Antiochus, or 170—160 B. C. For in the first place the external evidence brings it low; since the Jews arranged it not among their ancient prophets, but among the later miscellaneous writings, which are called the Hagiographa. Secondly, it has not only Greek, but Macedonian words; and these would be very improbable in a Jewish writing before the age of Alexander. Thirdly, it has plain and minute history, though in a prophetic form, down to the age of Antiochus. Now I assent to the canon, justly laid down, that any minute descriptions of external events must be considered historical rather than predictive, unless clear testimony is shewn to the existence of the book containing them at a date prior to the events; whereas with the book of Daniel the external evidence is for the lower date. In the same manner it may be remarked, that the book ascribed to Zechariah has about eight chapters which seem contemporaneous with the return from Babylon, and bear due marks of that time. But it has about six others, which are in an entirely different style, implying not the joy of return, but the agitation of alarm or struggle, while they mention a conflict with ‘the sons of Greece\*.’ No fair criticism would allow us to place

\* Zechariah ix. 13.

these latter chapters before the age of Alexander; though they may be somewhat later.

“As to portions of other prophets, I need only observe that they are arranged piecemeal, and in no consecutive order\*, as in the case of Jeremiah is allowed. There are critics, and not the worst, who think that the last twenty-seven chapters of Isaiah are of a later date than the first thirty-nine. Without speaking too positively on an unsettled point, I think that both the contents and the change of style render this conjecture probable; nor is there even a shadow of external evidence to turn the scale against whatever may be the internal probability. Finding then, as we do, that the first thirty-nine chapters speak of various events in succession, but chiefly in a tone of rebuke and threatening, with some interspersions of promises to repentance; while all the later chapters are in a sustained tone of exultation and a breaking out into joy for the glad tidings on the mountains of the decree of return from captivity, I assent to the chronological distinction which good critics have drawn. Even verbal arguments† to the same effect are brought, though not without dispute, among philologists.

“Now comes an important question, whether the results of chronological and other criticism affect the sacred character of the Bible, as a collection of religious books. It has been argued, that the religion itself is independent of such inquiries, and only bids us accept calmly whatever the Scriptures may say or imply of themselves or of the secular circumstances in which they had their origin. Nor can I deny, that such independence agrees very well with the spiritual view of Christianity as a kingdom not of this world, but as one taking possession of the ‘thoughts which wander through eternity,’ and of souls destined to enjoy it. I should be constrained to admit, that a knowledge and a peace which the world cannot give, can neither be taken away

\* Bishop Watson's *Apology for the Bible*.

† Compare Jahn, *Introductio in libros Vet. Fæd.*, and Dr Samuel Lee's *Discourses on Prophecy*, containing a reply to Gesenius.

by worldly accidents, affecting either ourselves or our sacred books and their authorship. But on the other hand, to those who hug the Jewish views of external prophecy and of an earthly kingdom, great difficulties appear to arise from a critical investigation of the Bible. For in the first place, the prediction of external events is rendered doubtful by any uncertainty as to the date of books. If the latter part of Isaiah is rather contemporaneous with Cyrus than prior to him by a century, it may remain a glorious outburst of national thanksgiving and recognition of Jehovah, who, although he had suffered his priests and prophets to be slain, was now bringing about their pious anticipations; but it will not have the positive air of a description of events beforehand, which some would find in it.

“We may now ask as to the Hebrew predictions in general, if they are of events nearly contemporary, by how long did the sayings come first? Was the interval ever too great for historical sagacity and human presentiment to overleap? Or if, as some tell us, there are predictions referring to a future still remote, how do we know these will be fulfilled? Some expect the Jews ‘to occupy Palestine again.’ I have not found for myself any predictions of a restoration, which may not have had an adequate fulfilment in the six hundred years of nationality between Cyrus and Titus. But as the canon was closed long before that period ended, it is a gratuitous assumption that any additional period was ever contemplated. Again, if the predictions refer to a coming Messiah, were they fulfilled literally in Jesus? If we make some allowance for the inflation of Eastern style, their text applies better to ancient kings and prophets, such as Solomon or Jeremiah, and others of the class of persons of whom I think it demonstrable that the old prophets conceived themselves to be speaking.

“But if we leave prophecy, a farther consequence arises. If we ask what is the range of knowledge in the books of the Old Testament, we find it answer in each case to the horizon of the age, in which a fair criticism places the books. Moses knows

Egypt, and Solomon whatever Tyre or Tarshish could teach. Daniel exhibits a wider acquaintance with the activity of the Greeks. In the books after the captivity, we find the Zoroastrian personification of evil first tinging the language of the Jews; as in *Kings*, it is the Lord who tempts David, but in *Chronicles* Satan stands up. So the names and distinctions of the angels are reported by the Jews themselves to have been brought from Babylon. But, if we find the system to have thus grown as an organisation; if human knowledge accumulates upon it, according to natural opportunity, while even its sacred ideas are tinged by contact with foreigners; if prophecy becomes less demonstrably predictive of events in proportion as the books containing it are rightly placed, may not the Hindús retort your question, What becomes of any supernatural communication? I have not dwelt upon miracles, for our friends here would probably allow them to any extent\*, and only relate to you greater marvels in return; but the farther any books are removed from the events mentioned in them, the wider becomes the room for magnifying whatever happened. Those who know the force of imagination, and how easily poetry takes the place of history, while popular traditions may receive from a learned caste a written form, will easily apprehend what I mean. However I have said enough, in deference to your wishes, to enable Sadánanda to judge, how far the *rationale* of explanation which criticism applies to things wonderful in Scripture, has a destructive effect or not."

Here Wolff paused; and Blancombe, turning to Mountain, said smiling, "Perhaps it is time to bring up heavier metal." Accordingly his elder friend, with a reverend sort of gravity, began.

"We should be careful to state facts rightly, and then draw inferences. The external evidence for the Pentateuch goes up much higher than the Babylonian exile, or the reign of Josiah, when Hilkiash the priest found a book of the law. For the five

\* See the *Abbé Dubois* on Hindu miracles.

books of the Pentateuch are received as sacred by the Samaritans; and it is impossible to conceive they would adopt anything from the Jews later than the eighth century before Christ, in which the mutual enmity of the two nations became intense. Nor is it likely that the ten tribes would have done so later than the disruption under Rehoboam, which was early in the tenth century before our era. Here is, therefore, nearly a thousand years before Josephus, with hostile evidence concurring for the genuineness of the Pentateuch as a whole. But again, although the Jews have little high tradition external to the Bible, yet the different books of the Bible, being written in different ages, are so far external to each other, that they supply a balance of mutual testimonies. All the historical books, and also that of the Psalms, refer back to the law or the commandments of the Lord\*, as to a thing well known in the times of their authors. No one can pretend that these books are not of a strictly historical kind, for they have a careful order of persons and events, with references to documents from which they are drawn. Under the entire period of the kings it is clear that there were scribes and recorders†, whose business it was to keep a chronicle of events. Even if we suppose them not to have been free from natural prepossessions, they still set down events with an appearance of general fidelity. They shew no sign of flattering kings, and often blame even the priestly order. Nor is there reason to doubt, that in the time of the judges similar records must have been kept, though perhaps in a less formal manner. When then all these historical books refer back to the law, as to something known, they prove the great antiquity of that law by an evidence external to it. Nor is the farther evidence of customs and rites to be overlooked. For certainly the building of the temple, and the still earlier reverence for the ark, point back to an ancient Mosaic law, and to a Levitical system,

\* Judges iii. 4, 5; 2 Kings xviii. 12, xxi. 7, 8; Psalm xl. 8; Joshua viii. 34; Jahn, *Introductio*, &c.

† 2 Sam. xx. 24, 25.

whether this was so strictly observed as in later times, or possibly not. It is by no means necessary to deny a play of human struggle between the elements of the state, or the occasional neglect of the law, which yet may have been handed down. For the conduct of nations never reaches their professed standard. We are told expressly, that the law of Moses was neglected by king and people; but if we believe that Hilkiah gave a book to Shaphan, we should believe also that he found it, as is said; especially since the Samaritans admit the whole Pentateuch to be older than that time.

“If we look at the Pentateuch itself, the difference of style in Deuteronomy is fairly ascribed by scholars to the old age of Moses\*, going over with the confidence of a great leader all the deliverance he had wrought for his people, and the precepts of which he had a right to demand their observance. But even if every part of the Pentateuch should not be from the hand of Moses, it all expresses one law, and so far one mind. If only half the five books had been written by Moses, and as much as half by later captains or high priests, no important consequence to our religion would ensue. The history, the ritual, the framework of the Hebrew polity, would be substantially the same.

“As to the quotations from popular poetry in the book of Numbers, there is no reason why Moses should not have embodied the sayings of his contemporaries, which would give them an interest in his more formal record; or, even if these should betoken some later compilation, they would still be fragments of very venerable tradition. Again, the book of Genesis is remarkable for its Egyptian words, which are just what might be expected from the contact of Moses with Egypt. If a later writer had written this book, and inserted such things, he would have inserted them also in the later books, where they do not appear. All the description of Egyptian society is just what all ancient accounts of Egypt, and the monumental stones, would

\* Jahn, as before.



lead us to expect. Do ancient writers speak of sacred caste in Egypt? So does Moses. Do they speak of shepherd conquerors from Syria and Arabia? In harmony with this Moses tells us every shepherd was an abomination to the Egyptians. Do the Egyptian dynasties mount up to a high antiquity? So Moses tells us of kings, priests, soldiers, body-guards, the use of fine linen, and a settled trade with other countries, from 2000 to 1500 B.C. As to the ancient genealogies in Genesis, there is no attempt to conceal them. How can they then be made a fault? Such ancient records give a value to the book. They both attest the good faith of the writer, and enable him to extend his range of credibility backward. It is not only Moses we are reading, but some of the most venerable and trustworthy records of that early age of the human race. Nor is the historical chronology of Moses necessarily shorter than it ought to be. We may make it so, if we draw inferences from men's lives. But Moses has only in few places given a number of years; and he gives no intimation that the aggregate of such years comprehended all the world's history. In the tenth chapter of Genesis the most learned critics think that we were intended to understand races or nations rather than individuals, and the plural terminations of the names put this beyond fair doubt. As to the genealogies of men, Moses is only answerable for inserting them as he found them; and we have no reason to doubt that he did so. Any difficulty which arises from comparing such tables should be ascribed, either to our want of data for solving it, or to the variety of tradition in the families whose documents he transmits to us. He does not represent it as part of the Hebrew faith, much less of the Christian, that we should have a certainty of the genealogy in every patriarchal tent having been kept scientifically. The duty of the Jew was to keep the statutes and judgments of the Lord; that of the Christian is to walk after the mind of Christ; any historical information may be useful for our instruction; but the force of ancient traditions is not to be strained beyond the intention or the means of information of

the writers who hand them down. The period of the history most important to the Hebrew commonwealth begins with Abraham. From his time to that of Joshua, there may be room for grave consideration, how far the human element, within which in a way the Divine wisdom manifests itself, is also reflected in the sacred narrative; for we expect the thoughts of men to appear in their words, and the imagination even of a nation under Divine guidance, to be mirrored in its writings; but certainly we see a great Providence working, and the Divine promise to the patriarch's faith coming wonderfully to fulfilment. It is hardly too much to say, that the subsequent history of the Israelites is a proof of the general authenticity of the Pentateuch. For no one doubts their living in Canaan, their belief in Jehovah, their festivals and ritual, or their ark and temple. These things arose in some way; and no account of their origin can be given more probable than that recorded in these five books, which we have seen to be of such high antiquity. This argument is both true generally, and will bear special application to the more wonderful events of the earlier history. For there runs through the Hebrew mind in many generations a belief in supernatural interposition on a national scale, or in the special manifestation to Hebrews of the Divine government of the world. I would lay less stress on this, if it belonged only to some dim traditional age, or came out only in poetry (though poetry too has a truth of its own); but it is very striking in conjunction with that prosaic habit of chronicling things year by year, which we find among the Jews, as well as with the literal veneration for documents, which they carried afterwards to excess. Considered in this conjunction with historical accuracy, the unshakeable belief among the Jews of wonderful displays of Divine Providence becomes more significant\*. It seems to shew that the Almighty had given them a special lesson, which they were to exemplify before the nations. Again, every argument for the antiquity of the Pentateuch renders the

\* See the XIXth Sermon in a volume called "Rational Godliness."

more wonderful portions of the narrative more credible, since it leaves less room for the shaping power of the imagination. Here also come in the striking prophecies of the Hebrew destiny, which the same books contain; for if these precede the first occupation of Canaan, they give a wonderful forecast of the future in its more general features down to the siege of the city by Titus. Yet they have not that specification of names and persons which has appeared questionable elsewhere.

“The genuineness and authenticity of the Pentateuch being allowed, I do not see that any earlier date for the book of Joshua need be asserted, than what the book itself points to. It is evidently compiled from documents older than itself; and these may have been contemporary with the conquest\*. It shews the good faith of the writer, that he enables you to fix his date, without the remotest insinuation to the contrary. The received title may refer to the subject, and is not affixed to the author. Our Master Christ has nowhere said, that we should place the books of the Old Testament otherwise than they place themselves. Nor has He determined how far they are affected by the more general laws of Divine Providence in history. Thus, if in Joshua we find tables of the division of the land among the tribes, and also quotations from a book of songs, we may leave every man to determine, whether the nature of prose and poetry should alter his way of understanding either; but whatever way is the truest is the scriptural one; and freedom, with sincerity, in adopting either way, is most agreeable to our Christian faith. Only we should not doubt the Israelite conquest of Canaan, for there is no reason to doubt it.

“What you have said of the Psalms only fills me with amazement, that you should conceive such criticism to be an objection. True, David, as the most illustrious of the psalmists, has precedence of the others in name. But how many of the psalms are expressly ascribed in our Bibles to Asaph, Heman, the sons of Korah, and others? Yet more weighty than any

\* This is argued well and minutely by Jahn, in his *Introduction*, &c.

titles are the contents of the Psalms themselves. If they allude to events extending from the age of the Judges, or earlier, to that of Antiochus Epiphanes, they give thereby an echo and a witness to the living Providence which so long wielded the national destiny. If they cling with especial fondness to the temple-service, this is what might be expected from the existence of a worship divinely appointed. If they enter into the deepest recesses of the heart, by expressing thoughts common to true penitents both then and now, this shews the truth of their breathing the influence of One Eternal Spirit. If in some of them are harsher sayings pointed against personal or national enemies, this both answers to what we are told of the people among whom they arose being a rugged one, and justifies the Christian in his preference of the general spirit to the particular letter; and again, is a sign of God having brought us into something better, according to His ancient promise. Yet if things spoken of worldly enemies can, with slight change, be applied by us to the enemies of our soul's peace, this shews the same Jehovah to have governed the Jewish kingdom of the body, and the Christian kingdom of the soul. Hence too those who might be in danger of gazing only into heaven, and becoming dreamy spiritualists, are wholesomely reminded of the life in which Divine Providence fixes us, and add a cheerful\* and practical tone to the deeper piety of the Gospel. Neither the many ages, then, over which the composition of the Psalms extends, should be any argument against their sacred character, nor vestiges of things temporal in them any sign that they do not partake of that Eternal Spirit, into whose kingdom we have entered.

“What has been said of the book of Daniel is a little more difficult. But scholars are not all agreed that this may not have been written under Cyrus in Babylon, as the contents

\* Some excellent remarks on the use of the Psalms in Christian worship may be found in Alexander Knox's *Remains*. As early as St Augustine the Psalms were used by the Church, and hymns, in preference, by the sects.

seem to imply. But if the later date under Antiochus should turn out correct, the book will still express, though in a less historical form, the strong faith of the Hebrew in the God of his fathers, and a confidence that out of the lowest distress He would yet fulfil His kingdom. This expression of faith will still precede the Christian era by a full century and a half; and what is more remarkable, it will equally have been fulfilled. For it was in the low estate of Jewry that God set up a kingdom not to be moved, which prevailed over the kingdoms of the earth. The mental nature of this had been denoted by calling it 'a stone cut without hands\*;' as St Paul also calls the Church 'a temple not built with hands,' thereby repeating the very words of Christ. Even the prohibition of the Law by Antiochus increased the study of the Prophets, which contributed (with the help perhaps of this very book) to awaken men's minds for a spiritual resurrection. The book then will still have been a part of the Divine education of the Hebrews for a better kingdom.

"But while I am willing that, as to Daniel and part of Zechariah, you should assign them whatever date is most probable, it must be questioned if some prepossession as to prophecy does not here influence theory. For in Zechariah, you say, Greece is mentioned. But if every uncertain book is brought as low as possible, there will remain the very ancient book of Deuteronomy, which foretells the 'nation swift as the eagle flieth,' and 'the delicate woman eating her own child' in the distress of the siege. The wildest scepticism would not deny these sayings to be very many centuries before the Christian era; yet they came to pass in the siege by Titus, A. D. 70. Since then you find some literal prophecies fulfilled in Jewish history, you gain little by diminishing their number. For even a few would shew the book to have an unique character, and from a few, certain, you may infer more as probable. Yet you seem to admit, that such a spiritual view of prophecy as my

\* Daniel ii. 34; 2 Corinthians v. 1; Hebrews ix. 11; St Mark xiv. 58.

friend Blancombe has propounded, cannot suffer from any such inquiries. Nor again are you able to take away that inherent tendency of the Hebrew polity to develop itself into something nobler, which we contend to be the reflexion of a Divine idea presiding over it through every age. So that the only risk dependent on such questions as you raise about Daniel is this question, Are we to take as a key to prophecy on the largest scale, the external view which makes it descriptive of coming events, or the more profound one, that it is perceptive of great truths, and so pregnant with hopes and fears, yet also with unforeseen applications? In either case the common teaching of Providence by sagacity and presentiment will have its limited field. But beyond such limits, we admit the possibility that prophecy means spiritual predication rather than literal prediction. This is the utmost question really dependent on such criticisms as we have heard, and this does not either way affect the truth of Divine Revelation. Many indeed would think the more spiritual view to be the more Christian, both in itself and in its consequences.

“The above principles will govern all that need be said about Isaiah. It is not yet agreed that any wide chasm intervenes between the earlier portion and the later. But if such should turn out to be the case, it will only extend the domain of those interpretations which according to the text are the most literal, for they apply its utterance to contemporary events, yet according to the ultimate design are the more spiritual, for they extend its application to that kingdom of thought which God brings to pass out of the ancient history. This view is both rational, in that it interprets men’s words according to the limits of man’s intelligence; yet pious, in that it does not shut out the Eternal from foresight of that which He brings about in act, and shews Himself to have designed by tendency. For, just as if the waters of the ocean were poured into vessels, so I suppose the manifestation of the Infinite must be limited by the compass of the intelligences within which He shews His

thought. The prophets then will have spoken of things present which they saw, but with faith in the unseen God who governs them, and He through their words will have shadowed forth the truth of things to come. Nor is it from mere *a priori* considerations, but from the difficulty which inquirers find in proving in the Bible or elsewhere minute predictions of remote events, that I am inclined to allow, some view of this kind will be hereafter universal. Let such things, however, be as experience may render probable. But if we find a people wonderfully trained by events into a Diviner faith, and that faith exemplified in their history, and in its ultimate growth a blessing to all nations, we can neither go back from the last act to the first, nor refuse to place the whole drama at the feet of the Governor of the world, acknowledging that His providence has been in it all along. The thing communicated is that sight which we have now of His grace and truth: and as a man whose eyes are suddenly opened to the heavens does not ask his physician for a vehicle of sight, so we are not troubled about an intermediate body of revelation, when the eyes of our mind have a true unveiling of God. Yet in purging as it were our mental eyesight, or in awakening our heart, and so in taking away the veil of sense or hardness, it pleases God to use an instrumentality of events and of doctrines, giving each man an experience of his own, and accumulating it by growth on the great scale of nations. He does not so much give proofs of truth, as instances of it. Nor are we surprised, since to Him all kingdoms belong, that out of His providence in history should be unfolded His more secret grace. Thus there is hardly a great nation with which His Church, the heavenly commonwealth and social embodiment of truth, has not at some time come in contact. She saw all those giant empires, which in turn overshadowed the world, but which now loom through a dim haze of memory. Perhaps even the lore of no ancient priesthood may have been quite strange to her. She went down into Egypt, and spoiled the ancient priesthoods of their wisdom, while yet she hallowed it by the



simplicity of faith. She learnt patience in the wilderness, and meekness with the 'poor and needy' men of the Psalms. Yet she taught kings to rule in the fear of the Lord, and neither the wealth nor wisdom of Solomon misbecame her. Again, she talked with the Chaldæans in Babylon, and whatever good they had, capable of combining, she took as illustration or help to her faith. Even the persecutions of Antiochus only deepened her yearning for an unseen kingdom, wherein righteousness should dwell. She then widened her sympathies by that humanity of the Greek, which yet she aspired to purge of its sensualism, and learnt discipline of the Roman, while she taught him to soften the rigour of his iron law. Nor should I wonder, if through Alexandria she borrowed something of your Indian asceticism, which hardly agrees with her cheerful faith in the God of heaven and earth and of life and death, but which yet may have helped to wean her from sense, and deepened that unworldliness which passed harmless through persecutions, and smote savage nations with awe.

"Christ appeared, as the Apostles tell us, in the fulness of time. For then all the elements of humanity had converged, and needed only the touch of the Son of God to heal them. The wood was all gathered round the altar, before the fire fell. Then the Divine Thought came to pass in humanity, and the Son of God was born. Then the Greek language was spread over Asia, as a vehicle for both the ancient Scriptures, and for the new preaching of the Holy Spirit. Then the Roman power compressed in some cases the madness of a persecuting multitude, and when it set itself in deliberate strength against the new kingdom over men's hearts, it was broken without hand. No earthly might withstands long a faith in the unseen and everlasting God. Yet before it fell, the Roman empire gave a splendid theatre for the first witnesses of Christ to shew themselves upon. It brought the sword, the flame, and the wild beast, to try their faith and patience. It gave all the processes of regular law to take cognisance of their conduct, and the rigid



genius of history to record it. Not Christians, but Heathens, such as Pliny in his letter to the Emperor Trajan, tell us of a community of men meeting at early dawn, and singing hymns to Christ as their God, and binding themselves only by a pledge of faith and of harmlessness. The same writer, and other Heathens like him, speak of the tenacity of the Christians in that shrinking from idol-worship, which was their only crime. Thus above all, the Founder of our faith lived, and died, and rose again, not in any obscure land, among a savage or imaginative race, with prepossessions in His favour; but amongst Jews, very jealous of His pretensions, with rival sects agreeing only to accuse Him, and intelligent strangers looking on, before the eye of Greece, and under the power of Rome. Who can say, the Augustan age was a credulous one? or that the fulfilment which Christ brought to the Prophets was such as the expectation of the Jews would predispose them to receive? or that every act of His life was not jealously watched? Again, though I have alluded to Heathen witnesses, yet the records of the Apostles themselves have every claim it is possible for books to have upon our credence.

“We did not dig these, which are our Christian Scriptures, out of the ground, or find them unaccompanied in some dead museum; but they are handed down to us by a long train of witnesses. They could not have been forged since the Reformation, for such a circumstance would have been prevented by the mutual jealousy of the Church of Rome and reformed Churches; nor since the division of the East and West, twelve centuries ago, for the jealousies of the Greek and Latin Churches would have prevented it; nor since the Council of Nice, fifteen centuries ago, for we find them then appealed to by the adverse parties of Arius and the maintainers of catholic truth. Neither could they have been forged earlier; since we find from Eusebius, from Cyprian, from Origen, and from Melito, that formal catalogues of them were critically made, and their genuineness the subject of fresh tradition and careful

examination. We may extend this historical proof of their genuineness into the first century, or within seventy years of the commencement of that new dispensation whose history they record; for we find them quoted by Justin Martyr, by Papias, and by Polycarp, the very hearers and companions of the first messengers of the new dispensation.

“Again, it may be shewn historically, that not only were these books received in the very age of their authors as the genuine works of the persons to whom they are ascribed, but that it was morally impossible for any important change or corruption in their contents to be subsequently introduced. They were both enumerated in catalogues, and collected into a distinct volume\*; they were described by peculiar titles of respect; they were publicly read and expounded to large assemblies of men, and their text rendered generally familiar by commentaries; they are quoted by many authors, appealed to by jarring and jealous sects, and scrutinized as the depositories of the new doctrines by enemies to the progress of the new dispensation.

“Thus our books have been preserved by the Church from the beginning, as embodiments or expressions of her first faith. On the one hand she may say, as Blancombe has argued, Here is a religion commending itself to you by its inherent goodness, or by the answer of the faithful witness within us, as well as by its fulfilment of those better anticipations which God breathed as signs of His purpose among a remarkable people of old; and this argument would hold good for spiritual men, if we had even much scantier record of the first establishment of Christianity in the world, or if any one imbued with an infection of Hindú thought, should extend the region of Máya, by supposing ever so much play of imagination in the outset, and fancying humanity to have divined the thought of God in a great poem, rather than to have seen it embodied in deed and man; for still our conscience, affections, and our faith would conspire to lay hold on this as the truth of things unseen, which are eternal. Blessed would be

\* Paley's *Evidences*.

those who believed, though not seeing. But on the other hand, the Church may now point bodily to the Son of God blessing, and healing, and bearing our sins on the shameful tree. She has the witness, not only of the Spirit, but of water and of blood. She believes, both because she sees in spirit, and because faithful men have seen in the flesh. Hence she may say, Even if this faith of Christ were less manifestly Divine than it appears to us by experience, yet it comes to us on that highest authority, which we dare not gainsay. It may call for obedience and trust, as well as for compliance and assent. For whatever is extraordinary in its facts, has the guarantee of no less extraordinary witness. Twelve men suffice the English law for any verdict; and twelve men have set to their seals, that they and many others saw wonders done by Jesus in the flesh such as no man without God can do. These wonders were works of goodness, but also of supernatural power. Nor was there any room for mistake; since multitudes looked on, and the men healed and raised from the dead, were seen surviving long afterwards\*. Christ Himself was seen often, and by many†, after His resurrection from the dead. Nor is there power in the ordinary laws of nature, which without any physical antecedent could work such cures and restorations as Christ wrought. He revived, for instance, the corpse already decaying in the grave. It remains, then, that some new or extraordinary cause, and that no less than the wisdom or power which orders and wields nature, must in such cases have interposed. For the Sánkhyasts rightly infer that every effect must have adequate cause. Nor is it a little gain to have our minds thus disentangled from the chain of sensuous effects by striking indications of that mental power, which is both in nature and over it, and without whose present will no material forces could flow. For we are thus saved from the Sánkhyasts' error of fancying nature self-dependent; and in acknowledging soul, as they do, we also ascribe to the highest soul that superiority of which it gives signs by thus working.

\* Quadratus, *Apology*, ap. Routh.

† 1 Corinthians xv.

But moreover, when the Almighty thus does things extraordinary, it is to excite our attention, and to give us reason for believing, or motive to obey. Christ's religion therefore comes into the world with a Divine attestation, adequate to the vast effects which flow from it, which are again a secondary confirmation of its first evidence, and worthy of the long train of providences which paved the way for it.

“ But when we take the Gospels of the four Evangelists as giving a literal account of Christ's life on earth, and the Acts as describing the progress of the Apostles, and their Epistles as preserving their words, then not only the works of Christ are more manifest, but the prophetic parallel of the Old Testament becomes more wonderfully complete, than when we considered only the main design of the Hebrew polity, and its general fulfilment in our faith. It seems now probable to us, that a divine design of such magnitude should have many correspondencies in all its parts; and such we find to be the case in fact. The Paschal Lamb, eaten in Eucharist for the redemption of Israel from Egypt, now signifies the better offering of Christ, on which His upright ones feed in spirit, when delivered from the worse bondage of evil habits. The sin-offering, burnt without the camp, implies that Christ should suffer outside of the local city, and an outcast from the ancient polity of the Jews, and that His followers must often bear reproach in being cast out of societies of men. The passing through the Red Sea becomes an emblem of baptism, and the stricken rock of Christ stricken for our healing. If we wander, with hearts half satisfied, and an earnest expectation of things better to come, yet sustained by signs of our heavenly Father's love, in this world, so did the Israelites for forty years in the wilderness. If they must pass a river, so must we a river of death, into a better land. If the high priest entered once a year into a holy place, bearing blood in sign of the people's contrition, so is our spiritual Intercessor gone within the holiest veil of the unseen world, carrying in thought the memory of all He did and suffered in unveiling the

love of God, and prevailing for us with a prayer which the Father cannot refuse. If great deliverers were of old born in Bethlehem, the house of bread, so was Christ. If they were despised by their people, Christ dwelt in Nazareth, out of which no good was thought to come. If they were set apart as Nazarites, Christ was separate from every evil of thought and deed. If the ancient judges affected not pomp of warhorse and chariot, but administered law as they journeyed in simple estate, so Christ shewed the nature of His kingdom, when He entered Jerusalem 'lowly, and riding on an ass.' If old deliverances of the nation, or decrees of return from exile, had been glad tidings which made the feet of their heralds beautiful upon the mountains, the message which Christ preaches of deliverance for all men from evil, is more especially a Gospel or good news. If the poor need sympathy, He brings it them; if the weary long for rest, He invites them to it; if sinners are bound with a burthen of shame, He takes it away in the unveiling of a love which has outrun and exceeded all our eagerness to destroy our better souls; if the simple need instruction, He gives them in purity of heart a direct sight of truths which no learning can teach; if to some men poverty, and to some wealth, and to others temptation, and to many an entanglement of all things in life as if by misplacement of the great enemy, brings a snare, and to all men death brings fear, Christ sweeps away all these things, by opening around us and within us a kingdom, in which the Lord God reigneth, and His will is done, both in earth and heaven. So, whatever is 'the plague of any man's heart,' Christ takes it away. Thus His Gospel is not a fixed or a hard thing, but good news to each man according to his need. Again, if the old prophets brought their messages through suffering, see if there was ever any sorrow like unto Christ's sorrow. '*My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death,*' He says. 'And He went a little farther, and fell on His face, and prayed, *O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt.*' Well might angels appear from heaven

comforting so Divine a sufferer. Again, if, as they looked on the brazen serpent, the Israelites were healed of the serpents' stings, so by faith gazing on the fulfilment of what is meant in all offerings, and on the perfect self-consecration of Jesus on the cross, we become healed of those wounds which the old serpent, the author or type of all evil, has wrought in our better souls. Once more, if God called of old Israel out of Egypt to be His son, and made him a firstborn among the nations, and lifted him in a little time, as on the third day\*, from under the yoke of bondage, so having through the suffering of Christ fulfilled all His will in Him, He lifted Him from the grave on the third day, and made Him a king for ever. Again, the hope of the Psalmist† that his soul would not be given over to the place of the dead, had not only a temporary fulfilment for himself in long life, but a visible and permanent one in the taking again of life by Christ, the Holy One, when He saw not corruption. Here also notice, that things spoken in hyperbole, or with eastern inflation of words, to earthly kings in Zion, become literally true when applied to Christ. So that, if in some respects we translate the letter into spirit, yet in others we make it more literally true. For, if any one addressed Solomon, calling him, as some think, in the 45th Psalm, 'fairer than the children of men,' and a god, and one whose 'sceptre is a right sceptre,' and one whose 'arrows are sharp in the heart of enemies;' these things would have something of figure when so applied: but when we turn them to Christ, they require no shading away; for in Him is that unearthly fairness which men's deepest desires have cried out for, and a rule which sways our love because it is right, and arrows of truth which pierce to the dividing asunder of the thoughts.

“ So much greater becomes the fulfilment of prophecy, when we read Christ's life in the four Gospels. And if we glance at the effects of His resurrection, the same fulfilment continues.

\* Hosea xi. 1; v. 15; and vi. 1, 2; Exodus iv. 22; Jeremiah xxxi. 9; Psalm lxxxix. 27.

† Psalm xvi. 10; Acts ii. 25.

For the prophets of old had spoken\* of an outpouring of the Spirit upon all flesh. They meant, that when God was truly known to His people, no caste or priesthood should come exclusively near Him; but wise and simple, old men and maidens, should alike know, and love, even as they are known of Him. We need not deny that, even in the greatest dulness of the Jewish people, the Divine Spirit strove with them; for just before Christ we read of men, such as Simeon, inspired, or ‘full of the Holy Ghost;’ but it was only when Christ’s disciples came together, thinking of all His life, and awaiting His promise, that the fulness of the Divine Spirit took possession of them. From that day of Pentecost, though they still learnt earthly things by means, the irresolute became bold, and the simple clear in wisdom. Then by their preaching, suffering, and living, they built up the kingdom, in which the Holy Spirit dwells for ever. From henceforth God and man cannot be put asunder.

“Here then is that joining of the hands together, which different parts of a proof require, to be complete. First, you have the stretching forward of the Hebrew nation and prophets under the impulse of some idea, which their mind could not be easy without fulfilling; and if even the instincts of lower animals and plants reach some fruitful end to which they are destined, we can hardly think the spiritual forebodings of man’s better nature, especially on so large a scale, and in so growing a system, would be given to mock him. Then comes out in the body of Christendom that temple of living minds, to which the fabric for prayer and offering at Jerusalem, however unconsciously, pointed; and thus the holiest instinct of what is immortal in a nation has found a fulfilment for mankind. But thirdly, you have intervening between this germ and flower, a history of no less than Divine interposition, by which the change is both brought about and ratified. In this intervening stage we find an interpretation of what might be doubtful in the older, an

\* Joel ii. 28—32; Hosea i. 10; ii. 19—23.

authority abolishing the old, no less than that which imposed it, and justifying its own wisdom in giving, by its very method of taking away. For the law, you see, is not abolished without having been fulfilled; it is not transgressed without finding a victim; it does not die in the letter without being glorified in the spirit.

“If the Old Testament is wonderful, the New is divine. The first has law and history, with providence and prophecy; the second has grace and a power of life, with fulfilment and truth. The second is implied in the first, and the first unveiled in the second. Nor is it easy to see how Almighty God Himself could more strongly persuade us to embrace a religion, than by thus giving proof to all readers of history, that it has come of the Governor of the world, and by making its experience satisfy the best conscience of every one who tries it. Surely the human shortcomings of men who have taught or professed it, are no sound argument against the divinity of the truth itself. For how much worse would they have been without it? Earthly acts never fully bring out the heavenly thoughts; and the very fact of a divine healing presupposes that human souls are diseased. The question of experience turns on whether the fruits of Christianity have been good, according to the soil it was planted in, or the materials it worked with. It finds ignorance, passion, sin, suffering, and strife. It brings enlightenment, peace, and with holiness either comfort or patience; and all these strangely combined in the power of the one cross of Christ, whose figure gleams through the world, standing above our highest pomp, and going down into the depth of sorrow. See briefly how our faith is justified in its history. Before the Apostles passed away, Jerusalem fell, but the city of the mind rose in its place, and the believers in Christ began building a new kingdom. Ignatius, the companion of the Apostles, desired the wreath of martyrdom, and was torn by wild beasts. Polycarp, the disciple of St John, gave his body to the flames rather than deny the Saviour who had carried him to grey hairs.



Justin Martyr, after in vain seeking peace among the speculations of men, joined his wisdom, like Moses, to a better faith, and after proclaiming the one God who by all-embracing wisdom had taught Jews and Gentiles, sealed his faith with his blood. The great fathers of the Alexandrine school followed in a like track. Irenæus exhorted men to be at peace, and shews the rightful unity of the Creed throughout the world. The martyrs of Lyons suffered without boasting, and disclaimed in humility the eminence which they won; for they had read how Christ was not greedy of that which was His right. St Cyprian, without pride for himself, strengthened the order of the Church, yet opened the gates of forgiveness to the fallen who repented. All these, and many men like them, built up in the Church a home of severe holiness of thought and act, with tenderness to want and sorrow. They shut out the profligate, but received the slave. They restored to marriage that sanctity which it had once in the better days of Rome, and made life more precious, as a trust from God. As their numbers extended, their principles passed into the laws of the world. But they received such power of moulding things seen, only from their faith in things eternal. Origen and Jerome with patient learning collected the Holy Scriptures, and distinguishing the Hebrew from later additions, gave versions in Greek and Latin. The spread of like versions in many languages is one of our great securities for the integrity of our text. In the fourth and fifth centuries the great architects of the larger fabric of the Church lengthened her cords, and strengthened her stakes, that she might be a tent holding many nations. Athanasius and others in the great councils contended earnestly for what seemed the truest statement of the faith felt of old. Some of their debates may have been carried with human passion; yet we see in them men not bent on selfish or earthly victory. We do not therefore blame the later councils, any more than the first at Jerusalem, for saying that what seemed good to them, seemed also good to the Holy Spirit. For God who gives treasure in earthly vessels,

can breathe the unity of His truth through many sore contentions and prophesyings in part. In about the same age the Liturgies of the Church grew up, partly out of an old Jewish inheritance, partly out of the fresh accents of the Spirit indwelling in the whole Church, and partly out of a combination of things sacred among the Gentiles, which the large wisdom of our fathers in the faith was not afraid to adopt, having that freedom wherewith Christ has made us free.

“ Thus when Rome fell, the Church had been divinely prepared to take her place ; and the dream of Plato, that governors should be teachers of wisdom, seemed near to fulfilment. The genius of the new polity is to be judged, not by the faults of particular men, but by the cast of virtues which it exemplified as a whole, and by its softening influence over the manners of savage nations. If the bishops of Rome\* and of other cities set up a power savouring too much of this world, they did so in an age of iron and of blood, and gained something for humanity by setting the simple cross against the sword, vanquishing kingdoms by faith, and brute force by mind. When Rome was sacked by the Goth and the Hun, and Carthage by the Vandal, the bishops† of both cities were the great relievers of all suffering by their alms and prayers. Often, in such cases, Christians shewed that they knew what sacrifice to God means, by selling even the holy vessels of their churches, that the price might relieve men suffering from war or famine. Even the emperor Julian, who loved them not, had with true ingenuousness confessed their zeal in such works, and had desired heathens to learn from it. *See, how these Christians love one another*‡, was one of their early marks ; for they could not fail to do so, if they knew truly the love of God, which yet passes knowledge. In a like spirit they built hospitals for the sick, whereas the empire before them had built amphitheatres for men to fight with beasts. It

\* See Milman's *History of Christianity*, both the earlier and the Latin ; or Neander and Chateaubriand.

† Milman and Chateaubriand.

‡ Tertullian.

was a Christian monk (St Telemachus) who, in the truest martyrdom, put an end to such spectacles at the cost of his life. But when the Northern nations had spread night over Europe, the faith of Christ, though mixed with legends and ancient customs, was still a light in a dark place. In its power, the bishops\* of Spain forbade the Gothic chieftains to estimate any humble life as worth less than their own, and affixed the same penalty to any murder of man. In the same spirit, it was reckoned an acceptable sacrifice to God for serfs to be emancipated by their rude lords. Even the right of asylum in churches, (though it became abused†, as it had been among the Hebrews, from whose precedent it seems taken,) was useful in so fierce an age, as enabling passion to cool, and equity to obtain a hearing. Again, in the monasteries were preserved the relics of learning. Around them, or in episcopal cities, survived an image of the old Roman tribunate, with its *veto* in favour of humanity upon illegal tyranny; and so the germs of our municipal‡ freedom were cherished. The schools of Charlemagne in France, the patronage of learned men by Alfred, and the foundation of many colleges throughout Europe, are all connected in some measure with the influence of the Church in the dark ages. They are akin to that spirit which sent missionaries into the most savage nations, like the Briton Winifrid (or Boniface) into Germany, softening everywhere wild man, by shewing him something of the truth of God. Even where such missions, or the Churches which sent them forth, were in collision with one another, as the Churches of Iona and Western Britain were with the growing centralisation of Rome, the spirit which animated them all was the same, and the truth which lay at the bottom of their zeal was essentially one.

“Of religious wars, such as the Crusades, we may say that, if Christianity had never existed, they would not the less have

\* Guizot.

† Hosea vi. 8, 9, where harbouring of homicides in the Levitical cities seems implied.

‡ Guizot, and Sir James Stephen's *Lectures on French History*.

been fought. For their real causes were generally passion or policy. Yet the religion, which was made a pretext for them, threw an elevating influence among the mixed motives of the combatants, and often ennobled ferocity into courage, while sometimes it even mitigated victory. Nor need we doubt that, in this tangled world, such contests are often means of working out a Divine design, which is neither to be measured by the consciousness of its instruments, nor yet to be charged with the acts of their free will. We see all things not as yet put under the feet of the most perfect wisdom.

“ But a great sign of the goodness of Christianity is, that when the ages of twilight were to brighten into noonday, they did so chiefly by returning to the first principles of our faith. By reviving the good news of God’s ‘ frank ’ forgiveness of sins, such men as Wyclif and Luther rolled away the burden that lay heavy on the human breast. By putting us, in the Spirit of Christ, face to face with God, they put away all false subterfuges of the conscience, and all vain gloryings, and at the same time all fears, awakening in men both a deeper humility, and a consciousness of strength not their own. Again, leading us to the foot of Christ’s cross, they shewed us the evil of wilful sin, and by what a sacrifice of self-dedication our health is wrought, and persuades us to ‘ sin no more, lest a worse thing befall us.’ They did not thus bring a new Christianity, but they renewed the power of the old. Then by putting in every man’s hands the sacred writings of the prophets and apostles, they not only enable us to judge of the truth of things, but give us a wonderful instrument for awakening in ourselves the same spirit as dwelt in the writers. For though faith is in one sense the gift of God, yet in another sense it comes by reading and by hearing. Hence I wish you also to study our scriptures, especially the book of Isaiah, and the Psalms, and St Paul, and St John, with perhaps also Genesis. These five books, postponing at first those which concern you less, I should like to see spread and read in India. They would teach you what our faith is, better

than my account can; and might, if it be the Divine will, have the same power to awaken in you a hunger and thirst after righteousness, as they have often shewn in Europe and in Asia. Nor is it a slight sign of our religion having come from God, that its earliest writings yet breathe such power. We have learnt since many arts and sciences, and have adapted our phrase and usage, as we have a right, to the aspects of various nations. But the first life which dwelt fresh in the apostles and prophets, upon whom the temple of men's minds is built, yet speaks in their writings; and when we have most caught a contagion from thence, we most partake of their spirit, and enter into the mind of Christ, and do, as Christ did, the works of God who sends us. You should read, then, Hebrew history; nor is there any harm in comparing it with your own, since there is one God of Jew and Gentile; you should compare the doctrine and faith of Christ with both that of the Jews, and with anything analogous to it among yourselves, or answering to it in your own spirits; you should study the life, and death, and all the history of Christ Himself, and the results of His appearing in the world; you should kneel down for a little, and pray as it were at the foot of the cross in thought, asking the Divine Enlightener for His light; you may consider also whether such a deliverer as Christ from both the penalty and stain of evil, and such a revealer of immortality, is not what you need for your own peace; and then I hope, alike the substance of our faith, and the attestation which accompanied it, and the history which prepared for it, and the results which have followed it, which we both see in the history of nations, and can try for ourselves, will all together convince you that it is taught us by God, the Father of all. But I agree with Blancombe, that the love of Divine things must go before their knowledge, and if you would know whether the doctrine is of God, you must be endeavouring to do His will."

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## CHAPTER XII.

*Doctrinal Difficulties and Explanations.*

“Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight which He hath made crooked? In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him.”—ECCLESIASTES VII. 13, 14.

“That which is far off, and exceeding deep, who can find it out?”—*Id.* v. 24.

“Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.”—I THESS. v. 21.

“For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love.”—I CORINTH. xiii. 9—13.

“THE more you explain all the circumstances and accompaniments of Christianity,” remarked the Saugata, “the more wonderful it appears to be. But when you urge the excellence of the Doctrine itself, as a thing that should awaken an echo of faith from the heart of man, you seem not to be aware, that the entire Christian scheme appears to us to contain very great difficulties, if not to be quite incredible.” “In what respect is this so?” asked Mountain. “If you have no objection, I will explain to you,” replied the other.

(1) “In the first place,” he continued, “you have spoken of human nature as diseased, or as having the Divine likeness in it marred, and requiring a certain health to be wrought in it. In the mouths of many of your teachers, this statement takes even a harsher form than in your own. For they speak of man’s nature as utterly abominable, so that for God even to compassionate it seems almost at variance with His truth. They say it deserves infinite torments, which are accordingly to be suffered by the mass of mankind. Then if we ask whether human sin does not come much of weakness and ignorance, and even of

circumstances in which our Maker has placed us, they answer, No ; for that it comes of our first mother's disobedience in eating the fruit of a forbidden tree ; and this act of hers, several thousand years before our birth, is, they say, put down to our account ; so that, even if we never sinned for ourselves, as dying perhaps in infancy, we should still be justly liable to punishment, for that act in which we had no share or consciousness, but which they say was prompted by a Spiritual Enemy, or Devil, who again preceded our birth by I know not how many more ages. We were present in some mysterious way, they tell us, in the loins of Adam or the womb of Eve ; and such a doctrine, they say, is the best account of the origin of evil, and explains the world's history ; whereas to us it appears to involve all visible acts and all voices of our conscience in inextricable confusion. But if we remonstrate, and say that such a doctrine neither gives a pleasant image of a heavenly Father, nor answers to our notions of justice, still less of equity, they reply, that our whole nature is too corrupt for us to have any notion of what is just or right ; and perhaps even, that the more a doctrine contradicts our conscience, the more likely it is to be true ; but that the infallibility of your sacred books, as proved by miracles, (which we never ourselves saw,) should compel us to abase our proud reason, and accept thankfully the Divine Revelation. But at least we know not how such a doctrine is good news, or a Gospel ; for it seems to us so injurious to our Maker, and so hateful to man, that we must at least pray it may not be true. Then, as to the evidence of it, we have not seen the miracles alleged to prove it ; and it is hardly pious to put the senses so far above the soul, as to make mere stories of what men have seen, overbear our holiest conceptions of Right. But, if we cannot conceive either Truth or Right, then our souls contain nothing for any Divine Revelation to obtain an answer from. Again, if God implants in some of us such a special organ of sacred perception, there is left no fitness in His doing so by men, rather than by tigers or dogs ; and all your arguments for the

immortality of man from his reason, and conscience, and holier aspirations, become utterly naught, and we are driven down to the sensualism of the Chárvácas. Nor then would any response in us to what seemed good in a doctrine be at all trustworthy. So unholy are the consequences which seem to us to flow from the doctrine of the fall of man, and especially of the entailment of 'Original Sin,' through Eve's eating the apple. It can only be proved to be revealed by arguments which make a truly Divine Revelation impossible.

(2) "Akin to our first objection is a second, which we feel, to what is said of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. It seems taught, either by Paul, or by those who profess his doctrine, that the highest God was too angry with men, ever to forgive them without exacting a certain suffering from some one in their stead. His justice, as they say, or as it seems to us, His vindictiveness, required a payment or satisfaction which was made by Christ. Upon receiving this payment, God changed His mind, and counted innocent those guilty persons who take advantage of this dying of the innocent Christ in their stead. Thus His righteousness is, by a transfer, imputed to them; and their guiltiness, by a fiction, to Him. The Innocent suffers as guilty, and the guilty are pardoned, as innocent; the places of both being changed by imputation, or their merit and demerit inverted. This doctrine seems made by some so essential, that all Christianity turns upon it, and faith in it stands instead of all virtues, or at least is the paramount requisite, and only plea availing, for acceptance. Whereas to us the whole doctrine seems unholy. For, in the first place, it makes the Eternal God change His mind, whereas we think, and Christians sometimes acknowledge, Him to be unchangeable. Secondly it makes Him vindictive, in that He would not forgive mere penitence; whereas we count it a hardness of heart even in men to be unforgiving. It makes Him also mercenary, in that He does, on receiving a price, what He would not do out of pure goodness. In the same way it makes Him selfish, in that He is said to



‘consider only His own glory\*’; whereas it would be more for His true glory to consider in love the good of others. Again, it contradicts the truth of God, that He should call innocent those who are really guilty, and by a fiction lay guilt on the innocent; especially if He does this out of an arbitrary choice†, and not out of inherent fitness. Nor can it be said, that Justice is thus satisfied, for such conduct is not truly just. Nothing which is untrue, can be just. Nor again, is it easy to see, how the life and death of Jesus, which took place in flesh and time, could satisfy a debt which you say was infinite, for it involved no less than eternal torments. But if you reply, that Jesus was also Christ the Son of God, and that His Divinity made His sufferings of infinite value, then it would suffice for all, and it would be cruel of God not to extend it to all.

(3) “ This brings me to my third objection. Most Christians teach, that only the chosen few, or the elect, are really saved. Then this infinite salvation of yours becomes finite; and the Gospel is no longer good news to all men, but to a few. Thus God is no longer the Father of all, but of the elect. Some of your teachers even connect such an election exclusively with the profession of Christianity, and say, that many Christians will suffer everlasting torment, but that all who are not Christians must do so. To me that is not good news. Others, who are more moderate, allow that Divine election may be amongst persons, who without fault on their own part, are ignorant of Christianity. But even these leave an arbitrariness in the selection of a few to be saved. Others, they say, will have rejected in free will an offer made them; but they add, that whoever accepts, does so because he is irresistibly induced by Divine grace. Why then does not this grace induce more? You blame us for taking away, as you fancy, the Divine self-consciousness; but what can be worse than taking away the

\* Calvin's *Institutes*.

† Hooker argues that the Divine Will is not without reason, but chooses the good.

Eternal love, and putting mutability, vindictiveness, arbitrariness, untruth, and elective caprice, in its place?

(4) “Fourthly, the explanation which some give of your Christian election only makes the doctrine worse. For they resolve it, not merely into the mystery of things, but into a wilful decree, conceived by God from eternity, which they call predestination. We are not, they say, to murmur against God, nor reply against His Will. I do not murmur against what comes of God, but does this come of Him? I accept His Will, but has He shewn us this to be His Will? If He has revealed Himself, as you say, through all history and conscience, and especially through the long line of the Hebrew Scriptures, as the very fountain of justice, mercy, and truth, these principles, once laying hold of any mind, are a better clue to His holy will, than a few texts in which the contrary seems spoken. That is not just, because of infinite power, which we should call horrible from man to man. I say nothing, of such a doctrine’s making human agency a mockery, and throwing a more than Brahmanical *Máyá* over the moral world, because that would lead us into a wider mystery. But at least this doctrine of election of a few by predestination is not good news to me; nor can I reconcile it with Divine justice, even if with human morality.

(5) “But fifthly, all the above doctrines are bound up with the Divinity of Christ. He is, you say, ‘very God of very God,’ and you speak of His appearance as a Divine Incarnation. Those who teach your religion in a system, go on to explain that you have three Persons in one Divine and Infinite Being. A missionary once, shewing me a creed, threatened me with endless perdition, if I did not fully believe what perhaps I did not understand, and what so far as I did understand it, contradicted itself. Each of the Three Persons, he said, was ‘by Himself, God and Lord; yet there were not three gods, but one God.’ Now, if I could understand how three may be one by difference of relation or aspect, yet at least it is difficult to imagine Three Persons in One Being, of whom the first shall

have a vindictive will to punish all mankind, but the second have a benevolent will to save them; so that the first shall only change His mind upon receiving a price from the second. Then, if the wills of the first and second Persons are at any time different, how can they be one? For if by substance you mean spirit, and not matter, there is nothing more essential to unity of spiritual being, than unity of self-conscious will? Again, if the will and self-consciousness are one, how are there three? Much more, if each is 'by Himself' God, and God is both infinite and One, how is there room for another to be by His side? All this doctrine of Three and One is difficult; and it becomes more so, when you connect with it anger, and punishing, and propitiation, and intercession, as if from one self-consciousness to another.

(6) " But sixthly, you say this doctrine is a mystery, and must be received by faith. But I thought that in Christianity you had a revelation, and that what was once a mystery had become unveiled. I do not deny, that reason goes beyond sense, and perhaps faith reasonably beyond the full company of reason; yet neither should contradict the other. But what do Christians mean by faith? If they mean belief, then it is an intellectual quality, and requires some ground, if not naked evidence. Then if it has good ground to assent upon, it is mechanical, and has no merit. But you have rather implied, that it is that mental apprehension which gives body to unseen things: as such, I see no objection to it, but it is not peculiar to Christians; perhaps even it is stronger among Hindús. Some again, make faith consist in trust, or confidence. If they mean trust in things holy and right, such as our conscience answers to, and the most Divine Intelligence supports, then it might be a moral quality; but this very faith, as I apprehend it, forbids me to receive immoral or arbitrary doctrines of God, as if He were Might and Self-will, instead of being also Right and Love. If, again, Christians by faith mean confidence, or assurance of our own salvation, this may come of selfishness, as well as of righteousness.

And what right has a man to be so sanguine? He can only be rightly assured of what is first true; and if he is saved by confiding that he is so, does this make our salvation a process of our own minds? Or, if it is by confiding that he is one of the elect, does not this make God partial, and an acceptor of persons? Still more, does not the stress thus laid on faith, in the sense of confidence, either make men presumptuous; or, if it consists in intense abnegation of merit, then make Christ jealous, and His religion a thing of name? What is the essential difference between those degenerate forms of Hindúism, which set the name of a favourite deity above all moral distinctions, and such a doctrine of faith as makes mere self-negation, and acknowledgment of Christ as a Saviour, avail more with heaven, than pure heart, or upright life? You have yourself," (here he turned to Blancombe) "touched on the danger of religion's losing morality: and I think the Christian stress on faith in Christ as opposed to good deeds, shews such a tendency in doctrine, which I should not wonder if bad men carried out in act. Especially all that is said of there being 'none other name given,' seems at variance with the equity and goodness of God. Through such a faith, and not from want of faith, I feel unable to receive your doctrine.

(7) "Here comes in, seventhly, all the exclusiveness of your religion. It is acknowledged, that such was a fault in part of the Jews. But yet it was a natural fruit of their Mosaic system: how then can that system have been Divine? You say, it was temporary. Be it so; but it obscured truths, which had been known before, as the case of Melchisedec in Canaan proves, no less than that of Viswámitra in India. Why then obscure things, only in order to uncover them? Or why construct an elaborate polity, which freedom and truth would require to be one day broken down? How does the long usurpation of the Levitical tribe in Jerusalem differ from that of the Brahmanical caste in India? Let your great Teacher and Deliverer have the merit of breaking down the one; but why may I not claim an

equally unfading crown for our master Sákya? His faith stands in the same relation to the Brahmans, as Christianity does to the priesthood of Aaron and Hilkiah. It should also be noticed, that Sákya was in age far prior of the two. But have not you Christians inherited too much of that exclusiveness, which you blame in the Jews of old? I should not wonder, if all that doctrine of election had something to do with old Jewish feelings. Still more it strikes me that the narrowness of mind, with which Christians speak of themselves as especial favourites of heaven, and of all other nations as wandering in darkness, is either Jewish, or at least wrong. To us it seems that every man everywhere is accepted, in proportion as he grows in intelligence, and does the thing that is right.

(8) “ You are perhaps not accustomed to such freedom of speech from us. But you were, though in all friendliness, our assailants on this question, and you invited me to speak. I will now however, try you with only one more objection. If Judaism and in a less degree Christianity, seem to be narrow in their sympathies, or unfair in their way of regarding other modes of worship, still more we think both one and the other have too local and material a view of all that concerns mental things, and especially the Divine intelligence. You speak of God, as of a king sitting upon a visible throne in the sky, with His eldest Son at His right hand, and one receiving petitions from the other. Then you make men, like mere animals, creeping upon this earth, at a great distance from God, and hardly daring to think any thought of immortality but what is written down for them in a book. If ever we are to see God, you think we must be transferred bodily through the air into this palace of the great King, taking with us flesh and bones, and I suppose, fleshly appetites. For though you speak of ‘a spiritual body,’ I cannot understand an union of contradictories; and a bodiless body, or a material spirit, has for me no meaning. Nor do I know what matter is, except body. Thus you make Heaven a mere place and our souls bodies, and the Infinite God a powerful ma-

All this has a poor sound to us when we compare it with those infinite worlds through which our own thoughts expatiate, and with the entire freedom from every shackle of sense, which we think belongs to perfect spirit, and with the kindred of that which is immortal in us to the Highest and all-embracing Intelligence. Every argument which you used for the immortality of man's soul seems to be on the side of such a faith as ours, rather than of this confined doctrine, with which Christians either express a higher truth in Jewish parables, or, as I should say, lose it in them. You have spoken, as if you were not incapable of apprehending our grander views of infinity; but the Christian doctrine, as I have generally understood it, of a Heaven and an earth, and a great king, and a lifting of our bodies out of the grave, and an opening or shutting the gates of Heaven with keys, seems a falling back from the full growth of the soul into childhood. So that, while you seemed to be right in taking the spirit against the letter of the Jews, when I compare your faith with ours, you seem to be Jews yourselves. For I suppose names make little difference, unless thoughts are changed. But I shall be glad to hear from you any explanation of the difficulties which I have ventured to suggest."

(1) "It would have been a bad return for your patience with us, if I had interrupted you," here observed Mountain; "otherwise your misconception of the aspect of Christian doctrines would have inclined me to do so. In the first place, you will nowhere find it written in the Scriptures of the Old Testament or the New, that the disobedience of Eve is put down, as an act, to our account. But have we no principle in us partaking of that which made her disobey? What have you acknowledged yourself of sin, and of the need of penitence and forgiveness? But whenever we sin, as the conscience of better men owns that we do, so often we fall from our better mind, and so from the likeness of God. We disobey the law to which conscience testifies. Nor does our disobedience come of accident, but of

a division in ourselves, which we lament and yet are guilty of, and so which attests an evil principle in us, warring with the good. But if any creature sins, of that which is in itself, or of a tendency which it inherits, then it so far has an evil nature, or a sinfulness bound up in its very origin. But such tendency goes on to act, and may suffer before act. We put our foot on the head of a young viper, without waiting till its fangs grow. But if one could change the nature of the viper, so that it should become harmless, or its poison prove medicine, we should save it for its better nature's sake. Thus Mankind have evil in them; but in so far as any one is cured of this evil, and fulfils the design of God which is our truer nature and His likeness, so far the man is healed, and delivered from evil.

“But it makes a great difference, under what aspect such a doctrine is presented to the mind. If it is exaggerated, so as to deny our better conscience, and destroy that witness to the holier law of God, which he makes an instrument to heal us, then it becomes evil. But no such statement is taught as our doctrine in the Bible. On the contrary, some of the stronger sayings, which might seem to support so harsh an exaggeration, are expressly condemned. Some of them come from the mouths of those three illnatured friends of Job\*, on whom Divine disapproval is pronounced. It is neither wise of friend, nor fair of foe, to make those wrong sayings a specimen of Christian doctrine. Again, some similar sayings are used only in reproof of a particularly evil generation†, as of that which sinned before the flood; or of strangers who oppressed the Israelites‡; or of tyrants and spoilers§, who got riches not by right. Words spoken in such a relation would naturally be strong, as there was great occasion for them. But the only passages in the Bible, which really express the general sinfulness of our race, are outpourings of penitence, or else of rebuke to men who

\* Job iv. 17—20; xi. 3, 12, 20; xxv. 4—6; xxxii. 1—21.

† Genesis vi. 1.

‡ Psalms xiv. 53.

§ Jeremiah xvii. 9—11; xxii. 3

pretended especial righteousness, and needed strong recall to humility. But penitence of heart is, like love or grief, a passion which does not weigh words nicely, but pours forth a feeling it cannot contain. *Behold, I was shapen in iniquity*, might well be said by David, when fresh from the sin of adultery, into which fierce passion had carried him; and every man, in so far as he approaches a like sin, may use words of like fervour. But even the purest may in a way adopt them; for he who conceives most highly of holiness, will have deepest contrition for even a slight fall from it. Hence it is that Christianity, having the strongest sense of the evil of sin, breathes such fervour of repentance. Our faith in that Holiest One, whom we cry out for, makes us feel most our falling from His Will. Nor do we doubt, that such life-long falling from man's better nature is also falling from what God intended him to be, and so from the Divine likeness; for our conscience witnesses by faith to no imaginary law. And as God is perfect in right, and infinite in goodness, so we ever fall short, but reach onward to attain that for which His better Spirit attains us. But neither Scripture of old nor the Church now, teaches, that God punishes us for any act, save our own. It may be, that when deep feelings come to be expressed in the uncongenial shape of forms, they become in danger of losing their truest aspect. Thus some would say, that Eve's sin is imputed to us, because we partake of its evil; but the same persons would add, that the imputation is taken away, when we become partakers of Christ, and are baptized into His fold. Some lay more stress on the moral disease, and on the health of soul by which we spiritually revive; others lay more on our visible birth in a nature partaking that disease, and on the sacred rite visibly sealing our admission into\* a covenant of the forgiveness of sins. But all agree, in what Scripture is express upon, that man is smitten of God for his own sins†, and not for those of his fathers. They agree also, that in so far as we partake of Adam, or fallen man, we die;

\* *els, into.* Nicene Creed.

† Ezekiel xviii.



but in so far as of Christ, or perfect man and Image of God\*, we live. As we partake of flesh, we have natural death. As we partake of sinfulness, we are in danger of the death of the soul. As we partake of Christ's sacrifice, we have forgiveness; and as of His Holy Spirit, we have eternal life. Even those Christians who lay most stress on visible baptism, as admission into the covenant of forgiveness, do so not from ascribing arbitrariness to God, but out of reverent thankfulness for His health, and unwillingness to forget the disease which needs it. Nor would it be reasonable, or humble, to neglect the rite by which His gift is sealed to the soul. But yet our wisest teachers make the rite not a charm, but rather a moral instrument to man, as well as an ordinance of God. For by baptism, they say, we are consigned humanly to holy teaching, and prayers, and all instruments of training the soul; while they doubt not the Divine blessing will, according to fit time and capacity, run along with these things, which have a promise to faith, and which express faith.

“Unless then you say that there is no sin in human nature, or that it needs no recovery, I do not see how you can object to the Christian doctrine that man is fallen, and needs to be raised on his feet. Your own confessions come too near our doctrine for you altogether to reject it. We are not the first among mankind to call mortals sick, or weary, or pining. Even Sákya, with his groaning over earthly things, acknowledged something wrong in the world. Our difference is, that we trace it far back, and refuse to stop short of its deepest root; and having learnt the greatness of man's sickness, we more thankfully proclaim the goodness of God who has sent the great Physician of souls into the world. Here is no cruel doctrine, but one of healing; and in so far as any one receives the gift, we rejoice, and would gladly extend it farther. Only our piety forbids us to find the origin of sin, as sin, properly in the mind of God, or anywhere but in an evil spirit in ourselves. But as to the great entangle-

\* 1 Corinthians xi. 7; 2 Corinthians iv. 4; Romans viii. 29; Genesis i. 26, 27.

ment, out of which evil comes and appears as an enemy, so that the good will is not fulfilled, Blancombe has said enough.

(2) “ I have said the goodness of God. For secondly, I must not allow you to think that our heavenly Father was either vindictive, or mercenary, or even changeable. He does not change; for it is written, that His *counsel stands fast, and He does all His pleasure*\*. Whatever is being done for the salvation of mankind now, has been predestined from before the creation; and by the term predestination we express this fixity of the Divine counsel. Thus Christ, as the Lamb of God, is said to have been *slain before the foundation of the world*†. With the Eternal, then, according to our doctrine, is no variableness. Neither, again, is there mercenariness. For though the life of Christ is the most precious of all ransoms, yet it is paid not to the Father, whose will was always to deliver us, but to the great enemy, whether death, or the devil, or the law, considered as an accuser. Surely you know that it is to an enemy ransom is paid, and not to a father. Thus the apostles with one voice teach in all their writings, that we are bought out of the hand of death‡, or sin, and out of this present evil world, but never out of the hands of our heavenly Father. So the primitive doctors§, who came next after the apostles, taught that the price of Christ’s sufferings was paid to the great enemy; only they knew not how He had a right to exact it. More modern doctors have explained the price paid as a satisfaction to the law; and there is no harm in this view, if we understand it of the law in its accusing aspect, when it becomes an enemy; for then it is the strength of sin; and we do read that Christ *has blotted out the handwriting which was against us*. But we must

\* Isaiah xlv. 10. Ephesians i. 11.

† Revelations xiii. 8. 1 Peter i. 10.

‡ Colossians i. 13: Acts xxvi. 18: Galat. i. 4: 2 Tim. i. 9, 10: Titus ii. 11—14.

§ So Irenæus, Origen, the two Gregories, and even St Augustine. The theory of a price paid *to the Father*, or to change His will, is as contrary to Ecclesiastical Antiquity as it is to our purest conscience, and to Scripture when caught from the point of view of the sacred writers.

greatly beware of understanding this of that innermost law, which is the will of the Father, and which, when it comes forth, gives light to the simple. For in that innermost law, which is love, there is no darkness at all. Neither does pain come of it; for no evil, as evil, is of God."

"But why," here interposed the Saugata, "did not the Father save the world, since He loved it, without such suffering by His Son?" "Why," replied Mountain, "do you hurt your child, when you wish only to correct him? Or why alarm, when you desire to warn? No earthly father rejoices in his child's crying, and yet he suffers it; nor surgeon in the sharp pain of the knife, and yet he uses it. So God is not angered as if out of infirmity; but if men break the order of His creation, they disturb forces which crush them. As they sow, He lets them reap. He could not put forth law in fixity, unless it had penalty possible. All that Blancombe said of evil, as coming of God only in possibility, but of lower agents in fulfilment, should be here remembered by you. He also explained sufficiently for humility the suffering of Christ. The old written law could not be broken as a civil institution, unless He who broke it suffered. Nor could it be abolished in its hold over men's consciences, unless He who suffered from it had also triumph. But if even that written law pointed to an eternal right above us, and its sacrifices to a dread of conscience within us, these deeper things are for mankind what the writing was for the Hebrews. These things then require of all men a suffering, which we must partake by sympathy, or otherwise, so as to be purged, and an assurance that our sacrifice, or that of which we partake in spirit, can be accepted. Again, it has been shewn, how Christ's dying and rising again brings about our death to sin, and our moral resurrection. But this visible effect (as in what I said before) points to a deeper something, or a writing in heaven, which answers to what is written in earth. Christ then died, even as the victims of the Mosaic law died; and as men offering those both expressed contrition, and were forgiven,

so we, associating ourselves with Christ's death in sympathy and sacrament, make as it were a spiritual sacrifice, and receive the forgiveness of our heavenly Father, which comes frankly of His infinite love.

“I need not prove farther that God is not vindictive. However imperfectly we may understand that mystery of evil, which Christ triumphed over on the cross, we find there the cause of His pain, rather than in the will of the Father. The limit set to everything human, the possibilities which accompany good, the threatening nature of all law, and the necessity of law not being broken with impunity, give us something like a clue. They teach us to find the necessity for Christ's death, as a death, in some necessity external to the innermost will of God, rather than within it; though yet without Him, by whom all things are, neither the necessity, nor the law introducing it, could be even in thought. They suggest also how that suffering, which to the eternal love was no motive\*, may yet have been an indispensably foreseen condition; and hence to our finite thoughts, not grasping an omnipresent unity, it may seem presented as a cause. Moreover, when we see how all great martyrs suffer, how out of their death goes forth power, and how death itself by the greater mystery of Christ's bringing immortality within its range, had its bonds for ever loosed, we can feel better than understand, that love here wrought with wisdom in delivering us from evil. Nor are our Scriptures doubtful on this point; for they ever teach that ‘God loved the world, and gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish.’ Only I must own that our doctrine of Christ's suffering for our sins, and taking away the sins of the world by His death, is by some modern teachers put in a different light from that of the apostles. For the moderns sometimes make belief in it a kind of legal requirement, and use it so as to discourage man, and to narrow the mercies of God. Whereas with the apostles of Christ it was ever a doctrine of

\* See above, page 334.

freedom. It was a message of good news that all legal sacrifices were put away, and that God freely forgives sins, and calls back all His wanderers through the spirit of the beloved Son to the Father. Such freedom then gave power to man's souls: and the loss of it now in the language of some blind leaders of the blind is the reason why our truth has less power to heal. But the very apostles of Christ are our higher authority: and as their doctrine is most wholesome, so from their writings I would have you take it.

3, "As God, by delivering us through His Son from the evil which was in the world, shews His love to man, neither doth He narrow it by rejecting any willing to be saved. You have rightly guessed that our doctrine of election has something to do with Jewish feelings. Only, instead of being the same as their narrowness, it is built upon St Paul's express teaching to the contrary. He saw the Jews priding themselves upon being a chosen people. Already John the Baptist had warned them that if they did not Abraham's works, God could raise up other children to Abraham. So St Paul tells them the chosen position of light which they had enjoyed had been the gift of God. Since they turned to the darkness of the letter instead of taking the light of the spirit in Christ, this better light would be to the nations at large. Whoever embraced this better gift would be a part henceforth of the chosen people. Thus mankind stepped into the place of Israel. You see, the apostle's doctrine is not narrowing, but a widening. It is a protest against national sacerdotal exclusiveness. There may be something of human metaphor in ascribing such choice to God; but do we not find that we could have no gift without an adequate Giver? Whenever light, then, we enjoy, or whatever calling comes to us through teaching, we ascribe it to a forethought of God, as a human act to a man's thought. If some have larger gifts than others, they are in a way more chosen. Thus St Paul, having power to turn many hearts to God, was a chosen vessel. So the apostles of Christ were chosen, though one of them turned

out an enemy. But if even bodily gifts are of God, much more those of the soul. The more, then, any man has right faith, and truth of heart, and goodness, the more he will ascribe such deliverance to God. But this ascription is in looking back with thankfulness, when we have received, not in presuming beforehand that we shall. We see the side of human performance, and our faith infers the inner side of Divine grace. Perhaps our language on such points may be innocently tinged by those difficulties which are felt throughout the world in all attempts to reconcile 'Fate and Freewill,' or Divine purpose and human agency. For as our freedom is both limited by vaster forces, and prompted by natural motives, we seem at once agents, and yet instruments. We are conscious of choice; yet we choose not without reason. We will; but our will had antecedents. Our will goes forth, but yet in act it falls short of its object. Again, it is biassed by inclinations hardly its own. Circumstances again give us power, or fetter us. We say for ourselves, we are free; yet the bystander foresees what we will do. Perhaps every individual man is in his own will properly free, and manifests his character by spontaneous choice; yet the conduct of a mass of men in given circumstances of mind and body is not doubtful; and we do not doubt that a higher and spiritual Governor wields the whole at His will. Such difficulties, however, whether they come of two truths which seem to contradict each other, or rather, as I should say, of limitation to our freedom, are at least not peculiar to Christianity. They were felt in Greece and India before the Gospel was preached in the world. Their connexion with our faith is quite accidental. Only, as we do magnify soul above body, and motives above circumstance, and will above deed, or character above results, so we magnify the secret teaching which comes of the grace of God. Whoever has this so as to use it, is so far chosen as to have cause of thanksgiving. But such a gift is no proof that the like was not offered to others: for we teach favour, but not favoritism. Take the doctrine of election as a way of ascribing all we

have received in humility to God, and it is wholesome. Turn it into an argument for presumption, or exclusiveness, and it is no longer Christian. It is the aspect of the speaker, and the feeling of the words, which makes the difference. We are saved by grace; but the grace of God appears, says St Paul, bringing salvation to *all* men\*. And again, God commands all men everywhere to have a new mind†. Not few, but all, you hear. Nor do we fetter human action: for the more we know our power of action is a gift, the more earnestly we use for fear of forfeiting it. *Work out*, the Apostle says‡, *your salvation; for it is God that worketh in you*.

(4) "What you object to Predestination has been now anticipated. For by this word we mean only that, whatever the eternal God is doing now, He intended to do. Christianity is not a new idea in His counsels, but one entertained from of old and pervading the Old Testament, though unveiled in the New§. How human action is compatible with Divine foreknowledge is, as you justly observed, only part of a wider mystery. Some may think that the Divine foreknowledge is by reason and method, being by prevision of circumstance and motive rather than by vague omnipotence; but this we need not discuss. For whatever may be the *rationale* of such things, whether few are saved, or many, Christ offers His salvation to every man; and whoever rejects it does so of free will. The metaphysics of such rejection, in respect of spontaneity or necessity, concern Christianity no more than any scheme of human life; and they may be settled, as metaphysicians think best, or left unsettled. For the Gospel, like human life, stands on one side of them. What God offers in Christ is life and health; and what we assert eternity of, is His purpose to offer them.

(5) "More important than metaphysical questions, which only affect the Gospel as they do everything else, is your first objection. For certainly we read, that Jesus spake as never

\* Titus ii. 11.

† Acts xvii. 30.

‡ Philippians ii. 12, 13.

§ Ephesians i.; 1 Corinthians ii. 10, where read "*revealed it*," i. e. the purpose.

spake. He wrought works such as never man wrought. He rose from the grave as never man rose. He lives by His spirit, in a temple of breathing minds, with such a life as never man has been able to infuse for generations into a community of all nations and tongues. He makes holy and humble men of heart, even now, one in spirit with Himself, and through Himself with the Father. He renews our humanity after the Divine likeness, and the world after the Divine thought. We cannot think that this life comes of less than God ; or that through any less than heavenly Truth we are thus led to the highest Being. We think, then, that it has pleased God, who as the Father is invisible, to shew Himself, by giving His lively image, in Christ, who is Son of God, and Son of Man. Thus, not like those systems, which deny Man's Fall, and leave him to fall lower, our faith takes away sin which separated, by bringing near God who heals. Nor is such only our inference ; but Jesus declared Himself one with the Father\*. His Apostles teach that the Wisdom (or Word) of the Father dwelt in Him†, and speak of His emptying Himself of a greater glory by being born Man, instead of retaining equality with God‡. Here we find a true Incarnation, better than your poets have fancied ; and it is by this outshining of Deity embodied in Man, that Humanity has fulfilled in it the thought of God. Thus all our life is hallowed, as its true pattern is shewn, and a power given to fulfil it. Thus, as members of Christ, we become in spirit children of God, and are baptised into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Then, when the Church in later times considered how the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit could be One, and the Word manifest in flesh, yet not the Father, and the Spirit distinct from both, and dwelling in men, yet one with God, she found no statement more probable than that of the Trinity, or the doctrine of Three and One. But she gives this fuller statement as correct reasoning from the elements of our faith, rather than as the very faith. What the missionary meant,

\* Ev. St John x. 30.

† Ev. St John i.

‡ Philippians ii. 6.



was to tell you, that, if you reasoned correctly, such conclusion would follow from what we read of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, in that scheme by which the grace of God offers to deliver us from evil. How far you would so conclude we are willing you should consider hereafter. What is first important, is, that you should come through the Spirit of the Son to the Father. But when I remember what you said of *Dharma*, and *Sanga*\*, your law and congregation, I think should not seem strange to you, for Christians joined in one body of Christ, to become partakers of the Word, and have fellowship through one Holy Spirit with each other, and with Christ, and with God. Again, though by the word *persons* we do not mean to divide from each other those three†, who are ever the blessed and undivided One Eternal, and One Infinite and One Spirit, yet you who join many persons (and even persons once human) in One Divine Intelligence, should not stumble at whatever may be difficult in our human words when applied to things Divine. Nor should the Hindús, who believe in many Incarnations, blame us if we say that truth, and love, and wisdom, embodied in Jesus, was ‘the express image’ of the Divine Being made flesh. For the coming forth of spirit from spirit, though undivided, like the radiance of light from light, is not like a coarse division of material persons. It is rather like Wisdom out of Majesty, or Reason from Will, or Truth from Being. But in whatever way you think Deity can have become Incarnate, suffer us to say that it was so in Christ the Son of God and Man, until coming to His Truth, and drinking into His spirit, and partaking of His life, you learn better than I can explain, how He is the true Offspring of the Father. I then will raise you into a better knowledge, and into a spiritual sonship, not foreign to His own.

(6) “Again, if I remember rightly the place in both t

\* See above, p. 23.

† Tres nescio quid. *St Anselm.* *ὑποστάσεις* might be rendered *subsistencies*.

‡ *ἀπαύρασμα*, *St Athanasius* and *St Paul*.

Bauddha and Vedántine systems assigned to faith, I do not see how you can blame Christianity for consisting mainly of faith. It is this which gives body to things hoped for, and is the sight of things unseen. Upon faith even our earthly knowledge is most fundamentally built, and by it especially things holiest to our better souls are apprehended. By faith we believe in Right, and Mercy, and Truth, and Goodness, and God; and in Immortality, and even in our own Souls. We surely need some deep principle to withdraw us from the splendour of things that glitter and pass away, reminding us in temptation of a law, and in sorrow of a comforter, and in all life of some truer home of our souls. The martyr in the flame, and the fallen patriot in the dungeon, or in sight of death, have ever by such power turned endurance into joy. Nor was Sákya, whom you extol, without some such feeling, either when he turned from the stir of earth to a deeper tranquillity, or again when he found bodily penances less help than the strength born of the mind. But if you claim such a feeling yourselves, you should not blame Christianity for endeavouring to purify and guide it. But you ask, is our faith intellectual belief? I answer that it is not without belief, as instrumentally necessary; but in so far as it is itself intellectual, it neither goes without ground, nor claims merit. He, however, who trusts in any one, must first believe that he is. You ask, again, is it confidence? I answer, that it grows into hope; for so the trustworthiness of the object leads it; and our hope maketh not ashamed; but yet the essence of faith is not confidence for ourselves, except so far as we are confident of God's truth. With more reason, you ask, if faith is trust. If you mean trust in all that God is, and all that He does, and commands, and promises, I answer, Yes. For thus it means confidence in one holier than ourselves. It leads us beyond our own weakness. It persuades us that God is the Father of our spirits, that He is our Guide and Judge and Saviour. So, when He commands, it persuades us to obey; and when He promises, to hope; and when He trusts us, to be faithful; and when He

speaks by His inspired servants, or by their records, to believe what they have spoken of His indwelling thought. Faith, therefore, is belief, and a taking hold of the unseen, and trust, and confidence, and obedience, and faithfulness. For it puts on a dress and aspect according to the object it lays hold of. Here then is the peculiar character of Christian faith, that it has the most glorious object in God unveiling Himself in Christ. This it is which kindles it into hope and love and faithfulness; for by this it becomes truly alive to sin, and puts it away, and is encouraged, and goes on in a life of joy, in which its Saviour never forsakes it. You may now understand how our faith has something of its nature in common with what good men feel among yourselves, but yet is transformed into a more glorious shape, when it comes through Christ to our God and Father; nor will you see unreasonableness in our saying, that by such a faith our souls are saved. For certainly thus we grow better; nor do we say that pure heart and upright life are ever of no avail with God; but without a right faith a man is less likely to be either pure or upright. But it is the greatest of errors for you to speak of our putting faith in a name, above true righteousness. For since He whom we trust is the very Truth, and Holiness, and Love, and since the salvation He gives us consists in delivering us from evil, and making us like Himself, it is not possible to have faith in Him, without growing into a like nature. But having His hope, we purify ourselves, even as He is pure. This is even our deliverance: and to this we are called.

(7) “ You are prepared now to anticipate all that I need say about exclusiveness. It is no part of Christianity to believe that God acts unjustly by any man. But if He deals better by Christians, it is because He makes them better in themselves; and His gifts are according to fitness. You trust your best servants with your highest offices. So the Ruler of the world gives great things to those who have been faithful in little; and may often make rulers of human things those who will rule them in his faith and fear. But in general, earthly virtues have

from Him an earthly reward; while the meek or pure in heart are great in the kingdom of heaven. Not that their greatness is, as many think, in the mere inversion of a temporal scale, as if we could abase ourselves on a calculation of being exalted. Rather the reward is the excellence of that which God works in us. For there is no higher happiness than to partake of His Holy Spirit, and to be like Him. Hence it is more blessed with us to give, than to have given to us.

“How then can you call Christianity exclusive? Its only exclusiveness consists in its higher goodness. It is not reasonable to sit down with the lowest knowledge, when we can reach a higher. So, if God gives men in His gospel more light, and with light the means of growth in godliness, they condemn themselves, if they turn back to darkness; and by doing so, throw away a gift of life. You ask, why Sákya may not be ranked so high as Jesus, whom we call Christ and Deliverer. I answer, because his faith is inferior, both as regards God and man. On the one side, he brings us to no clear sight of the Father as our judge and our friend; on the other, he gives the conscience no true sacrifice, by which sin shall be at once acknowledged and put away. Here also we see why Brahmanism, as compared to the religion of the Hebrews, greatly fails; for it leads to nothing. It was, as you have said, an usurpation; and one not without good in its time, but with a yoke, which humanity required broken. But it left little inheritance by which a deeper faith could profit. It would have been useless for Buddha to preach the Vedic Deities, and very difficult for him to trace in the whole Brahmanical system a leading idea, as of a heavenly guide, leading forward mankind; whereas Christ speaks all along to his disciples in the name of the eternal Lord God who had led their fathers of old, and had brought up their nation from a child. He takes hold of the ritual, and shews its Divine institution, by fulfilling it in himself. In the same spirit St Paul compares the Law to teachers and nursery-masters\*.

\* Galatians, ch. iii. iv.

who have charge of a youthful heir. They are not given for nothing, but to teach him. So the old Hebrew belief in a Judge of the whole earth has not passed from Christians. The old sacrifices have not lost their significance; but that out of which they came, and to which they tended, is fulfilled in us, if we walk after this spirit of Christ. So the offices of king, and teacher, and religious minister, have not even forfeited their earthly range of usefulness: but yet their highest origin is unveiled by their embodiment more ideally in Christ. Mankind then are better for the Mosaic training of Israel; and hence we can infer a Divine design. So the Church still lives by the life of Christ, and humanity is brought nearer to God by that He fulfilled in Himself. He then is still the Mediator between God and man. It is for the holier truth and the higher blessing that we are anxious, rather than for the name. It may be that the word Moloch means only king, and Baal lord, and Jupiter (or Diespiter) the bright father, or in its later use, God the father—yet if the rites connected with one of such names were bloody, and with another, licentious, and with a third, clouded by superstitious fable, our consciences stand aloof from what does not suit the holiness of the true God. So, if the Vedic Deities were natural objects, and the triad of the second stage of Hinduism were sacerdotal generalisations, and the Pauranic mythology full of confused fables, and if Sákya, or his followers, can put in the place of such things no clear sight of the Governor of the world, and no fulfilment of what sacrifice means from a true heart to God, it is not for names we contend when we shew you the more excellent way of Christ. We rather offer you truth here, and immortality hereafter. We address you with some hope of finding an answer in your own consciences, that what Christ commands is right, and what He promises, desirable; but also with a clear history, shewing instances of our promises for this life having been fulfilled in many, and for the life to come, in Christ's own rising from the grave. The books of our Christian history are not written after

a long period of tradition, such as you say was inspired, but such as leaves scholars to doubt \* whether anything certain is known of Sákya's life; but our books come fresh from the companions of Christ, and the witnesses of His resurrection. That wonderful event is a proof that the highest God and Governor of all things must have given a mission to the Son whose faith He thus sanctions, while the effects of the faith in the world are a perpetual witness worthy of its beginning. If then you take our history, it is a proof; if our religion, it should be of itself a persuasive; and if its ultimate hope, nothing can be more encouraging. Do not therefore call us exclusive, but rather friendly, for offering you a better boon.

(8) “But you have been pleased to say, that our views of Deity and of a Resurrection are too narrow and local. You complain of the doors of Heaven being opened as if with keys†. But to bear a key was a common sign of office among the Jews; so Christ in giving to His apostles an office of teaching, by which men should be persuaded to enter into life, says with an expressive image, that He gives them the keys of heaven. Again, in speaking of the doors being shut, Christ expresses the fixed destiny of a man's lot, when he has thrown away all his opportunities, and wasted his time or capacity of working out his desire, or of even feeling what is true and good. But such sayings, and others, of the throne, and the twelve thrones of the apostles, and the sitting down to a feast, are spoken in parables which may awaken faith to an apprehension of higher things, such as truth, and peace, and holiness. *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God*, says Christ, thereby teaching clearly, that the sight is one of faith, or of the mind.

“Now the habit of using such parables can only be a reproach to Christianity, if there is some better way of teaching

\* See a paper by Professor Wilson in one of the latest numbers of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, April, 1856.

† Isaiah xxii. 22; St Matthew xvi. 19; xxv. 10, 11.

men ; whereas in reality no faith has ever found its disciples able to dispense with such images. All the local paradises, and hells, of the Hindús, shew how necessary are such helps to our sensuous apprehensions. Hence even in the most direct communication from the Almighty to his creatures I do not see why we should expect such pictures not to be employed. They may not answer to the highest realities of spirit in themselves, but may lead us up to them by regulating our thoughts. Hence they may be parables, but yet sacred ones. How well suited the Christian pictures are to raise in us thoughts of a higher being to come, appears from the tone of mind of even our simplest Christians. If they think of God somewhat after the manner of a man, yet they never forget Him as a Judge, or make Him accomplice in sensual sin, still less worship Him as a stone. Compare even their greatest simplicity in taking literally things meant as parables, with the idolatry of most of your people, with the lefthanded Sáкта worship of others, and with the vagaries of those who, like the Thugs, make a religion of crime. Such extravagances shew that men require something to regulate and elevate their thoughts. We believe that the Almighty has given us such a standard in those spiritual experiences of His Church of old which are collected in our Bible. We find no dangerous error come from the most literal reading of it ; while the wise may, if they keep humility, be led on into higher views of things eternal.

“ I do not know what justifies you in speaking positively against a resurrection of the body. It certainly is easier to conceive of our souls as immortal. But then would souls disembodied have a complete humanity ? We have no experience of their acquiring impressions, or developing powers, except in connexion with matter. We do not know what process of refinement the body may be capable of. Perhaps a more subtle texture, or delicate organism, such as ‘ the subtle person ’ some of your sects imagine, may be the instrument of our soul’s activity hereafter. Such a glorified companion might be less

open to injury or pain, yet capable of affection, and of a higher interest in the works of the Creator. But, if you say that any possible body, being organised, must admit of decay, and so our life would not be eternal, this objection comes ill from men who put before us a series of many transmigrations. Again, even a bodily life in some higher form, may yet have more consciousness, and pleasure, than the final apathy, little better than extinction, which is the highest bliss you aspire to. We look by faith, as Christians, for a rest more blessed than a fresh birth in this earthly world, yet for a life more active than your breathless absorption. The earliest Christians believed that the resurrection would not be until God had made new heavens and a new earth, fit for spirits made perfect. Our faith is still in its substance the same; though, as the mystery of the subject tempts conjecture, some fancy that the spirits of the departed enter at once into joy; and these would not dispute with you about a bodily resurrection. Others think, more agreeably to the letter of the scripture, that our bodies are raised and glorified, or else that a new organisation, perhaps in some distant world, is given to the soul. Nor should I wonder if some of them would reconcile a part of your doctrine with their own, by thinking that a succession of lives may be a succession of steps of glory, as star differs from star. They might think that men are born again in some higher world, as in a resurrection, with organs fitted for a higher life; yet such a life, though having the seed of immortality, might yet be finite, so far as to admit of a higher one beyond it. Thus souls might migrate, and men rise again in successive ages, as the Divine Wisdom might determine. Only from this present life we must ever hold that the great impulse is given, by which God, revealing himself as our Father, delivers us from evil, and takes us into his spiritual kingdom. Nor could we think patiently of any dream of our falling from such consciousness into a lower estate of animals: still less could we bear to imagine, that souls, once made in the image of the Eternal, can ever lose the individuality He



stamped on them, or cease to be self-conscious ever for good or for evil. This life of ours now, then, seems to us the crisis of our everlasting destiny. We have before us life and death ; and while God ever invites every man to choose the good, the immutability of his counsel (which you justly assert) forbids Him to change the laws against which we may dash ourselves into every wreck of self-conscious misery, if we determine to create for ourselves evil. Truly with Him is no variableness. For my own part, seeing that the issue is so tremendous, and that it turns upon a heart and life cleansed by faith\*, rather than upon doubtful knowledge, I had rather take hold of the inheritance which God has promised, than speculate about the manner of its coming about. You may enlarge the Christian parables, of the Judgment, and the Thrones, and the Books, and the instruments of music, and the palm-branches, into whatever vision you think more spiritual, of retribution, and of memory, and of remorse or good conscience, and of communion with the Father of our spirits, and of triumph among all who have lived purely and acted nobly in every age and country. Still you must leave in reality of meaning that God has appointed to all men once to die, and after death the judgment. The more sober this truth sounds, or the more nearly your faith approximates to it, so much the more gladly you should welcome the good news of Christ, who though conscious of that indwelling in Him which was before Moses or Abraham, and beyond space or time, yet emptied Himself of that illimitable consciousness, and took on Him the form of a servant†, becoming subject to legal and local limits, that He might embody before us a picture of God's true being, and of his design for man ; and so by living and dying, He brought home to us the holiest truth in a form suited to our human conceptions, and by entering visibly into his kingdom threw light on life and immortality. If Sákya had in like manner risen from the grave, we should have more reason for examining his doctrine reve-

\* Acts xv. 9 ; xxvi. 18.

† Philippians ii. 7.

rently: or, if we had found his doctrine a sufficient mediation between God and man, we should not have been surprised at God having in like manner raised him. But no such rising from the dead is even pretended for him. Nor do we find in his doctrine, as it now is, the power of regenerating men and bringing them to God, which we find in that of Christ. We take hold then of that which has the higher attestation in history, and the purest persuasion in living experience, while it gives us also the clearest hope for the life to come. It may be that in this faith of ours, even because it is a faith, we know but in part. Yet the time will come for us to know, even as we are known. Any immortality which we could understand while in the flesh would fall short of our hope. But though things to come belong to the Eternal, we thank Him that the things He has revealed belong to us and to our children; and these are enough to shew us the way of peace now, with that of an endless hope hereafter. Jesus Christ therefore remains to us the author and finisher of our faith; and we are not ashamed of following Him as little children, if only we may so grow to the fulness of His spiritual stature, and be at length in the Holy Spirit One with Him, even as He is One with the Father.

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## CHAPTER XIII. PART I.

*On General and Special Providence, and on various aspects of Revelation in History—Letter and Spirit—Inspiration—Bible—Church—Truth—Faith—Sacraments—Seen and Unseen.*

“The Lord is my shepherd, therefore can I lack nothing. He shall feed me in a green pasture, and lead me forth beside the waters of comfort. He shall convert my soul, and bring me forth in the paths of righteousness, for his Name’s sake. Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil : for thou art with me ; thy rod and thy staff comfort me. Thou shalt prepare a table before me against them that trouble me : thou hast anointed my head with oil, and my cup shall be full. But thy loving-kindness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever.”—PSALM xxiii.

“There is no difference between the Jew and the Greek : for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. Even our ancient writings say, *Who-soever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.* But then you ask, How can Greeks or Indians have called on Jehovah, if they did not believe in Him? And how, you continue, could they have believed in Him, if they never knew Him by His name Jehovah? And how can they have known Him, unless He were revealed to them ; and how can they have had a revelation, without a ministry, as we had, of prophets or heralds ; as, for instance, it was written on the return from Babylon, How beautiful are the feet of them that proclaim good news of peace, and glad tidings of weal! Or even if the Lord makes known his grace to Greeks and Indians, yet you object that they do not believe the good news ; just as Isaiah said, Lord, who hath believed our report of thy deliverance? So then you argue, the Gentiles have not faith ; for faith comes by hearing, and hearing by an express message, such as the Lord has not sent to them. But I answer, Oh ! thou that retest upon scripture and boastest of revelation, have not all nations heard something of the goodness of God? Yes, verily ; as we read in the Psalms, of his starry witnesses, that *their sound has gone into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.* And again I ask, Had not Israel reason to know that God loves every human being in the wild isles of the sea? Certainly ; for even Moses says, I will provoke you my elect people to jealousy by those whom you count no people, and to zeal by those whom you call foolish. But Isaiah is very bold in proclaiming the same truth, that God is the Father of all, and not of the elect nation only ; for He says, *I was found of them that sought me not ; I was revealed to them that inquired not of me.* But to the elect nation He says, *All day long have I stretched forth my hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people.*—Paraphrase of St Paul, Romans x. 12—21. Compare ch. ii. 17—20 ; i. 19, 20 ; and Psalms xix. 4, and viii. 3, 4.

“MANY of the objections raised,” here remarked Sadánanda, “have received from the stranger answers, which seem to me

satisfactory. For it makes a great difference, from what point of view doctrines are regarded, or who, and in what frame of mind, is the speaker of words conceived to embody them. Thus, if the doctrine of a Fall of Man is made to destroy our perceptions of right and wrong, it may become an instrument of moral degradation to the entire conscience; or if it forbids us, any more than brute creatures, to strive after immortality, it is injurious to the better soul within us; or, if it makes a single act of the first woman the alone cause of a change in the world's course, it derogates from the wisdom of whatever supreme Lord any of us are able to believe in; and if it transfers the guilt of that single act, with eternal penalties for it, to millions of men unborn, it shocks both justice and humanity. But if the same doctrine expresses rather mankind's keen sense of the difference between good and evil, with their earnest aspiration after the better part, and their generous shame at falling short of it, then it may become a wholesome instrument of contrition. So again, if it expresses our confidence in the Divine compassion as ever ready to rescue us from the evil we have brought upon ourselves, it may waken our courage and our thankfulness. Especially if the words thought to teach such a doctrine, are in the sacred writings either an outpouring of passionate penitence, or a fervid denunciation of sin, we may see them to be relatively true and wholesome, though they might ill bear cold inferences from logical bystanders, as if they were dispassionate descriptions; still less might they be useful to force with iteration upon all persons in all moods. For deep feeling, whether penitence or love, expresses a truth, but with a colouring of its own. So again, if there is a shortcoming, such as we admit, in the world either from misplacement or sinfulness in nature, the first instance of such a fall on part of a human being may well be recorded as critical, without being thereby made a cause. Nor do I know that the difference would be important if such an instance were symbolical, and were so to express the tendency which we find, for passion and darkness in man to warp goodness. But,

as the losing of a child in the first act of a play does not prevent it from being found with good fortune before the end of the last act, so the drama of the world may have always been harmoniously evolving, in spite of internal contradictions.

“The Christian doctrine of the Atonement too may vary much according to its aspect. For, if it is presented to us as a doctrine of ritual bondage, and of external compensation or vindictiveness, or if it makes an honest and good heart of less worth than mere confidence in the name and merit of another, then we could hardly call it wholesome. But, if the doctrine is rather one of freedom to the soul, by putting the love of a supreme Lord in strong contrast to a dreary round of sacrificial penances, and by shewing His compassionate desire to deliver men from all evil, and especially from the scourge of a law which He willed should exist as inherently good, though yet He did not will the penal effect which was through our acts an accompaniment of it, then I can understand how the soul is reconciled by such a doctrine to whatever is holiest above her, and does good, being delivered from evil. Nor do I see much difficulty in the clash of feeling, or of personality, which such a doctrine as that of the Atonement has been said to involve in the Divine Being. For though to myself all pure soul appears necessarily tranquil, yet whoever attributes agency either literally or metaphorically to a supreme Lord, must ascribe also volition analogous to that of man. But we find in ourselves an apparent clash of motives, and painful means to desirable ends. Thus the Will must work by reason, or with consideration, and these may unite in one consciousness. So the Divine Unity, if it correspond at all to our complex being, might have without offence to reason a triplicity of its own. Even the Sāṅkhya admits a triple divinity or manifestation of one principle. The Vedānta, with still greater conformity to the Christian Trinity, teaches a certain divine outcoming of the eternal Spirit; and most of all, the Bauddhas, who worship a man as partaker of the highest intelligence, and join many agents in a sort of

spiritual unity, have no room for consistent objection to the Christian doctrine. If Christ has adequately manifested the Divine Being incarnate, any speculative difficulty in reconciling such a manifestation with fundamental unity, belongs equally to many of our Indian systems. So again, whatever difficulty is found in predestination, cannot be charged exclusively on Christians, for it appears analogously in every attempt our own philosophers have made to reconcile freewill with fate, or human agency with divine forethought. The only question really is, whether Christians have introduced any fresh confusion in such speculations; and upon the stranger's shewing, they have not done so. Rather, I should say, from their stress upon conscience, that they magnify human responsibility to the utmost; though their doctrine of grace, or encouragement from the Holy Spirit, and their strong colouring of the perplexities of human nature, may be taken also as expressing the vast forces which surround (and, as we say, absorb,) the personality of man. Perhaps, then, if the entire scheme of Christian doctrine be wisely taught, it may be the absolute truth, as the expression of the human soul in its most devout attitude towards a higher power; and yet such doctrine may have come about by development and confluence, such as the Bauddhas and I myself should contend for. From such a point of view at least I am willing to consider the whole question; and I think the objections have been fairly answered. But very much depends upon the aspect and limits with which the doctrines objected to are taught. If the Fall of Man is made to cloud our conscience, it must be evil; if it expresses intensity of remorse, it may be relatively true. If the Atonement be made an external substitution, or a venal compensation, it is bad; but if it expresses the fixity of law, and teaches men through sympathy to consecrate themselves in self-dedication, it is very good. So, if by election is encouraged either pride, or a feeling of the Divine arbitrariness, it contradicts the conscience; but if we are thus taught only to ascribe whatever gift or capacity we have to the Divine goodness, it is then a wholesome lesson of humility.

On the same principle, faith may either be a substitute of passionate egotism for moral sincerity, or it may be an earnest laying hold of things eternal, and an instrument of growth by trust in One who is able to deliver from evil to the uttermost. Faith, it seems truly said, must take its character from its object; and it is easy to conceive, that faith in God as He is declared to have revealed Himself in Christ, may be a most animating impulse to all holiness.

“Once more, the objection made to a certain narrowness of view in Christianity, as if it dwelt too much on persons and places, or on material and local imagery, instead of rising into a truly spiritual faith, seems to me fairly answered. For our wisest doctors have admitted, that the religious books, which we ourselves receive as sacred, contain many signs of partial and temporary knowledge. Probably spiritual things could never be expressed to any class of human beings, without something of imagery and parable drawn from the senses. Most certainly they cannot be so to the great mass of mankind. Nor is it any detriment to the truly religious knowledge, that it has an earthly accompaniment, which we may be trained to discriminate, and often go beyond. It is quite consistent with our own views, that the religion of the New Testament should, either by a fresh revelation, as the strangers think, or by steps of development, as we should imagine, go greatly beyond the more limited knowledge of the Old, and even discard the imperfect religious rites of early time. So far I feel compelled to assent to some such plea as the elder stranger has put forward.

“But yet there seems to me a great difficulty for Christians, involved in the fate of the Jews. It seems to be often said, that the Jews had their sacred city destroyed, and were scattered through many countries, as a punishment for infidelity. Whereas, it is clear, that if they had not clung faithfully to their ancient law, and trusted in their God that He would deliver them, they would have been spared by the Romans. So that in fact they suffered for their fidelity. No one can with any fairness say,

that the system which the Jews uphold, is not literally truer to the Old Testament, than that which Christians force upon them. Only the younger stranger has attempted to obviate the difficulty thus arising, by his distinction between the letter and the spirit. Still, ought he not to acknowledge, that the Jewish view is not only most literally correct, but such as conscientious fidelity to the Mosaic law would naturally engender? How then can they be justly punished for cherishing a Divine law, or for a pertinacity of temper which that law was humanly certain to produce in any nation. A local temple, a written Bible, a round of sabbaths, and feasts, and slaughters of animals, and in short a rigid sacerdotalism, may be termed the characteristics of the Mosaic system. Grant that the Gospel of Christ does better in teaching a consecration of the world and of man's life and heart, a perception of holy truths by the conscience, and offering of ourselves heartily to the Divine service, with great freedom in drawing nigh to God, as Christ drew nigh, being a son; yet the Jewish fault seems a failure in rising with the development of their system, rather than a positive fall from it. They suffer by fidelity, not by infidelity. When then we add, that they have been cruelly persecuted, for what was the most natural, if not the most enlightened, course, and when the obvious sense of their Scriptures is often wrested (though it has not been so to-day,) by narrowminded bigots who want an excuse for heaping up accusations, what conclusion must we draw? Is not the fate of the poor Jews, not so much a standing argument for Christianity, as a very great difficulty in its way? That predestination of Christianity which has been spoken of, as involved in Judaism, at least does not lie upon the surface. I should be glad to hear the younger stranger endeavour to explain this difficulty. Nor can he well do so, without entering somewhat upon the question of letter and spirit, and explaining how far the Bible is the fixed rule of Christians in its letter, or how far there dwells in the Church or in mankind, a living spirit, and a power of discerning principles and modifying applications, by



reason, or by religious instinct. He also promised in the outset to say something about Inspiration. Nor did I quite understand what his elder friend said about a Sacrament, and its connexion with the general sinfulness of mankind. I should be glad to hear these questions, and any closely bound up with them, more fully handled. Nor would it be amiss, if he would discuss some book of the Old Testament, so as to exemplify the real connexion of the Old with the New."

Thus far Sadánanda; and Blancombe responded thus to his invitation: "I should have begun," he said, "with asking, whether you believe Divine Providence to proceed most by general laws, or by special interference in minute instances. For such a question might lead up to an explanation of your difficulty. But unfortunately your whole system seems to deny any truly ruling Providence, since you ascribe such a thing only to the Divine agencies which flow forth from nature for a transitory reign. Here then is a great gulf between us, which I know not how to bridge, unless it please the great Searcher of hearts Himself to give you such a conviction of His being and of His goodness as you seem to need. For it is by steadfast belief in Him as an Almighty Governor, that we on our own part hold more firmly the hope of a life to come. We think that He has not made us for naught, nor suffers the whole universe to be an ocean of transitoriness, and void of beings with His likeness, who may know both themselves and Him. By belief also in Him we interpret the world's course, and see in it a good design. Thus our belief in God gives substance to our belief in the evil of sin, and to our consciousness of falling into it, yet also to our persuasion of its not being intended for us, but being an evil from which we must pray to be delivered. Still more, when our conception of the Almighty Governor is raised and purified by what we see of His likeness in Christ, our moral instincts as it were are deepened, and we feel more strongly how far mankind are fallen, and our need of forgiveness, and of rising again into that which God intended us to be. Hence while I

thank you for the fairness with which you have considered our answers to some objections, I am not sure that you feel the full force of our doctrines, unless you are able to see light thrown upon them in the light of God. You have rightly conceived, that our doctrines take their shape from the aspect and mood of men uttering the fervid accents in which they are embodied; but you must not forget, that these moods reflect a deeper law, and the accents are eloquent of a perpetual truth. Whatever is now doctrine, was once feeling, and the intellectual form may too often have warped the affectionate life. But it must not therefore be thought that the feeling was not a true one. Nay, it may even have been swollen to passion, and may have run coloured by imagination, but it does not follow that its source was not in a true perception of an eternal law, and in a consciousness of having wandered from it, and of needing return. For it is through our feelings and thoughts, as well as through our experiences of life, that our Maker seems to teach us. We become each a mirror to some portion of His law, and perhaps mankind to the whole of it. Our faith in Him also leads us to believe, that whatever special guidance He has given was for those to whom He gave it the best. If then He has put plain words or homely images in the mouths of His servants, we do not doubt that such conveyed the truth as men were able to receive it. Nor is our faith in this respect without warrant from the shortcoming of those amongst whom the imagery of Christian truth is not known or received. If any of you object to the parables of our Gospels, you have no way so efficient of communicating their truths; or if you blame our associations with names, and persons, and places, you yet justify the wisdom of God in so teaching us, by the far greater darkness into which your countrymen, without such helps, have fallen. But perhaps I have said enough to shew, how even your fair appreciation of some Christian doctrines must fall short of apprehending them fully, if you are yourself not convinced of the being of that God, who is their beginning and their end.

“ But even amongst those who have the fullest trust in the Giver of every good gift, there is some difference as to whether they should look upon His Providence as general or particular ; that is to say, whether it deals chiefly with the whole or with its parts, and whether it embraces all in a large design, or whether it interposes often with change and interference. We shall understand the nature of their question better, if we distribute it in some instances. We see life both springing everywhere from the earth, and pervading the waters and the heavens. Does the unseen power of Deity which supplies the secret seed or principle of such life, and arranges its types by combining forethought, care also for each weed in our garden, and for every egg in the wild bird's nest? It is easy to say, that whoever cares for the world must care for all that is within it ; since we could not embrace a class without including its members, any more than have a body healthy, if its limbs were diseased. Yet this seems partly answered, by noticing how many things perish, both of seeds, and plants, and living things, yet the class to which they belonged lives on, and is perhaps better for their extinction. The gardener will pluck half a tree's fruit, that the remainder may have room. Even of our bodies we seem to spare something, having often to choose between beauty and strength, or between labour with health, and ease with sickness. More manifestly in nature at large we see a lavishness of beauty, which seems as if the Deity were prodigal of life, as knowing that He can bring it again out of every seeming extinction. We see also poisonous creatures, and many instruments of ruin. But look more at human affairs. A fisherman is starving in his cottage, because wind and sea are adverse. He prays to the Divine wielder of the elements, and has perhaps a prosperous time. But the same gale which wafts his little bark, sweeps also the entire ocean, and carries fleets from one continent to another, not without inconveniences possibly, and casualties of shipwreck. Was the gale sent for the fisherman, or did it come of wider causation? Again, in passion a man mingles falsehood

with blasphemy, and imprecates sudden death on himself if he be not speaking truth. At the moment, perhaps, his passion causes some internal rupture, and he incurs, as he deserved, the death, which he invoked. But does he die from his imprecations being heard, or from the general laws of health and disease? So great criminals may be men of cleverness, though more commonly of brutish stupidity; and nothing seems to escape the sagacity or cunning with which they provide against detection. Yet in the midst of their provisions some fatuity seizes them, and by a blunder so gross that it seems intentional, they drop a clue which leads justice on their track. Does such infatuation come of the general law, which makes all anxiety embarrassing, and guilt especially blinding; or does it signify the special care of an Almighty Governor that this or that man should be punished? We see the links of general causation more clearly in cases where our actions or prayers tend to realise themselves. Thus even small armies, when fervently devout as well as patriotic, have often vanquished disproportionate numbers; and it is difficult for even any human force to conquer them. But does this indomitableness come of a special blessing of Heaven upon the cause, or is it the offspring of men's minds, kindled by common prayer and exhortation, and having confidence in their cause and in each other? We seem at least in such cases to trace a general instrumentality by which faith removes mountains, or turns to flight the armies of aliens\*. Yet I know not if we do not more readily conceive of the Divine forethought as guiding events, when they involve the destiny of nations. Thus when Spain, in her time of greatness, would have crushed the free faith of England, and the threatening Armada was shattered by storms, our own nation was not afraid to say, that 'God had breathed, and His enemies had been scattered;' for the occasion seemed worthy of a Divine interposition. So, if in a shipwreck

\* Hebrews xi. 32—34, where the sacred writer speaks of Faith in its most general or *ideal* sense. We destroy all his argument if we suppose him thinking of doctrinal details, or the particulars of Christianity.

is an Apostle\*, who has yet to carry the news of spiritual freedom to many nations, we more easily believe that his life and that of his companions may be given him by the Ruler of sea and land. Yet it is difficult to say that anything human could be great in the sight of the Infinite God, if His goodwill did not make it so; and the same goodwill might magnify what concerns the least of us. It seems fanciful when we are told, in conflagrations, that the flames have halted at the sacred threshold of some church; for if such respect for local sanctity came of law and thought, it would be regular; but since it is exceptional, it seems to be fortuitous. Yet if a life, as of a child, is spared by some strange concurrence of things, as in sheltering for instance under two transverse beams in the downfall of a house, we hesitate to ascribe the escape to chance, for it seems not without thought and goodness. But again, if we say, everything good in the world comes of special arrangement by a supreme Governor, there are many terrible casualties of fire, and shipwreck, and pestilence, in which prayer goes up from hopeless agony, and which neither wit of man nor malice of devil can have devised, yet which we shrink from ascribing in each instance to the special *fiat* of a Divine Will. It seems to us more pious to believe, that such sorrows could not consistently with the large extent of our Maker's dealings and the fixity of His laws be prevented, and that while they themselves may be rendered tolerable by patience, the capacities which make them possible will be greatly overruled for good. There is a shortcoming, or a sinfulness, on part of all creatures, which leaves them no right of complaining that they are placed generally in a scheme admitting of drawbacks; yet there is a complicated fortuitousness in the happening of evils, which warns us not to think them indexes to any sentence of God.

“Thus there seems to be a certain margin of chance, or of what comes to the same result, a complication which is the inevitable accompaniment of fixed law; and we seem intended to

\* Acts xxvii.

bring ourselves by free agency within the range of the currents and the sweep of the tides of Divine Providence, rather than to expect their course will be divested for our convenience. Many accidents of life and death happen, which men dispute whether they shall explain by the general operation of law, or trace in them a special design. All intellectual reasoning leads them to magnify general law; and they find laws in operation, which seem to embrace all things. But the feelings again, and the devouter instincts are thought to lead us back to a more special view, as if the Deity must regard each person and thing. The first view seems the wiser, the second the more devout. The first enlarges the domain of human action, and awakens the sense of duty; the second speaks more of resignation, and of gratitude for gifts. The first may go so far as to be in danger of forgetting God; the second may pay Him unwise honour by neglecting our part in His scheme. That unblest activity which might seem akin to an atheistic philosophy, is the extreme expression of one; and the apathetic torpor which aims at no good, and remedies no evil, is the exaggeration of the other. Thus wholesome inventions in common life have often been frowned upon, and faquirs or saints both in the East and the West have thought it wrong to remove vermin from their bodies; for do not such things, they say, and all mischievous agencies, as well as calamitous events, come of the Divine Will? These, however, are wild extremes. But, amongst sober persons, there is an aptness to look more, either on the idea of general law in the world, or on the possibility of special commands. Whichever is the inclination of a man's mind as he notices the signs of Providence in common things, will probably re-appear in his judgment of sacred revelation. If he finds the religion in some respects temporary, or the knowledge which accompanied it imperfect, he may ascribe this shortcoming to a general law, which made a certain view natural in given circumstances, or he may believe it to have been positively imposed for a time by some Divine utterance, and again as positively revoked. In the one case, Revelation

will seem a growth and an unveiling, in proportion as men could attain or see with fitness; in the other case, it will be a succession of external oracles, with no steps of inherent connexion, and perhaps with no harmony, except from without. Thus, if we have rightly supposed that the religion of India has varied in different ages, and if such steps as polytheism, slaughter of men or horses, and then a higher conception of the Divine unity, with bloodless sacrifices, are found to have followed on each other, one interpretation of such changes would be, that an overruling Providence had thus trained men through rude awe, and thought, and thankfulness, into truer perceptions of religion; while another view would be, that the Deity had by oracle revealed each of these stages, and then again annulled it. So again, if the 'white-complexioned A'ryas' overran India, their conquest of the aboriginal Dasyus will by some be thought a natural result of their higher intelligence, yet not therefore a thing without mission or duty; while to others it may seem a direct response to the prayers for victory, which are recorded in the Rig-Veda. So that our answer to many questions about the theory of religion will depend somewhat on our conception of Divine Providence in the world at large. Are we, for example, to say that it proceeds by general law, or by frequent and special interferences?

"I will try to answer this question, by asking if the two views may not be in a way reconciled? The more we know of nature, the more undeniable it becomes, that the forethought of the Deity proceeds by law on the grandest scale; and that need of frequent meddling (or revocation as it were of orders), which we think a sign of infirmity in man, is least of all traceable in any work of the Highest Wisdom. *Known unto God*, says an Apostle, *are all His works from the beginning of the world*. But this extension of the sphere of order in no way tells against the fullest consciousness in our Creator's mind of the operation of His own laws as regards the minutest thing. We have argued sufficiently, above, that the law in the creation is the thought of



the Creator. But it would be strange, if by extending the sphere of thought we were to narrow the consciousness of the thinker. *Without our heavenly Father*, said our Master Christ, *not a sparrow falls to the ground*. Now we feel reluctant to ascribe directly to the Divine Will the gasping of the dove under the talons of the hawk, which seized her, as she was carrying food to her young; we had rather say, it came of the contingencies in a large scheme, which make death at some time certain, and possible there and then. But whatever contingencies or reasons operate in a scheme of law, may equally be present to any mind superintending the whole, and acting upon each part. It is only from narrowness of mind that we suppose any higher guardian of each separate object would not take account of fitness, and of other objects around. Even mankind, in superintending things, do so, as far as they can, by method. The more perfect our method, the more minute our supervision; so the more vast and regular the Divine laws appear, the more easily we should believe each want is, as far as fitness permits, provided for by the Author of all. Thus our Master Christ went on to assure His disciples, *they were of more value than many sparrows*\*; here He shews us Divine Providence taking account of things, and proceeding by reason; and again, elsewhere†, He teaches that men who die under cruel tyranny, or by accident, are not therefore guiltier than others, as if their misfortune might be called a judgment. So the book of Job seems a lesson, that Divine favour is not to be measured by outward prosperity, but that there is a crookedness in things, which the enemy may take advantage of to hurt us, though such machinations will be overruled for good. Hence it is implied, that the Ruler of the world permits things to go otherwise than we might expect, for some reasons which He considers sufficient, and which we most easily explain as belonging to the nature of general law.

“The truest wisdom as to these things is shewn in the simple prayer, that God would give or take away, according to His will.

\* St Luke xii. 7—24.

† St Luke xiii. 1—5.



Thus we acknowledge that there may be reasons against our prayer, yet trust that they are under control of Him to whose fashioning thoughts they may be traced. The same consciousness appears dimly in our feeling that prayers for the soul's health are more certain of being granted than prayers for bodily gifts. For the first come within Christ's promise, that our heavenly Father would give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him; so that to pray for the Holy Spirit\* is to pray in Christ's name; and by the same Spirit we are shewn 'the things to come†,' or the spiritual 'powers of the coming age‡,' that is, of the kingdom of God, and all the force of pure truth, in distinction from the earlier dispensations of the temple and the letter. We find also that prayers for spiritual gifts, such as holiness, and calmness of mind, and insight into truth, are in a way fulfilled by being offered; so that the allwise God answers them by method and law. Whereas, in praying for bodily gifts, we may ask what counter-claims oppose, or what fitness, or even possibility, prevents. Yet even here we see some tendency of the prayers to fulfilment, as when they act on our own minds, and suggest means; or when they stir sympathy, and bring about co-operation. Beyond such a range, which may be called the sphere of instrumentality, many, even pious persons, feel less confident of being heard for temporal things, and think that, after securing right action, our next prayer should be for resignation, or acknowledgement of gifts, rather than petition for them. For they find nothing in which the Divine Will has not, as far as is fit, anticipated us for good, and they would not have us dictate to the best wisdom. But most men have an instinct, that where the sphere of our action ends, that of petition more emphatically begins; for it is when we have done all in our power, that we properly ask for a blessing; as men must sow their corn before they pray for rain. Such an instinct implies that human agency is an instrument which Divine

\* St Luke xi. 13; St John vii. 39.

† St John xvi. 13; xiv. 17—20.

‡ Hebrews vi. 5; xii. 28.

Providence takes into account in its plan of the world. We can understand, how defects in such agency make the plan turn out worse, in some aspects or relations, than it otherwise would have done. Nor do I know that any topic is so pregnant as this of prayer is (if considered in all its aspects and experiences), with suggestions which throw light on the Divine government of the world. It is itself an action in time, having temporal results. But it is also a voiceless colloquy of that which is immortal in us, with that which is eternal above, and so it opens the doors of the kingdom of heaven. It shews us in this world a scheme of vast largeness and variety, with order wrought out of freedom. The laws, we find, invite us by persuasion rather than compel, yet are terrible in punishing disobedience. Not the least spring can anywhere be touched, without affecting we know not how much of the whole machine; yet He who governs the whole, seems not unmindful of the least part. When we pray to Him, our very prayer becomes a remedy or a fulfilment; yet it loses this healing power, the moment we rest in itself as a process, or direct it to any less than Him whom we conceive as its living object. Thus He teaches us, that His government is by all-embracing method and law, yet forbids us to stop short of Himself as the true Governor. He gives no warrant for expecting fresh interference to cancel His own work (as if He were a clumsy artificer) at every step; but still less does He reveal Himself as inert, or as withdrawn from the world, when we should rather conceive of Him as upholding by His beneficence every life, and rejoicing in the operation of His thought as eternal law. All wills minister to His Will, and though each of them were perverse, it might still express a portion of that which is perfect.

“ He who thus conceives of the Providence of God as general, may judge Jewish history differently from those who dream of perpetual interferences. He may call a sacred instinct, in-breathed, and a feeling taught of God, rather than find a form of words prescribed, or an immutable model laid down. Thus he

may think the conquest of Canaan was conducted with mixed motives, and sullied with crimes. But these things will not startle him more in a religious history, than they would in any other. If they may happen in the world, they may be recorded in the Bible. But he considers them as events which happened, and not as examples, which he need admire, of faultlessness. So he may think that patriotism, as well as religion, inspires the songs which call Jerusalem 'the joy of the whole earth.' Again, if he reads that Jeroboam was particularly sinful for making priests who were not of the tribe of Levi, he may infer that the Levitical recorder resented the injury to his tribe, no less than the degradation to Divine service. Perhaps in the story of Samuel and Saul he may note a like mixture of motives. For whatever passions and frailties, and whatever complications from human ignorance, are found under the Divine rule elsewhere, will seem to him natural accompaniments of the evolution of truth in Israel. Nor need even a play of imagination, or of poetry, in magnifying the elder epochs, appear to him strange, unless he is prepared to say, that such poetry elsewhere has not naturally sprung from the human mind, and in turn elevated its tone. For since we know that parental and conjugal love are divine, we suffer them to ascribe beauties hardly due to children or wives, without feeling ourselves bound to tame down their expressions exactly; and thus the better spirit of a nation often tinges with its fancy the early stages of a history, which becomes typical of its destiny. Nor is there any reason, why such a mode of educating men, through poetry as well as prose, should not have been extended by the God of the whole earth to the Hebrew people. Nor need any kind of human shortcoming, or temporary misunderstanding, much surprise us. There may be one knowledge for the child\*, and another for the man; and one virtue for the soldier, and another for the saint. But, if there are steps of growth in generations, we must expect each step to be considered in its day as final; or at least as absolutely imposed. It

\* 1 Corinthians xiii. 11; Galatians iv. 1—3.

will be considered the very revelation; for by no less a view could it acquire due reverence and fixity. But yet the Eternal God may all along be training His people beyond their full consciousness. Especially, if a great priesthood is to have charge of certain truths or rites, we may expect among them all the faults\* incidental to priesthoods. It seems a grand conception to have a body of men in charge of the national temple, more educated than their fellows, and living under the direct influence of the breath of God, sought daily in prayer. Such a body might be expected to mediate as it were between God and man, having the clearest perception of right, as the unwritten law of Him to whose service their lives are dedicated, and again associating the people together in harmony of inspired prayers and songs. Thus they would give shape and voice to the better instincts and aspirations of the people at large, partaking with them the life which the supreme Father upholds, and with clearer consciousness† of its source. Yet we can see, on reflexion, what temptations of form and of literalism, and of professional selfishness, and sloth, and even vice and rapacity, must beset such a body; and if the Jewish priesthood yielded to such, and involved also their nation in a barren literalism, and in obstinacy and in ruin, they only partook of a sinfulness common to mankind. It is evident that many of us in their place would have acted alike.

“But yet there are limits which neither institutions nor men transgress with impunity. An institution must not suffer the idea out of which it came to fade before an absorbing selfishness. Nor must men strengthen their passions against their conscience, by crying down every teacher of righteousness, or organising a conspiracy of the crowd against the meek and the truth-speaker. Especially the Jews had received such Divine sanction for the ideas of Truth and Right, and such experience of great witnesses to them arising from time to time, that they sinned against great light if they stoned the prophet or crucified

\* Hosea iv. 6—9; Jeremiah v. 31; 1 Samuel ii.

† Jeremiah v. 4, 5.

the reformer. It had been a promise in the law of Moses\*, that God would raise up prophets, reviving the sound of His word in men's hearts. When then He had raised up prophet after prophet, and they had stoned one, and slain another with the sword, and sawn another asunder†, they had outraged the better voice of their consciences, and so forfeited the blessing of the spirit, however zealous they might be for the letter of their covenant. The whole argument of St Stephen with his countrymen (in Acts vii.) is, that they had always resisted the Holy Ghost, or stifled the better voice within them. Thus they had not understood Moses, when God raised him up as a deliverer out of Egypt, and it was only characteristic of their old dulness of spirit, that they understood not Christ, when God gave Him as a Deliverer of the soul from evil of stain and fear, and from the bondage of written ordinances. Thus, in rejecting Christ, the Jews only brought to its fatal culmination that habit of rejecting spiritual teachers, which is natural to 'animal men‡,' and which their history had often shewn. They had accustomed themselves to revile the servants when living, though they garnished their tombs when dead; and at last they rejected the very Son. I do not say that many of us might not have done the same: and in many Christian literalists, especially in those who are most jealous for 'the historical Christ,' I observe the same stamp of mind which was in the Jews, and which would have turned as deaf an ear to Christ as they did. For such men ever disparage that spiritual power of the Truth, to which our blessed Lord came into the world to bear witness; and they make everything depend on the external authority of the book or the temple, not knowing that God can raise in three days out of the Truth a temple not made with hands. Such men undo the work of Christ, while most zealous for His name. For they make war on that witness in man, to which Christ perpetually appealed,

\* Deut. xviii. 10—18; xiii. 1—3.

† Hebrews xi. 37. Such a tradition has been of Isaiah.

‡ 1 Corinthians ii. 14, where the unhappy mistranslation of *natural*, for "the animal man," has been a source of confusion to many.

and break down that freedom of the soul, which Christ established before God. This they do from having a veil of pride and mistrust upon their hearts. For the worst part in us cannot see the good way of persuasion and love, by which our heavenly Father leads us, and puts instead a worse way, with fear, and bondage to precepts, or to names. Hence, in the name of Him who is true, men sometimes rage against the very Truth. Still it is a fact, that such a sinful tendency of our nature was exemplified by the Jews in an eminent instance. They had suffered their sympathies to contract, and their love of truth to fade, before that of their religious system. Thus they put their own nation before humanity, and the letter of the law before the Spirit of God. The temper thus engendered became a fierce bigotry, and brought on them, by natural causation, the last penalties of a fanatical and obstinate pride. Such tendencies would hardly have gone so far, if the men had kept before the eyes of their mind the living God of the spirits of all flesh. They would then have been more sensible of the lessons He taught them from time to time. They would have learnt of the prophets a wider consciousness of humanity, and have seen with the Psalmists, that ‘the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit;’ nay even with Solomon, though more clearly with Isaiah, that ‘the Lord dwelleth not in temples built with hands.’ They would not then have been so shocked at hearing the same sentiment from St Stephen, as to rise up and stone him for sacrilege. Nor would they have entertained so fierce a jealousy of St Paul, for teaching doctrines essentially the same as the most spiritual part of their ancient books. Nor again would they have been hurried into crimes, such as Josephus, their historian, mentions as shortly preceding the fall of their city. For instance, there were the murders of Zacharias, and of others, especially that of Ananus the high priest; and if Josephus, with some lingering fondness for the country which he had deserted, makes the national guilt consist chiefly in the murder of a high-priest, we may as Christians find the same temper shewn in putting to

death the Apostle James\*, and above all in the crucifixion of James's Master, the Holy and the Just, already spoken of. By such a succession of tragedies, the Jews shewed that zeal without knowledge, which runs upon judgments. In fact, their attachment to the Mosaic system became more passionate, as their understanding of it was less perceptive; and so a zeal for it betrayed them into crimes, of which yet the predisposing causes were certain tempers in themselves. So that, on the whole, I do not indeed justify any persecutions of the Jews by deed or word; but rather think all such proceedings hateful to our common God, and likely to bring on whoever is guilty of them His ancient curse on whoever cursed His people, and His wrath† against those who afflicted them beyond His will; but still I think your difficulty sufficiently answered; for we have seen that, if the Jews were not infidels to the letter of their system, they did not suffer for fidelity to what was best in its spirit. They had so far a veil upon their hearts, that they saw not the original motive, or ultimate tendency of their religion. Thus they have fallen short in a way of the predestinating counsel of God, which yet, we hope, will complete itself in them; and we look forward to a building of them with ourselves into one temple of mankind, in which the spirit of the God of Jacob, and of the living God‡, will dwell.

“ If now from the ancient unveilings of the Almighty, we turn to the books which record them, the sort of question we have been discussing will reappear. Just as some might doubt, whether the world at large is governed by general law or by special interferences, and others might hesitate whether the knowledge of God has been given to man by development according to fitness, or by jumps of positive imposition and revocation; so the

\* Compare St James v. 6; Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* iv. 5, 2, 3, 4; and Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 23.

† Genesis xxvii. 29; Ezekiel xxv. xxvi.

‡ I take this opportunity of expressing my own conviction, that there neither can nor ought to be any general conversion of the Jews, without a full confession on our part of the wrong we have done their race, in argument and in act.



Sacred and most Blessed Volume will be interpreted by some largely, as a record of spiritual experiences, and by others narrowly, as a communication of literal words. The more frankly we look at the books collected in what is called the Old Testament, the more clearly we see them to comprehend the literature of the Hebrew priesthood and people. They are an expression of the national mind, or a reflexion of its consciousness. Whatever Almighty God had taught the Hebrews is therein written; whether His lessons had the form of historical facts, or whether they came through a stir of the religious feelings, or whether they took a glow from the colouring of the imagination. No man can truly believe that God governs the world, and each nation in it, without expecting that any true expression of a national consciousness, especially if trained by a devout priesthood, and expounded with constant reference to the God of truth, will be pregnant with lessons significant to all men. For it will at the least be eloquent of that design which we believe to be fulfilling itself, as the will of God, in mankind. For *there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding*\*. It seemed indeed to the old Hebrews, that no guidance less than Divine could originate any art. Hence the arts of ploughing and sowing corn are said in the Bible to ‘come forth from the Lord of hosts†.’ The artificers who do cunning work for the tabernacle‡ are said to be ‘filled with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding.’ The Psalmist, when successful in battle, says, that ‘the Lord teacheth his fingers to fight§.’ When king Saul|| is filled with patriotic fervour, ‘the Spirit of the Lord’ is said to come upon him, ‘and his anger was kindled greatly.’ Even those darker passions and delusions, such as a fit of melancholy or any temptation, which the refined distinctions of later times ascribed to evil spirits, are, in the older books of the Old Testament, said to

\* Job xxxii. 8.

† Isaiah xxviii. 24—29.

‡ Exodus xxv. 30—31.

§ Psalm cxliv. 1.

|| 1 Samuel xi. 6.



‘come from the Lord\*.’ Now writers whose perception of the Divine agency was so vivid that they thus ascribed to it every earthly process, would not exclude from its operation the pen of the ready writer, and the chronicle of the recorder. We ourselves have noticed so many steps of law and instrumentality in the order of the world, that we can only accept such sayings by giving them a larger range. We interpret them as meaning, that even the results of human agency are ultimately gifts of a Divine Providence. It is hardly certain how far such interpretation would have agreed with the conception of the original writers. But perhaps it might; for if the question had been stated to them, they would have been found not so much to have denied human agency as to have overleapt it in thought, or made it merely instrumental. One thing is quite clear, that in giving us knowledge of the past or of their own times, the sacred writers never profess to have derived it from other sources than such as were humanly open to them. ‘Is it not written?’ they say of each memorable fact, in such a book, or chronicle. And when they give genealogies, they do so with a form of quotation, saying, ‘these are the generations,’ or this is the pedigree. This we read in the Old Testament; and so in the New it was thought important that the first doctors of the Church should have been eye witnesses of the life of Christ; and if any Gospel has seemed written by any who had not been witnesses, the traditions of the early Church are careful to describe such writers as companions of the Apostles. Thereby is implied a consciousness that earthly facts were not to be described even in the most sacred books without earthly means of knowledge. It is quite in harmony with this reasonable view of our Sacred Volume, that every portion of it corresponds, in the range of its knowledge of facts, with the circumstances of each of its writers. There is no account of China or of America, nor any trace of language or science beyond those indigenous to Palestine, or accessible in

\* 1 Samuel xvi. 14—23; 2 Samuel xxiv. 1; 1 Kings xxii. 19—23 [and less certainly, Ezekiel xiv. 9].

its neighbourhood. Such limitation is found by experience true, not only of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, but of every other sacred literature in the world. Whether we look to the Koran, or to the Vedas, we nowhere find in the books a larger range of knowledge of facts than belonged naturally to the share of the writers. Since then natural means are sufficient in the wisdom of God for the result, it is only folly and pride in man to imagine unnatural ones. Nor is it necessary that errors be found in the sacred document in order to confute any carnal imagination of earthly history having been communicated afresh from heaven with Divine infallibility. It suffices that the knowledge of the writer correspond only with his circumstances, to render such a theory needless, and thereby to refute it. Much more, however, even the slightest error in things otherwise unimportant, will overthrow so gratuitous and wanton a dream. It is somewhat less unreasonable to say, that an unseen inspiration may watch over a record of things known through natural Providence, and so make it faultless. But such faultlessness is not to be assumed without some reason, either of general probability, or of Divine promise, or actual proof of its existence. We do not find it necessary to the value of history in general that all its records should be faultless. Nor is its wholesomeness necessarily lessened by its having a large infusion of poetry, or of imagination. The Grecian fable of the city of Troy, and the British romance of King Arthur, were both fanciful, yet were believed in good faith, and were the inspiring sources of more glorious life to Greece and Europe than a thousand dull pages of facts. Nor are they now scoffed at by any but brutal men. In the noblest nations, indeed, the instinct of truth will, with freedom, work itself out; yet not so as to render each chronicler infallibly faultless. Still less can it be of importance to religion, which opens a kingdom of thought beyond earth and time, that its records of earthly events should be unnaturally infallible. We should not therefore say beforehand, that a religious document need be infallible: and if there is a Divine promise of

infallibility, it has to be shewn; or if the thing has existed, its proofs must be brought. What then are we to say to the claim of the Saugata that certain Cingalese chronicles are to be considered infallible records of the early progress of Buddhism, because they were written, he says, before the age of inspiration ceased\*, though some hundreds of years after the date of the supposed events? It is clear that his argument comprehends under the term *inspiration*, not only the notion of infallibility, which is questionable, but that of a heavenly communication of earthly facts, which is a thing without precedent in the world. All books everywhere, so far as they have made such a claim, have failed upon examination to make it good. We have seen some instances of such failure to-day in examining Indian religious literature. Books said to have come bodily from the mouth of Brahmá, turn out to be the multiform expression of many stages of thought and fluctuations of society. Wherever we were to extend a like examination, we should find an analogous result. But our Baudhdha friends are the less justified in making claims to any unnatural exception in such things, since their whole faith professes to be in a way a development of nature. They accept the Sánkhyā doctrine, that all effects are contained in their causes; they are less justified, therefore, in assuming upon vague and traditionary testimony effects for which nature, stript by them of active Deity, retains no adequate cause. It is more probable that the shaping power of imagination should have given birth to the stories of the lion†, and the serpent, and the demons shivering around the Saviour, than that things so unnatural should have happened: and if this probability gains strength with every year of interval before the chronicle is written, so it cannot be gainsayed by a theory of inspiration. For whatever this *being inspired* may properly mean, it does not mean a heavenly communication of earthly facts to any chronicler. I have said that the Hebrew writers do not in that sense even claim it. But yet the art of writing, and the zeal for the

\* See above, page 33.

† See above, p. 161.

honour of God or of one's country, and the spirit of religious truthfulness, with which a man may record things, will bring even the task of a chronicler within that range of providential teaching, which embraces, I suppose, all wholesome things, and which the old Hebrews describe with intensity as a 'fulness of the spirit of the Lord.' But more especially whatever is most direct, and has the power of motive, as a feeling or a passion which stirs a man's nature, and which comes upon him he knows not how, or impels him to efforts beyond himself, is ascribed naturally to a higher breath than our own. In proportion as such impulses become also powers, they seem more properly Divine. Nor least of all, if a clear vision of any great and wholesome truth comes to us, it seems a gift not dependent on our own exertions, though perhaps it may have been secretly connected with them. Even our bodily sleep seems not dependent on our volition. Again, many states of the mind seem caused in us rather than by us. New truths strike us, or old ones come home to us, in a way we did not expect. Especially in the domain of sentiment, or of moral feeling, we have not only thoughts deeper than we can express, but better instincts or convictions, which are either intuitive or have a wisdom underlying them more subtle than we can well trace in thought. Hence in a great number of languages such things are called by names taken from breath rather than speech, such as *spirit*, or *aspiration*, *afflatus*, or *Awen*; for they seem the very breathings of the mind. St Paul calls desires of this kind 'groanings not to be uttered.'

Thought is deeper than all speech,  
 Feeling deeper than all thought:  
 Souls to souls can never teach,  
 What unto themselves was taught.

I am far from thinking that such perceptions or desires are not connected with our general life and moral purity of mind. But yet they seem more immediate; and so the Divine gift or impulse in them, being less veiled by an instrumentality of

things visible, is more easily traced to its highest source. Moreover they are much connected with prayer, which I have called both an exertion, and also an intercourse of our soul with the eternal wielder of all things. Thus the ideas of aspiration from man and of inspiration from God go naturally together. Here too, doubtless, there is a Divine method, but it is more difficult to trace than in things less immediate. In all nations men have ascribed their highest impulses, and their best thoughts, and their most glorious achievements, to some Divine will or prompting. *No one ever, says Cicero, was a great man, without some Divine breathing upon him.* Especially in men who founded states, or organised human life by law, or in any way earned a fair memory by good deeds, both Cicero and all the religious thinkers of antiquity saw a Divine impulse; though one acting not without reason, but rather by it and through it. Nor need we, my friends, doubt that, even amidst many errors and much confusion of thought, the Almighty led by methods of His own the ancient nations, and those most eminently, to which His gifts were greatest. You would not, I believe, exclude from such guidance the wonderful instinct of the ant and the bee, or the wild fowl which find their trackless path through heaven as the change of season requires migration; or, again, the affection of all the beasts of the forest for their young, or any other of the marvellous works which God makes signs of His invisible power in the tribes of living things. But more eminently we recognise it in the fuller consciousness of reason, and in the higher destinies of man. All pure thoughts and noble deeds, everywhere, whether the rearing of kingdoms or churches, or the establishment of laws, or the breathing of a purer spirit into religions, or again the quiet virtues of the household, and all gentleness or patience, seem to us, as to all the best teachers of mankind, to have come from no less a source. But when God unveiled His mind more clearly in Jacob, and established His fear in Israel, I suppose that His breath, which does answering things elsewhere, here especially stirred the hearts of men. Those sweet singers of

the temple who breathed a deep desire for the presence of the All-holy One, and expressed their innermost perceptions of His Truth and Right, did not so aspire, without being also inspired. So the Prophets, or great Preachers of righteousness, when they denounced in fervid accents the wrong doing of priests and kings, or the madness of the people, and poured out with passionate imagery their strong foreboding of judgments, must have had a true feeling of the righteousness of God, and of its irreconcilableness with any permanent prosperity for national guilt. But whence such feeling should come, unless it were taught them by the inbreathing of some holy impulse from their Maker, I cannot divine. It is true, the sympathies and capacities of moral insight and anticipation, and of speech, were given through nature and through education; but all these things enter, according to my perpetual argument, into the long foresight of the Eternal, and have their inworking from His ever-present will. Nor is it difficult to conceive, that, as all strong emotion is a marvellous quickener of the intellect, in whatever direction it may be turned, so in the agony of national crisis, and in anger at pollution of the temple, or shame at the unworthy selfishness of religious literalism, the Prophets may easily, and I might almost say naturally, have seen farther than we ordinarily see into things to come. Nor is it my business here to dispute with those who think that the Prophets foretold even literal events from which centuries divided them. But it suffices myself to argue, that their vision of unchangeable truths gave them such an insight into the plan of the Eternal Governor of the world, that what they spoke of things of their own time will bear applying for all time, and especially to the most eminent instances of whatever they loved, or desired, or deplored. So that beyond the sphere of presentiment or sagacity, (which has been allowed them, and) which we can readily conceive both their education, and all their circumstances and feelings, would tend somewhat to enlarge, what I myself claim for them is a moral affinity to the thoughts of the future, rather than a

foresight of its events ; or, in other words, a predication of eternal truths, rather than a prediction of temporal accidents. If such view turn out correct, as it probably will, the harmony of the Divine dealings with man will be cleared up, and the whole theory of inspiration will come out reasonable. We have already seen, that earthly facts are recorded so far as they fell, by Divine Providence, within the natural sphere of the writer. Nor can it be denied, that the art, and science, and whole range of thought, moral, social, and religious, is that of the writer's time. Only it remained to be asked, whether a marvellous prediction of very distant earthly events did not introduce an irrational element into inspiration, as if the only wise God had departed from His method of teaching men through faith by the Reason which comes forth from Him as His Truth, and had broken His own laws, through impotence to keep them? From all that has been now said between Dr Wolff, my friend, and myself, you will see why I think it truest and therefore most pious, to say that our Lord has not violated in Prophecy, more than in other things, the harmony of the Divine Reason. God seems to touch us by the natural sensitiveness of our feelings, and awakens our best affections by contact with those around us ; He leads us through fear and awe, with something of silent inference from instinctive logic, to an apprehension of an eternal Power above us, and shews us the wisdom of listening to whatever experiences of the most sacred things have been handed down ; again, He shews us through our better conscience, that mere passion of devotion or fervid stretching forward to things unseen, will not commend us to Him without a practical element of truth and righteousness ; He reserves also a place for the intellect in comparing, and judging, and remembering ; again, He makes all religious emotions fruitless, unless we discipline them into action ; and some power from Him, difficult to trace, but which moves by order, and which we win chiefly in prayer, goes along with all such processes, and puts life into them, so that they come to good result. So that inspiration seems on the whole to



be a quickening from the breath of God, which awakens what is best in us, and works in all the faculties His providence had given us, so that they become effectual to His will. It puts into our minds good desires, and enables us to bring them to good effect. It gives us fervour in prayer, and clearness of sincerity in purpose, and a vision of truth so far as it concerns our peace, which is as it were a sight of the mind. Hence *faith*, which is especially awakened in us by it, and answers on our part to it, has been called by the Christian Scriptures, *a sight of things unseen*. But such a perception of principles in an intense degree would be not only moral insight, and the intuition of right, but the spirit of prophecy. Nor again do we find that this inbreathing of the Holy Spirit ever stands outside of that instrumentality of events, and thoughts, and language, by which God makes us capable of receiving it. We may, however, use the word inspiration in a larger sense, for every lesson traceable even remotely to the Providence of God; and this would be the sense of the Old Testament; or in a narrower and more distinct sense, for the right feeling of sacred things, which might almost seem a special organ in religion, such as the moral instinct has been called in ethics, and which is both perception of the Truth, and performance of the Right. But, however much we may thus distinguish the inworking of the breath of God from other gifts of His providence, it still moves in unity with them all, even as God the Giver of all is fundamentally One. So again, we sometimes distinguish that shewing of the Father bodily by the Son, which is called Revelation, from the gift of faith in what has been revealed, which seems rather the inworking of the Holy Spirit. For it seems convenient to have such a distinction of the work of the Son and of the Spirit. Thus St Paul says, no man can accept Jesus as the Messiah, or prefer a kingdom of thought and peace and holiness to one of earthly triumph, except by the Holy Ghost. But here again, both the Son and the Spirit, and their works, are so joined in one, that I dare not divide, even if I venture to distinguish them. Such unveilings of God as are



given in the Old Testament, seem to have been chiefly through the Spirit of the Lord, or by Divine working on the thoughts of men. Even in the New Testament the incarnation of the Son is not without the agency of the Spirit. He who was by birth\* the son of David, is declared the Son of God by power according to the spirit of holiness. It is the Spirit even which joins the Highest Father and the Son in One. And what is revealing so much as taking away a veil? Nor does anything hide the Father of our spirits from us, so much as sensualism, or sin in some of its forms of selfishness or materialism. By sowing to the flesh we reap corruption. But when we turn unto the Lord, who is the eternal Spirit†, then the veil is taken from off the eyes of our mind, and by purity of heart we become able to conceive of Him more nearly as He is. If, therefore, I have spoken of Providence, and of Revelation, and of Inspiration, as of three Divine gifts or agencies, you will understand me as not meaning to divide their essential and eternal unity.

“I have kept back as much as possible the New Testament hitherto; but it was not possible to speak of Divine Inspiration, as the source of all high impulses amongst the ancient nations, or in its more sacerdotal form among the Hebrews of the Old Testament, without glancing on at the broader life which the Spirit brings to pass in the Christian Church. When Christ came standing between God and man, and with a name‡ and a mission, each of which attested the Divine breathing upon Him, He could not lessen the consciousness of men, that all powers and gifts come down from the Father of lights. Yet in one sense He might be said to have narrowed the idea of inspiration. For He cleared it in its best meaning from connexion with those wild outbursts of passion, which might often impel men to supernatural energy, yet which seemed borne in upon them by frenzy. Nor is the Spirit, which He most emphatically com-

\* Romans i. 3, 4, “*natu hominem, virtute spiritus Deum.*”

† 2 Corinthians iii. 16, 17; St Matthew v.

‡ St Peter, Acts x. 38.

mended, to be traced as directly breathing in the creations of art or genius. Yet all such things, so far as they are good, come ultimately from Divine motives; and perhaps there is a nearer kindred than many are aware, between the dreams of unearthly beauty which our imagination would embody in art or song, and the earnest aspiration\* of our faith to a holiness we have not yet attained, and a kingdom which is to come. Prayer and poetry seem to be twin sisters; for both of them seek, what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard. But yet Christ's words would awaken in men a spirit which cares† so little for earthly gifts, that we can hardly class among its powers the general impulses of Divine Providence. Even if it permits to Christians renown in arts or arms, it does not urge them to desire it. Rather it persuades them to take hold of eternal peace, and is a participation of that spirit which dwelt in the Prince of peace. *Let this mind* (or tone of sentiment) *be in you, which was in Christ Jesus*, says the Apostle Paul. Such a mind triumphs over the impulses of 'the animal mind,' such as pride or selfishness, and opens the eyes of our understanding to see God as Spirit, and makes us worship Him in spirit and in truth. It awakens us to the life of the soul, which 'animal men' cannot discern. It is rooted in faith, and is confirmed by patience, and made perfect in love, and has hope growing into joy. Such a strength it derives from following Christ, in doing the will of God, and so fulfilling His thought, and making us partake of a Divine nature, and escape the corruption which is in the world through selfish desires. Thus St Paul is not afraid to describe the Spirit which knows the mind of the Lord, and is His eternal Counsellor, as animating also the assembly of faithful men, and so making it an embodiment of Christ. For that is any one's body, in which his mind or his spirit dwells. Divine inspiration then, according

\* Compare St Paul, Romans viii., with the *Phædo* of Plato, and with many passages in the *Republic*. See also the remarks on devotion in the *Remains of Alexander Knox*, with his illustrations from certain of the Gentiles' own prophets.

† St Matthew vi. 19—34; x. 28; xviii. 8, 9; St Luke xvi. 9, 13, 25; xvii. 27—30; 1 Corinthians vii. 29—31.

to the faith of Christ, is not any frenzy or madness, such as the Arabs or Turks might so call, nor yet any stormy impulse of warlike or patriotic fervour, as the ancient Hebrews thought, nor yet chiefly any excellence in gift of song or earthly art, as many moderns would teach us; but is most eminently a partaking of that spirit of truth and love and self-sacrifice, which dwelt in Christ Himself, and which the Father had given Him without measure. Whereas we have it each in our measure and degree, some with ten talents, and some with only one. The Apostles had it very eminently, and other preachers of truth have partaken of it largely, but no true Christian is a stranger to its eternal and indwelling power. Christ has described it as a well of water springing up in all His followers unto eternal life. St James also speaks of *the ingrowing word*, which is able to deliver the soul from evil. Touched by this fire, as if with a coal from the altar, we glow with a pure love of God, and become conformed to His will, and offer up our lives as a sacrifice of the mind, partaking of Christ in thought and in deed, rather than in name. Thus the Apostle says, *Let Christ dwell in your hearts by faith*. Now as Christ's kingdom is not of this world, and as He bids His followers not be anxious about worldly things, so the outpouring of His holy breathing upon His followers cannot be chiefly an enlightenment in worldly things. Thus the Holy Ghost does not teach us whether we shall be rich or poor, for it bids us not 'seek great things for ourselves.' Nor is it careful to inform us, how many years have rolled over any earthly kingdom, or over the habitation of the globe, or what was done in ages which do not concern us. But it leaves all such inquiries to the ordinary methods of Divine Providence, which may permit in their kind a certain inspiration by the love of truth and by cultivation of reason, since the spirit of the most High gives also understanding. Hence there may be closely connected with the eternal spirit of true religion a temporal history, which yet may be liable to whatever accidents of humanity Divine Providence permits elsewhere. It is not in the records of

earthly knowledge, however sacred may be the book containing them, but in the conformity of our heart and will to the will of God as shewn in the mind of Christ, that we are to seek for that truest Inspiration, which is with Christians the gift of the Holy Ghost. Yet, as you often see that a simple and good heart has clearer perceptions of the Right and even of things slightly connected with it, than men of proud learning; so the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in purifying the heart, branch over indirectly into the intellect. The love which the Apostles felt for Christ, would make them more religiously watchful of His words. The conformity of the beloved Apostle's mind to that of His Master may have enabled him better to give us the highest import of Christ's most solemn discourses. Again, Reason, though in the narrowest sense of the word it is applied chiefly to ratiocination, yet in a larger sense as comprehending all the capacities of the mind, has its vision cleared, and its best perceptions made firmer, by the breathing upon it of the gift of God. Thus age, and authority, and office, have due place in the Church of Christ, though the Spirit which, like the wind, bloweth where it listeth, may often give its better life to simple and unlettered people, and is better recognised in the voice of conscientious humanity from the congregation at large, than in the sentences of dignified men. All things with us are done decently and in order; yet old men and maidens, rich and poor, one with another, have often in the pure instincts of simple piety an inspiration better than that of official doctors, and exert by moral contagion, a power of binding through opinion things to be done, and loosing things that should pass away. But we are persuaded by Christ, that as His words in their highest meaning cannot pass away, so the life of His Spirit in the faithful congregation will never fail. We find by comparing our experience with the records of Holy Writ, that what the Holy Spirit taught Apostles and saints of old, He teaches by the witness of pure hearts for ever. We do not then change what is written. It would be absurd to suppose that facts truly recorded can be undone at our pleasure; or that

the record of them can be useless as an instrument to make them known. Moreover, since the record is one of spiritual life, it is no slight instrument of awakening the same life in ourselves. As the word of God, when it speaks home to a man's conscience, does not return empty, so neither can its record be void. Thus faith may come by reading, or hearing. But yet since the record is spiritual, we cannot put it above the spirit which it records. Since it is written in order to quicken and make us live, we must not use it so as to quench the life it should cherish. If Christ especially reveals the force of truth as an indwelling power of the mind, and the law of conscience witnessing to the Holy Spirit of God, these principles by their very nature have an expansive power, which reduces all laws of the letter into useful instruments. Thus St Paul\* says of the ancient Scripture, that *it is useful*, not that it is dominant. For whatever is useful, is thereby subordinate. The Apostle takes for granted, that the body of Christ is tenanted by His mind, so that the aggregate of Christian consciences is animated by the Divine breathing. Moreover the use of ancient Scripture is connected by St Paul with the spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom. It is useful, he tells us, as having power to make the servant of God wise unto salvation. But our wisdom is the fear of the Lord; and we are saved, when we are delivered from evil. For then our Lord's prayer is fulfilled in us. When then holy Scripture awakens good thoughts in us, it carries on, as an useful instrument, this deliverance or healing of the soul. Then it does instrumentally the work of the great Physician. But yet God is a God of the living, and our Healer is ever present as the Holy Spirit working in us the life of Christ whom He represents on earth. Nor will I here distract you with discussion, why the Holy Spirit, which is said to be shed abroad in men's hearts, and in virtue of such diffusion is called a gift and a breathing of God, is yet in its unity spoken of in the Holy Scripture as a person, though not in such a sense a person, as to destroy the fundamental unity

\* 2 Timothy iii. 15, 16.

of God. For this would be going back into that discussion of the Trinity, in which we said that the Father and the Word and the Holy Spirit are One God. That is not here our question, except so far as the Spirit, who is also called the strengthener of men, and the Pleader between God and Man, must be remembered to be eternal. However much, therefore, His gifts may differ in degree, or clearness, or variety, yet He who lives in every generation of the faithful, is ever One. His life then is the same, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. If He could cease to animate the Church, she would cease to live, or truly to be what she is.

“But just as the Jews erred, when they rested only in the letter of written precepts, neither discerning the intention out of which their system came, nor learning the design which it grew up to fulfil, so Christians would have fallen from their faith if they did not recognise by faith the law of God written spiritually in their consciences\*; yet they would sin against reason and Providence if they did not cherish the expressions of a like spiritual writing in men’s hearts of old, which are recorded for their learning in their Bible. Being brought face to face with God in Christ, in His light they see light, and no longer need a mediator such as Moses was†, yet they rejoice in handing down the inheritance which they have received, and find the better life, which is the light of the soul, wonderfully quickened in them by the thoughts which come of tracing its former landmarks. Thus the twilight of the world’s morning brightens into noon, and the echoes of many an ancient confession swell on into a living volume of sound, like a cry of prayer and praise from a multitude which no man can number. In the sight of

\* “Lord, have mercy upon us, and *write all these thy laws in our hearts*, we beseech Thee,” is the prayer with which the Church of England concludes her reading of the Mosaic commandments, and which may justify her retention of them as an instrument of admonition (though not as the highest law) in the spiritual service of the Eucharist. Compare Luther *On the Galatians*, and Whately *On St Paul*, and Palmer, who treats the Decalogue as a lesson, in his *Origines Liturgicæ*.

† Read Galatians iii. 19, 20, 25.

God the witnesses are not dead who are gone before us; and He by whom they live, renews perpetually their life in us. Cannot you now understand, how we separate the temporary from the eternal, when we read the experiences of the Church of old, yet *stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free*? Clearly we are not concerned to justify the personal frailties of men recorded in our sacred books. If in their lives we see principles exemplified for good and evil, it does not follow that we have always examples for imitation. Often we may even have warnings, and most commonly, food for thought, or instances of the world's course. Nor again are we bound to adopt all their associations with persons or places; but if they loved their kindred or country, we may love ours; and if they thought theirs especially favoured of God, we may trust that a like favour embraces ours, and those of other men. We can take what is general, and waive what is special; that is, we may find many of the principles involved to be eternally true, yet the applications of them to bear shifting in every age and country. But as the application to persons, rather than the general truth, admits of change, so may it even of error. A man may feel truly that justice ought to be done; yet he may think wrongly that he shall win his cause: for perhaps his cause is not just. Or he may have a true foreboding that oppressors will be overthrown, and the lot of the oppressed made tolerable by patience or deliverance; yet he may be often mistaken as to the time and nature of the deliverance, and the persons by whom it may be wrought. Perhaps, after looking in vain for a particular thing, he may sink his own desire in a wider design of the Almighty, and so find his prayer fail, yet have it answered in peace of mind, or a gift higher than he expected. But the inspiration of God applies to the great principles which we apprehend by the conscience and reason, or to the feelings which are conscious of a spiritual law and a divine love encompassing us, rather than to our anger or fear, or to what we desire for ourselves. Thus, if king David curses Ahitophel who betrayed, or Shimei who

railed at him, we need not desire his imprecations to be fulfilled, still less apply them to any enemy of our own. For we can see how the kindred of Ahitophel to Uriah the Hittite gave him just cause of grievance, and the kindred of Shimei to Saul made it natural for him to rejoice in David's overthrow; and so in our own cases, our faults, or the clash of our interests, may have rendered enmity to us natural. But yet whenever treachery or insult to fallen greatness recur in the world, we discern them to be hateful. Nor need we doubt that, in so far as any one partakes of any sin, he merits a consequence of it, which may be called a malediction. But above all, when our Divine Deliverer, Jesus, goes beyond the sons of men in innocence and in suffering, we cannot indeed say that any ancient imprecations are prophecies of those who betrayed or slew Him; for we read that He uttered no such accents, since He rather said, *Father, forgive them*; but we can understand how the affectionate reverence of the Church would take up every description of suffering innocence and triumphant guilt of old, and apply it with accession of meaning to her Lord betrayed and crucified, and to those who wrought His death, or rejoiced at it. Such is the method by which I believe the ancient prophecies become applicable to Christ; and as He transcends all who went before Him, in goodness, in fall, in triumph, and in the unfading nature of His deliverance of the mind from evil, so things written strongly of human sufferers and deliverers come out eminently true of Him.

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## CHAPTER XIII. PART II.

“As you wish it we may illustrate this briefly by the Book of Psalms. It is called more properly the *Book of Praises*, or of those songs which through a number of generations were brought forth for the service of the temple. It is therefore the Liturgy, or the Book of Common Prayer, of the Hebrew priesthood. The first Psalm, as the book is now arranged, may not be nearly the oldest; but it is a convenient Preface, expressing the general blessings of the righteous, and the falling of the ungodly. There is nothing here the Church cannot adopt; except that she turns our minds more to blessings of the soul; and if she still observes worldly virtues have their reward, she does not hold this as her special promise. If by ‘the leaf which does not wither, and the ripening of whatever fruit the tree by the waterside bears,’ any one chooses to understand the ‘unfading garland’ of St Paul, and the good deeds which come of Christian faith, such an interpretation will suit the changed point of view from which the Church now looks on body and soul; but yet if we so apply the words, we can hardly say the old Hebrew so meant them. But there has been a growth of the inner mind of men, which makes them often speak a new language, and often apply the old in a new meaning. Yet often the more homely and literal view has a perpetual truth of its own.

“In the second song we have a clear expression of some time of trouble, when nations and kings made war against Jerusalem. The singer then boldly identifies the cause of his country with that of the Lord whom she honoured. Her anointed king becomes to him anointed as it were by the Eternal King; and he bids those who, like Edomites or Hagarens, would shake off the yoke of his sovereign, beware, lest they be shattered like the potter’s vessel. He even declares it for a fixed decree, that

the king of Sion shall be as a son, or a fixed favourite of heaven. He bids the surrounding nations therefore *honour the Son*; or, as it is better rendered, *to worship purely*, lest Jehovah be angry, and so they perish before Him. Now, if you remember what I said about the temporal kingdom of the Jews, and the spiritual one which Christ establishes, you will understand why the Jews are clearly right in applying this song literally to some king of old, and in extending its application to whatever deliverer they may hope for at any time. Yet you will also see why we, thinking a kingdom of thought better than one of the sword, and the binding of nations in peace under the throne of God far better than any Jewish triumph in Palestine, can only take up this song by transferring it from the realm of the body to that of the mind, and making its temporal accents vocal with a better meaning, which Christ, and not David, has taught us.

“ In the eighth song, which the maidens of Israel chanted as they trod out the grapes, we have the goodness of God celebrated as putting all lower creatures under the feet of man. We dare not say, for it is not true, that the phrase ‘Son of man,’ which the Hebrews used for any mortal, is here spoken predictively of Jesus. But yet, if we consider, how the likeness of God in man was blurred by sin, and how he lost his rightful superiority to the beasts that perish by letting his sight of God and consequently his hope of everlasting life become faint, we can understand how Jesus, coming forth as the true likeness of God, and restoring in us that likeness by delivering us from evil, may be especially the Son of man. We do not therefore blame the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whether he were Paul, or Apollos, or some one else, for taking up these words, and applying them to Christ, as one under whose feet all things should most properly be put. Yet in the transfer of this passage there is less inherent fitness, and more fanciful play of words, than in many others.

“ The eighteenth song is difficult. For the Hebrew title makes it sung by David when he was delivered from the power of Saul,

or perhaps from imminent death, and there is no fair room to doubt that it speaks of some temporal deliverance\*. Yet it is conceived in so lofty a strain of poetry that some think its images too grand for any human application. The terrors of death encompass the speaker, and the bands of the sepulchre come about him. But earthquake and storm, with wind, and hail, and lightning, attest the presence of God as his Deliverer: so that he comes forth into freedom, and is rewarded for his righteous dealing, by strength in battle, and by victory over enemies, with submission even of strangers who dwelt in distant fortresses. Thus it would seem that David in his latter days gathered up into one poetical description the scenes of his eventful life; and as many years crowded on his memory, his deliverance from so many perils seemed a stooping of the most High to deliver him with His right hand. Perhaps, in recounting the guidance of their souls into the way of peace, men are apt thus to group in unity, and concentrate in an hour, what were really many steps of growth or of time. When, however, the first Christians had chosen Christ's empire over their hearts instead of a national triumph, they naturally transferred to this diviner object of their homage, whatever expressions had been familiarly used of David, or of the chosen line of princes which had inherited his throne. Such a transfer from outward dominion to the realm of thought requires often a translation of the language from history or poetry into parable and hymn. But in this case, as in some others, what had been poetically said of David may be literally applied to Christ, who is first encompassed by the grave, and then having its bands loosed, comes forth into freedom. This application to Christ was not probably intended by the original writer; but many Christians conceive that the natural play of his thoughts may have been overruled by the unseen inspiration of the Almighty, so that what he spoke

\* This will remain true, even if for *Saul* in the title we read *Sheol*, the grave, as the contents of the Psalm may incline us. Death surrounds, when the "fear of death comes over" a man, and "the archers follow hard after him."

poetically of things human should come out after the lapse of ages as prophetic of things divine\*. Such interpreters apply this kind of notion to the greatest part of the Old Testament, and especially to the Psalms. Thus many ancient doctors of the Church said, that 'David only sustained the character of Christ,' and that 'Christ is in every book of Scripture.' According then to this view†, which differs from the nakedly predictive, in that it does not require us to violate the natural interpretation of the Old Testament, but frankly admits its evident reference to Hebrew history, we are to consider that all the Old Testament predicts the New, and 'David sings Psalms of Christ;' yet not nakedly, so much as by parable, or by a spiritual sense, which underlies the literal, and is implied in the words rather than expressed. But again others, and perhaps the most thoughtful, and the best skilled in tongues among us, would say that the praises of the Old Testament are not so much predictive of Christ as applicable to Him: for they are predicative of truths which find the highest ideal expression in Him; and whatever is spoken of a thing after its kind may be applied with sometimes more and with sometimes less of force, to whatever is highest in that kind. Such interpreters take the moral affinity in prophecy as a weightier element than the external circumstance, which they think not of the essence, but of the accident. They often say that the correspondence between the worldly history of the Hebrews and the spiritual life of Christ is very wonderful, and points to a certain providential unity of design repeating itself. Nor does it surprise them, since the world has one eternal Governor, that His dealings with men in earlier ages should be so repeated in later instances, that whatever things were written of old, should turn out written for the learning of

\* Compare Pascal's *Thoughts*, with Lowth's *Prelections*, and Bishop Kidder's *Boyle Lectures*, called "A Demonstration of the Messiah."

† The English reader may consult, for a view of this subject, Bishop Horne's *Preface to the Psalms*, and his *Comments on the 18th*; also, Davison's *Lectures on Prophecy*, and Dr Arnold's *Sermons on the same subject*, with the discourses which touch upon it in *Rational Godliness*, by Rowland Williams, B.D.

men under a larger dispensation, which we may conceive of as the last trial Almighty God can give to mankind. If then they are asked, whether such applications of the ancient Hebrew writings as Christians now make to the ruler of their hearts, and priest of their lives, and prophet of their best thoughts, may not, though unforeseen by the original writers, have been foreseen in the mind of the Eternal Spirit who wields men and nations at His will, they fairly answer that such a question opens again the same doubt as I have now been discussing in various relations between a Providence governing all things by general law, or one arranging each thing by a succession of special interferences. Those who take either the broader or the narrower view in the course of the world, and in life, and in religious revelation, and in sacred record, will do so again in prophecy. You may judge from what I have said, to which of the two alternatives my own mind leans, in prophecy, as elsewhere. You can also understand how a new bearing or relation, which ancient words may acquire in virtue of new events happening to which they become applicable, may appear to some as if it was a part of the original sense. Yet the prophecy may lie in the parallel of the events, and in the speaker's right apprehension of the first, rather than in his foresight of the second. Perhaps the question is not one of practical religion so much as of the mode in which we should apprehend the Divine dealings. But yet the larger view may not only explain many difficulties to thoughtful men, but may turn out, as the highest truth always does in freedom, the most wholesome practically to simple people, so far as they are able to receive it.

“I need hardly go on to shew, with many more of the Psalms, how each of the songs will admit of being taken up and applied to Christ, or to the life which now is, as well as to that which is of old. Many may innocently think, that even in every man's personal life there are stages of growth answering to the development of the Hebrew people. They may perceive how from an infancy of guileless unconsciousness we fall into a sense of

evil, as we apprehend the distinction between it and good; and how we pass into a childhood or youth of wandering and dimness, with glimpses of something better awaiting us, to which we stretch forward; how again we become subjected to the hard lessons of life, and the necessities of obedience, yet feel that we cannot obey so as to obtain happiness by an iron law; then how we grow into a perception that by external rules no man finds peace, or is acquitted either before his own conscience, or before God who is its author; and how at last we are delivered from corroding fears and from the sin which causes them, by passing into a higher atmosphere, in which we feel the truth as if we saw it, and love it, and are reconciled to the God who has led us all along, and has predestinated lower things to work out a higher good as the eternal will of His fatherly love. So men seem to grow out of unconsciousness, through fear, into a faith which is made perfect in love. But I will not here wander into such thoughts. Let me return rather to the Book of Psalms, pointing out only a few. In the 72nd song we have the blessings pronounced by some pious priest upon a young prince, to whom he wishes a happy reign. 'May all kings,' he prays, 'fall down before him. May he deliver the poor when he crieth. May he deliver their lives from falsehood and wrong. May his name remain under the sun among the posterities, and may they be blessed through him.' Now all these good wishes were imperfectly fulfilled in Solomon, but come eminently to pass in Christ. So in the 89th song we have a man of prayer reminding the eternal God of the promise to David, which is recorded in the 2nd Book of Samuel, that his son and his son's sons should reign after him. Whereas in the Babylonian exile and the distress under Antiochus these promises appeared to have failed. The sweet singer therefore prays that they may be fulfilled. Accordingly in Christ, whose reign is to that of David what a kindred to Abraham in heart and faith is if compared to a descent by blood, the better kingdom of God comes forth because His will is done. So His dominion is from sea to sea;

and He stands fast as the faithful witness in heaven. Again, in the 110th song we have a king of Israel mentioned, who goes forth to battle, and whose young men glisten in armour like the dew of the morning. He is not subject to any arrogance of the priesthood forgetting their ministration for God, and magnifying their own power over men; but He reigns, like Melchisedec, alike King and Priest, and the people willingly obey Him. Even the singer, whether priest or not, owns Him as his Master (*Adonai*), and paints Him in pious imagery as sitting, vicegerent, at the right hand of the Eternal Lord (Jehovah). So Christ delivers men from the need of human mediators, when He places them in His own spirit face to face with God, giving a pledge of being heard to all who worship the Eternal Spirit in spirit and in truth. So He reigns over men by persuasion, and receives from them for God the freewill offering of their hearts. He sits at His Father's right hand until all evil is put under the feet of goodness, and proud imaginations are cast down with the persuasive weapons of the heart before the spirit of meekness. But it is especially the songs which tell of suffering innocence, in which we recognise a lively likeness of our Lord suffering, and rejected, and triumphant through patience. When the poor and needy cry, and the Lord heareth them, when the ploughers plough long furrows upon the back of captive Israel, and when God delivers the afflicted, so that not one of his bones is broken, we see painted beforehand in men who had something of His spirit, the Man of sorrows striving in prayer in the garden, and beaten with scourges, and pierced upon the cross, yet 'quickened in spirit\*,' and rising above all extinction, so that not a fragment of His doctrine is lost, nor any member of the Body which the Father has given Him perishes for ever. There is something immense, and passing speech, in the vision thus opened to us of the Eternal God throwing many forecasts by anticipation in His chosen people of those strange dealings with the faith and patience even of His best beloved, which He was going to re-

\* 1 Peter iii. 18.



present with the highest fulfilment in the person of His dear Son. With what awful sadness these things recur, or answer to what happens, in the history of the purest teachers, and reformers, and martyrs for truth in all nations, I need only here remind you. Again it is natural for poetry, with its deep tones of the heart, to sound spoken for all time; and if the inherited volume supplies the daily language of the Church, she will inevitably transplant into it whatever feelings are strongest in her own living experience; and thus men, in whose thoughts the central vision is the great Deliverer of their souls from evil, may seem to find His figure equally prominent in places where it was never intended. Nor is there any great injury to religious truth in such a process so long as fancy remain the servant of faith, and not her mistress. But if fanciful interpretations should have been laid down in past ages by men not only ignorant of one or both of the languages in which the sacred volume was written, but otherwise utterly unfit for every critical work; and if these are so made a law that men who know better must repeat as arguments the mistakes of men who know worse, then not even the sacredness of Divine truth will save us from such complications as are apt to attend everything involved in the passions of men.

“It must now have become clear to you that when the Church adopts the writings which express the narrower consciousness of a growing time, she must do so without detriment to that larger life, into which she is brought by the same eternal Spirit as animated her ancestors in the faith of old. She reads them for their history, and imbibes from them a kindred tone of sentiment, (so that in a way she is built up by them,) but she is neither bound by the rude manners of ancient Syria, nor sees a virtue in repeating the modes\* of speech involved in them.

\* The scriptural terms for husband and wife are merely *man* and *woman*; and a primitive nakedness on all kindred points pervades strongly the Hebrew language, as in a less degree the Greek. The Romans, with deeper reverence for law and for human sanctities, brought out such words as *maritus*, *uxor*, *conjux*, &c. It was *religion* which bound such things; though the word *religio* means rather observance, or reverence: from *re-ligere* = *diligere*.



Rather she asks guidance from the living Spirit of God, both by whatever direct vision He gives of the truth, and through reason and feeling, and all their instruments, among which history is one. Hence the greatest teachers of Christian truth have ever been apostles of the spirit\* rather than of the letter; for the spirit enlivens, but the letter deadens the soul. The whole assembly of Christ's Church is the temple in which the Holy Ghost dwells, pervading men's minds with right instincts and pure sympathies. In all our prayers† we pray often that this inspiration may never fail the Church, but always prevent and follow us, cleansing our hearts, and pouring into them love, and in all things directing and ruling them. Nor are such prayers unreasonable; for we are ever taught that the eye of the Only Wise is not blinded, nor the arm of the Almighty shortened; nor again, on man's side, is there anything in the lives and circumstances of the ministers of the Christian Church which should make them less fit for the guidance of the Holy Spirit, if they duly seek it, than prophets and priests of old. On the contrary, we have the unfailing word of Christ‡, that John the Baptist was greater than all the prophets before him; because, I suppose, he saw more clearly the significance of the law and the subordination of its letter to the principles involved in it, as, for instance, the meaning of any one's being a child of Abraham's: but yet the word of Christ goes on, that even the least and humblest Christian may have a light beyond that of the Baptist; that is, I suppose, we have written in our hearts the

\* See St Paul, 1 Cor. ii. xii. 2 Cor. iii. Luther, *On the Galatians*. Barclay's *Apology for the people called Quakers*. Hooker's *Eccl. Pol.* Books I. and II.

† See *Collects* before and after the Communion Service, 5th after Easter, 17th and 19th after Trinity, Quinquagesima, Easter, and Whitsuntide. Very striking are the words of the Rev. Frederic Robertson: "Love God, and He will dwell with you; obey God, and He will reveal the truths of His deepest teaching to your soul. Not perhaps—but as surely as the laws of the spiritual world are irreversible—are these things prepared for *obedient love*: an inspiration as true, as real, and as certain, as that which ever prophet or apostle reached, is yours, if you will."—*Sermon on God's Revelation of Heaven*, pp. 15, 16.

‡ St Matthew xi. 11; iii. 9.

truths, or apprehend by conscientious reason the principles, which are the will of God, and our way of peace. If then a question is raised between the Church and the Bible, we may say that each side has a truth not to be despised. The Bible has the element of fixity as an unchangeable record. The Church has the element of freedom as a living society. We can no more say the Church is built upon the Bible than that a nation is built upon its literature or a speaker upon his speech; for the Bible is itself the voice of the Church, or the collection of her voices in many ages. For the Church, or the assembly of men believing in God as He spoke to Abraham and Melchisedec and Jethro, and shewed Himself in Christ, is not a household of to-day, but from of old, and for ever.

“The Bible would not be inspired, if a Holy Spirit had not dwelt in the Church; for it expresses thoughts which were in the minds of her members, either one by one, or together. If in one sense she is the witness of Holy Writ, as handing it down, and stamping it with the authority of genuineness, so in another sense she is its very speaker, and has embodied in it her own experiences. Those who look only at the record, and put it instead of the Truth which it expresses, or the living Family of which it is the speech, take the Jewish element in our faith, and are in danger of becoming slaves to the letter. Whereas those who use the Bible, as the Apostle Paul used it, only as an instrument of instruction or awakening, but cherish chiefly the Truth, and rejoice in the life of reason and conscience by which Christ, ‘being dead, yet speaketh’ in His Church, choose rather the Christian side of our faith, and have the freedom wherewith the Truth makes us free. Yet such a freedom is in its own nature a law of right, as it is of truth; and it is balanced against self-will by fitness of counsel, and regard for others, and again by the witnesses to itself and to law, which are recorded in the inherited volume. Moreover, since the human element in the Church is liable to err, and so her hold on the Truth may grow feeble, or her faith cold, so the rightful freedom of the body may

be abused through the sin or selfishness of dominant members. Then the record of better generations protests against falling from their type, and serves to revive their spirit. Thus a zeal even for the letter, as against secular domination, though not as against the spirit of Truth, may in some stages of the Church become a symbol of spiritual freedom. We may then have two opposite tendencies, the one magnifying the inherited record, and the other the living society. Those who would make the Book the rule, lie open to the objection, that it contains no knowledge requiring any other methods than such as the Eternal Spirit still upholds in His world. Again, those who magnify the indwelling witness of the Church, either in the interest of freedom or of discipline, are taunted with the frailties by which her prominent members have often fallen short of sanctity. So that an argument from experience is said to lie against the claim of unnatural infallibility for the record, and against that of supernatural guidance for the society. But the advocates of the first may fairly answer, that if the records or the generations once quoted in the Bible, have so passed away as to be known to us only by quotation in its pages, the volume thus preserving them steps into their place, and becomes the precious tradition of a most remote antiquity. The very method of the Almighty in giving us historical knowledge through means, forbids us to neglect such means. But as to the life of sentiment, or religious breathing, with which it is true that God pervades both the Past and the Present, we can in no way better awaken it, or test our genuine participation in it, than by study and comparison of its utterances from the earliest time. So far the advocates of the Bible seem to prevail, as shewing its usefulness, and the fitness of our reading it intelligently. Nor need they trouble themselves at every step to trace into its consequences, as regards the Bible, our old controversy between a Providence of general law, and one of special interferences. But the advocates of the Church have also their reply, that if men now are frail, so have they always been; and that the very fact of Christian redemp-

tion, or deliverance, presupposes moral evil in which our souls are entangled; yet the saints of later ages do not appear uniformly worse than those of the Old and New Testaments, but rather in many cases better. There is no more proof then against a Divine working in human nature now, according to the elements of which we are composed, than for ages gone by. But if the God of truth has emphatically promised that He will be with us or dwell in us by His Spirit for ever, it seems faithless to doubt that this promise is on His part performed. Especially, if under the Old Testament His prophets\* foretold it as a perpetual characteristic of the New, that a larger and more permanent measure of the Spirit should be universally diffused, no Christian can confine the gift of inspiration to any book or bygone age, without becoming an infidel. Nor can he do things, after the letter, and merely because they are written, rather than because they are holy and lovely and true, and therefore taught us by God, without falling from the life of Christ's freedom into a Jewish narrowness, which is almost bondage. If he thus made the Bible his highest law, it would, as a law of the Letter†, become to him, as it was to the Jews, *the strength of sin*. Nor again, is it reasonable, to feel a thankless contempt for all the lessons which the living God teaches us daily by experience: nor is it even pious, to make worship of one thing a pretext for irreverence to all others; or, to desecrate His world, in order to idolise any book. With such answers, the defenders of Church authority prevail so far as to prove her inspiration a world-long gift, and one coextensive in idea with God and man, though not always‡, or equally, brought to pass in act. They leave also its mutual interlacing with the events of Divine Providence; and as their theory does

\* Hosea, Joel, Jeremiah.

† "Not only the ceremonial law, but the moral, and even the most holy decalogue of God's eternal commands, is *the letter, and the tradition of the letter*, neither giving life nor righteousness, as St Augustine abundantly proves, but killing, and causing sin to abound."—LUTHER, *In Galat.* i. 14.

‡ "Where there is no *vision*, the people perisheth," Proverbs xxix. 18.

not bind them to magnify anything beyond what it may be in the eye of the holiest truth, so they win by the grace of God, and with the mind of Christ, a great freedom for human reason, yet subject mere waywardness to authority. You can now apprehend, how the living Church is divinely free, and yet the record of experiences of her bygone members is historically precious to her, both on the side of providence and of grace. Can you not also see, that inspiration may somewhat change its character, according to the events or persons with a knowledge of which it is connected, and yet in another sense it may be the most permanent of all the Divine gifts? For God does not repeat again before our eyes the past history of the world; nor does He send again His well-beloved Son, bearing the shame of the cross on Calvary; but He ever awakens, in men not wilfully hardened, impulses for good; and He varies these, so that they become clearer or deeper, or leave a calmer vision of truth, as we sit in spirit at the feet of the Son of Man, and are stirred by Divine words or deeds; yet in all diversities of operations, now, or of old, it is one Spirit that worketh all in all. It would be well, in either extolling the record, or in vindicating for the Church her holy inheritance of freedom, if we remembered that each draws life from the Truth. The Truth hallows the books, but is not made holier by them; and gives life to the Church, but cannot be changed by her. Nor does this saving Truth consist in earthly facts and speculations, or sciences, all of which we may inquire about, and either believe or reject, as the worthiness of the record, or the external witness of the Church in handing it down, or the probability of things, and our range of knowledge from time to time, may persuade us. All those may be matters of inquiry and of belief, but not of religious faith. But the Truth which saves the soul alive, consists in seeing what God is, and what we are in His sight, and what He would have us do, and how He delivers us from evil. To worship an idol, which is less than ourselves, or our own interest or passion, or anything of our own, as if we were to live

for ourselves only, is to worship a lie. But to worship the God who upholds our steps in life, and who is the fountain of all goodness and compassion, and who would have us purify ourselves as He is pure, is to worship the Truth. The more we know of Him, the more we feel our infinite shortcoming, and reach forward to Him, crying out for the redemption of our souls from both sin and death, which are contrary to Him. Such a Truth is itself a life, and the faith which lays hold of it cleanses the heart. For this end was Christ born, and came into the world, that He might bear witness to this Truth. God quickens our faith in it, and helps us to grow in the knowledge of it, by shewing His own likeness in Christ, as one 'lovely above ten thousand.' By that strange partaking of all our nature and all our life, yet standing aloof from all our sinfulness, we recognise the Son of Man and the Son of God, and take courage to tread in His steps, as in those of a brother who was tempted in all things as we are, while we hope thus to be rendered sons of His Father, and of ours. Some one\* has not badly defined faith, as taking Christ for our Master, and shaping our lives after His mind. Yet we do not think the Word of God thus manifesting itself in the Son of Man ever began to be, but (as thought is before even human speech, so) before all worlds was the Wisdom of the Eternal. Neither then would I limit the idea of faith to the following of Christ by those who have heard of Him incarnate; but in all your efforts, my friends, to escape from human sin and misery, and in your aspirations after immortality, I acknowledge something kindred, which encourages me the more to speak to you of God unveiling Himself in Christ, and bid you ask of Him for that which you seek. He only has the well of life; and as in His light we see light, so to Him, the Hearer of the prayer of all who diligently seek Him, I think all flesh must come. Come down, therefore, from these grand imaginations of being able to raise yourselves into Infinity, and begin with humbly asking that the only wise God would shew you His

\* Archbishop Sharpe.

Truth. As you learn something of it, you will see how it is written in our Scriptures and Liturgies, and cherished by reading them ; and, again, how it agrees well enough with all secular truths of history or science, yet does not depend upon them, as if our faith in the heavenly need waver, whenever our belief in the earthly is altered.

“ *Things seen are temporal, says St Paul, but things unseen are eternal.* Yet though our faith goes beyond sight, and the hope, which fastens our souls as an anchor amid storms, has its holding-ground behind the veil of sense, it does not follow that in this temporal life things visible may not be pledges and symbols to us of what is to come. God, who shews His eternal power by the worlds which He upholds, shews also His lifegiving purpose in His Son, and ever renews His work, not only by the Spirit which animates the Body, but by words and symbols of what was done of old. Thus the words of Scripture still express the motives which Apostles felt, and which we should feel. The prayers of ancient sufferers for the truth still waken in us a daring or a patience such as theirs. The washing with water, (which curiously resembles the religious bath spoken of among Hindús,) still represents to us the saving health of Christ, and the cleansing of His followers’ souls from stain. The pledge we give in this rite, either with our own lip or by that of others, is still the Christian vow of holiness ; the promises, repeated in accompaniment, still pledge to us in a way the Divine faithfulness ; and by coming, or bringing any one, to such a rite we both express our faith in Christ\*, and bind ourselves to whatever prayer or education on man’s part can make the Divine work effectual in the soul.

“ You have asked me to explain the connexion, briefly hinted at, between baptism and original sin. The idea, then, of Christianity is deliverance. Christ shews what kind of a Deliverer He is, by teaching us to pray, *Deliver us from evil.* The greatest evil is sin, which causes chiefly the entanglement and misery

\* Thus Baptism was anciently called “the sacrament of faith.”



you deplore in the world. He who becomes subject to Christ is free from sin. We even say, with something of figure, that He is dead to sin and alive to God. Here then are two states, one of bondage to evil, and all that it involves, and the other a glorious deliverance from whatever debases or alienates our souls from the God of our health. But every such state has a beginning. If sin were only outward crime, we might say the bondage began in mature years. But if sin has root in some principle or shortcoming deeply ingrained in us, we have its capacity, or nature, so soon as we begin to be. Thus Man seems born from the womb like a wild ass's colt. He brings with him into the world the seeds of a disease. He has tendencies in him, which, as natural forces, are capacities of good, but which require, like volcanic elements, to be bound down and subjected to the will which gives them limit for a good end. Thus nature, which, if left lawless, becomes the enemy\* of the Divine purpose, must be brought into the kingdom of God, and become an instrument of grace, its discords being thus blended into harmony. Such tendencies and such needs seem to begin with our beginning. Again, if our soul's health were our own working, it might begin in mature life, or at any arbitrary term. But since it is the gift of God, and is also to be wakened with the concurrence of human instruments, its capacity may most fitly be said to begin when we are first commended to the grace of God, and born into His Church. Thus we think, a child new born partakes of Adam who fell, or of man who falls, and one baptised is a member of Christ, and an heir of His kingdom. We do not mean that the first is a murderer, like Cain, or the second a saint, like St John; but the one is in a way of being ruined, and the other in a way of being saved. The same doctrine may be also stated variously. Those who lay hold most easily on things external, will lay stress on the natural birth, and on the religious rite; while those who see more with the eyes of the mind will think rather of a disease of the soul, and of the saving

\* *Discordia rerum, nondum concors facta, est diabolus.*



influences by which our Deliverer heals us from it. But if there is deliverance in a house, it may be said that the door delivers us. Thus the Mosaic law might be called (as by St Stephen) 'the covenant of circumcision,' and baptism, as the ritual admission into a better covenant of the grace of God, may be said (as by St Peter) to save the soul, or to wash away sins. Our righteousness, you will remember, is shewn in our Lord's prayer to begin with the Divine forgiveness. Again, if a man accepts a gift, or becomes subject to some gracious Lord, he must not be ashamed of professing his acceptance or allegiance. Thus we count no man a Christian until he has enlisted himself by open baptism in the army of the cross of Christ. We do not doubt that whoever thus comes to God is in no wise cast out, but receives from Him every grace needful to his soul's health. With our own people, indeed, where we have fair reason to hope for Christian education, we baptise little children; for Christ said, *Suffer them to come unto me*; and the mercy of God is like an overflowing cup, and outruns our answering capacity, or accompanies its least beginnings. But with strangers, and with all who have wandered far from God in any idolatry or darkness, we require knowledge of our faith, and signs of sincerity in it. For our service, as St Paul teaches us, is a service of the reason, or a worship of the mind. St Peter too declares, that the baptism which saves is 'not the putting away of filth of flesh only, but the answer of a good conscience towards God.' But whatever human being is thus rightly consigned to the grace of the Eternal Spirit in the body of Christ's Church, we earnestly believe that the God of all comfort is both able and willing to serve him to the uttermost; and this belief is a sufficient answer to the charge of arbitrariness which was brought against us. For we do not proclaim as good news a remedy from the Healer of souls, and then say that it is a mockery to any one; but we make its powers of healing embrace every human soul, to which on man's part it is rightly applied. It is true that the words healing, and deliverance, or redemption,

imply a disease not less than the general sinfulness of our race; but there is no greater difficulty in this than in the existence of evil in the world, which you not only admit as fully as we do but even rather exaggerate.

“Baptism then is an expression of human faith, and a pledge of Divine faithfulness. It goes upon the idea that there is such a disease as human sinfulness, and embodies the promise of God to heal every one who comes to Him in the Spirit of His dear Son. As an external rite, it may be said to admit men only into the visible Church; but it is a symbol of something deeper, and admits into a fellowship of promises which concern the soul. Thus to our mingled being, with our necessities of sensuous apprehension, the rites which speak of Christ and dedicate us to His service, are what faith and the strong crying of the spirit are to our innermost man. They are not then unworthy instruments of Him who embodied His Word in man, that He might lift us into spiritual life. For in these things we see as it were again our Master, and while we give ourselves to Him are assured that He is given to us. Nor what God has joined in spirit and form can man rightly put asunder. Thus, when we have been admitted through baptism, with a rightly answering mind, into the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, and the ‘waters’ (if I may here borrow your words\*) ‘have taken away our sins,’ we go on to ‘shew forth the Lord’s death’ by taking the bread and wine which represent His body and blood. We give in our names as soldiers of the truth, and receive our colours and watch-words, and bind ourselves by a vow of faith, and are consecrated into that body of living men, which is to the Spirit of Christ now what His fleshly tenement was on earth. For in the second, as in the first sacrament, it has pleased God to give our sensuous consciousness a symbol of that secret grace which prevents and follows us, and of the faith by which we hold fast our life from Him. I have said, that what the slain victim was to the old Hebrews, Christ on the cross is to us. Or rather shall I say, that

\* See above, p. 77.

both the Hebrew sacrifice looked forward, and our own sacrament looks back, to that perfect self-consecration and obedience to His Father's will, even unto death, by which the Saviour of men wrought out a spiritual deliverance from evil, and triumphed by patience over every enemy? By partaking of Christ's Spirit, and by such a life as His, we partake of His sacrifice: and in the symbols of His death, we receive a pledge that the Eternal God will renew His life in us, and make us partakers of His triumph over the grave. Nor is this to be considered without remembering, that the ancient nations ate the flesh of victims they had slain in token of worship with joyful eucharist. So men who use strong figures say, that we verily eat the body and drink the blood of Christ. But far from us be any thought of eating, as cannibals, human flesh, or 'making mention of drink-offerings of blood\*,' even for man, much less for God. For all along you remember that our service is a spiritual one; and our sacrifices, as the ancient doctors said, are bloodless; and prayers, and praises, and almsgivings, with dedication of the life and heart, are the sacrifices with which our God is pleased. Thus it is by partaking the mind of Christ that we become truly members of the body which He animates; by faith we assimilate with our natures the Divine truth which dwelt in Him; and though our dedication of ourselves, with the memorials of His death, is truly (and not figuratively) a sacrifice, yet since *Christ, having once died, dieth no more*, so as regards that bodily oblation of Himself on the cross, we have not a repetition, but a commemoration, and an eucharistic sacrament. If the wicked come to it, they receive, to their own judgment only, 'the sign of so great a thing;' but if men come with that contrite heart which God calls sacrifice†, desiring to die unto sin, and to live by the mind of Christ, they receive from God the free gift of His Holy Spirit, and all the benefits which by living and dying Jesus Christ wrought out for mankind. Thus we sacrifice, like the Levites, but not with

\* Psalm xvi. 4; Isaiah i. 11.

† See Psalms l. li.

blood ; we renew the death of Christ, but in spirit rather than in letter ; and becoming partakers of His life, we receive, with the symbols of His body, the pledge of His everlasting life. In short, our sacraments are an embodiment in act of the doctrine of the atonement. Thus our God has in His manifold wisdom graciously counselled for our complex being of body and soul ; nourishing the one with daily bread, and bidding the other find in simple elements nourishment of a faith which looks on to things eternal. If we had been like beasts which perish, we might have lived by bread alone ; but we have a hope full of immortality, because of the word which cometh forth from the mouth of God, and His word abideth for ever. Then these two sacraments, which are the most solemn acts of Christian worship, and the pledges of Divine grace, as we are either consigned to its beginning, or have our faith nourished in its progress, are also symbols and expressions of all our daily life. They ever remind us, that all true Christians are cleansed from sin, and that by such a life as that of Christ we truly live, and that with such sacrifices as His entire self-consecration and obedience to God, and love to man, the Father of our spirits is well-pleased.

“ I will not conceal, nor need you wonder, that with a general agreement among Christians as to the essentials of their faith, there are points as to some of its aspects variously disputed. *Him that is weak in the faith*, says St Paul, *receive ye without vexing him with doubtful disputations*. Some men, with breadth of reason, lay stress on the secret handwriting which the Eternal Spirit engraves on the hearts of all nations\* ; others, with partial feeling, will mention nothing in comparison with the fuller embodiment of the Divine wisdom in Christ. But to the most thoughtful, neither nature is godless, nor the Gospel unnatural ; yet the lower lesson gives place to the higher, and the fainter light fades in the brighter. Some value most the sacred history of blessed words and works of old ; others cherish more the

\* Psalm xciv. 10 ; Romans ii.

fresh lessons of the living God, and the continuous flow of life which His Spirit upholds throughout all generations. Yet surely the ancient letter is an useful instrument to the soul, and yet the Holy Spirit is the living law. Some imagine the work of the Spirit is only when feelings are stirred in the heart, and flow like rivers of water; others will not exclude from the gifts of the same 'Father of lights' the firm grasp of reason, or the clear sight of conscience, and the unbiassed convictions of the understanding. Some test our state by asking only what we think or feel, and whether we trust ourselves to God, or have confidence in Him; others ask rather for the growth of such flowers into the fruit of good deeds, and the tangible tests of life. With some men we must have faith, which will be followed by love\*, but is distinct from it; with others, love must enter into faith, and perfect it, or even give life to it. But perhaps of the three sister graces, faith is nearest to us on earth, and love has most of heaven. Some again give the practical conscience a large place in religion; and I think rightly so; but others say, the cleansing of conscience must needs follow the grace of God, which therefore we should first apprehend. Thus some teach the truth with their eyes bent on human life; and others the same truth, gazing on nothing lower than heaven. Some speak more of grace, and others more of faith; the one placing before us God our Saviour, and bidding us come to Him; the others searching our hearts to see what we have answering to Him. Some grasp more easily the sign, others value more the thing signified; some make a banner of the sacred book, others strive to have grow in them the truth and life, of which the book is the expression. Thus to some the rites and sacraments, which I have just spoken of, seem the very substance of Christianity, or the things which make it a religion, as distinct from a moral wisdom, and which represent to us all that God reveals and

\* The fatal ingenuity of theologians has symbolised in a letter, or a diphthong, (*fides QUÆ viva est*, or *fides QUA viva est*,) the controversy between faith and love, or faith and works, which perpetually divides Christendom.

does for us, and convey to us His grace. But others look rather at the intention of giving ourselves to God, with which the parent dedicates his child at the fount, and with which the contrite spirit comes to renew its memory of Christ's patience, and, by receiving its symbol, to acquire the power of imitating it; and the more they are convinced of God's kingdom being a kingdom of the mind, the more earnestly they contend that in Christ Jesus\* no external rite avails anything, except as a legitimate expression of an inward life, but rather a casting of the motives in a new mould of holiness, and a fashioning the heart after the will of God. But so long as we consist of body and of soul, and some men give their conceptions more a bodily shape, while others feel rather that ineffable power, which is most akin to our forecasting spirits, and which we love without knowing, and believe without comprehending, so long will there be a wavering to and fro in our diverse thoughts of the one truth, by which yet we all live and have our being. Nor dare I speak as if I had skill to decide, where minds far wiser have found the waters too deep for them. Which comes nearest the truth is for Him to judge, whom all I have spoken of seek alike, and who alone knows, and has a right to take account. Probably He suffers each of us to apprehend that aspect of the one truth, which each can best bear, and which is fittest for each. We see that in different ages He has suffered the mind of His Church to gravitate, now on one side, and now more on the other. In the patriarchal time was the simplicity of childhood; under the Mosaic law all was precept and rule of outward building; with the prophets and great teachers of righteousness, either in song or in judgment, came a perception of the soul's freedom from lifeless forms, and of its rightful nearness to God. In the ecclesiastical books (such as that of Wisdom) which intervene between the older scriptures of the Hebrews and the newer ones of the Christian Church, we find no fervid burst of song, or fresh clearness of insight; but yet

\* Galatians vi. 15; Colossians ii. 20; Romans ii. 29.

the moral element is developed in them with reasoning; and both their language and their thoughts passed into the storehouse of the earliest Christianity, and had no slight share in preparing for it. Then among the Apostles of Christ we seem first to find the Jewish stage of conscientiousness, with zeal for ritual. In St James we have moral earnestness; in St Peter single-hearted zeal for his Master; in St John the love of God and of His truth; and in St Paul faith, as the preparation of heart which God counts righteousness rather than any outward claim, and as oneness of Spirit with Him who freely saves us. The first victories of Christianity over the world were won by faith and patience, but yet eminently in freedom. *They all had the Spirit; and because they had an unction from the Holy One, they knew all things:* and if there was anything they knew not, they trusted that *the Spirit would teach them that also.* Then, in building up the Church, it was natural to seek firmness by taking solidity of framework somewhat after the Jewish model. So, although the primitive doctors, who came next after the Apostles, were steadfast in refusing to own the legal sabbath of the Jews, and the limited sanctity of local temples, or the bloody sacrifices of the ancient nations, yet they strengthened their government, and developed their ritual, with a view to consecrated precedents, both in Jerusalem and elsewhere. It is not easy to decide, whether such imitation went always upon real analogies, so as to have a sort of Divine authority, or whether it was the result of circumstances, and had only a temporary necessity. But since the God of the Jews is still the Governor of the world, it is reasonable to believe that, setting aside their admitted imperfections, the social framework good for them may be found good for other nations; and although Christ has left His Church free to leaven the world with His truth as she best can, yet, in doing so, she must work in harmony with the general laws of Divine Providence; and even if she can discover these by interrogating nature and human consciousness, yet she may derive help in doing so from the precedents of an-



cient Churches and nations, both as regards their ritual and their law. We cannot rightly appreciate Christianity if we consider it nakedly as a complete whole, and as destined to supersede everything else; for it is intended by our Maker as rather a supplement to His general providence in nature, or as capable of working in harmonious relation with the whole. In more modern times, with an increase of the study of our earliest sacred writings, and perhaps a larger outpouring of the Divine Spirit in various forms of intelligence, there has come a revival in the Church of that freedom for which St Paul was jealous, as for a thing *wherewith Christ had made us free*.

“But we are truly taught that *wisdom is justified of all her children*. Nor do I know through which way it might please God most naturally to lead you. We have spoken to you of the life of Christ. Perhaps, if you would read that life in our gospels, you would fall in love with the beauty of that likeness of God, shewn as it were before our eyes. You might be glad to listen to Him who brings good news for *the plague of every man's heart*, and who heals all manner of diseases. If you are weary, as all your speculations seem to say, of this transitory world, you might hear Him saying, *Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest*. If you doubt the reality of sin, and think it only a play of natural forces, and not hateful before God, you might change your mind if you contrast its ugliness with that beauty which comes forth in all His words and works, and see its hatefulness in the malice with which it rose against the meek Teacher of the truth of God. If you doubt, whether souls have each an individual life and an eternal one, you might be convinced, when you see the same Jesus who died rising again, and entering visibly into His glory. If you speak of the thought of Deity embodying itself in the world, you might find such a speculation turned to a higher idea in the wisdom of Him who is from everlasting coming forth as the Word, and made manifest in man, as full of grace and truth. If penances weary you, here is Christ taking away their need;



if you yearn for what they aim at, here is Christ giving it you freely. What manner of love could God have shewn more than in thus giving His dear Son as the messenger of His love to us, and suffering Him to be smitten, while the charge of guiltiness was laid upon Him, rather than that we should perish in sin, without His good news? What can keep us from Him except a greedy desire to continue in some wickedness? This indeed is the only obstacle, and it is a great one; for Christ's deliverance is not merely from external laws, but from evil in its spirit and in all its forms. If you would be delivered from evil, He will give you, if you pray for it, the free spirit of holiness. Again, if that temper, which makes you throw so intense (though we think so mistaken) a feeling of religion into all your life, should desire means of realising to the senses spiritual truth, the prayers and sacraments of the Church would bring Christ before you, walking as it were in the midst of His people, and shewing them His wounds, and pleading with them by His passion that they would not be so in love with sin and with ruin, but rather follow the example of His patience, that they might be partakers of His resurrection. There also you might see the same Jesus pleading the same passion for His people before God, and desiring that no human soul might be lost, for which He had paid as it were a price by passing through agony and shame. Or again, as you have pilgrimages in India, and you have spoken of the old ascetics who dwelt in solitudes, you might read in some Christian authors how the soul of man is in this world like a pilgrim, finding no rest which satisfies it, but seeking a heavenly city. Then it passes perhaps through struggles of doubt or darkness, as if through a slough of despond; but when it calls upon Christ for help, it finds in Him an interpreter of all its difficulties, and in gazing upon His cross it drops the burthen of its sins, and it prevails in contest with every ghostly enemy, and moves on in prayer until it has glimpses by faith of an everlasting peace beyond the dark river of death, and so it is led on until it enters, as Christ entered, into glory. But if such

sayings have too much of parable for our very wise friends here, they may please, with our more rationalising doctors, to consider our earthly life as a state of trial, by which the heavenly Master proves us in order to see what are fit for, and intends to exemplify in us His own equity in the sight of other worlds, and spirits yet unseen, by rewarding every man for the works he has done in the flesh, whether they were good, or whether they were evil. But in any way, you see, we agree in pressing forward, as you do, with a great desire of things unseen and eternal, but with a better assurance of attaining them. Men in almost all nations have had some instinct or dread of eternal punishments in death\*; and however the human consciousness of an immortal soul, and of guiltiness, and of an eternal law, which seems involved in such a dread, may have been evoked, our Master Christ so far appeals to it, that he adopts the expressions of its instinctive fears, and leaves them as lurid possibilities which we may bring on ourselves, and as things which should outweigh the meaner fear of man who can but kill the body†; but yet the doctrine of Christ is chiefly good news, and His especial work is not to implant such fears, still less to increase them, but rather to deliver us from all such evil by making us partakers of His own Spirit, and fitting us for the kingdom of our heavenly Father. So far however as such expressions of awe appear among the words of Christ, I dare not attempt to lessen their force; I only say they are not the main burden of His mission from the Father; yet perhaps those among us are not wrong who, believing the kingdom of God to be spiritual, think the flame that is not quenched is the flame of passion with shame, and the worm that dieth not, the infinite remorse of an undying soul.

“It would be more Christian, and more wholesome, to consider how much is parable, or what is the meaning, in the words which Christ and His apostles have spoken of the infinite joy of the

\* “*Æternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum.*”—*Lucretius*.

† St Matthew x. 28; St Luke iv. 18; ix. 54; xii. 5.

life to come. But yet it is more wholesome still to consider by what life and mind we may now become fit to partake of it. The fruit of the Spirit, says St Paul, is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. Against such is no law of terror, or prevailing of any enemy. For such fruits do not wither, and if we have in us now the life which puts them forth, death will have no power over us. But consider, said a wise Gentile, whether eternal right must not forbid what is impure to lay hold on the pure. So the Christian must consider that he cannot see God without being pure of heart, or be where Christ is, without partaking of the Holy Spirit. There are persons of sensuous and affectionate mind, who lay hold chiefly on the promise that they *shall see Him as He is*, and *shall know as they are now known of Him*. Many of them, such as maidens and simple people, imagine they shall behold Him, with the hair parted, and with the Divine smile but no longer of pitying sadness, such as they have seen Him in some picture, or as His resemblance was fashioned in their fancy by the scriptures which tell of His healing the sick and comforting them that mourned; and they believe that seven torches will throw light around Him, and an infinite company of singers will celebrate his victory over the last enemy, and bear palm-branches of triumph in their hands, yet rejoice in throwing the garlands before His throne, and ascribing glory and salvation to Him who was dead, and is alive for ever. Among this great company of just men made perfect they expect to meet again the familiar faces of earthly friends, and to see the mother whom they lost in childhood, and that dear person whose love they longed for. They think also of angels, with instruments of music, and the fluttering of golden wings. But others, that would be wise, think such sayings of Holy Writ are parables of bliss, but confess they know not what it shall be. We know in part, they say, and prophesy in part; and we now see images of things spiritual cast with broken reflexion, as in a figure, on the imperfect mirror of our understanding; but in the day when

the Lord, who is the eternal Spirit, shall be our light instead of sun or moon, we shall have clear vision as it were face to face. Then, they say, we shall see Christ because we shall be like Him in spirit, and be one with Him, as He is one with the Father; and then we shall read aright the mystery of the world's history, and 'understand strange propositions,' and know the reasons of His death, when we know the power of His life. As to the company in that place of blessedness, they think it must be of saints, and martyrs, and of all who have witnessed a good confession for the right and the truth, and of persons like them by a fellowship of mind. But as to earthly affection, they know not if it will endure in that higher world, nor understand, if it did, how its many probable divorcements could consist with bliss. Our mother and sisters and brethren, they say, must then be like those of Christ, the persons who do the will of God. Others again speak, as if they would be thought to know more, by confessing that they know less. *Eye hath not seen, they say, nor ear heard, what God hath prepared for them that love Him.* Or rather, perhaps, their knowledge is of a different kind, and more beyond speech, like those deep *breathings* of the mind, and its clear perceptions, which I spoke of before. For they say, the kingdom of heaven must begin upon earth; and as it will be hereafter beyond sense, so is it now. The pure of heart see God now, though not with the eye, for He is spiritually discerned; and they will see Him hereafter in the same way\*, though in a different degree. We apprehend an originaive will, and the ideas of moral right, and truth, and wisdom, and love,

\* "Never yet has *eye* seen the Truths of God, and never shall it see them. In Heaven this will be as true as now. Shape and colour give them not. God will never be visible, nor will His blessedness. He has no form. The pure in heart will see Him, but never with the eye; only in the same way, but in a different degree, that they see Him now. In the anticipated vision of the Eternal, what do you expect to see? A shape? Hues? You will never behold God. Eye hath not seen, and never shall see in finite form, the Infinite One, nor the Infinite of feeling, or of truth." (Rev. F. Robertson's *Sermons*, p. v.) With this suggestive passage may be compared Archbishop King's analytical *Sermon on Predestination*, ed. Whately.

and holiness, and duty, not with instruments of sensation so much as with a consciousness of the mind, which acts through faith. But though these truths are great and eternal, and worthy of being loved with all our hearts, they stand almost on one side of the mass of impressions which belong to our natural life. All our language, even of things unseen, is steeped in the imagery of the senses. Our thoughts, even when born of the mind, must borrow subject-matter from observation, and cast themselves in the mould of sensible objects. We cannot take note of the world without applying to it classifications of space and time, such as we cannot conceive to fetter—even if they exist for—any higher intelligence, to which there is no distance or nearness, or past or future, but an omnipresent knowledge. When then we pass into that region of thought which we divine rather than comprehend, the change may be as great as when a blind man receives sight, and the visible world is revealed to him. Then, although the things of faith cannot change, except into greater clearness, the things of our earthly definitions may pass away like dreams, and our expectations become as inappropriate as the blind man's conjecture, when he fancied a scarlet colour might be like the sound of a trumpet. It is also evident that the sacred writers were in this respect under the same law of imperfectness as we are ourselves; for they admit it freely, and the stamp of their language proves it. Their metaphors, like our own, are of earth, and their associations are with what they have each known. Thus as their hope is ours, so their manner of shaping and expressing it is kindred. Hence their words of the life to come should not be strained, so much as interpreted broadly. Now men who feel strongly, how any parables which now regulate our anticipations may be transcended hereafter, are apt to conceive of the life to come with almost the abstract subtlety of Hindú metaphysics, and call it life, and thought, and joy, or spiritual being, and a consciousness of the living presence of God, which may be called oneness with Him, rather than define or describe it according to what in the flesh seem realities, but what to spirits made perfect

may become transitory images. But in this they greatly differ from you, that they are persuaded of the forecasting will and the unity of selfconsciousness which belong to eternal Deity, and in this they find a pledge for the individual life of every soul made in His likeness, as well as a reason for humility in not confounding the creature with the Creator, or even the child with the spiritual Father. If then you ask, what persuades them that so great a mystery as eternal life for each of our souls is possible, they answer that God is able to give it; and if you ask of His willingness, they answer that He has implanted promises of it in the better instincts and higher consciousness of the noblest teachers in all nations; and as He is faithful to fulfil such forebodings, so He has exemplified their fulfilment in His Son Jesus, by lifting Him as the firstborn of the resurrection from the grave; and He strengthens the testimony of Jesus by the witness of His Spirit, which quickens in men the thoughts that go beyond extinction, and gives them through faith a firmer hold of the living God. But as to hour, or place, or fashion, whether now or then, or on earth, or in some distant star, or in a being as free from limits as that of the Eternal One who made the worlds, and needed them not to dwell in, and whether in the body, or out of the body, they cannot tell. They know, that He who clothes every grain of corn with the new blade and ear, is able, if He will, either out of the grave, or out of anything, or out of nothing, to give every soul whatever tenement\*, either earthly or heavenly, is fittest for it. He is also able, if he think better, to preserve His own likeness in spirits made perfect, without aid or trammel of organisation, but with powers rather answering to His own. Yet though all Christians own that 'flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom,' they mostly find it difficult to conceive of human personality as surviving without some tenement or instrumentality†,

\* 2 Corinthians v. 1, 3, 5.

† "It is a mistake of ultra-spiritualism, to connect degradation with the thought of a risen body; or to suppose that a mind, unbound by the limitations of space, is

however subtle, which may be called 'a spiritual body:' and even if such language should be tinged by sensation, yet it may be provisionally useful in leading our thoughts to a higher truth; and it may be justified perhaps in your eyes by its resemblance to the Sāṅkhya doctrine\* of 'the subtle person,' as well as by the Vedantine tendency to embody the mind of Deity in the world.

"But how can men be so in love, it may be asked, with a life of which they confess that they know so little? But they answer, not only that it is the rightful complement of the world's history, in which all abuses shall be rectified, and mysteries cleared up, and wickedness come to an end, and the kingdom of God prevail, but that it is the great desire with which our souls †cry out, and the will of the Father, that we should draw nigh to the Giver of life, from whom the creature seems unwillingly divided by vanity. Nothing could be told us of eternal life, equal to what we know, that it means being with God, or a greater nearness to Him than now, if not in place, yet in thought, and truth, and acquaintance with His Being. He who knows this has enough to strive for. The more he knows it, the more he rests in it. Nothing else could so satisfy him. Thus Bradwardine, a British archbishop in the dark ages, made this his prayer:

"Thyself, my God, I love, for Thyself, above all things. Thyself, for Thyself, not for aught else, I always and in all things hitherto seek; with my heart and whole strength, with groaning and weeping, with continual labour and grief. What therefore wilt thou give me

a more spiritual idea of a resurrection than the other. The opposite to spirituality is not materialism, but sin. The form of matter does not degrade. For what is this world itself but the form of Deity, [?] whereby the manifoldness of His mind and beauty manifests, and wherein it clothes itself? *It is idle to say that spirit can exist apart from form. We do not know that it can.*"—F. Robertson's *Sermons*, p. 359.

\* See above, pp. 51, 167, 8.

† Romans viii. and Pascal's *Thoughts*. So I have heard a Welsh peasant say, that nothing but God could satisfy "the deep desires of the heart of man" (*dyfod dymuniadau calon dyn*).



as my final end? If thou givest me not Thyself, thou givest me nothing. If I find not Thyself I find nothing. Thou dost not then reward, but torture me. If thou deniest me Thyself, and that for ever, and not for a season, whatever else thou givest me, shall I not always languish with love, mourn with languishing, weep with grieving, because I remain ever void and empty? Shall I not mourn inconsolably; complain unceasingly; grieve interminably? This is not thy wont, God of goodness, of clemency, and of love: it is in no wise fitting, in no point seemly. Grant therefore, O my gracious God that in the present life I may ever love Thyself, for Thyself, above all things; and in the future world may find Thee, and hold Thee for ever."

"Such are the petitions which many Christians offer up at this day. What reason is there why you should not join us in them?

"There is so much variety in the conceptions I have expounded of the life to come, that the more spiritual might appear to the other side coldly abstract, and the more sensuous might by the others in turn be called carnal. Yet the holders of such views do not differ as to the main truth, but only as to the fashion of conceiving of it. We all agree that the eternal I AM is the rightful Governor of the world and of our lives, and that His Word delivers us from evil, and that His Holy Spirit quickens us into the life everlasting. We agree that death shall be swallowed up in victory, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from every eye; and those indeed who have bowed down to the beast of fraud and violence must be judged by His mark, which they will bear in their souls; but those who have followed the Lamb in innocence will receive the crown of patience in joy. So that the way to have the life of Christ hereafter, is to learn the power of His death now. We also agree, that the tempers and deeds which God has made conditions or instruments of entering into heaven, are the surest means of peace and happiness on earth. So that the kingdom of God is the same, now, and for ever; and our faith has the promises of the world which now is, and of that which is to come."



## NOTE ON CHAPTER XIII.

I append here as illustrations, some broken extracts from the Rev. F. Robertson's Sermon on *God's Revelation of Heaven*.

"Revelation is made by a Spirit to a spirit. Christ is the voice of God *without* the man—the Spirit is the voice of God *within* the man. The highest Revelation is not made by Christ, but comes directly from the universal Mind to our minds. Therefore Christ said, *The Spirit shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you*. And therefore it is written, *The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God*. (1 Cor. ii. 9—12.) Now the Spirit of God lies touching as it were the soul of man—ever around and near. On the outside of earth, man stands with the boundless heaven above him: nothing between him and space—the confines of the sky touching him. So is the spirit of man to the Spirit of the Ever Near. They mingle,—in every man this is true. The spiritual in him, by which he might become a recipient of God, may be dulled, and deadened by a life of sense; but in this world never lost. All men are not spiritual; but all have spiritual sensibilities which might awake. All that is wanted is to become conscious of the nearness of God.....Our souls float in the immeasurable ocean of spirit. God lies around us: at any moment we might become conscious of the contact.

"The *condition* upon which this Self-revelation of the Spirit is made to man, is Love. To love God is to love His character. For instance, God is Purity—to be pure, is to love Him. God is Love—to love men, even the evil, and enemies, is to love God. God is Truth—to be true, is to love Him. God is Infinite, and to love the boundless, reaching on, and rising upwards ever, aiming insatiably to be perfect, even as the Father is perfect,—that is to love God.

"This love is manifested in obedience; or is the life, of which obedience is the form. Nothing can be love to God, which does not shape itself into obedience. Strong feelings, warm expressions, may not usurp that sacred name.

"To love, adoring and obedient, God reveals His Truth. Love is the condition, without which revelation does not take place. The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him. No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us. With this man will He dwell, even with him that is of a meek and contrite spirit. If any man will do His will, he shall know of the

doctrine. Reverence, love, meekness, contrition, obedience, these are the conditions upon which God enters into the soul, whispers His secret, becomes visible, imparts knowledge and conviction.

“There is no favourite child of nature who may hold the fireball in the hollow of his hand and trifle with it without being burnt—there is no selected child of grace who can live an irregular life without unrest; or be proud, and have peace; or indolent, and receive fresh inspiration; or remain unloving and cold, and yet see and hear and feel the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him.

“The Cross is humbleness, love, self-surrender. These the apostle preached. To conquer the world by loving it, to be blest by ceasing the pursuit of happiness, and sacrificing life instead of finding it, to make a hard lot easy by submitting to it, this was His divine philosophy of life.....The disciples of the inward life recognised the divine truth, which this doctrine of the Cross contained. It was God’s own wisdom, felt by those who had the mind of Christ.

“If obedience were entire and love were perfect, then would the Revelation of the Spirit to the soul of man be perfect too. There would be trust expelling care, and enabling a man to repose. There would be a love which could cast out fear. There would be a sympathy with the mighty All of God. Selfishness would pass. Isolation would be felt no longer; the tide of the universal and eternal life would come with mighty pulsations throbbing through the soul. To such a man it would not matter where he was, or what: to live or die would be alike. If he lived, he would live unto the Lord; if he died, he would die to the Lord.....

..... “These are the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. Compared with these, what are loveliness, the eloquent utterances of man, the conceptions of the heart of genius? What are they all to the serene stillness of a spirit lost in love; the full deep rapture of a soul into which the Spirit of God is pouring itself in a mighty tide of Revelation?”

F. ROBERTSON’S SERMON, pp. 11—17.

\* \* In balancing the General and Special, it would have been important to notice, that remorse of the nerves, as a kind of physical sensitiveness, is no entire criterion of guilt; for it ensues upon mistakes of manner, and trifles of misunderstanding, as much as upon deliberate sin. Yet it is an index to a faculty, which reason and faith are to train.

## CONCLUSION.

"Thou that hearest prayer, unto Thee shall all flesh come."

"With Thee is the well of life : in thy light we shall see light."

"WELL," said Wolff, hastening to interpose while Blamcombe paused for a little, "you have been tolerably successful in removing the objections brought against Christianity, and your success seems to have resulted from a larger view of the working of Divine Providence in the world and of its religious development in humanity than some might be willing to take. Nor can I help admitting, on part of my Chárváca or materialising clients, that so far as their materialism implies a denial of an overruling Deity, or of a spiritual world encompassing us, into which our spirits which seem akin to it may pass hereafter with a fair probability of surviving for ever, so far, I say, their cause appears to have broken down. For not only the clear consciousness of men affirms the first, and an immense instinct aspires to the second, (even the stories which it may have generated bearing witness to its force,) but the belief compounded of these two thoughts has exercised so lively a sway throughout all history, that it has been proved one of the dominant forces of the world. So that, however the thing may have come about, I admit we must believe in God, and have reason to hope or fear, more or less distinctly, the possibility at least of a life to come. Nor do I wonder that such thoughts should both have vexed or swayed men's minds, and taken positive form in religion, however obscure may be some of the questions involved in them. But still it is not clear to me, whether you have not shifted the idea of Revelation from its usually positive sense into a kind of spiritual growth, or something that more nearly resembles some Indian theories of a Divine spirit pervading and elevating humanity. Or even if you do not intend this result, yet your arguments for what is commonly termed an external revelation, either as the transfer from heaven to earth of a body

of information which is to be conned over like a map, or as a placing before men's bodily eyes, in some remote period, Divine objects, which are always externally opposed to us, and except on rare occasions within that period, not seen or cognisable by us,—have not appeared so convincing as you may have desired. Nor must I shrink from expressing to you my own concurrence in the suggestion of Sadánanda, that Christianity may be true as an expression of whatever is most devout in human nature, with due allowance for the moods of affection, or the attitude of various speakers. To put, however, my own deliberate view more generally, it seems to me that any faith which would express our desire of communing with what is Highest and Best above us, must take account of every constituent in our minds, or be the harmonious aspiration of a balance of all our powers, either of feeling or acquirement. Thus not only to omit religion as a grateful incense from our life, would be suicidal to man's peace of mind and his noblest capacities (for then we should sink into the narrow verge of prospect and endeavour which belong to animals); but each part of our nature must find utterance, as for instance the conscience in doing right by man, and the sense of awe in prayer or song, and our sorrow or shame in penitence, and our joy in thanksgiving. The greatest excellence of Christianity seems to consist in its giving voice to what is best in us; or, as its doctors often say, in its adaptation to the moral constitution of man; but this very correspondence implies a connexion between the two things, which may be of the nature of cause and effect. Take care, then, I should say to religious teachers in general, lest you either violate the better instincts of our nature, or fail in your systems to give due expression to any of them in all their manifold relations. So may your result be a perfect echo of man's heart, and mirror of his consciousness."

"When I compare your present speech with what I remember of your first," was Blancombe's reply, "I feel thankful for the improvement. But you must forgive my saying that the present one is very inadequate, and perhaps more strikingly so,

from its setting out on a journey, of which it does not reach the end. For when once your religion has taken account of all, as you say, and the whole of our mental faculties, the higher ones, such as conscience and the clear reason elevating itself into faith, will not bear a divided dominion; nor will they rest in anything lower, or even in themselves, but look outward to the law of their witness, and the Author of their being. There are principles which once admitted must reign supreme. So our higher faculties, when duly awakened, must govern the baser elements in us, and cast out the evil spirit of doubt which ministers to them. Yet they themselves cannot ignore that by which they live, or refuse to acknowledge whatever instrumentality of outward evidence either in person or book or event or history has served to win them a full consciousness of themselves. Thus if Christ and all that belongs to the life of Christ has brought home to our minds a clearer knowledge of God, He must remain for ever the representative of a higher authority than that within us, which answers and bears witness to Him. So if His rising from the grave has exemplified the entering of spirits made perfect into glory, what was once an instinct or aspiration has become now a fulfilment. You speak of the anticipation of a future life as a ruling force in the world's history. But all the Christian nations who have cherished such anticipation for eighteen centuries, have not held it as such nakedly or alone, but ever in connexion with the truth of their risen Lord. So that the historical truth is the quickening power, and not the bare instinct. While then I myself contend, in harmony with all the soundest doctors of the English Church, that the faith of Christ agrees with conscience and reason, I do not therefore make it their product. For these would have no power, unless it were given them from above. Only own their leading, and they will lead you on to One higher than themselves. They refuse to be flattered, as if they were authors or beginnings of religion; but the more majesty you ascribe to them, the more they rejoice in throwing it down at the feet of a greater and

better Master, who is their God and Saviour. For all their light, they say, is a reflected one; their rule is only a delegated vice-royalty; and they are not the very law so much as witnesses to the will of the Lawgiver. So that all your theory of religion's being a product of the human mind, as if we could make it at our will, not only fails, but contains the instruments of its own destruction. The thing we can least of all do, is to make a religion. It is rather our innermost necessity to take that which God Himself shews us. For truth is of all things the least dependent on our caprice, and we only reach it in so far as we know by faith the very Being of the Eternal. Yet this utter repudiation of your theory in the shape you leave it, as if our aspirations were a sufficient religion without the truth of that higher Being which they point to, is not inconsistent with my own admission of a large variety of modes in which we may conceive of the only true God as teaching us. But I have said enough of the broader and the narrower views of the play of Divine Providence both in nature and revelation, and again in history and scripture. Nor do I deny that God may have scattered elements of His own Truth largely among nations who both mingle it with errors, and conceive inadequately of its rightful Author. So that, in conversing with our friends here, I would have them indeed throw away their idols, yet not necessarily all kindly feeling for that which they have been brought up in, but rather associate whatever is best in it with the purer faith which we bring them, and the firmer historical warrants by which we recommend it; and so, living by the best they know, and learning as they live, I would have them pray the Father of the spirits of all flesh to lead them into the entire truth."

"It is very agreeable to me," here remarked the Saugata, "to hear from the stranger tones of more tolerant wisdom than those in which some foreigners address us. But I humbly think, he and his friend should carry their charity a little farther, and permit us to sympathise with them in the truths which we have in common, as for instance in a zeal for virtue, and for the

general growth of intelligence in the world, rather than force upon us a worship we are not prepared for. Nor can I receive with any cordiality the recommendation that we should renounce our Saviour Sákyá, whose faith has been proved by miracles, and written in inspired books, and advanced by peaceful missions, and adorned with so many gentle virtues, for the name of any one who may have wrought a kindred deliverance for men elsewhere, but who at least is later in time than Sákyá, and whose name we see no reason to hold more sacred."

"But pray, when you speak of charity," replied Blancombe, "what do you exactly mean? If charity is love or kindness, that is just the principle which makes us invite you to a more excellent way. Out of charity we came into this country, endeavouring to persuade men to be saved. What greater kindness could we do you, than to shew you a way of holiness here, and peace hereafter? Your own missionaries, under the influence, I suppose, of kindred motives, went about preaching to men still more ignorant. We, seeing even the better doctrines of their preaching to have vanished from you, and some things vital to have been wanting in their doctrine originally, try to imitate their goodwill, but with more reason for our purer faith. You have spoken of the errors of the old Brahmanical priesthood. But they taught no error grosser than the worship of dead men's bones, which you now practise. You speak of deliverance from a yoke. But no sacerdotal yoke in the world is heavier than that now borne in many countries where the Bauddha priesthood has dominion. You desire the growth of intelligence. But that neither ministers to the purposes of your priestly order, nor prevails in the countries of its rule. Travellers of approved credit tell us, that the millions whom you boasted of as adherents to your creed in Thibet, and parts of Tartary and China, are amongst the least intelligent worshippers, and the least advanced in all the arts of life, that can be found in all Asia. But wherever intelligence is low, virtue is weak. I have no desire to deny whatever good you feel able to assert as existing

among you. Only consider, and judge for yourself, whether the firmer and purer virtues are ever strong, without a clear conviction of the All-seeing Judge of the whole earth. That shortcoming of belief on this point, which you acknowledge partly for yourself, and more strongly for some of your brethren, cannot fail to tell on your morals: it seems also to have affected your metaphysics. You were very anxious, in an early stage of this dialogue, to repudiate the charge of 'total perishableness,' or of reducing all things to a material flux, which some Hindús had brought against you. Then came a discussion about the solidity of matter, which you said was not mere appearance, but had something underlying. Yet you thought intelligence was more certainly known to exist than matter itself; nay, was perhaps the cause of matter's existing; or at least the organ of its recognition. As to the primary atoms you spoke of, I hardly know whether their existence also, or whether only the composite form of definite objects was held by you as dependent upon intelligence. But at least all form and aggregation of things were considered by you as so dependent: and I think very reasonably so. For whatever may be the substance, or ultimate principle of solidity in things, that which combines atomic particles in material objects is most easily conceived of as a mental principle, or a law; and if so, it has meaning, or implies a more or less ordering intelligence. I admit that a tree, for example, has no material substratum, apart from both the atoms composing it, and that combining principle, or natural law, which gives it both generic life and type according to the germ of its species. Thus the idea of substance being dependent upon an ordering intelligence applies to the life of the tree, and to the plank which comes from it, no less than in turn it does to the relative structure of the table, or to its characteristic form, which implies a carpenter: and I believe the same idea is as truly applicable to any primary atoms, though of such it must be more difficult to prove. But then, after all this confession, that the material depends upon the intelligent, and form upon meaning, you



proceeded calmly to explain a doubt whether the vast frame of the world has any intelligence indwelling of sufficient activity to have the care of governing and ordering. I must not quite say you took away self-consciousness; but, coming as near to that as possible, you took away design, or meaning, and so destroyed that which gives the laws of combination to material forms, and even existence to their primary particles. It seems acknowledged, that such a conception of passiveness in Deity affects your notions of the life to be expected hereafter. For it takes away clear individuality, and leaves a breathless absorption. So it must, I apprehend, in moral questions take away the clear boundaries of right and wrong; and if any one were speculative enough to care about pushing it into consequences respecting the material world, it would be found to make all existence uncertain. So that, I suspect, the Brahmanical reproach of 'total perishableness\*' had more meaning against the Bauddha doctrines than at first sight appears. For you do resolve the universe into a vast ocean, as you said, or rather a flux of generation and perishing, in which existence is connected with intelligence; but intelligence has no governing design, and becomes either passively observant, or else as blind and objectless a force as if it were material: and so all the laws which express a Divine meaning, and give the world and all that is therein its form, or which give direction to human life, and stability to virtue or penalty to crime, or warrant to our souls for the expectation of an abiding individuality hereafter, are swept away in the whirl of a blind and remorseless revolution, without beginning or end. This is indeed a 'total perishableness,' and opens a dreary prospect. Supposing then such were the doctrine which Sákyá preached, I cannot so far call him a deliverer. Even if, as you imagine, he wrought miracles, they are not credentials from a moral Governor of the world, for they do not lead to one, and you do not acknowledge one who might have caused them; but are only strange products of this Nature.

\* See above, pp. 8, 9.

which you say expresses no design, and therefore they convey us no message. The very contents of your doctrine then seem to negative the possibility of its being a Divine Revelation. But it must be added, that the processes of nature are in fact uniform enough for things so extraordinary as what are called miracles to require no common attestation. Whereas such as you appeal to, mixed up with legends and fables, and recorded in books written, many of them, after a long interval of time, have even less proof than we require in common history, and tell more against the credibility of the story, than for the truth of the doctrine. As to Sákya, let us honour what was good in him. Probably his success was due to his goodness, and to the dim awe which in an ignorant age invested whatever belonged to him with more than human dignity. But his deliverance of men from a sacerdotal yoke was temporary; it has even passed away in itself; and if you would now restore it, which might be to his true honour, still it would be temporal. But in the sad transitoriness of the world, which Sákya lamented, and with our better souls hungering and thirsting within us for something more durable, our deliverance must be an eternal one, if it is to be the bread of life. *Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil* must be our prayer to Him whom we can call Saviour. Again, *Shew us the Father* is a cry which the better nature of mankind must offer with hope to its teacher. Nor can we feed on the prospect of breathlessness; but each man desires a Redeemer of his life, of whom he can say, *Whom I shall see for myself, and not another*. Nor must the Spirit which helps us be called *void*\*; for it is not a mere emptiness of earthy, but a fulness of heavenly things, such as love, joy, peace, and hope full of immortality, which we must seek from One who can uphold our steps in life. It is no blame to the man Sákya, that he fell short of giving these things, which were not his to give; but such a salvation of the soul from sin in all its burthen and stain, and such a vision through the open gates of heaven of a perpetual Helper

\* See p. 10.

of our souls, is what mankind need, and such has been wrought for us by Jesus, the heavenly Messenger and Word of God. In Him the Divine Mind has become vocal; and so He has brought us to a Creator and Lawgiver of all worlds, and a righteous Judge, but yet an eternal Saviour. Not from His own wrath, so much as from the evil which estranged us from Him, and from breach of the immutable laws against which our faithlessness would dash itself, He ever rejoices to deliver those who call upon Him. Our sacred books which record this revelation of the Word of God made man, have all the characteristics which you thought might suit a Divine message. They are full of humane sentiment, not in formal theories, but brought out in simple precepts, which tell upon every man's life, and exemplified (as we see) in the conduct of those who utter them. Their doctrine is deep, since it opens mysteries which no speculation can exhaust, yet plain so far that children can act upon it. They bring before our eyes the first teachers of the faith of Christ working wonders in stirring men's minds, and throwing a new force into human motives on the side of good. Instead of doing violence, Christ and His followers suffered it. Yet they prevailed by the power of a Truth, which having every human element of weakness, shewed its strength to be Divine. Nor did the life thus infused into the world cease in any generation. Even now, the same Spirit of God which took possession of Christ's disciples with a wonder-working power, finds an echo in the hearts of thousands both simple and wise, and puts forth in their lives a perpetual witness, that their faith is well-grounded in an ever present Helper. Thus Christ has done, and is doing in the world what Sákya attempted. One might say that Buddhism went before Christianity as a sort of rude prophecy of the methods by which Truth should conquer, or as a tentative groping of mankind in the direction in which God was about to open for them a new and living way. You have noticed the resemblances; but do not forget the differences. Remember that we invite you to worship the living God; we

shew you in Christ the way of coming to Him, and promise you the help of His holy breathing to animate you in treading it. Especially such help will accompany your efforts in proportion as you become familiar with the life of Jesus, and have your faith in the God whom He reveals strengthened by the witness of His resurrection. The first thing we should do, as Christians, would be to teach your children to read. Will you so far join us? Then give them any books you have most wholesome. But if your literature contains none so true to history, or so prophetic to the heart of eternal things, then try the effect of our sacred writings, which teach all the good you have, and superadd higher truths, with clearer warrants, and a life of their own. By the Divine blessing on such means I should hope for a purer development of intelligence than the countries which own your doctrine have ever yet seen. It will be something gained, if you only discard your relics, throw your idols to the moles and the bats, and revive your old doctrine, that the law of Heaven should pervade the whole congregation of the people; but if you come so far, I prophesy you will not stop there; for experience of the truth of Christ so far will lead you on to embrace thankfully the whole of the salvation which He offers you for this life, and that which is to come. I speak, however, more modestly than perhaps I ought; since it is only of your own freewill that you can be persuaded to accept the blessings which God offers you. It is your loss if you reject, and your infinite gain if you believe."

"Probably the Saugata will have no objection," here Sadánanda interposed, "to accept your doctrine of soul as distinct from the material world, and as surviving at least the present forms of things, if not their primary atoms; for so far you countenance somewhat the distinction he admits between intelligence and nature. The notion, however, which he entertains of an extreme quietude as the proper attribute of Deity, and the correspondent apathy which he consistently regards as the highest goal to be reached by the human intelligence, will make him

slow to admit your doctrine of an abiding individuality as the necessary destiny of every immortal soul. In this respect then I am able to approach you more nearly ; for I conceive our souls to have each its personal being, and to be free from danger of extinction. I can also agree with you so far as to think a large accession to our knowledge may be derivable from your sacred records, and I think it reasonable to study them. But it is not yet clear to me that they have not much of that character of temporariness, which I have ventured to ascribe to our Indian scriptures or Sāstras in general. You would not, I suppose, permit me to say, that there is something popular and economic in many of their teachings ; though indeed Christians admit that their great Teacher spoke many things in parables, and I do not see why some things intended perhaps as parables, and so understood by some, may not have been innocently taken as literal by others ; but at any rate you admit a just distinction between the religious element in any sacred books and the natural framework of human associations and of limitations to the knowledge of any particular age. Even if you were unwilling to draw such a distinction, it would necessarily follow from what you have said of the nature of that Truth which is properly Divine, or which saves the soul. For the Holy Spirit, you said, teaches men what concerns the being of God, and their own relations to Him, their falling from Him by sin into all evil, and their need of being restored, as well as the fact of such redemption. Nor have I ever heard of any devout person's anywhere holding, that men are more likely to obtain everlasting bliss from having the most exact knowledge of commonplace facts, whether ancient or modern. But if a particular kind of knowledge does not save men, its absence cannot ruin them ; nor can it therefore be a just argument against the value of any sacred writings. But I confess myself to go somewhat farther in the same direction. It appears to me that religion itself admits of improvement. Hence all our school contend that things even in the Vedas are temporary, or even blameable ; such as the in-

cantations permitted against human life, and the shedding of blood in sacrifice. We therefore urge on men the duty of cultivating knowledge, and thereby developing humanity; and we think that the religious sentiments will then share in the general improvement. You appeared to me not blind to the force of such considerations, when applied to the religious literature of the Hindús. But dare you equally face the consequences from them, when they are applied to that of the Hebrews? If you cannot deny, that bloody sacrifices are enjoined in the earlier books of your sacred volume, but forbidden in the later ones, your Bible appears subject to the same law of growth and development as other scriptures elsewhere. But as the letter is altered for the better, so I conceive the spirit had improved. Religion then becomes a thing not independent of the general progress of the human mind. May I not add, that the Sánkhyā preference of knowledge to blind faith receives also a justification? For not only science seems to outgrow the popular conception of things, which would be naturally embodied even in the most faultless or divinely-dictated religious book, if it was to serve as a vehicle for instructing men in rude times; but also reason seems to outgrow faith, if even she does so, by aid of an education to which faith ministers; and so our conceptions at length burst the very mould in which they were cast. On the whole, then, without wearying you here by reverting to peculiarities before explained, I am inclined to believe in a certain law of progress, and abide by the Sánkhyā esteem of right knowledge as the true liberation of the soul."

"But since you talk of progress," answered Blancombe, "where has your school got to? Is it moving forward now? If it satisfied the deepest convictions of men, it would have a growing hold on multitudes; and this is a test which your own theory of science renders appropriate. Whereas I have recently learned, that in all India the adherents of your school are very few indeed. Men have found your system wanting; and such a verdict of men's conscience corresponds with the failure of all

similar speculations elsewhere, whether found among the sensual sceptics of Rome when her simpler faith had grown cold in her, or among the Sadducees of Judæa, or among those of the moderns who have criticism to destroy without faith to build. Mere scepticism has never alone answered the questions which vex man's heart, and never will. Indeed, Almighty God has so graciously cared for the least of His children, that He scatters evidences of His eternal power and godhead in forms which childlike and pure minds can apprehend: but if such better instincts, which by a sort of logic of the heart and conscience grow into faith, are stifled, it is not possible to supply their place by such a form of rationalism as requires demonstration of things which belong to faith, and which indeed we naturally believe. Thus if men refuse to see God's design in nature, they may become blind to it in history: or again this process of doubt may be inverted, and pass from life into nature. But if we feel our own lives under guidance, and subject them to obedience, or if in almost any part of our thought or action, beginning with whatever is nearest to us at any time, we seek light practically from the Divine Enlightener, we are then led on to find reasons for acknowledging Him in all His world, and in the history of mankind, and in our own destiny. Thus in the history of the Hebrews, we find the same good Providence which has everywhere governed the world, exemplifying itself in a wonderful manner, and with more significance of revelation, yet remaining the same. Signs of growth, or of alteration, or of human infirmity, do not hinder our recognition of one Mind forecasting the whole, and at length bringing its work to head, by revealing itself in Christ, as the Word made man, and as the Redeemer of mankind. Let either the Vedic literature, or the history of India, bring you to the same result, and I will not dispute by what steps you were led there. All that we have noticed of change and development might then perhaps be discovered to have been so many steps. But if the very religion of early India implied certain divinities, whom you degrade, and



prescribed religious duties answering to feelings of conscience, which you ignore, there is no unity in your drama; and by ending in a blank, you prove that either you began wrong, or went wrong by the way: whereas in the sacred literature of the Hebrews we have evidently a great drama played out before our eyes, and one in which we are infinitely concerned, as it both comes to a good end, and gives us deliverance for our own souls. There is one eternal God from the beginning; and though He may permit temporariness in things of earth, yet in what most concerns our souls He gives glimpses all along, and at length brings us to the fullest outshewing, of eternal truth. Accidents may seem to play, but yet a law encompasses them. Nor can a law on so vast a scale be less than the ruling idea of God. We rise then in thought, (to borrow your own metaphor,) from the drama to the poet. He who creates and sustains, and gives life, works out an eternal purpose of order in nature, and of providence in mankind, and of a better life in the fellowship of living souls with Himself; and then shews us in His own Son, or embodied likeness, the Mind by which all things have been and are, and then fulfils in Him for our redemption and comfort, whatever war we have to wage against evil, whatever consecration of ourselves we are to offer, and the victory which, by partaking of His Holy Spirit, we may win over death and the grave. Here is a drama, and here is progress, such as I would gladly have you enter into; but such progress as you have suggested, from faith to doubt, instead of to greater clearness, and from religious worship into a sort of naturalism, and from a lively conscience into an obliteration of human responsibility, is a series of downward steps, or a progress in degradation. Thus you end in leaving man nearer to the brutes, or to mere physical agencies; while we, beginning in humility, would lead him up through the faith and spirit of Jesus to the likeness and life of God. So that I think there is little room for doubt, whether the religion of Christ, or that of the Hindús, if interpreted according to the Sánkhyā philosophy, has most real



progress. What do you say, my friend?" here asked Blanche, turning to Vidyāchārya, who had appeared for some time lost in meditation.

"I am very thankful," replied the A'chārya, "for your vindication of the Divine thinking, so far as you conceive it yourself to be everywhere present. Especially in your rejection of what has been said about making religion an arbitrary product of the human mind, I am entirely agreed with you. I felt great satisfaction, too, in hearing you disprove the claims of Sākya Muni to any Divine authority, and in your demonstration of the irreligious character of the Bauddha doctrines, which end, as Sancara had argued, in 'total perishableness.' But the Sānkhya philosophy, if it may be so called, has so much in common with the Bauddhas, that a refutation of the one must be fatal to the other; while the Sānkhyasts have special inconsistencies of their own, in professing allegiance to our sacred books, yet departing so widely from their true sense. I shall not quarrel, therefore, with your reply to Sadānanda. Again, in your positive doctrine there are many things which have my entire sympathy. When you admit that there is only One Creator of the world, and of all that it contains, whether apparent good or apparent evil, you seem so far not to reject our doctrine of non-duality. Your defence of what always appeared to me the unphilosophical *localisation*, or of the narrow limitations of place and other temporary accidents, which seem ordinarily involved in the Christian doctrines of heaven and earth, and the resurrection, and judgment, and hell, might be accepted by me as satisfactory, in virtue of your comparison of imperfections, which prevail amongst our simpler people, if I was sure that what you call parables, or the imperfections of your doctrine, were not more essential parts of it, than idolatry and other such things with us are of our essentially spiritual faith. But you should be aware, that while we permit (of necessity) to persons full of passion and darkness things which they might unlearn, if they had more of goodness, we open an unbounded field of spiritual speculation to those

capable of clearer views of Deity. We are led to this course by our own sacred books, which recognise distinctions among men as divinely ordered. But as to the hope, which you hold out as the gift of Christ, of a better life, beginning with the Holy Spirit here, and going on into eternity, consider, whether such a hope is not already ours rather than yours to give. Christianity is, as you acknowledge, the child of Judaism: but it would be difficult to shew that many of the ancient Hebrews had any clear expectation of life beyond this earth; and I have heard that such a hope is not universally allowed to have prevailed among them at all. Whereas with Hindús, not only is an absorbing sense of other worlds and future existences one of the ruling influences of our life, but, according to some strangers, it makes its presentiments too deeply felt by us. Was not then such a presentiment, or a hope, taken by Christians from us, rather than from the Jews? But supposing us to agree with all else that has been said, sufficiently to share your hope of immortality, without nicely appropriating it to a local heaven, or to successive stages of existence, or to a purely spiritual conception, and supposing that in such a hope we were to co-operate together in raising the spiritual and intellectual tone of men by education,—yet to give up the faith of our fathers, and all the revelation which they have handed down, seems a hard thing to ask. It is acknowledged between you both, that the Giver of true knowledge must be Deity. Therefore knowledge is Divinely revealed: and it seems to me safer to hold fast the sacred books, which even our enemies acknowledge as among the most venerable in the world, and which we believe given us by the Supreme Being as oracles of religion. In them we find the framework of society divinely instituted, and a way of escape from passion and darkness laid down for our souls. It may be that in this wretched age many things in the Divine plan have become confused; but we retain as much of the original fabric as we can. Nor again do we deny the secular wisdom of your countrymen; nor would we refuse large concessions to please them.

But even if many of you understand our higher speculations, (which I have often doubted,) yet your authority in religion is inferior to the Divine. While then we are willing to learn from you, and to co-operate in what is good, without denying that perhaps Christianity may be better for you, we still should not feel justified in surrendering our own religion. So that when you refuse the name of Christian to all who do not openly give in their names to Christ, and accept His discipleship together with its benefits by means of the sacraments, I confess myself not quite prepared for such a transfer of allegiance. We too have our religious Bath ; and we have the Sástras, so long considered sacred, if not actually the breath of Brahmá's mouth ; and on these we think it safest to rely."

"But my dear and venerable friend," replied Blancombe, "when you speak of reliance on the Sástras, upon which of them do you mean? For we have already seen, that their different parts neither agree with each other, nor the whole with histories of which we are most assured elsewhere. All our arguments on that head would appear clearer to you, if you had been in the habit of valuing history, as an accurate record of facts and characters and times. But when you suffer imagination to stretch over from the province of song into that of story, and are so careless of chronology that you seem to put thousands of years off or on at pleasure, and hardly a single mark of time can be fixed in India until we have foreign help, you can neither have authority on questions of historical evidence, nor appreciate it from others. Hence I am not sanguine of your being able to see all the weakness of your position, until some systematic education shall have taught you to distinguish periods and persons, instead of throwing over all alike a haze of indistinct antiquity. Yet it can hardly have escaped you, that we found the Vedas, the laws, the epic poems, and the Puráanas, to differ in time, and in their characters. As the voices of infancy, of childhood, and of various stages of manhood differ, so are these expressions of the mind of your race the voices of different stages

of society. You cannot adopt strictly as your religious code any one portion of your literature, without doing violence to some of the rest; still less combine them all, without endless inconsistencies. Such a variety would present no real difficulty to a faith which acknowledged a law of reason or of truth, higher than the books, and of which they were only instruments or expressions. Nor would it hurt a religion which should bring men to the living God, and make His unwritten will their law, and the perpetual indwelling of His Holy Spirit the means of teaching it to wise and simple, while yet the expression of like teaching of old might retain its sacredness and value. No variety of stages, or discrepancy of views, or frailty of agents, or humanity of narrative, need trench upon the higher principles of truth, holiness, freedom, conscientiousness, and love, which, with God their Author and Upholder, would be the special subject-matter of the faith, and from which all those supposed difficulties stand entirely on one side. But such variety is at once fatal to any claim of immutable authority for a body of books, on the score of a primeval communication of them with preternatural, or rather unnatural, infallibility. The two things are mutually destructive; for the variety has growth; but the claim presupposes immoveableness. Your Hindú religion really has grown; for we have traced some of its stages; so that to represent it as an original fabric divinely instituted, and to congeal accordingly (as you would, if circumstances permitted you,) all society into immobility, is to contradict your own sacred records, and to belie a course of Divine government, to which the Sástras in their way bear witness. I am the more bound to press this contradiction upon you, in proportion as any of you may urge the authority of the Sástras against better principles which God may breathe into the minds of your people. If any men should be outgrowing idolatry, or ashamed of licentious festival or worship, and yet be repressed by appeal to books said to contain an immutable revelation, we cannot too earnestly say that such claim of immutability has broken down. All your

history, and your Sástras themselves contradict it. Even in the Vedas themselves are signs of growth, and of humanity. Such books, then, have no Divine authority as against any better lessons which God may teach us through conscience, or by His better breathing. Yet I doubt not, that the God of the spirits of all flesh may have put good thoughts in the minds of many of your people; for His Spirit is, as Christ has taught us, like the *wind which bloweth where it listeth*. So, if He has given you good hope of eternal life, I would not weaken, but rather bid you embrace it. But yet if such hope is clouded by a dread of degrading transmigrations, or by the mixture of fanciful dreams, or perhaps rendered less wholesome by a notion that it can be purchased by penances which are not acceptable to the God of our lives, I would make it clearer by bringing you to Him who gives it freely, and for ever. As to your question, whether such a doctrine was not taught earlier among the Hindús than among the Hebrews, I answer that the want of fixed data in your history renders it difficult to discuss such a claim fairly, and also impossible for you to substantiate it. You cannot tell how much in your later developments may have been imported indirectly from Christian sources\*. Nor does it much concern us, whether that knowledge of the Divine plan which the Hebrews had only as a preparation for something better, was more or less distinct. But please to notice, that there is not any ground for supposing the hope of life eternal to have formed part of the earliest Vedic religion; and when such a hope does appear, it is only as a hope, or as an instinct amounting perhaps to a prophecy, and as a speculation favoured perhaps by the highest reason, but as nothing more. No wonder that such a hope appears in strangely bewildered forms, and is mixed up with speculations which seem visionary dreams, or have at best no certain ground. Connected with this vagueness is the sad fluctuation in your thoughts of the supreme Deity, who ap-

\* See Note, above, p. 295, or Grant's *Bampton Lectures*.

pears now as the visible sky, or as the storm, or fire, or some other creature, and then becomes a cold abstraction, and is again one, or all, or none, of many conflicting deifications, an idol perhaps for the crowd, and a vague spiritualisation of visible nature for the few. In short, you have a lively picture of the searching instincts and weary wanderings of the human mind in every direction, rather than a fulfilment of its highest hope: whereas among the Hebrews, not through any special merit, but because God made them His national apostles to mankind, we have in the Old Testament one Eternal God, distinct from the creature, yet friendly and akin to men, who having given life is able to renew it, and whose kingdom is an everlasting one throughout all generations. Then in the New Testament we have the Son of God made man, reconciling together those whom sin had divided, and not speculating about eternal life, or hoping it, but giving it as a free gift out of His Father's eternal purpose, and manifesting His power to do so, which is our triumph, in His own person, as He had also shared our humiliation and sorrow. *The creature, says one of His apostles, is not willingly subject to vanity, but has a hope of being delivered.* Such a hope perchance you have; but it is Christ who brings us the deliverance, and gives us the gift. Might I not then say, your prophecies, or at least your desires, are fulfilled in Him? Here is a difference from anything elsewhere, which shews that we are not offering a mere rival creed, but proclaiming the good news from God of that gift of eternal life in His dear Son, which you so earnestly seek. But He who thus brings the gift, has the best right to decide in what language it shall be described. We humbly use those terms respecting it, which we have learned from the resurrection of our Lord. Since He thus taught us them, we think them the fittest; and although the admitted imperfection of our knowledge as to the future life may render speculation on this point more innocently reconcilable with our faith than it would be on plainer ones, yet experience shews, that as no religion gives so tangible a pledge of immortality as the Christian, so no

language brings home the hope of it to mankind so definitely as the Christian, and there is at least no proof that, consisting as we do of body and soul in this life, we may not have an analogous duality in the life to come. Rather many speculations imply that we must. So that the Christian language of the resurrection is at least the fittest expression of immortality for time, and it may turn out the truest for eternity. We do not therefore acknowledge, that what you call imperfections in our doctrine are really so, even if they should be in some respects parables. For whatever subtleties may be thought about time and space,—nor would I deny that all such limitations seem to fall away from the purest Intelligence, and therefore from things of faith and of the soul, when clearly apprehended,—yet in such a framework our human conceptions are almost necessarily cast, and we gain little for truth as applicable to life, by attempting to transcend them. Rather perhaps there may be danger to some of losing themselves by such a process in an ocean of vagueness. But here surely you should remember what you said of knowledge being Divine. God who gives us the life, has also taught us how to describe it. He best knows how to regulate our modes of thinking on earth, though it is not impossible that His gifts in heaven may exceed all we can think, as well as ask. Again, as our thankfulness for the clear glimpse He has given us of a light whose fulness transcends our present vision, teaches humility in thought and speech, so should it inspire faithfulness in act. Had you known the gift of God, and who Christ is that offers you redemption, and Himself, and in Himself life, you would not fear or hesitate to enrol yourself under His banner, but rather bless and thank Him for inviting you, and throw aside whatever scruples hold you back from the truth, and the new world into which you might enter. Nor if you thought worthily of God, would any distinctions of castes of men appear to you great as in His sight ; nor if you knew His infinite love, would you despair, as you seem to do, of His giving to all the truth and the life. No scruples, then,



of caste or sect, and no clinging to books which have been proved contradictory, or to a system which has been unable to save your many from idolatry and your few from spiritual barrenness, because it had not in itself the very truth of God, should prevent you from praying with us to the only true God, and asking Him to give you the life which He promises to all who come to Him through the Spirit of His Son. You will not then dispute about the words by which it should be called; for as the gift is infinite, and worthy of being asked for, so the Giver is Divine, and His words worthy to be received.

“If now you ask, why, after leaving to the Hindú religion only such power as the little elements of truth scattered through it may have to recommend themselves, I go on to recommend Christianity for its greater inherent goodness, and also affirm for it a worthiness of belief, as a message from God through the Son of Man to mankind, I will not weary every one by repeating all our arguments, but gather them up under a few heads. There seem three main standing-points from which we might start, though each comprehends an immense variety of persuasives, and by considering them under special aspects, we might add to them two more.

“In the first place, Christianity, as it exists, seems to satisfy the spiritual consciousness of the most thoughtful men and of the most enlightened nations, and so to express their highest apprehensions of things eternal, or to be the attitude of their minds, when, with a true knowledge of what they need and are and ought to be, they turn most reverently towards the Deity. Thus much I rather understood to be admitted by Sadánanda, whose testimony, as that of a philosopher, is not to be despised. So far Christianity might be said to have the same witness of itself as the most perfect justice, or the highest harmony, or the most faultless beauty, has each in its correspondence to whatever faculty in us apprehends such excellence. But in *spiritual things*, since they are *spiritually discerned*, I humbly conceive that such correspondence with the highest perceptions implanted



and kept alive in us by our Maker, must be far more decisive than in things merely moral or intellectual\*. Nor should I scruple here to apply the grand Sánkhyā maxim, that *the nature of cause and effect is the same*; but, since the faith of Christ according to our best conscience keeps alive a right sense of the Divinity, I should say its origin must be Divine. So much indeed might be admitted by a devout rationalist, who agreeing with us in ascribing all to Divine teaching, might yet assign to our mental faculties a larger share in the conveyance of Divine lessons than most Christians would concede. But then I suppose his idea of revelation would be chiefly internal; or would imply the unveiling of the Truth of God, as Spirit, to the eyes of the mind; and to such a person perhaps many things, ordinarily considered proofs, might appear rather fruits, or expressions, and instances. But such a view of our faith might seem to come short on some points; and many who accepted it as an important but partial view, might hasten to fill up the side on which they thought it wanting.

“But secondly, if the goodness of the faith of Christ approves itself to our conscience with the same sort of evidence as makes us shrink from godlessness and crime, and hold fast a faith in God and a good conscience above all things, so it appears still more clearly when we see its effects exemplified in history. Those indeed who start with imaginative anticipations of what the world ought to be, may find the reality come short. But those who start from the hard facts of nature and of the world, will acknowledge that the greatest mitigations of evil, either as sin or pain, have come from the fear and love of God, as influencing either men's conduct or their hopes. This may hold good of other religions to some extent; but it is eminently true of Christianity. I sketched you in a few strokes a rough outline of Church history in what is considered its least favourable time. We are willing our faith should be judged, according to the

\* Compare Calvin's *Institutes* with Barclay's *Apology*, and in general the history of devout experiences, from St Augustine downward.

materials it has to work upon, by its history in all times. It generates life in men, as making them feel that they are under the eye of God, and work His will; then it confirms the freedom of nations, with good order, and law as the form of justice: it gives sanctity to the home, and peace to the heart. Its immediate sphere is that realm of faith and thought, of which only God and ourselves are conscious; but yet, as thoughts into actions, so its fruits branch forth into the councils of nations, and the direction of armies, and the laws and dealings of the market-place. Even in its most trying periods, when for instance the beloved Apostle saw the city of his fathers doomed, or St Augustine amidst the wreck of the Roman world stood reasoning of the work of God in man's soul, it fixed men's eyes, with no doubtful gaze, upon that city whose foundations are not of earth, but whose builder is God. In our own time we see it persuade well-born women to do work which money cannot buy, in schools for the young, and in hospitals for the sick. We have seen it mitigate war, and abolish (by its living spirit, rather than by its written letter,) an infamous traffic in slaves, as its voice is now lifted against every kindred abomination. Nor is it a little thing that our missionaries go daily forth with no other arms than those of persuasion, and not only preserve the emigrants of our own land from degenerating to the standard of new settlements, but either reclaim wild races to a purer faith and to the arts of civilisation, or at least put forth the most energetic of all influences employed in such a direction. The same love of mankind in the fear of our common God which sends our missionaries on such a task, both animates thousands at home, who contribute to the support of such missions and pray for them, and it also imbues our legislation with a care for the rights even of races most alien to ourselves. There is no tribe so outcast on any shore of the world, but if wrong done to it by British subjects is brought to our knowledge at home, the Christian spirit of the country comes to the aid of the oppressed, and advocates in our senate are found to plead, often

even our fleets go forth to vindicate, their cause. Was there ever any country, in which so generous and disinterested a zeal was felt, as is now shewn in Great Britain, for the holy cause of humanity, whether concerned in the independence of nations, or attacked by despotism, or outraged in the case of the negroes, and the Pariahs of mankind? I know of none: and this practical spirit has its life in the faith of Christ, who died for all men, and brought us to one God and Father of all. For this reason I think that the Governor of the world gave into the hands of our Sovereign the sceptre of India; and in such a belief we have spoken to you to-day, not exaggerating our cause, as if we would use arguments to you which might not be repeated in the face of nations, but as soldiers of the truth, inviting you to lay hold of it, and to find rest for your souls, which are wearied with wandering on a sea of doubt. Here let me remark, that the good fruits of our faith are most eminently seen, where no earthly force binds or distorts the heavenly vine. Some men, because they think the form of our religion good, would force it on others by any means that come to hand. But it is not the nature of faith which lays hold on truth, to be propagated for good by any unworthy means. Truth flourishes best in her native air of freedom: and while the heart of man, which is the prize she strives for in order to lay it at the feet of God, turns aside from deceit, and resists compulsion, she only desires to be fairly presented to it, that she may win its love with a power of persuasion stronger than force. For so the breathing of the God of all comfort runs along with weapons of peace; and *Not by might or by power, but by My spirit, saith the Lord of hosts*, the battle of the faith is won against evil in the world. Nor yet is it any detriment to the triumphs of the Cross of Christ, that they go along with the growth of intelligence, and the development of free humanity; for I all along maintain that the God who doeth wonders in the deep, which men behold who go down to the sea in ships, is the same God who worketh great marvels in the realm of feeling and thought. All

Nature\*, in the lap of which we are fearfully and wonderfully made, is a manifestation of the same Lord, by whose marvellous grace our souls are saved.

“ You who pride yourselves on the study of causation, are not unaware that even the least thing has some cause ; or, if Sadánanda prefers it, I will say, some source. Now certainly the effects of Christianity in the world have been important enough to require some very eminent cause ; and since they are altogether good, so far as they come of the thing of itself and not of collateral impediments, I do not see what other cause they could have but the fountain of all goodness, or the will of God. So that the origin of Christianity appears Divine. This might be more proved, if we considered the shortcomings of those who have not reached it, and the inability of men who fall from it to build up anything so good. All moralists or philosophers allow, that prayer to one eternal and life-giving Spirit is better than idolatry ; that sacrifice of the mind and being, either in bearing or forbearing, is better than shedding animal blood ; that belief in the great brotherhood of mankind is a more holy thing than license of tyranny or rapine ; and that the household and social virtues which the faith of Christ requires and brings forth and consecrates, are far happier than licentiousness. Yet men who fall from Christianity now, whether philosophers or simple, are not able to devise a religion which shall preserve society from that darker side of things which they confess to be worse ; and those worse things are just the vices by which older nations, who knew not Christianity, were too commonly stained. Does it not follow, then, that whatever preserves human nature in practice from what we confess abhorrent to our better nature, must have been designed by the God of our nature as the element of preserving or restoring it. Such a moral argument may be said to commend the sentiments of Christianity to our faith, rather than prove its facts to our belief. Let those who say so,

\* See Psalms xxiv. 1—3, xix. 1—14, the Epistle to the Romans, and St Paul's speech at Athens.

exhibit the sentiments on a large scale, without aid of the facts. But what God has joined in history, we are not well able to put asunder in theory. Still less can we do so, because our practice, which has comparative praise, hangs upon our theory, or rather upon our faith; and this faith is connected with a belief in historical facts, which form partly its groundwork, and are altogether its most triumphant exemplification. Beyond controversy, the Christian life is built up with a faith in a life to come for each soul hereafter; and though such faith may be, as I think, an instinct of our highest reason, it comes out brighter in the light shed upon it by the rising of our great Representative and Deliverer from the grave. If a man was in prison, and had dim hopes of release, his hope would be infinitely strengthened by hearing of One who had been before Him in the same bonds, and had gone forth by might, and acquired power to come again, and to rescue with authority every wearer of the chains which He had learnt to pity by feeling them. So the history of Christ, as told in the Gospels, falls in naturally with the stronger assurance of Christians in a faith, which yet others, such as yourselves, may in a measure feel.

“But thirdly, as the faith of Christ has, in the answer of our highest conscience to its truth, and in the exemplification of its effects in history, two strong arguments for its origin being Divine, so it has a third, and a more tangible one, in the supernatural manner of its coming into the world. To most Christians indeed this third proof appears in theory the strongest, and they would call it the only trustworthy one; but I suspect that in reality they are more swayed than they are themselves aware, by the first, or by the witness of their conscience, and by the holy breath of God quickening their better affections. Nothing is more usual, especially in religion, than for men, little accustomed to self-analysis, to put forward as their strongest reasons those by which they are not at bottom most profoundly swayed. Still to any man who finds the working of the faith of Christ in his own life, and in that of others, Divine, it affords a gratifying

confirmation to learn that the preparation for Christ's coming was marked by Divine forethought, and that His works in the flesh were signs of Divine power and goodness. Again, those who are dull of faith, and slow to feel the Holy Spirit quickening them now, may be awakened to a sense of the blessings offered them, and the danger of rejecting them, by learning with what supernatural signs of a Divine mission the Almighty was pleased to sanction the appearance of His Word made man. Their attention may be raised, and a sense of awe quickened, as they read of Christ speaking words and doing works, such as never man spake or did; especially, if goodness runs along with power, (as was explained above\*,) in the works of Christ, men may discern them more evidently to be signs of one coming forth from God; and the greater the manifestation of Divine authority thus given, the greater must appear the danger of rejecting one whom God has thus honoured as a Saviour. We have dwelt less on this argument with you, because your neglect of the boundaries between history and poetry renders you less critical in such things, and you do not discriminate facts accurately enough, either to be aware how rare are certain signal workings of Divine Providence, or to appreciate them duly, when they are presented to you. It was out of a desire to awaken such a critical instinct, that I went through all that history, in which we found the literature of India so plainly fail. But you may consider the matter thus. The working of your own minds in India shews the need which men have of religion. The various forms which religion has taken with you, though unsatisfactory in themselves, point forward to something more perfect, which it might be hoped you would one day reach. But much more, the unity of idea, which we saw dominant in Hebrew history, prepared the way for a fulfilment, such as we found in Christ. The prophets and psalmists bear witness to Christ, either by literal prediction of the events of His life, or

\* See above, pp. 356—7.

(as I humbly suggest) by anticipations of a better kingdom of God, such as He has brought about, and speaking out something of the principles which He brought into clear light, and so by little foretastes of the Holy Spirit which dwelt in Him without measure. Thus the witness of belonging to Jesus is having the spirit of prophecy\*. But in whatever way a man regards the prophetic element in the Old Testament, if he considers it at all true, he must acknowledge it Divine. To me it seems that this, like other things spiritual, must be spiritually discerned; and I follow St Paul† in laying less stress upon correspondencies of place and time and genealogies after the flesh, than some Christian advocates think wise. But in whatever way any one, after comparing the Old Testament with the New, believes this argument from prophecy, it becomes a direct supernatural proof of the Divine origin of Christianity. Join now to this all the wonderful works of Christ, as done before multitudes, as written down by contemporary witnesses, as having more than human power, and a Divine goodness; then (without here dwelling on the wisdom of His words, which speak rather to the conscience, and win that witness before spoken of,) consider, if in such works you have not clear signs of a mission from the God who upholds nature, and as He governs it always, so in rare instances gives signal manifestations of His government, and of the good ends to which He directs it. Thus in prophecy and miracle, or in truth-telling and wonderful signs, you have what are generally thought the most direct and clenching evidences, that God sent His Son and coeternal Word into the world, that all mankind might have faith in Him, and having faith, might have life. Certainly no marvels or prodigies ascribed in legend to Crishna, or Sákya, or any other Hindú, will bear comparison with the works of Christ, either in the testimony by

\* See Revelations xix. 10, where the Angel declares that his speaking forth the words of God is no sign of a right to be worshipped, but rather of being a fellow-servant with Christians, who have as witness of Jesus the spirit of prophecy. Compare 1 Thess. i. 5, Eph. i. 17, 18, Gal. v. 22, 23, vi. 12, 13.

† On St Paul's treatment of prophecy, see above, p. 379.



which they are delivered to mankind, or in the Divine blending of goodness and power which speaks in them, or in the wonderful significance of their lessons, when taken in connexion with the blessed words, and the life, and character, of our Saviour. I do injury to our argument, by breaking it, for distinction's sake, into triple form. For all the life of Christ on earth, and the prophecies of Him, and His works of healing and words of wisdom, and His death, and His rising again, and the life with which by His Holy Spirit He still pervades His Church or even mankind, and the witness of true hearts answering for ever to His doctrine, and putting forth fruits in life by works such as He wrought on earth, may be distinguished in idea, but in fact are one thing, and that is the power of God, making men wise to salvation. No part of the whole can be cordially admitted, without in a way inferring, or joining on to, the rest; and as they altogether lead up to God, so whoever has by natural piety the purest belief in God, will be most apt in turn to see their force, and to accept the faith of Christ as an eternal design. *If ye had believed in Moses*, said Christ, *ye would believe in me*: for Moses spake, (I suppose he means,) of that eternal Spirit which came forth in Christ, though with more of grace and truth, saving men from evil.

“Hence, let me fourthly observe, while for yourselves, and for strangers in general, I think it easiest to begin with appealing to your conscience, and by asking what there is in the faith of Christ to which your purest affections or most devout aspirations do not bear a kind of witness, and whether anything really prevents you from accepting this Divine message so much as a fondness for the sins it forbids, or a shrinking from the holiness it requires, I still wish you to take the Gospel as a whole, rather than fasten on any single aspect. Whatever little varieties may be among Christians, (such as Hindús with their enormous discrepancies of belief and caste cannot consistently make an objection to us,) we all agree in propounding the faith of Christ as the great means of salvation. Have therefore faith



in the only wise God; lay hold on the hope of eternal life; practise all virtues akin to it in this life; learn to hate the sins which unfit you for it; carry the fear of God into honest dealings with men; speak truth one to another, since we are all members of one body; read the Holy Scriptures as books divinely inspired, and written for your learning; receive the sacraments as instruments and pledges of the Divine mercy; grudge not a little selfdenial as the great safeguard of innocence; quicken your mental gaze to faith in an everpresent Helper; keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace; acknowledge a weight of persuasion in the good order and counsel of the Church, as having to Reason a sort of authority; and the better you combine all these, the more perfect will be the practical harmony of your faith and life; but whichever aspect or part suits you best, begin with that sincerely; so all Christians will unite to welcome you into the fellowship of saints, and of spirits made perfect; and we may with hope unite in prayer, that the Eternal Spirit will lead you into the entire truth. Nor am I afraid of adding, that even if such faith and prayer are as yet too much for you, yet a consideration of what things in your religion have been permitted to resemble ours, and a putting away from yourselves and others of what you acknowledge to come of darkness and passion, might be the beginning of a growth in goodness.

“But fifthly, I must add that all the above triple argument should strike you more strongly, if you compare it with the miserable bewilderment of your own system, both as regards its want of any attestation of Divine authority, and its inherent barrenness of any power to save the soul from evil. We have seen its history as an external warrant of immutable infallibility break down. It has no Divine authority, except such as parts of it may by their partial truth persuade the conscience to admit. You acknowledge its weakness as a moral instrument, by your despair of improving men of low caste, or of unteaching them even idolatry. But that fancied wisdom in which you look down upon the ignorant, without effort to teach them, leaves

your own souls barren, with the sensuous richness of the popular faith stript away, and with cold abstractions instead. For whatever comfort your metaphysical subtlety may derive from 'blending all opposites into a higher unity,' or 'identifying thought with being,' such imaginations hardly touch the realities of life; and we who live and die amidst many possibilities of suffering, though with aspirations to something better, need each man a deliverance for his own soul. To many, if not to yourself, I know that something more personal and lifelike than all that dreary revolution of Siva and Brahmá\* is requisite, not only for mental comfort, but to restore, or bring out the capacities of, their moral being. They cannot be themselves, until they know something more of God. For how can they act with the firmness which comes of faith, while they doubt whether they are doing His will, or even if He has a will? Or whence are true contrition, or even a sense of answerableness, and such virtues as righteousness and truth-telling, to derive permanent motives, if we are only parts of one infinite activity, and our thought of self-consciousness an illusion? Not but that any of your metaphysical speculations, so far as they are probable or innocent, might stand very well with Christianity, which is not hostile to any kind of truth. If it is wise to call nature or the world 'a sustained manifestation of the Divine thinking†,' rather than the handiwork of God, nothing in the New Testament forbids our doing so, provided you do not confound the creature with the Creator, in such a way as to support idolatry or sensualism. Such a confusion would be exactly what we lament to find here prevailing. Again your parable or history, of Vâch‡ coming forth from Brahmá, is not opposed to Christianity, but might rather prepare you for apprehending what we read in St John, that the Word was with God, and was God, and that through the Word all things were born, and without it nothing began to be. If indeed Vâch means only a process reflected from

\* See above, pp. 103, 4.

† See Appendix.

‡ See above, p. 100.

human action, we need not dispute about her; for our belief is, not that God should be lowered by imagination to the standard of man, but that He shews us the very truth of His Being, so as to raise, or restore, man to the likeness of God. But if Vâch means, that out of the will of Eternal Spirit goes forth, by whatever ineffable utterance, and remaining undivided, Wisdom creating, and preserving, and quickening, then I should hope you need only to see such wisdom embodied in the life of our Son of Man, in order to approach very nearly to our doctrine of the SON shewing us the FATHER. With submission at least to wiser people, I do not think it a greater tampering with mixture of distinct systems, than the early Church doctors permitted themselves in setting forth the life of Christ after the phrase of Plato, if I say that your Vâch appears a prophecy, or expression, of the everliving Word of God. At least, what you said about thought or reason as going before speech, and coming forth in deed, may help you to understand why we conclude the Word of the Eternal to have been from of old, though manifested once in Jesus in flesh and time. Whatever you believe of incarnations, though such as you mention are but poor expressions of the allholy and everblessed Spirit, may also illustrate to you our doctrine of the One Infinite and Eternal Spirit becoming unveiled to the eyes of our mind, by taking body in the sacred form of Jesus our Lord. But whatever things you retain out of your old superstition, must either stand in the light of clear reason, or in virtue of their being reconciled with the faith of Christ, which has Divine warrants, rather than from such claims to authority or soundness as we have seen utterly fail. But I have spoken of things which your religion does not heal; nay, which it directly supports; rites in some cases idolatrous, in others obscene; unworthy thoughts of the moral character of Deity, and unreasonable distinctions between men; with various forms of social ignorance and vice. That it spares, and even cherishes such things, is at best weakness; and weakness to such an extent in a religion is falsehood. But just where your

older superstitions have failed, we trust the faith of Christ would prevail to heal. It would come with such attestations of Divine authority as you have failed to shew, though your attempt implies that they are desirable. It would teach you of the righteous Governor, yet not vindictive; and of the everlasting Friend, yet not weak, but rather engaged in a perpetual war of Providence in behalf of our souls and of His own laws, against whatever evil would ruin the one, by breaking the other. It would give you definite hope, and personal responsibility, as motives to action. It would quicken your regard for truth, in deed, and in belief. Such teaching, as we give to the young, and to girls, in our schools, would then seem to you a duty. And just as now your superstitions, being false, are morally weak, so the Gospel of Christ, being strong to save every soul of man by which its good news is welcomed, would put forth in good works the easiest and most certain proof of its being Divine.

“But my arrows were shot before; and this was a summary, which it is no use lengthening. I feel now, more than ever, the hopelessness of disputing men into religion. For we have to deal with living beings, whose freewill must be persuaded; and that only God can do, or their prayer must concur in doing. If I could only persuade you to join me in prayer for the truth, our battle would be half won, and it would be one of those happy victories\*, in which there is neither victor nor vanquished, but one helps to save a soul, and the other is saved. So far, however, as argument can avail, it has been shewn clearly that Hindúism has neither Divine authority from external history, nor internal power of healing men from evil; whereas God has given every persuasive of wonderful signs, and of inherent truth, and of quickening power, to make us embrace the good news, that all mankind may come through the faith of the Son, in the life of the Spirit, to the love of the Father. The practical question now lies with yourselves, though the result in the hands of the Searcher of hearts.”

\* A French writer has a thought of this kind.

“You know, I have never pretended,” here Vidyáchárya answered meekly, “to be able to compete with you in discussion. Nor would I deny that your religion, as that of a superior people, may be in some respects better than ours. But yet it is a hard thing to give up what we have always regarded as truth, especially conveyed to us as it is in all our books of sacred inspiration.” “Not hard, I should hope,” replied Blancombe, “if you only lay it down for a higher and more perfect truth. We do not ask you to lay down the less, without offering you a far greater. Nor is this plea of inspiration altogether open to you; for we have seen it negatived by the numerous contradictions in the books you call sacred. We found this too, without even venturing on the ground of comparison with the science of modern times; for the books are signally inconsistent with themselves, in the different objects of worship which they propound, and in all their ideas. All that weight, therefore, which you justly attach to Divine authority in religion, has fallen away from your Sástras, and should lead you over to the faith which can truly claim it.” “Do you then,” rejoined the A’chárya, “require an absolute renunciation of the authority of our entire system, and allow us to retain only what agrees with your faith?” “For ourselves we require nothing,” answered Blancombe, “but such seems to be the requirement of truth, which you would confess to have the most binding authority in religion. Such therefore must be the will of God, and your way to happiness.”

“Certainly,” here the elder stranger remarked, “there is no room for halting in this matter. Either Hindúism was true or false; but it has been proved to be false in at least its claims to Divine authority, and very imperfect in its representations, or rather its conjectures, of truth. Whereas Christianity has been proved of Divine origin, by the preparation for it, and by the signs of prophecy and miracle with which it was accompanied, and by the resurrection of our blessed Lord from the grave, and by the descent of the Holy Spirit, and the whole history of the

Church, with the witness of men's better consciences even to this day. As this faith has alone Divine authority, so it is such a Gospel, or message of goodwill to man, that we should not dispute, so much as thankfully embrace it. Nor is it easy to see, what can keep men from embracing the infinite love of God, and being saved by it, unless they cherish some sin, which shrinks from His holiness."

"I should be glad of time, and will consider the matter farther," here said the A'chárya. "We both hope, my friend," said one of the others, "that you will consider it seriously, and pray the Divine Enlightener to lead you aright. But now," he continued, "it is time for ourselves to be going to our prayers."

Accordingly, after some courteous salutations, the two strangers departed. Following them shortly afterwards, I came to a lofty building, with a table, and a plain Cross upon it, at the far end, and in the middle between the tall pillars were the two strangers, and a multitude of mixed people, with youths in white robes and with instruments of music, singing some such hymn as this :

We praise thee, O God : we acknowledge thee to be the Lord.

All the earth doth worship thee : the Father everlasting.

To thee all Angels cry aloud : the Heavens, and all the Powers therein.

To thee Cherubin, and Seraphin : continually do cry,

Holy, Holy, Holy : Lord God of Sabaoth ;

Heaven and earth are full of the Majesty : of thy Glory.

The glorious company of the Apostles : praise thee.

The goodly fellowship of the Prophets : praise thee.

The noble army of Martyrs : praise thee.

The holy Church throughout all the world : doth acknowledge thee ;

The Father : of an infinite Majesty ;

Thine honourable, true : and only Son ;

Also the Holy Ghost : the Comforter.

Thou art the King of Glory : O Christ.

Thou art the everlasting Son : of the Father.

When thou tookest upon thee to deliver man : thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb.

When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death : thou didst open the Kingdom of Heaven to all believers.

Thou sittest at the right hand of God : in the Glory of the Father.

We believe that thou shalt come : to be our Judge.

We therefore pray thee, help thy servants : whom thou hast redeemed with thy precious blood.

Make them to be numbered with thy Saints : in glory everlasting.

O Lord, save thy people : and bless thine heritage.

Govern them : and lift them up for ever.

Day by day : we magnify thee ;

And we worship thy Name : ever world without end.

Vouchsafe, O Lord : to keep us this day without sin.

O Lord, have mercy upon us : have mercy upon us.

O Lord, let thy mercy lighten upon us : as our trust is in thee.

O Lord, in thee have I trusted : let me never be confounded.

Taking up some of the books about, I read prayers like these :

O merciful God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live ; Have mercy upon all them that are in any error of thought or life, and take from them all ignorance, hardness of heart, and contempt of thy Word ; and so fetch them home, blessed Lord, to thy flock, that they may be saved among the remnant of the true Israelites, and be made one fold under one shepherd, Jesus Christ our Lord, who liveth and reigneth with thee and the Holy Spirit, one God, world without end. *Amen.*

O God, who art the author of peace and lover of concord, in knowledge of whom standeth our eternal life, whose service is perfect freedom ; Defend us thy humble servants in all assaults of our enemies ; that we, surely trusting in thy defence, may not fear the power of any adversaries ; through the might of Jesus Christ our Lord *Amen.*

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What became of the speakers in the Dialogue I never happened to hear, for I soon changed my abode. But I have myself married a wife, who was brought up in the schools of the missionaries. She is more decidedly a Christian than I yet am able to be myself, and she sometimes reads to me the words of Christ, which seem very wholesome. We intend our children, if possible, to have the benefit of the same schooling as their mother had; and I often doubt, (perhaps you can advise me,) whether I ought not to take the more decided step of receiving your sacraments, and owning myself as a follower of Christ, the Son of God, and Saviour of Mankind.

O ÆTERNA VERITAS, ET VERA CARITAS, ET CARA ÆTERNITAS,  
TU ES DEUS MEUS.

ST AUGUSTINE.





## APPENDIX.

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THE following, which is extracted, with Mr Solly's permission, out of his interesting work on *The Will, Divine and Human*, may help some to apprehend the Vedánta doctrine, and might, with the change of a few expressions, be translated into its language.

“The difficulty of conceiving the relation of the human will as free, to the will of God as absolute, arises in the following alternative. Either the human will conforms absolutely and entirely with the Divine, in which case its freedom can only be reserved by the supposition that it forms an actual part of the Divine will, and that the whole life of a man is but an emanation from God,—only one mode of God's action ; or else the human will is not in absolute conformity with the Divine, but has an individual existence of its own ; and in this case it appears as a limitation to the power of the Omnipotent.

The first of these hypotheses appears to me untenable for several reasons. Besides making God the immediate author of evil, it runs entirely counter to those subjective feelings, to find an object for which is the sole purport of faith's assuming a God at all. For by this absorption of man in the Godhead, the relation of the human to the Divine will is annihilated in their identity. But it is the consciousness of this relation which, in the dim region of subjective feeling, constitutes the moral sentiment, and which, when objectivised by the sum total of the faculties in their joint operation under the name of faith, evolves the conception of God, and superadds to the feeling of duty, that of religious reverence.

The difficulty of the second hypothesis is also great, but it is a difficulty of another character. It does not arise from its irreconcilability with the conception of the God of our faith, but from our inability to form any adequate conception of an act of creation.

Now emanation, or a purely positive pouring forth of the Divine activity, is a comparatively simple idea ; at any rate it does not appear to involve any logical contradiction. But in the conception of creation, we have that of a created object, which, as such, must have a species of independence of its creator, and thus offer a resistance to the very will from which it has proceeded. For if it offer no such resistance, if, on the contrary, it sway here and there with the thought of its creator, it ceases to be anything in itself, and becomes a mere manifestation of the creating power without any independent result ; in short an emanation from the same. But then, on the other hand, this very power of resistance in which the creation as created object consists, is itself the product of the creating will. Hence an act of creation, as opposed to mere emanation, involves the conception of a double will in the creator, namely,—the positive, or the greater will which produces, and the lesser, which may be called the negative will from its being limited by the object thus produced.

This double will involves for us the principal difficulty in the conception of an act of creation. In the conception of mere *making*, we have the acting will and the resisting matter. But in that of creation, the action producing and the action resisted, or the positive and negative wills, proceed from the same being, and in the same act. And yet this relation of the double will is not quite inconceivable ; at least we find an extremely analogous relation between the first and second wills in the so-called creations of the imagination. If, for instance, I represent to myself a mountain of gold, I am aware that the image, when considered positively, is a product of which my will is a principal factor ; but by conceiving it at all, I give it ideally an independent existence, such an existence, in short, as resists that imaginary will, by their relation to which the second subjective and objective are distinguished from each other.

It appears therefore that the products of the imagination are termed its creations with peculiar propriety. But although they require both first and second wills in their conception, and may thus afford some insight into the nature of a Divine act of creation as far as the mere form is concerned, yet is there one difficulty referring to the matter of the conception in which the analogy does not hold. For the creations of the imagination are merely ideal, that is to say, their power of resistance is limited to the second will of that being exclusively whose first will produced them ; and the second will, upon their resistance to which their imaginary objectivity depends.

is ideal also. Whereas the creations of the Divine imagination, whether they be worlds or human wills, are real existences, with a power of resistance to all wills in general, and require that the second or limited will should be no less actual than they. While therefore the operations of our own minds may shew us the direction in which we have to look for the conception of creation, they cannot give us the conception itself.

Now our conception of God can never go beyond what may perhaps be aptly called a spiritual anthropomorphism, or in other words, we can never introduce into our conception of God and His operations, any elements which we have not found, in kind at least, in our own minds. To attempt therefore any further analysis of the relations of Creator and created than that with which the operations of our own imaginations present us, is simply a loss of time, as it is an attempt to go beyond the province of our faculties. Creation must accordingly be assumed as a fact.

But the hypothesis of the human will being a free centre of action in spite of its original dependence on the Divine will for its very existence, only involves the same difficulties as any other act of creation. For whether the created object be on the one hand subject to a rigid law of necessity, or on the other be absolutely free, its resistance to this second will in the Creator is still the indispensable condition to its being anything at all in itself, in short, to its being a creation and not a mere emanation. Hence it follows, that if the possibility of creation be once admitted, the objection to the second hypothesis vanishes, on the ground that the impossibility of our forming an adequate conception of it, arises from the inadequacy of human faculties to conceive an act of creation in general, in the full sense at least in which this expression is employed of the works of the Almighty.

Taking however the analogy offered by human creations as the only guide we possess for our conception of the Divine, I would represent the relation of the human to the Divine will as that of the poem to the poet. Human wills are the thoughts of the Divine Imagination. But whereas the thought of a man is a dead thing for another, until he has made it his own, these thoughts of God are in themselves centres of life and power, with a might of resistance establishing their independent individuality, and a freedom making them like the Image of their Father, and capable, in some sort at least, of fresh creation.

Whether the same can be said of all that proceeds from the Divine energy, whether in short the external world is a selfsubsistent living power, or a mere emanation, is a deep question,—one that man will never answer. For my own part I am inclined to believe that the higher form of procession from God, (that of creation as opposed to emanation,) is restricted to the free alone,—that living wills are the only new centres of power,—and that in the glory and beauty of the material world, we gaze, though through a veil, upon the Majesty of the Eternal. Not that the granite of the mountains and the verdure of the fields beneath our feet, or the blue depths and bright orbs of heaven above our heads, are the living God, but that they are the maintained manifestations of His energy, operating on the souls of all living beings. The free can surely feel subdued into reverence and awe in the presence of the free alone. Cut off the outward world, bound hand and foot as it lies before us in its causal fetters, from that first source of its existence, the free and unconditioned Cause, and what is there left in the dead machine that the spirit of a man with infinite aspirations and an eternity for their accomplishment, should feel abashed before it?

In Schelling's *Essay on Human Liberty*, already quoted, there is the following poetical passage. As the reader will readily perceive, it contains single sentences with which I entirely agree, but this is not the case with its general purport. "A much higher point of view is yielded by the contemplation of the Divine Essence itself, the idea of which is utterly contradictory to a succession which is not a generation, *i.e.* a putting of a self-subsistent. God is not a God of the dead, but of the living. It is inconceivable that the most perfect Being should take any pleasure in the most perfect machine. Whatever may be the manner of the succession of beings from God, which we imagine to ourselves, it can never be a mechanical one, a mere effecting or putting, in which that which is effected is nothing in itself. Just as little can it be emanation, in which that which emanates remains the same with that from which it has emanated, and which therefore is nothing of its own and self-subsistent. The succession of things from God is a self-revelation of God. But God can only reveal himself in that which is like Him, in free beings acting from themselves, for the existence of which there is no ground but God, but which are, as God is. He speaks, and they are there. If all world-beings were only thoughts of the Divine mind, they must even on that account be living. In the same manner indeed thoughts are

begotten by the soul; but the begotten thought is an independent power, continuing to work for itself, aye, growing in the human soul to such a magnitude, that it vanquishes and subjugates its own mother. But the Divine imagination which is the cause of the specification of world-beings is not like the human, that it gives its creations merely ideal reality. The representations of the Godhead can be only self-subsistent beings. For what else is the limiting in our representations than that we see that which is not self-subsistent? God sees the things in themselves. Only the Eternal, that which rests on itself, Will, Freedom, is thing in itself. The conception of a derived Absoluteness or Divinity is so far from containing a contradiction, that it is rather the central conception of the whole of philosophy. Such a divinity belongs to nature. Immanence in God and freedom are so little contradictory, that it is precisely the free alone and in so far as it is free, that is in God, and the not free, and so far as it is not free, that is necessarily out of God."

It is impossible to deny the eloquence of this passage in the original, harsh as it must appear in a literal translation. With parts of it I agree entirely, but not with the general conclusion, which stated shortly seems to be, that the whole creation has a free and self-subsistent existence. This is based upon two positions, namely, that the succession of things out of God is a self-revelation of God, and that God can only reveal Himself in what is like Himself, that is, in free beings acting from themselves.

Now although I have already asserted my belief that the external world is a direct manifestation of the Divine energy, yet must I pause before I can apply the term revelation in any but a highly poetical sense, where we can only arrive at a knowledge of the revealed object through the revelation, with tottering and uncertain steps, leaning half on reason, half on faith, and receiving no support from direct intuition. Besides, if there be such a thing as absolute law anywhere, surely it is in the external world. But where there is absolute law, freedom can exist in that thing for which the law is valid, only in so far as the law is self-imposed. Now if external nature is a self-subsistent being and imposes its own laws, it becomes not only free but a God. If, on the other hand, it does not impose its own laws, it ceases to be God, but it also ceases to be free, and is nothing more than a dead machine; a view of the question repudiated by Schelling, and one on which I have already commented. The only alternative, as it appears to me, which saves any form of

life and freedom in the external world, anything that should account for and justify the profound sense of awe we experience in viewing the glories of the universe, without making it the very God Himself, and thus rushing at once into the grossest form of pantheism, is this,—that we should give up the idea of its self-subsistence and conceive it as a maintained manifestation of the Divine energy. But there is a wide difference between such a manifestation and a self-revelation of God ; nor is there a less difference between saying ‘the outward world is God,’ and saying ‘that being is God, whose energy produces immediately on our souls the consciousness of an outward world.’ ”

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“Y mae y pregethau hyn o radd llawer iawn uwch na'r truthiau cyffredin a elwir felly, a ddygir allan yn fynych o'r wasg Seisonig. . . . . Y mae ôl llafur mawr—darlleniad eang, a myfyrdod dwys—ar yr holl gyfansoddiadau; eto y mae y fath symledd ynddynt ag sydd ar unwaith yn dangos fod yr awdwr wedi bod mewn mwy o drafferth gyda'r meddwl, na chyda'r dull o'i osod allan. Nid y prawf lleiaf i ni o nerth meddwl yr ysgrifenydd, pa dyb bynag a goleddir am gywirdeb ei olygiadau ar rai pynciau neillduol, ydyw y gallu anghyffredin a feddianna i gynnyrchu meddwl yn ei ddarllenwyr. Cymro yw yr Awdwr.”—*Y Traethodydd*.

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